In the wake of a 2001 scandal over the use of government employees to assist political campaigns, public interest groups in the US state of Wisconsin pushed for reform of the state ethics and elections boards, which had been slow to respond to complaints about misuse of resources and had declined to refer suspected lawbreakers for prosecution. During the 2002 election period, gubernatorial candidates of both main parties joined the call to insulate election administration from partisan pressure. Five years of negotiation came to fruition in 2007, when the state senate and assembly voted to create a consolidated election and ethics agency directed by retired judges. The first nonpartisan election administration authority of its type in the United States, the new agency, called the Government Accountability Board, replaced a system that had vested governance of elections in a commission made up of members of both major parties. But eight years later, political alignments shifted. Arguing that the board had overreached in its handling of certain sensitive cases, state legislators in 2015 voted to shutter the institution and reverted to the pre-2007 system run by representatives of the two major political parties. This case illuminates both the circumstances that can drive politicians to introduce a nonpartisan election management system and the challenges associated with the design, implementation, and sustainability of the approach. (Note that the lead reformer in this case, Michael G. Ellis, died in 2018.)  

Daniel Dennehy and staff drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in the United States from August through November 2022. Case published February 2023.

Tunisia’s Independent High Authority for Elections faced a formidable task in May 2011. The newly created commission had five months to organize and implement elections for a National Constituent Assembly that would rewrite the Tunisian constitution. Commissioners moved quickly to build capacity and restore public faith in elections. The commission navigated the pressures of a compressed electoral calendar, an agitated electorate, and skepticism of the transitional government. The story of the group’s efforts to manage a successful election offers insight into how an electoral commission can take advantage of relationships with political parties, government, and the public to overcome inexperience in volatile circumstances. This case study focuses on commission staffing and recruitment, the creation of regional subsidiary bodies, and voter registration.

South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission faced a daunting task in January 1994.  The newly established body had less than four months to organize and implement the country's first fully inclusive democratic elections.  The stakes were high.  A successful vote would signal a new beginning for the nation after the apartheid era.  Failure could mean civil war.  Choosing suitable polling sites, dealing with parties' distrust, reaching alienated and possibly hostile communities,  addressing potential spoiler issues and remedying shortages of electoral materials posed formidable challenges.  The commission's difficulties snowballed.  In the end, however, all parties accepted the election results and the Government of National Unity went ahead as planned.  The elections offer an example of how an electoral commission can sustain political will-of parties and the public-to overcome administrative shortcomings in extremely sensitive circumstances.  The case study discusses location of polling stations, temporary polling facilities, candidate access, ballots and ballot counting.

Amy Mawson drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Pretoria and Johannesburg, South Africa, in February 2010. To learn more about the second post-apartheid elections in South Africa, see "Using Conflict Management Panels to Resolve Tension in the Second Post-Apartheid Election." 

Associated Interview(s):  Johann Kriegler, Howard Sackstein, Benedict van der Ross

When he became head of Albania's Central Election Commission in February 2001, Ilirjan Celibashi faced a difficult task. Three years earlier a new constitution enshrined the commission as a non-political body charged with overseeing Albania's historically troubled elections. The permanent commission aimed to promote bipartisan cooperation and restore trust in the political system after violence gripped Albania's capital, Tirana, in the wake of 1996 national elections that the international community labeled as fraudulent.  During its first three years, the commission failed to achieve substantial reforms largely because of the partisan leadership of its chairman. When Celibashi, a former lawyer and judge, took over as head of the CEC, he had to overcome a highly politicized environment, and he set out to enact reforms to restore confidence in the commission and the electoral process. His reforms concentrated on four priority areas: staffing the CEC with competent people, ensuring transparency for the commission's activities, assembling voter lists and overseeing local election commissioners. In 2008, the political parties removed the commission from the constitution and reinstated it as a political body, erasing most of Celibashi's reforms. The case provides insight into how and why a window of opportunity opened for reform, explores how an individual was able to enact changes in a highly politicized environment and considers reasons why the changes were short-lived.   

Michael Scharff drafted this case study with the help of Amy Mawson on the basis of interviews conducted in Tirana, Albania, in June 2010. 

Associated Interview(s):  Petrit Gjokuta, Kathleen Imholz, Ylli Manjani

In 2008, Ghana held a peaceful run-off in a hotly contested presidential race, breaking the pattern of violence that had afflicted elections in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and several other African countries during the same period.  Since the advent of multi-party democracy in 1992, Ghana had held three consecutive elections that observers regarded as relatively free and fair. However, the 2008 presidential race generated concern. Previous elections had revealed substantial ethnic block voting, raising allegations of misbehavior by the two major parties both during the campaign and on polling day. Tensions were increased further in 2008 by the closeness of the initial ballot, which forced the country's first run-off in which the outcome was genuinely uncertain. This case study analyzes the measures taken by the Electoral Commission and other bodies to reduce the likelihood of violence, including an emphasis on transparency as a way to build trust.  With the help of other groups, the commission also organized a system for identifying potential trouble spots, mediating, and building cooperation.  In large part because of these efforts, Ghanaians experienced a peaceful transfer of power.

Lucas Issacharoff drafted this case study with the help of Daniel Scher on the basis of interviews conducted in Accra, Ghana, in January 2010 and using interviews conducted by Ashley McCants and Jennifer Burnett in August 2008. 

Associated Interview(s): Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Albert Kofi Arhin​, Vincent Crabbe, Ransford Gyampo

Varanya Chaubey drafted this case study with the help of Amy Mawson and Gabriel Kuris on the basis of interviews conducted in Georgetown, Guyana, in May 2009. Case published September 2011.

Associated Interview(s):  Robin Campbell,  Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, Calvin Benn, Gocool Boodoo, Remington Eastman, Rupert Roopnaraine, Steve Surujbally