As of January 2008, South African citizens had to wait more than four months, on average, to get a government identity document. The delays in producing IDs, which disrupted lives by preventing citizens from working or accessing government benefits, reflected longstanding organizational problems at the Department of Home Affairs, the agency responsible for issuing the IDs. The processes at each stage of ID production were in disarray, and the department's staff lacked effective supervision. Backlogs developed; workers became demoralized. In 2007, the department began to tackle the problems. This was one component of an ambitious turnaround strategy that targeted the department's core business processes. In the ID production process, a team of consultants and department officials made individual and group performance measurable daily and weekly. The turnaround team avoided backlash by engaging the staff union, removing the threat of job losses as a result of restructuring, and consulting the workers in each section before making changes. The performance-management changes were informal: Managers evaluated employees' and sections' performance in meetings and on wall charts rather than through the formal performance-appraisal system. By the end of 2008, South African citizens received their ID booklets in an average of less than six weeks.

David Hausman drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Pretoria and Johannesburg, South Africa in February 2010. Case published April 2011. Case slightly revised and republished March 2013. 

Associated Interview(s):  Mavuso Msimang, Yogie Travern

When Awni Yarvas took over as head of Jordan’s Civil Status and Passports Department in 1996, he was in an enviable position in many ways.  His predecessor, Nasouh Muhieddin Marzouqa, had moved forcefully to deal with inconsistent and time-consuming service delivery that had angered citizens who depended on department documents important to their daily lives.  However, despite Marzouqa’s achievements on several fronts, the department was still inefficient in many ways. The department’s training system had to address low levels of computer use in processes, while the performance-management system required extension and systematization. High levels of data-entry errors by employees continued to vex citizens. During his nine years as director general of the department, Yarvas, a former intelligence officer, significantly improved departmental efficiency, accuracy and public credibility by further simplifying processes, bolstering employee performance and capitalizing on technology. In both citizen and government circles, the department gained an even stronger reputation as a highly visible service delivery success by the end of Yarvas’ tenure.     

Deepa Iyer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Amman, Jordan, in November 2010. A separate memo, “Creating a Citizen-Friendly Department,” covers Marzouqa’s efforts from 1991 to 1996.

Associated Interview(s):  Awni Yarvas

In 2004 Ifueko Omoigui Okauru, a management consultant with no previous government experience, took on the challenge of fixing Nigeria’s corrupt and dysfunctional tax system. As executive chairman of the Federal Inland Revenue Service, she was responsible for reforming a weak and ineffective organization to meet the needs of a changing country. To reduce its heavy dependence on oil, Nigeria needed to diversify its revenue streams beyond the petroleum sector. Improved tax administration offered an avenue toward achieving that goal. In overhauling the tax system, Omoigui Okauru had to overcome entrenched opposition from private consultants who earned high pay under the existing system, defeat the institutional inertia that characterized the revenue service, and curb the corruption that fueled citizens’ distrust and hampered tax collection. To advance her vision for modernized tax administration, she recruited talented professionals and instituted specialized career tracks for employees, alongside additional training modules for existing staff and a reorganization of departments and functions. This case study chronicles the first five years of Omoigui Okauru’s efforts to improve tax collection in Nigeria and offers an example of how an outside leader working with a team of experienced professionals can build the coalitions necessary for legislative, policy and administrative reforms.