When the first case of COVID-19 reached Germany in January 2020, the country’s world-class medical and scientific institutions snapped into action to contain—and learn from—an outbreak in Bavaria. As the pandemic escalated, Chancellor Angela Merkel, a scientist by training, based the government’s response on epidemiological models and expert advice. But Germany’s strictly federalized political system reserved power for the 16 states, not the central government. To coordinate the kind of nationwide response needed to curb the spread of the virus, Merkel’s government developed new coordination bodies that harmonized physical-distancing policies across the country. After a nationwide lockdown slowed the initial spread, a response model of federal government guidance and support but with decentralized, local implementation enabled Germany to quickly ramp up both testing and contact-tracing capacities. As a result, from January through October 2020, Germany contained the virus more effectively than any large country in Europe or North America. At year’s end, however, political consensus about how to respond to the virus broke down. With a vaccine on the horizon and the public tired of lockdowns, states hesitated to reimpose restrictions, and new infections surged.

Gordon LaForge drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in February 2021. Case published October 2021.

Narrowing the gap between rich and poor was a top priority for Teresa Surita, five-time mayor of Boa Vista, Brazil. Surita had long viewed early childhood development services as crucial for improving life chances and attaining that goal, and she had partnered with several programs to expand parent coaching and other opportunities. As her fifth term began in 2017, she turned to a program called Urban95, which called for making a top priority the needs of young children and their families in all of the city’s planning and programs. Building on work the city had already done, Surita and her department heads undertook projects that included adapting a neighborhood to the needs of young children and their caregivers and building a cutting-edge data dashboard and alert system designed to ensure citizens would get help when they needed it. The city sought to keep those efforts on track while also extending assistance to families among the refugees fleeing deprivation and violence in neighboring Venezuela. As the term of the initial phase drew to a close in September 2019, municipal officials began to take stock of progress and results. Despite some philosophical disagreements and some uncertainties about the future of vital federal funding, the city was on track to achieve its project goals. 

Bill Steiden drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Boa Vista and Sao Paulo, Brazil, in July and August 2019. Case published October 2019. The Bernard van Leer Foundation supported this case study to foster early-stage policy learning.

In 2009, South Africa's health-funding system teetered on the verge of collapse. Despite the adoption of a transparent and credible budget framework in 1994, large parts of the public health system suffered from chronic overspending and poor financial control. As wage hikes and supply costs ate into the health budget and as government revenues plummeted in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the national health department had to find ways to preserve priorities, linking them more effectively to the budget. The department won agreement on a list of non-negotiable expenditure items to protect in provincial budgets, used earmarked conditional grants to channel funds to key programs, cut medicine costs by improving central procurement, rolled out a new information technology system, and improved its monitoring of provincial finances. Although the country's nine provincial health departments had important roles to play, most of them struggled. However, the Western Cape was able to set a model by controlling personnel costs, improving monitoring, and creating incentives for health facilities to collect fees. Nationally, total per-capita government revenues dropped by 5% in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis and grew only slowly thereafter, but the health sector's strategy helped ensure progress on its key priorities even as resources fluctuated.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Pretoria and Cape Town, South Africa, in August 2018. Case published October 2018.

To view a short version of the case, please click here

Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election opened a new era in the country’s political life. For the first time since 1998, when a 30-year period of authoritarian rule ended, a popularly elected president completed two full terms in office and ceded power to a successor from a different political party. The transition tested the leadership of the outgoing president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose cabinet included opponents of his elected successor, Joko Widodo. Governor of Jakarta and a former mayor, Jokowi, as the incoming president was popularly known, faced a steep learning curve, but Yudhoyono’s cooperation eased the challenge. The director of Yudhoyono’s innovative delivery unit, Kuntoro Magusubroto, worked with Jokowi’s transition team. The unit prepared reports and briefings that gave the incoming Jokowi team an overview of key policies and programs. Other ministries provided briefings that varied in depth. The cooperative tone of the 2014 transition was a welcome departure from prior divisive handovers. Nonetheless, as of 2016, there was still a need to adjust the timing of the five-year plan with regard to the transition period as well as provide a legal basis for transferring information between incumbent ministers and incoming government officers.

Robert Joyce drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Jakarta in May 2016. Case published August 2016.

In the wake of the 2011 civil uprising that toppled a longtime dictator, Tunisia’s transitional government struggled to meet citizens’ demands for economic opportunity. Interim Finance Minister Jaloul Ayed saw limited access to financial services as a barrier to building the private sector and creating jobs, but the microfinance industry was overregulated and dominated by a majority-state-owned bank that loaned government funds to nonprofit associations, which in turn loaned to clients at unsustainably low rates. Ayed and his deputy, Emna Kallel, crafted a strategy to expand small businesses’ and entrepreneurs’ access to loans by revising requirements and opening the door to private-sector lenders under the watch of a new supervisory authority. The law upended the existing microfinance industry, creating new opportunities but also disrupting the government-funded associations. Four years later, uncertainties remained, but Tunisia’s microfinance sector had begun to move toward a market-based system under a new regulatory environment that allowed for the industry’s future expansion.  

Robert Joyce, ISS Research Specialist, and Natalie Wenkers of Science Po's Paris School of International Affairs, drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Tunis, Tunisia, during September and October 2015. This case study was funded by the French Development Agency. Case published in February 2016.

Mexico’s 2012 presidential transition tested the durability of the country’s democracy. Outgoing president Felipe Calderón ceded power to longtime political opponents. The new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, had to gather information on government programs, select a Cabinet and top aides, and set priorities—with no guarantee of significant cooperation from his predecessor’s administration. But to the surprise of some Mexicans, Calderón ordered his staff to cooperate by gathering and organizing information to brief their incoming counterparts. The process the two leaders put in place ensured an effective handover and helped pave the way for a landmark political deal early in Peña Nieto’s term. The 2012 transition, only the second between opposing parties in eight decades, followed steps other countries could find helpful for ensuring the continuity of core government functions during transfers of power.

Robert Joyce drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Mexico City in April

2015. Case published in September, 2015.

In 2010, President Ernest Bai Koroma struggled to implement his development agenda for Sierra Leone, unable to count on consistent follow-through by his own ministries. He had won election in 2007, five years after an 11-year civil war had decimated the civil service and destroyed much of the West African country’s infrastructure. Early in his presidency, Koroma had established an advisory group called the Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU) in a bid to monitor ministries’ progress on major projects and to hold ministry staff accountable. During 2008–09, the SPU had made a few notable gains, particularly in formulating performance contracts with ministers and steering completion of the giant Bumbuna hydroelectric dam. But by 2010, major elements of Koroma’s development agenda had faltered, and the president knew he had to improve coordination and accountability at the center of government in order to address Sierra Leone’s daunting challenges. He hired a chief of staff, Kaifala Marah, and charged him with overhauling the SPU. Marah hired expert support staff and sharpened the unit’s focus. Victor Strasser-King, a retired geology professor who oversawthe successful completion of the long-delayed Bumbuna project while working as an SPU adviser, became director of the unit. Rather than spreading its efforts across all of the president’s priorities, the unit under Strasser-King targeted a handful of flagship projects. The revamped SPU held regular coordination meetings of the president and ministry officials that strengthened monitoring and accountability and identified logjams and bottlenecks that required presidential intervention. By late 2011, with support from the Africa Governance Initiative, the United Nations Development Programme and other partners, the SPU had increased interministerial coordination and significantly improved progress on priority programs. This case study describes the reforms in the president’s office at the center of government.