In 2002, Lithuania was struggling to defeat corruption, which had flourished during the Soviet occupation. Once viewed as the key to survival in an administered economy, offering gifts for services had become an accepted social norm. More than a decade after Lithuania regained independence, polling showed that although 77% of Lithuanians considered this form of corruption a problem, few were willing to change behaviors they saw as practical. The country’s recently created anti-corruption agency, the Special Investigation Service, faced the challenge of changing those social expectations. It decided to focus on a new generation of Lithuanians. The Modern Didactics Center, an educational nongovernmental organization, and a dedicated group of teachers stepped in to help the agency work toward the ambitious goal of changing the attitudes of students across the country. The group experimented with a variety of educational approaches both in and outside the classroom, including a curriculum that integrated anti-corruption elements into standard subjects and projects that encouraged students to become local activists. Despite resistance from educators that limited the program’s scale, the effort developed new approaches that illuminated the ethical and practical downsides of corruption for students across the country.

Maya Gainer drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Vilnius, Mažeikiai, and Anykščiai, Lithuania, during February 2015. Case published June 2015.

When Andrius Kubilius became prime minister of Lithuania in November 1999, he faced dual crises. Russia’s economic crash a year earlier had thrown Lithuania’s economy into a tailspin, and the government was in danger of losing its ability to borrow on international financial markets after running a large deficit the previous year. Furthermore, the European Commission had informed Lithuania that the country was falling short in its efforts to join the European Union (EU)—a key element in the Baltic state’s economic and political future. Kubilius’ government devised a plan to manage those crises, but systemic weaknesses in the center of government made it difficult to execute the agenda. The government was unable to ensure that line ministries set aside pet projects, was focused on supporting the goal of EU accession, and was unable to channel the government’s diminished resources to the most important projects. To address these challenges, Kubilius instructed State Chancellor Petras Auštrevi?ius and Government Secretary Algirdas Šemeta to reform the policy planning process to focus ministries on EU accession and other strategic goals, and to synchronize the budget and policy planning processes so that government spending flowed more reliably to where it was most needed. With less than a year until elections that were widely expected to bring in new leadership, Auštrevi?ius and Šemeta implemented reforms that put Lithuania back on track in negotiations to join the EU and back on its feet financially. Successive governments led by Lithuania’s other major political parties helped sustain and institutionalize the early gains.

Jonathan (Yoni) Friedman drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Vilnius, Lithuania, during January and February 2012. Case published June 2012.  A separate case study, “Focusing on Priority Goals: Strategic Planning in Lithuania, 2000-2004,” deals with the initial implementation of the strategic planning system in Lithuania.

Associated Interview(s):  Giedrius Kazakevicius, Kestutis Rekerta

After a protracted civil war ended in 2003, Liberia’s government began the costly and complex task of rebuilding. During the early years, philanthropies and foundations stepped forward to help but often worked on isolated projects that had little to do with Liberia’s broader needs. In addition, some donors duplicated the efforts of others or, worse, worked at cross-purposes. At the same time, government capacity was severely strained. Many experienced and skilled civil servants had died in the war or fled the country, and those who remained were swamped with work. When she took office in 2006, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf knew philanthropies and private foundations could help her achieve ambitious development goals. But although she had a strategic plan and concrete funding priorities, Sirleaf lacked the time and organizational means required to integrate private donors’ resources into the overall effort. After struggling with the problem early in her first term, Sirleaf assigned one of her most trusted advisers, Natty Davis, to work directly with private donors, enlist new contributors and channel philanthropic investments toward government priorities without burdening her office or ministers with repeated information requests and meetings. Davis created the Philanthropy Secretariat within the Office of the President to match donors with local nongovernmental organizations or government ministries on projects of mutual interest. By 2012 and despite shortcomings, the new unit had succeeded in linking more than a dozen new foundations and philanthropies with local organizations and government institutions. The funders gave more than US$16 million in grants, admittedly a small sum compared with annual contributions by multilateral and bilateral donors but still significant in helping the country move forward.

Michael Scharff drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Monrovia, Liberia, and the United States in April and May 2012. Case published in September 2012. 

Associated Interview(s):  Momo Rogers

When Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley assumed office in January 2007, he took over a government hamstrung by ineffective coordination and imprecise monitoring. The state had 20 executive departments, 80,000 state workers, and a $30-billion budget. Winning cooperation to work toward shared goals and keeping tabs on progress posed daunting challenges. A Democrat who had served as mayor of Baltimore, Maryland's largest city, O'Malley had staked his campaign on promises to reform the education sector, increase public safety, safeguard the environment, make health care more affordable, and improve the state's economy. As he had done while mayor of Baltimore, O'Malley decided to focus his cabinet on several main priorities and set specific goals. Then he and his team (1) invested substantial amounts of time to come to understand the inner workings of the various departments, (2) developed measures of department performance, and (3) met regularly with department heads to evaluate progress. Because the governor was able to keep abreast of what was getting done and what wasn't, his team could focus on department performance in a timely manner and from a position of knowledge. O'Malley called the process StateStat. The implementation of StateStat kept departments focused on the governor's priorities, promoted greater coordination among departments and agencies, and produced measurable progress toward goals set by the center of government. 

Michael Scharff drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Annapolis, Maryland, in October and November 2012. Additional interviews were conducted by phone in February and March 2013. Although the governor was unavailable to be interviewed for this case study, aides and officials close to O'Malley described the reform process in detail. Case published July 2013.

Associated Interview(s):  Matthew Gallagher

Michael Scharff drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Jakarta, Indonesia, in December 2012. Case published April 2013.