After a decade of reforms to boost tax collection, in 2014 the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) faced up to one of its biggest remaining challenges. Although the agency had significantly improved its internal capacity—along with its ability to collect taxes from registered taxpayers—large numbers of Ugandans paid nothing because they were unregistered or because inadequate compliance monitoring enabled them to underpay. The holes in the system undermined public trust and bedeviled the URA’s efforts to meet the government-mandated target to raise tax revenue to 16% of gross domestic product. The URA then joined other government agencies to bring millions of unregistered citizens into the tax net, and it tightened the oversight of existing taxpayers who were paying less than their fair share. Prime targets were millions of Ugandans who worked in the informal economy, which the government said accounted for nearly half of the country’s economic activity. At the same time, the URA set up operations to go after wealthy and politically connected individuals who avoided paying their full tax load, and it created a separate unit to press government departments that failed to remit to the URA the taxes they collected, such as withholdings from employees. The URA’s program achieved strong gains on all three fronts and thereby helped increase the country’s tax-to-GDP ratio to 14.2% in the 2017–18 fiscal year from 11.3% in 2013–14. Just as important, the program made significant progress toward a fairer distribution of the tax burden for Ugandans across all economic levels.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kampala, Uganda, in January and February 2019. Case published April 2019.

To view a short version of the case, please click here 

See related Uganda Revenue Case Study: Righting the Ship: Uganda Overhauls its Tax Agency, 2004-2014

In the early 2000s, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) faced a crisis. Even after adopting a modernized legal framework that made the agency semiautonomous—able to operate much as a business would, though still accountable to a public board—the institution remained paralyzed by corruption, outdated technologies and procedures, and a toxic organizational culture. In 2004, to begin righting the ship, the URA’s board appointed 43-year-old Allen Kagina, who had served the agency for more than a decade, as the new commissioner general. Kagina engineered a radical overhaul that required all 2,000 URA staff members to reapply for new positions under a revamped organizational structure. A new modernization office overhauled tax procedures, upgraded the URA’s technology, improved anticorruption measures, strengthened the tax investigation and prosecution function, and enhanced staff capacity. At the same time, the URA was working to smooth its customs procedures and improve cooperation with partner countries in the East African Community. 

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kampala, Uganda, in January and February 2019. Case published April 2019.

To view a short version of the case, please click here

See related Uganda Revenue Authority Case Study: Bolstering Revenue, Building Fairness: Uganda Extends its Tax Reach, 2014-2018

In 2007, the political moment was right for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to build Brazil’s Ministry of Defense into an institution that would give civilians a significant role in defense policy—more than two decades after the end of military rule. The ministry had existed since 1999 but had failed to provide effective civilian leadership in setting defense policy and overseeing defense institutions. The president, known to Brazilians as Lula, set the stage for the reform by way of a strategy document that called for institutional changes in both the ministry and the armed forces. Then he appointed a well-known and respected minister, Nelson Jobim, to implement the new policies. Jobim worked with a military adviser to unify control of the armed forces, promote greater cooperation and closer coordination among the three service branches, and press civilians and military officers to work together in creating defense policy. By the end of Lula’s presidency in 2011, key tasks remained, but the joint staff held key strategic planning functions, the three branches were cooperating on important matters, and military officers, civilians in government, and outside experts were collaborating in the formulation of defense policy.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro in May and June 2016. Case published August 2016.

In 2005, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became Liberia’s first democratically elected post-conflict president, she found her country’s government in shambles. Years of cronyism under military rule and a 14-year civil war had left behind a bloated civil service corps riddled with unqualified employees, most of whom did not have a university education and some of whom could not read or write. The president needed more-capable employees at every level of government. Externally supported capacity-building programs helped fill top and middle management roles with Liberians who had fled abroad during the war, but Sirleaf also wanted to attract the most-talented and most-ambitious young graduates from Liberian universities to work in the public service. With assistance from international donors, Saah N’Tow, a Liberian working at an international consulting firm, set up a fair and transparent recruitment process and coupled it with strong training and mentorship to create the President’s Young Professionals Program. Beginning in 2009 and annually thereafter, the program placed 10 to 20 Liberian youth into government ministries for two-year fellowships. By 2016, 72 young professionals had completed their fellowships and about 75% were still working for the government. Many stood out as some of the top performers in the civil service and several had been promoted to positions as divisional directors and assistant ministers.

Blair Cameron drafted this case study based on interviews he and Pallavi Nuka conducted in Monrovia, Liberia and Paris, France, in March and April 2016. This case study was funded by the Open Society Foundations, which in 2015 donated $250,000 to the program profiled. This case draws from a variety of sources including an independent evaluation ISS conducted in 2016. Case published July 2016.

In 2000, the election of opposition politician Chen Shui-Bian as Taiwan’s president upended five decades of rule by the Kuomintang Party, and an era of tight military control over defense decision making. Chen had long favored reforms to increase civilian participation in the areas of defense policy, strategy, and procurement. Now he faced the tough task of implementing a new law that called for restructuring the Ministry of National Defense and placing a civilian defense minister into the chain of command. The new president confronted strong opposition from officers, many of whom resisted the increased presence of civilians in the formulation of policy. During the next eight years, Chen’s efforts sharply increased the number of nonmilitary personnel at the ministry and created new opportunities for civilian influence and oversight. Chen turned the National Security Council, an organization within the presidency that previously had held little influence, into an effective advisory and policy coordination unit. His administration also introduced an annual political–military joint exercise that increased civilian officials’ defense capability and preparedness.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Taipei, Taiwan, in February and March 2016. Case published June 2016.

In 2000, Croatia’s newly elected reformist government weighed how best to increase civilian oversight of a powerful and entrenched defense establishment. Since the end of a long and bloody war for independence five years earlier, political and military leaders had made little progress in adapting to the realities of peacetime. Franjo Tuđman, the country’s first president, had exercised strong personal control over the military, awarding favored officers high ranks and political offices. Both the Ministry of National Defense and the armed forces were far larger than their new roles required, and their lack of accountability to elected civilian leaders was out of step with modern standards. The ministry operated largely in secret and did little strategic planning. But President Stjepan Mesić, Prime Minister Ivica Račan, and Minister of National Defense Jozo Radoš saw an opportunity for change after Tuđman’s death in 1999. The three knew that significant reforms were necessary to make the defense sector more effective, to diminish its political role, and to secure Croatia’s path toward membership in NATO and the European Union. They also recognized the difficulties inherent in (1) establishing a new culture of transparency and democratic civilian control, (2) slashing the size of the military, and (3) drafting laws that would revamp defense institutions. Despite opposition from the military as well as from veterans and politicians who had benefited from the Tuđman-era political system, the reformers succeeded in creating a less politicized, smaller defense sector led by civilians; and by 2003, the country was on its way toward NATO membership.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Zagreb, Croatia, in December 2015. Case published April 2016.

In August 2013, two and a half years after a citizen uprising ousted a long-ruling dictator, Tunisia was at a tipping point. Following the assassination of a secularist politician—the second such killing that year—opposition parties demanded the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly and the resignation of the interim government, a coalition led by the Islamist Ennahda party. Work on a new constitution stopped amid dueling street protests between the two blocs. In October, four civil society organizations intervened and mediated political talks between the two sides. Under the terms of the resulting deal, the assembly agreed to resume its work and to appoint a new prime minister to run the government. They chose a compromise candidate, Mehdi Jomaa, an incumbent minister of industry with proven managerial experience and no known political allegiances. Jomaa and his cabinet of businesspeople, civil servants, professors, and judges led the country to peaceful, credible elections in October 2014. His government walked a narrow line as it tried to lead government operations without an electoral mandate and to bridge the interests of the civil society mediators, Ennahda, and the secular parties. By the time he left power, Jomaa was one of the country’s most popular leaders, and in 2015 the civil society leaders who had mediated the political talks won the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in crafting Tunisia’s distinctive effort to navigate tensions and avoid political violence.

Robert Joyce drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Tunis, Tunisia, in February 2016. Case published in March 2016.

Following Kenya’s disputed 2007 presidential election, fighting broke out between supporters of incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. Triggered by the announcement that Kibaki had retained the presidency, the violence ultimately claimed more than 1,200 lives and displaced 350,000 people. A February 2008 power-sharing agreement between the two leaders helped restore order, but finding a way to govern together in a new unity cabinet posed a daunting challenge. Under the terms negotiated, the country would have both a president and a prime minister until either the dissolution of parliament, a formal withdrawal by either party from the agreement, or the passage of a referendum on a new constitution. The agreement further stipulated that each party would have half the ministerial portfolios. Leaders from the cabinet secretariat and the new prime minister’s office worked to forge policy consensus, coordinate, and encourage ministries to focus on implementation. The leaders introduced a new interagency committee system, teamed ministers of one party with deputy ministers from the other, clarified practices for preparing policy documents, and introduced performance contracts. Independent monitoring, an internationally mediated dialogue to help resolve disputes, and avenues for back- channel communication encouraged compromise between the two sides and eased tensions when discord threatened to derail the work of the executive. Despite the odds firmly stacked against it, Kenya’s Grand Coalition cabinet was largely able to govern according to a unified policy agenda. As a result, the coalition managed to implement some of the important reforms stipulated under the power-sharing deal, including the adoption of a new constitution. However, the level of political corruption remained high.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2015. Case published March 2016.

This series highlights the governance challenges inherent in power sharing arrangements, profiles adaptations that eased these challenges, and offers ideas about adaptations.

In 2010, 20 years after the end of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, Chile transformed its defense sector by restructuring the Ministry of National Defense, stripping military leaders of responsibility for planning and strategy and placing that authority in the hands of civilians. The event marked a sea change in the relationship between the armed forces and the government. Civilians at the ministry previously had provided the military with scant guidance regarding the country’s strategic goals—in part because they lacked the training and experience required to anticipate threats to the country or to determine what capabilities the armed forces required to confront such threats. The enabling law, enacted after years of debate, also gave new powers to a chief of Joint Staff, an officer whose job was to promote cooperation among the army, navy, and air force—three military branches that jealously protected their independence and were wary of any attempt to diminish the authority of their powerful commanders in chief. Sebastián Piñera, who became president in March 2010 just as the law took effect, faced the task of implementing the massive shift in expectations, norms, culture, and the chain of command. His administration restructured the ministry and hired civilians to manage tasks long controlled by military officers, and by the end of his term in 2014, the Ministry of National Defense had taken the lead in developing Chile’s defense policies.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Santiago, Chile during July and August 2015. Case published November 2015.