Policing Interview no.: II7

Interviewee: Oliver Somasa
Interviewer: Arthur Boutellis
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BOUTELLIS: Today is the 5th of May, 2008, and I am now sitting with Mr. Oliver Somasa, who is deputy inspector-general of police with the Sierra Leone Police in Freetown, Sierra Leone. First, thank you for your time, and before we start I’d like you to first confirm that you have given your consent to the interview.

SOMASA: Of course I have.

BOUTELLIS: Thank you very much. To start the interview, I’d like to ask you a little bit more about your personal background. If you could give us a brief overview of your career with the Sierra Leone Police.

SOMASA: Thank you very much. Of course, my name is Oliver Somasa; I am approximately 50 years old now. I joined the Sierra Leone Police Force as a cadet in 1987. Prior to that, after university I was a teacher for about eight years, teaching science. What actually drove me to come to the police is because of my background as a scientist; the Sierra Leone Police Force was trying to recruit a forensic analyst. I was one of the successful candidates earmarked to be trained as a forensic analyst. Unfortunately because of budgetary constraints, I did not have the opportunity to go overseas for the training, so I had to join the SLP general duty training, and I came out as an officer cadet in 1987.

I had some training in the analysis and identification of drug abuse in Vienna, after which I came back here and headed the Anti-Narcotics Squad in the CID [Criminal Investigation Division], and I was in the CID for the rest of my time until later on, when the restructuring of the SLP began. I was called up to serve in general duties as an administrator. I progressed through the ranks until I became the Deputy IG, as I am now.

BOUTELLIS: The restructuring of the SLP took place when?

SOMASA: The restructuring of the SLP effectively started in 1998 after the pronouncement of the Sierra Leone Policing by the then president of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Dr. Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabba. The pronouncement was very important because it tried to show the responsibilities of the police in a democratic system and also the responsibilities of the public that we serve. So after that there was a need to restructure the police in order to actually support the emerging democracy at that time.

BOUTELLIS: So you have been Deputy Inspector-General since?

SOMASA: During the time of the restructuring we had an expatriate who was head of the police by the name of Mr. Keith Biddle; after Mr. Biddle, a Sierra Leonian, [Acha Kamara], was appointed IG, and I was appointed as his deputy. We are about five years now in office.

BOUTELLIS: Since 1993.


BOUTELLIS: Before we go into more technical areas of the police reform that has taken place in the last years in Sierra Leone, can you give us a brief—tell us a little bit about the status of public order and crime, maybe the last few years in Sierra Leone? What is it now, and what are the major challenges that you face?

SOMASA: We face a lot of challenges as far as public order is concerned. You know there has been dramatic change in governance in this country. I can probably say that
people to a very large extent have the power to express their views. There is a lot of freedom of speech. This freedom comes with a lot of challenges with regard to public order, because people come out to express their views. We are also very much mindful that we must allow people to express their views. We don’t want to be seen as a police force that oppresses people.

There are a lot of unemployed youths who normally use the occasion of genuine protests as an opportunity to cause havoc. Also, we have a lot of problems with the availability of public order equipment, so much so that we are most of the time overpowered, because we try to restrain our personnel as much as we can, not to use extreme force. If we don’t have to use extreme force, then we have to resort to CS gas [2-chlorobenzalmalononitrate] and other things which are not very much available.

Talking about crime generally, as I mentioned, after the war there was a lot of unemployment, especially among the youth. So especially in the big cities, you found that there were a lot of youths hanging around there, involved in petty crimes. After the war, the years following the war, there was an increase in the volume of crimes generally. Also, there was an immediate increase in serious crimes like wounding, murder, and what have you. That was the time, closely following the cessation of hostilities, because you have a lot of ex-combatants who had the culture of violence already for many years. But as time went on serious crimes actually reduced.

In the past three years we have seen a decrease in all sorts of crimes. Our recent annual crime statistics show a general reduction in crimes. This year’s perception survey also showed that the people of this country are very much satisfied with the services that SLP provides, about 74% of the people.

BOUTELLIS: Public perception surveys?
SOMASA: Yes, public perception surveys.

BOUTELLIS: The SLP has been doing it since—?
SOMASA: Since three years back. I am in charge of developing and implementing the SLP strategic development plan. One of the ways we monitor and evaluate our strategy, the development plan, is by doing public perception surveys to ask people how satisfied they are with the services, our priorities, in SLP. So this year shows an increase in public confidence.

BOUTELLIS: Who conducts the public perception surveys?
SOMASA: We normally hire—we are supported by the justice sector development plan. This survey was carried out by independent people in the past two years.

BOUTELLIS: The NGO?
SOMASA: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: And support then done by the British UK JSDP [Justice Sector Development Programme].
SOMASA: Yes. We are happy that we have established a Family Support Unit in the SLP which addresses crimes that are not normally reported by victims. Examples are domestic violence, sexual assaults, etc. With the introduction of the Family
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Support Unit working with the social services, we now see an increase in reporting of these sorts of crimes which under normal circumstances would not have been reported. Also, we have a lot of people are coming out to report to the police which is an indication of confidence in the SLP.

BOUETILIS: Now moving into technical areas. The first area I’d like to ask you about is recruitment. Maybe if you could describe for us the recruitment strategies that you’ve put in place for the Sierra Leone Police, and again, what are some of the challenges you’ve faced?

SOMASA: We have put minimal requirements for recruitment into the SLP. Initially we said you must achieve form level, you must be literate. You have to apply formally. You go through a test which is given by the SLP, and if you pass through that test you have to go through medical and other interviews, and you go to the training school for at least six months. Recruits spend three months in the training school and are sent into the field for practical exercises for another three months. We have a regional balance in recruitment. This country has three major regions: north, southeast, and west. So we give the opportunity from all regions to be represented in the SLP.

BOUETILIS: You mentioned the minimum literacy level. How do you sort between the good applicants and applicants that may be dangerous because of the past—how do you do the vetting?

SOMASA: After the tests, when they pass, they go through interviews and they go through the criminal records. They all take fingerprints—the criminal checks are done at the CID. They go through medical. So we do what you call character clearance checks.

BOUETILIS: That is before they start the training.

SOMASA: Definitely.

BOUETILIS: How long does the recruiting take, approximately?

SOMASA: About six months. But because of exigencies we had to meet a minimum requirement of 9,500, so most of the trainings of late have taken only three months in the training school. Now they come out in the field and they are allocated to mentors in the field.

BOUETILIS: The requirement of 9,500 for the Sierra Leone Police force?

SOMASA: Yes.

BOUETILIS: How were the requirements made? For instance, you mentioned the restructuring in ’98—can you give us a brief overview of the number of Sierra Leone Police then, and how was the optimum number decided?

SOMASA: During the restructuring, when the restructuring started, we had—I cannot remember the figure, but less than 6,000 policemen, maybe. During the restructuring they took a lot of factors into consideration, for example, the population of the country, the ratio of how many policemen to a particular group population. We worked it out in consultation with some experts from DFID [Department for International Development] and the United Nations, and they came out with a figure that to be effective the SLP would require 9,500
policemen. That was based on the withdrawal of the UNAMSIL [United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone] at that time.

BOUTELLIS: In late 2005.

SOMASA: Yes. During the restructuring we still had UNAMSIL. Now they worked it out to say, when UNAMSIL has withdrawn totally, this police force should have a total number of 9,500.

BOUTELLIS: So in order to reach that number faster the training period was reduced.

SOMASA: It was reduced.

BOUTELLIS: When was the number of 9,500 reached?

SOMASA: That was when they finally pulled out: 2004, 2005. I’m not too sure about dates. We are yet to reach that number; we are in the range of 8,000. But frankly, we have looked at it ourselves, and we have now realized that in fact we need more than that.

BOUTELLIS: More than 9,500.

SOMASA: Because the 9,500 took into account even support personnel. When we talk about effective policing, it has to be those who are actually involved in operational policing. If we should have effective policing, we think we will need more than 9,000. We have a conservative figure of 12,000 policemen.

BOUTELLIS: Is this something that is in the strategic planning for instance?

SOMASA: Yes. In fact, we have tried to send a message to the government in our police council meetings.

BOUTELLIS: One obstacle is the building of the capacity, the effectiveness of the police force, and you explained how you’re trying to cope with it. Are there other obstacles you have been facing in recruitment in terms of getting qualified applicants, and so on?

SOMASA: Yes, definitely. You see, this is a country where employment opportunities are very much limited. So when you advertise that you want people to come to the police, all sorts of people will come. When they come they want to enter. So they come with fake certificates. So the process of actually vetting poses a lot of challenges. Also recruitment goes with money. Normally we want to recruit more, but we are hindered by budgetary provisions. It is very difficult. The revenue base of the government is still very low. So we normally find it very, very difficult to get the requisite funding to be able to recruit the required number of people that we will need.

Also in terms of capacity building, during the restructuring we were lucky. I was the first person who led a team of about 12 senior officers to the United Kingdom [National Police] Training College to have an International Commanders’ course. There were 12 of us, led by me. The main aim or objective was that, at that level, they wanted to train people together, so that when they come back they have a common focus. To a great extent we were able to achieve that. So almost all the top managers you have now were all trained together. At least we have a lot of things in common.
BOUTELLIS: Can you describe the program? When was it, and how long did it last approximately, and what were some of the classes for instance?

SOMASA: The course was an International Commanders’ course run by the UK National Police Training College. The course was supported and funded by DFID UK. The course was on command and control, and leadership by senior police officers, and it lasted for about four months. So at least we would share common ideas.

BOUTELLIS: How many in total officers?

SOMASA: I don’t know.

BOUTELLIS: In the hundreds?

SOMASA: About 100.

BOUTELLIS: So it was not too much of an issue having 12 officers outside of the country for four months? That was sustainable?

SOMASA: It was sustainable. Some members of the senior police leadership also benefited from the UK Strategic Command course. We are presently offering middle-level police management courses to bring our personnel to the required standards.

BOUTELLIS: Now we started talking about training and professionalization. Can you describe for us some of the basic training to start with, and also what you were just talking about, this middle management training? How do you design these programs, what are they going to be like? Do you have them existent, and so on.

SOMASA: I can’t. The assistant inspector-general responsible for training can give you more details. After a probationary period of three years, the constable might benefit from the next level of training, which is the middle-management training. The next levels are the senior and executive management, etc. In the meantime, specialized trainings would be offered. Middle-management training, again, is about the command and control at that level. How they can deploy their personnel.

BOUTELLIS: The restructuring of the police has been going on for the last 10 years, approximately, since 1998. There are also a number of other training programs that were implemented with the help of the UK, maybe UNAMSIL with the United Nations. Can you describe some of these programs, and were there some that were particularly useful, you think, in terms of what they were addressing?

SOMASA: As I said earlier, we had a lot of training sponsored by DFID and the British government overseas which really had to do with command and control. They were very important, as I said, because that training was structured to train a group of officers outside this country together so they had a common focus. Before this time everybody—you’d speak one thing, and the other person thinks something otherwise. But when you are trained together you have the same philosophy, you have the same way of thinking. I think it made the top management more efficient. Also, like the United Nations when they were here on the ground, they also offered a number of trainings. For example, traffic management training went on with them, which is also very good for us.

We had opportunities to train our FSU, Family Support Unit, which again, some of it was sponsored locally by UNDP [United Nations Development Program] and the British government also. As I said, that is creating a very good impact,
because offenses which would never have been reported are now reported, like sexual, domestic violence. So it is highly specialized. We are now offering, in fact, assistance to Liberia also, because they want to establish the same system. It is a very effective system that is being introduced, maybe next to none in the West Africa region, honestly. So that is creating some recognition for us outside Sierra Leone. So that also is very important. But most of the training that they offered is by donors, and by ourselves we have actually created a lot of impact on the organization in terms of service delivery.

BOUTELLIS: How do you measure the impact of some of these trainings? You seem very keen on evaluation through the crime analysis, perception survey and so on. Are there ways you evaluate the success of some of this training?

SOMASA: I am in charge of the change management programs in the SLP. I have under my command the corporate services department, and in the corporate services department we have a research and planning section; we have monitoring and evaluation integrated inspectorate in our department. Of course we also have the change management section.

From time to time, the monitoring and evaluation department of the corporate services department will go out to evaluate the impact of some of these trainings that we have. In fact, we are just about to review our Medium-Term Strategic Development Plan, which we drew up for 2006 to 2008. It is almost coming to an end. As a way of evaluation of change programs, the research and the planning department will do an evaluation so as to give us feedback, so we will be in a position to know which projects have created impact, positive or negative. The ones that have not we will carry forward in the next strategic plan as a priority. So we have structures that actually monitor, apart from the perception survey.

BOUTELLIS: So the next strategic plan will be 2008-2010?

SOMASA: You are right.

BOUTELLIS: On a two years’ basis. Are there some you’re just starting this review?

SOMASA: Definitely.

BOUTELLIS: Are there some lessons already on the training side, maybe, some preliminary lessons? Whether it is on the training the SLP is doing itself, or maybe some of the international assistance?

SOMASA: Really, the assessment has just started; it has to go on. What we normally do is, we have a consultant who should have been here by now, but he is not coming until June. So we are just set up to evaluate some of them. So it is very premature to really talk about the results. But definitely there will be areas where we might need to improve, I’m quite sure, in terms of training. After the assessment we expect to have a workshop where we discuss this together with other stakeholders to see how much impact there is.

We also have a system as a way of evaluating our service delivery. We have a system under the change management program; we have a change management board which meets at the end of the year. At the end of every quarter all accountable officers, the top managers, for particular programs meet in the Change Board meeting which comes up every quarter; each accountable officer comes out and gives a report or an account on achievements in those programs under his regime. So that is one way we follow up. All this came during
the restructuring process. Before this time there had been no strategic planning process at all. So we are a little bit more organized. We follow our commitments; we follow how much we have achieved our targets in the SLP. We always evaluate the progress of these targets.

BOUTELLIS: One thing you’ve been talking about is international management, the importance of strengthening internal management. You mentioned the reform in the rank system. Are there any other major management issues you’ve been dealing with in the last strategic plan?

SOMASA: Yes, we had before this time a lot of problems with the public. There was no system where the public could seek redress when they were aggrieved by police action. So one of the organizational structures we put together was what we call the CDIID [Complaints, Discipline, Internal Investigation Department]. This is the internal investigations department where the public, as well as aggrieved policemen, can lodge complaints which are investigated and either prosecuted internally or referred to magistrate courts, as the case may be.

BOUTELLIS: So the internal investigation unit, the CDIID, is within the SLP?

SOMASA: At the headquarters. We have made it so important that we have an acting inspector-general of police in charge of professional standards; he controls that one. Also before this time we had a sort of paramilitary wing of the police which carried weapons. They still do exist but in a different capacity.

BOUTELLIS: The former SSD [Special Security Division].

SOMASA: SSD. Now they are what we call OSD, Operational Support Division. It is only some groups of people that now carry arms, specialized, trained, and they are only called upon to act when the need arises. They are all now trained together with other general duty personnel. Then they go into specialized training for weapons, and they have various sections in the department.

BOUTELLIS: Coming back to the CDIID, how does the public—you were saying, for instance, bring about a potential complaint? What is the process?

SOMASA: We sensitize the public about the existence and role of the CDIID through regular press briefings at the police headquarters. This encourages them and gives them the assurance that police excesses can be dealt with, contrary to previous thinking by the public. The public will go and make their complaints directly to the department, and it is recorded by a designated investigating officer.

The system is decentralized in the provinces, so they can go straight to the office of the CDIID and make their complaints. It is a direct thing—or maybe in writing, they can write to the head of the police in the particular section to the IG or any senior police officer and make a complaint.

BOUTELLIS: Can you give me one or two examples of some complaints that have been expressed to CDIID and maybe led to internal investigations in the last couple of years?

SOMASA: There was one before me where the complainant alleged that when the policemen went to do the arrest they used excessive force. It was investigated. The police were right in their action, as they had a warrant to search the premises, which was locked, and had no means of opening it apart from breaking it. The warrant gives them the right to break the door in this circumstance.
thought that was excessive force. There are other complaints. General civility to the public is a common complaint by the public. Some policemen, either in action or words, are not very good to the public. Recently also there was a shooting incident in Kono during a public order situation. That was investigated, and a commission of enquiry was recommended. The commission recommended that the matter be charged to court.

BOUTELLIS: That is in process?

SOMASA: That is in process.

BOUTELLIS: So there was a shooting? The OSD was in charge of the riot control?

SOMASA: Definitely, because when it gets so violent you call the armed personnel.

BOUTELLIS: To support the regular police.

SOMASA: Yes. Almost every month we are firing policemen for infringements against the public. Even sometimes misconduct within the police, we reduce them in rank or we sack them straight. There are quite a number in which they don’t meet professional standards, or—.

BOUTELLIS: Are there mechanisms of enhancing accountability to the public that have been put in place, in terms of public relations with the public, accountability of the police to the public? Are there other mechanisms other than CDIID?

SOMASA: That is just where we have started, but we have also recommended the establishment of an independent complaints [department] under the minister of internal affairs. That is yet to come, because normally that should be seen as more independent, where you have other players outside the police. That is in the pipeline, but for now this is what we have until we get to that point.

BOUTELLIS: Maybe one more area before we ask the last round of questions on police reform and the priorities. It is the issue of the depoliticization of the police service. You mentioned in the past before the restructuring, for instance, the use of SSD for political purposes. Are there some initiatives as part of the restructuring in the last 10 years that have been aimed at trying to avoid political interferences?

SOMASA: Of course. If you look at the policing charter that I mentioned initially, as a document that the previous government brought up which really brought about the restructuring process, in that document you have that the SLP should be apolitical. In previous governments, and even now, we have had the assurances coming straight from the heads of state that they will ensure that the police remain apolitical, that we have operational independence.

BOUTELLIS: For instance, with the new President [Ernest Bai] Koroma, who took office in late 2007, there haven’t been any major changes in the senior management of the police?

SOMASA: We are assured of that. There has been no major change, political change in the system at all. That gives us a lot of confidence as well. As long as we know that we are professionals and we behave like professionals, we think we have nothing to fear.

BOUTELLIS: There are a number of non-state security groups like private security companies, for instance, in Sierra Leone. What is the relationship between the police and
these groups? Are there any ways of communication? Are they cooperating with the SLP generally?

SOMASA: Definitely. We as an organization appreciate them. We think they complement our efforts in trying to prevent crime. But there is as yet no formal relationship between the private companies and the SLP. These companies are private people. They go, they register their companies, and they begin to operate. But we also think there should be a relationship. We really appreciate it very much, because we have everything on the ground. We want to encourage people to actually hire private security for a lot of things, because now, in fact, as I speak to you, we are getting a lot of requests from commercial houses, banks; they want OSD to be at their banks as static guards. We want to discourage that. We want to have more policemen patrolling instead of having individuals standing at private commercial houses. So we want to encourage the public and private business people to hire private security, so we will provide overall security for everybody. We’re yet to get there. Maybe we will form a relationship with them, but there has not been any formal communication between us.

BOUTELLIS: Are some of these companies carrying weapons?

SOMASA: No, nobody is allowed.

BOUTELLIS: Nobody is allowed.

SOMASA: You can carry a baton, but no firearms.

BOUTELLIS: Are there policing mechanisms—I’m thinking in the provinces—traditional chiefs, or so on, that are complementary to the work of the police?

SOMASA: You have the chieftdom police, who are attached to the chieftdom administration, but again, for a long time they have been very ineffective in terms of assistance to prevent crimes. They are only there as messengers to take the bags of Paramount Chiefs. They have not been very much—.

BOUTELLIS: They’re only in the provinces, and they only work with the Paramount Chiefs. They’re not armed either?

SOMASA: No, they’re not. They’re not much involved in crime prevention. Also, there is a program in the Justice Sector, the development program to see how they could be useful in complementing the efforts of the police. I don’t know the details of what they are doing.

BOUTELLIS: Now we’ve covered a number of functional areas. You are in charge of strategic planning and reviews and such. I’d like to ask you: the reform process has been going on for maybe the last 10 years; it is a long haul. I would like to ask you, what are some of the more pressing issues, and what are the priorities, what are the tasks that you would maybe prioritize in the next phase of the reform?

SOMASA: We have had a number of priorities which I know we have to repeat. For example, public order is one of those priorities. As we get more civilized, as we get more freedom, there is a tendency for people to come out together to vent their grievances. We should be in a position to be able to control that. Crime is always at the top of the agenda, because the police mission is to fight crime. So the priority is to work harder to reduce crimes, especially those crimes that have to do with organized crime. We are more concerned with organized crime at this time, because we have a lot of intelligence that criminal gangs have now begun
to penetrate these areas. So drug trafficking and money laundering and other organized crimes will be at the top of our agenda in the next few years to come.

We think airport security and the security of our borders are high priorities. In order to maximize income for the country, we have to make sure that the borders are properly manned. In terms of priorities, also, we will have to scan the environment as usual, will have to talk to people again and see what their policing priorities are.

BOUTELLIS: In terms of public order and riot control, are there some initiatives already of maybe the creation of specially-trained people for that?

SOMASA: Definitely. We have been embarking on the training of crowd control personnel, and we have made sure that we have distributed those trained people all around the country. So they have been trained over the years. We’ve done a lot of training on that. I think the next step is to get the necessary equipment for them, like CS gas, protective clothing, etc.

BOUTELLIS: How many? Are they regular SLP?

SOMASA: Yes, they are regular SLP that have been trained specifically in crowd control.

BOUTELLIS: How many approximately?

SOMASA: I cannot tell the exact number.

BOUTELLIS: They successfully managed?

SOMASA: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: There were few incidents?

SOMASA: Yes, we were acclaimed all over the world for our neutrality and the way we controlled the elections.

BOUTELLIS: Are there any innovations, maybe experiments that you’ve done? I think you're particularly pleased with the training that you mentioned of the command and control in the UK—are there any other innovations or experiments that you’ve done that you think merit attention, that you think we could learn from that were particularly successful? There was also the Family Support Unit that you mentioned was a Sierra Leone success. Are there any others that we haven’t mentioned?

SOMASA: I think one thing we achieved success in terms of planning is our planning for elections. I think that is something people are craving to know, how we are able to do it. There were a lot of tensions, and people went out of this country before the elections because they thought it was going to explode. But I think because of our planning, our strategy planning, thinking of threat assessments in the various areas, which actually informed the deployment strategy, we were able to actually run the elections without major incidents. I think that was one area we are proud of now which we should share with other people.

BOUTELLIS: And the local elections now?

SOMASA: Yes, we will start—.
BOUTELLIS: Will use similar strategies?

SOMASA: What we normally do is, we look far into the future on our operational plans and start planning the process, taking into consideration those challenges that will come during that period. So we start planning. We start working with our partners. We have the Office of National Security which actually coordinates all the activities of the security sector. So we work with them effectively and make sure that we identify the appropriate partners for particular operations. I think we will be able to do that very well.

BOUTELLIS: So the very last question. You mentioned the international partners and the donors—are there any comments, maybe some examples of partnership that were successful, successful coordination and maybe some others where things could have been done better?

SOMASA: By the international community?

BOUTELLIS: Yes.

SOMASA: Again, we have to be grateful because the international community came to our aid. Most of what I talk about in terms of logistics, whatever was said, the success depends on the working tools. They were able to provide them. Although the problem has been the timing. There are a lot of administrative bottlenecks, especially when you deal with the United Nations. So we don’t get the things during the right period. Also because of lack of confidence, maybe sometimes we find it difficult to convince donors. I think they have the idea that they might be misused. The rigors involved in convincing them that we can manage these resources and we are very sincere—this is my personal view—I think the trust is still not very much in this part of the world because the view is that everybody is corrupt. So that creates some bottlenecks.

Also, those people who come to assess, to help us give the message about what we really need—I really don’t blame them, but most of them are not in a position to take cultural differences into consideration when they make the assessments. So we find out that some of the assessments do not reflect what is actually the reality on the ground. These are differences that are bound to exist, but also these sorts of things, because of not understanding the system, also bring a few bottlenecks. That is why normally I advocate that those people who come—there is always a rapid change of people. You come on with a man, and a new man comes, and the understanding of the situation is gone. So there is lack of continuity. You need to have people who continue to understand so that they can be in position to give a clear picture of actually what happened. The constant removal of people, advisors in and out, I think also creates some bottlenecks.

We are very much appreciative, because they come and we learn from them, but also they have to stay a little bit to build the capacity of the people on the ground, so that at least if there is some trust and they build the capacity they might not have to send people. We can give them the right picture, and things will work faster. That’s the way we look at it.

BOUTELLIS: Any final comments?

SOMASA: I can only say I’m very pleased talking to you. We also are managing to serve the police force. We are proud. We have a lot of challenges, quite a lot. In a country where the salary of the average policeman is very, very poor, the living conditions are very, very poor, I think under the circumstances we are doing well.
We talk to people; people have invested a lot in this country, donors everywhere. I think it is hopeless sometimes to think you want to continue to depend on donors. We have to look at the time you withdraw, because the gains that we have achieved so far will just dwindle if we aren’t at the appropriate time left on our own. Professionally the SLP is up to date, but logistically and in terms of conditions with the people that we work with, I think there are still a lot of obstacles, hurdles to jump. But I’m very hopeful we will continue to progress in the right direction.

BOUTELLIS: Mr. Oliver Somasa, thank you very much.

SOMASA: Thank you.