



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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BOUTELLIS: Today is May 12th, 2008, and I am now with Mr. Peter Zaizay, who is the deputy minister of national security and acting minister of national security for Liberia. We are today in the Mamba Point Hotel in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia.

First, thank you for your time. I'd like to start by learning a little bit more about your personal background, and particularly the positions you've been in prior to becoming acting minister of national security, and how you got involved in police issues.

ZAIZAY: *My police career dates back almost about 15, 16, 17 years ago. When I graduated from high school in 1986, my first job was private security, where I worked with one group called Jascere Security Services as a way of financing my education at the University of Liberia. After graduation I was able to pass the placement exams of the University of Liberia, and then enrolled in 1987. While in school I also did private security jobs at night. That helped to facilitate my school.*

That continued a little while, '87, '88, after I did some basic training before doing the job. One former commandant of the National Police Training Academy, NPTA, the late [George P. Kemokai], became my first training officer and the motivator who really inspired me to pursue career opportunities in law enforcement, in policing. I didn't stay too long working in 1989, 1990. So '92, '93, I took the aptitude test of the police, the Liberian National Police and I happened to come in first on the aptitude test of 2,000 candidates, and that qualified me to go to the academy. I did basic police training at the academy and came out with flying colors, I came out first. I graduated with about 270 recruits. That gave me the opportunity to be sworn a police officer in the Liberian National Police. I worked within the patrol division, doing routine patrol work at the Spriggs Payne Airfield, and then central headquarters. Then later, based on my performance as a good investigator and good writer, I was asked to transfer to the Criminal Investigation Division, where I spent the rest of my time.

Then due to the intermittent nature of our war, the civil conflict, I had a break with the Liberian National Police. After 1997-1998, I chose to work quietly within the national police. I transferred to the Criminal Intelligence Unit. That gave me the opportunity to do other things, to work in other areas. So I worked within the Cooperative Development Agency, and then that gave me a better cover to report on a lot of things that we were doing within the police, reporting on crime and other things. Then after the 2003 war, there was an opportunity that availed itself to me and that had to do with some nomination that was done by a civil society political party. The New Deal Movement nominated me for their slot within the government, the National Transitional Government of Liberia headed by Gyude Bryant. I went back to the police. I rose through the ranks of the police, and then became an assistant director of police for press and public affairs.

It was a position I served for two years until I was asked to resign in January 2006. Following my resignation, after a few months, I spent February, March, and around March I was again nominated by the present president based on the recommendation of the present inspector-general of police, Colonel Munah Sieh, to serve as deputy director of police for training, and then commandant of the national police training academy. I served in that position from 2006 up to August 2007. Then I was transferred from there to where I am presently, the Ministry of National Security, as the deputy minister for administration.

Basically, that is a history of my career. While in those positions, I had the opportunity to do some basic training in peacekeeping support operations. I studied briefly, two seminars, at the Kofi Annan Center [KAIPTC: Kofi Annan

International Peacekeeping Training Centre]. I did a media operations course. I also did a design and development facilitations course at [...] this training centre. The media operations course was done in 2005, and the design and development course was done in May 2006. So these opportunities were made available to me.

I also had the opportunity to travel to South Africa to participate in an IDASA [Institute for Democracy in South Africa]-organized program on security sector reform in post-conflict African societies. I represented the Liberian National Police at that conference, which helped us to do some comparative analysis of post-conflict societies' police reform efforts. Then I also did some assessment basic to the police training school in Sierra Leone, and also did some comparative analysis to see how well we could improve our academy. That gave me deeper insight with respect to what was eroding in our own country, and gave me the impetus to really press for improvement in our training facilities at the academy.

While at the academy I had the opportunity to work closely with the United Nations, who happened to be more involved in security sector reform efforts with the police, especially to be involved with the training of police officers. While being there, I also raised a number of issues with them to see how to help us own this training process, so our own value system would be integrated into the trainees. That, to some extent, I would say has played out well. I also raised the issue of helping us improve the facilities in the academy, since we were transitioning from conflict to peace, and that was also welcome.

Today you go the academy—there is a modern dormitory there. There is a modern classroom being constructed. All of these facilities are being constructed thanks to the honesty of the United Nations. They heard our concerns, and we were able to establish the infrastructure, and I left in place able successors who, in my view, were given the care of all those dreams that we had at the academy in terms of strengthening the capacity of the Liberian National Police.

I stayed at the police until we trained and met the benchmark of the United Nations to train 3,500 police officers.

BOUTELLIS: That was in 2007 that the benchmark was reached?

ZAIZAY: Yes, 2007, July. Right after that, I was transferred from the police to the LNP.

BOUTELLIS: We'll come back to your training experience through the interview, but before that I'd like you to give us a brief overview of the status of public order and crime since the end of the war, and maybe the major challenges that the Liberian National Police faced in its restructuring postwar.

ZAIZAY: *There is a huge challenge in terms of combating crime and in terms of combating public order. As you're aware, this country is predominantly youthful; there are a lot of young people that participated in the 14, 15 years of civil conflict, on various sides of the conflict divide. Based on that, most of these people have become accustomed to lawlessness. Violence became the order of the day, and for 15 years—some of them, the young people, were born into conflict, and they adopted conflict attitudes. After the cessation of hostilities, the DDR [disarmament, demobilization, reintegration] was not totally comprehensive as—it was incomplete because—*

BOUTELLIS: The disarmament and demobilization.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, the disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation—reintegration. The RR component of the DDRR has yet to be reinforced, because when there is a conflict in society, people are traumatized, because they witness horrific violent scenes, and they become both primary and secondary victims of conflict. That causes a lot of trauma. So most of the young people now that we have in our society are traumatized. So the situation of crime and lawlessness are huge security challenges, because, one, the young people were combatants; they used drugs to stimulate them into becoming brave soldiers, as they call it. Some of them also were accustomed to grabbing valuable things. Those valuable things are no longer around, because we have a peaceful environment. So because of their conflict nature, their violent nature, they still want to have access to the valuable things that they illegally took from people through violent means.*

So in the absence of that, many of them lack specific skills. They are trigger-happy, and that is the only skill that they have. In the absence of that, in an urban environment, if people lack basic skills, they are problems, because an urban environment is for people with skills. If you don't have a skill, then the possibility of finding a job or earning your income honestly can be difficult. So that is one of the factors that is contributing to the wave of crime in Liberian society. The youthful unemployment. That is also tied into that, because most of the young people who claim to be out of jobs don't really have a skill, so even if people have jobs to offer, they don't have the requisite skills to do the particular job. So there has to be some mechanism put in place to provide skills. That should be a tie-in to the rehabilitation programs of the United Nations or aid organizations in Liberia.

Secondly, there has been no drug treatment program offered to ex-fighters. There is no drug treatment program as we speak in this country, where people who have been accustomed to narcotics, drugs, or psychotropic substances can have some feeling of being rehabilitated, reformed, and reintegrated into normal societal life. So yes, most of the young people are lawless because of the violent nature that they went through. Supposedly it's a huge challenge—even those who have been enlisted into the services of the Liberian security institutions, some of them participated in these violent conflicts. Some of them have violent orientations. With this violence they also have a playback on their mentality, and on their attitudes in these various organizations.

So the police, as police officers, as young people who have enrolled into the police, they could become violent because they did not have the opportunity to be rehabilitated and reintegrated—because they witnessed violence, and they may have been a primary victim of conflict or trauma, or secondary. So all of this plays into what is obtained. Some of them witnessed criminal behavior or were involved in criminal activities during the course of the war. Those attitudes are still there, and if there is no mechanism to correct those behaviors, they will have a playback in the professional or the vocational performance, whether it is in the army, in the police, or what kind of institution they find themselves. Those antisocial behaviors will surface and will have a backlash on the society as a whole.

BOUTELLIS: So the youth is a major issue. What are the most common types of crimes?

ZAIZAY: *The most common types of crime usually are theft of property. The issue of armed robbery is also tied in. Most of the robberies that are committed in town are really in urban settings, pretty much occur in Monrovia, because this is where the countryside of Liberia [...] has emptied as a result of the war. Sometimes they*

use machetes, sometimes they use arms, but most of the armed robberies are being committed with machetes and the robbers move in groups. They tend to defy the security presence. So when they move in groups they attack communities, particularly helpless communities, people who are impoverished. The victims are usually low-income earners, and sometimes middle-low people who don't have protective opportunities, fence, or public security that are protecting them. So that is a major issue.

It speaks for itself. There is a social-economic disparity that we find in society. So those who have the means pay for private security services, because private security is an extension of police function. Those who can afford it will hire private security to provide protection for them. Also they will put barbed wire, have lighting systems. The city is dark in the communities, the dark communities. Those who can afford a generator will only use it for the early evening hours; about 10 they shut it off, so the community goes dark. So the criminals use those opportunities to also move in the communities to terrorize the residents of those communities.

The government is doing its best to provide lights in the streets. When those lights move into the communities, we hope that will also help to curtail some of the criminal activities, because people will be able to see you marching to their house, be able to identify you when you commit a crime. Police will be able to pick you up based on that identification they provide. Yes, predominantly theft of property is dominant; then you have armed robberies.

Another problem is the issue of rape. Rape and the issue of women and domestic violence are key concerns too. All of this is due to the long, complex situation that we have. For 15 years young people have become accustomed to violence and so forth. This is a playback of the violent years that we had. So; that is what I see as the main problems in society.

BOUTELLIS: The first area I'd like to talk about is the area of recruitment, recruitment stages. So following the war, the former Liberian National Police were deactivated. Can you describe for us the process of recruitment and transition?

ZAIZAY: *That's one of the areas where I had a problem. Every time I go to a forum I raise this issue. The security sector reform process was fraught with a lot of problems. The mandate of the international community—Liberia is a society in transition to peace. Because the state failed, it has to collapse. When the state collapses, efforts have to be made to firstly reconstitute the state and make it a living state. That aspect is what the government is fighting with. Now the peace accords, the comprehensive peace accord in August 2003, gave the mandate to the United Nations and the international community to reform and restructure the police and other security apparatus, including the army, but it didn't tell them how to do it.*

So what they are doing is, they pushed down our throats approaches that were practiced in other societies and that didn't work. The Liberian National Police had professionals, and some of us were there, hundreds of us were in the police. Then one day the United Nations came; they said everybody had to reapply. They said before you stay in the police you must be out of high school.

There were people who stayed in the police, from patrol officers, constables; they went to schools, they went to the university, they graduated, they got degrees and other things. When they came, people graduated from high school in the '70s, and they stayed in the police in the '80s, and we fought the war. People's homes were burned; people's documents were destroyed. Now the insistence

was that you must produce documents. If you went, some of the schools that people went to no longer existed. They had either been destroyed or in ruins. Now most institutions did not have records to trace, no records of these students. So sometimes they went to the Ministry of Education; they were declaring, they said you had to bring some document to identify, for clearance, for the information that will be provided on the clearance, so that means if you didn't have you can't be accepted. There were a lot of good guys who lost the opportunity to stay on in the police with professional backgrounds. So that also hurt the recruitment process and the reform efforts of the police.

The same thing went for the army. The standard that they used in the police was the same standard they used in the army. For the army it was worse, because they disbanded the whole organization. Institutional memory was not given consideration. People who had stayed in the organization for 10, 15, 20 years who needed to stay in the organization to even socialize the new guys, who would aid the organization, were asked to leave. So you have a group of new people. If you see the military today, they even had to have some ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] member countries contribute men to serve as company commanders. That is ridiculous. But these are the pains that we have to go through, because we fought the war and we have to accept because they are giving the money. We don't have money, so we are like a failed state that is in desperate need of help to reconstitute our state to deliver those basic social services for our people. That's why the government is helpless, because it needs all of its international friends, all who are making the services available, and whatever they say, the government has no other option. If you say no, they will take away their money, because they give the money with conditions. So these are problems that we have. That is why, some of the disparity you find in reform efforts.

In the army, one of the key problems you have is the DynCorp issue of being responsible to train the Liberian Army on a bilateral arrangement, government to government. Now the American government, contracted to reform the army, decided to sub-contract the program to a private security [firm] which is called DynCorp.

BOUTELLIS: To private companies.

ZAIZAY: *Now, that private company is not even using their name in the reform process. What they are using is SSR [security sector reform]: DynCorp is providing training, but they are using SSR or PA. So DynCorp is problematic!*

BOUTELLIS: A subcontractor.

ZAIZAY: *DynCorp is the one that subcontracted the whole thing. The SSR is a process in Liberia—security sector reform—but it seems to be the name of a process that is being strapped to a particular organization performing one aspect. So that is more confusing. Because if they ask you who is doing the army, they say SSR. Instead of saying DynCorp, they say SSR, because all of the vehicles carry SSR. So that is like a cover name for DynCorp in the training process. That is more confusing. But that is not much of a problem. The issue is all of the guys who had institutional memory, because the history of the army, the history of the police, has been a history of America's involvement in the training processes. So it is just the pressure of new knowledge and new leadership.*

BOUTELLIS: So to come back to the police. Of the new police, the 3,500, you were describing, how many were re-recruited from the previous police?

ZAIZAY: *Between 800 to 900 of the old guys. Some of the guys said they didn't want to be trained because what happened in the police, and the same thing is happening in the army. Like if one [...] has stayed in the service for 10, 15 years, your experience is not considered for retention. They treat you as if you have not worked for the service before. If they choose to stay, they break you down in ranks and to the level of the recruits and go back to training.*

BOUTELLIS: In ranks.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, assuming I have [more] experience than you in the profession, they ask me to train with you. So you and I go to the training and start at square one. It means that all of your training you had [...] with the organization and your experience you accumulated over the years are given no consideration. So some of the guys, most of the experienced guys, felt that was humiliating or demeaning. They felt that they should pay them off for them to leave. So that's why most of the good guys left the police. Even the military. They said they would not sit with people who do not have military knowledge or police knowledge and go through training from square one. What we were asking them was: it is important to do training of the present people in the organization First do a scan of the organization; get those who have served the organization for maybe 25 more years, who are old—you can retire them, since they have age in their favor. All you needed to do was give them some refresher courses at the academy. They could help to socialize—with the new mandate, new orientation—they could help socialize the new guys who were being recruited. You have to spot suitable candidates. But again, those institutions that were disbanded, like the ATU [Anti-Terrorist Unit], the SOD [Special Operations Division], etc.—some of the guys wanted to make [...] and have in fact come back into the organization under different names, under different guises and so forth, and they are there.*

So you are not able to identify them. Some ex-veterans who have poor human rights records have managed to come in, because the criteria is a high school certificate. Because [if] they have a high school certificate maybe from somebody over the years they knew [who] either might have died, traveled, or they might have already taken off the person from the service—they could use his /her name, with a picture, and come back into the organization.

BOUTELLIS: So this is the issue of vetting. How was the vetting—?

ZAIZAY: *The vetting was done predominantly by the United Nations; it was not done by the government but by the United Nations. Very little was done by the Liberian staff. It was of late, after a series of heated debates, arguments, and so forth—even those who were appointed to leadership positions had to go through the vetting. Some of those went through because this is our country; we want to see our country move forward. I went through the vetting. I even went through some training programs, senior management training. I did that for three months. I did more training of management courses, a week, three months, so forth, intermittently. All of these were processes that we went through. By and large that was not worth it; it has affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, even the military. So we were kind of skeptical as to whether these institutions would be all together to provide a kind of protection that we really need in terms of sustaining democracy when the international community leaves. So these are key questions in trying to reform. There is a lot of bitterness amongst people who served their country loyally over time, and they felt they were dishonorably removed from the service. This is the people's sense.*

BOUTELLIS: Now we're moving to the training and professionalization, and you started talking about it with the fact that everyone had to go through training. Can you describe some of the training programs? Who designed the training curriculum, and who delivered most of the training?

ZAIZAY: *Before I went to the academy in 2005—the training started around July—all of the training was conducted by UNMIL [United Nations Mission in Liberia], the United Nations, people from different countries.*

BOUTELLIS: Before 2005, so from 2003 to 2005.

ZAIZAY: *From 2003 to 2004, these were development periods; they were developing curricula and other stuff. So by 2005 the actual training started to some extent. In 2004, July, the training started. There were some in-service training programs that were conducted. Even those who went to do the in-service training programs of the United Nations, about 600 of them, a good number of them were deactivated. If you didn't go back for the vetting, it means you were disqualified, you were paid off. But you have this 24-week or 36-week program. You had to do 13 weeks, academic work in the academy, and then you went off for 24 weeks, and then you came back for another four weeks to complete your visit, so that amounted to about 10 months' training.*

In terms of getting more information, the time for acquiring more information was limited because that was 12 weeks. That was three months. So the curriculum where you had to exhaustively deal with some of the core courses were very limited. So most of the thing was done practically, with mentorship or field training. You had 24 weeks of field training. Then you came back and do academic work for another four weeks and validate your graduation.

That went on for some time when we got there. Then the precedent of this had to be changed. We had more academic work—more practical, theoretical knowledge about the work that they are going to do—and less fieldwork. So it was cut down. They increased the time to 16 weeks' academic work, and then you go into field training say for nine weeks, and then you come back for another four weeks. You came back to 24—so this is how the training process went about, basically. Then some of the guys that they trained, who didn't have real records or history of policing, they were recruited, trained as teachers, as trainers. So then we also had some problems.

BOUTELLIS: Trainers were trained.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, from those that are trained.*

BOUTELLIS: Did Liberian trainers start? When did they start taking over part of the training?

ZAIZAY: *Liberian trainers started taking active part in the training the later part of 2006 to 2007. Right now most of the training is being done by Liberians. But the question now is, some of the guys who are providing the training, they cannot give you practical experience from fieldwork because they just came from the classroom. It is their first experience in the profession. That really has a negative impact. They speak of the kind of quality that we have in the organization. You need to link some of the training with some basic experiences in your own career. But will they have that? There are a few of the guys who stayed with the organization for some time and in the process [...], one or two of them. So we said, although you need not train the old instructors, you need to retrain them and give them a specific mandate as to what you want them to do. Look at the curriculum, sit with*

them, and develop together a comprehensive curriculum. Look at the curriculum—and they just got some of them, others you would think should have been there. Some of the important courses that should be taught at the academy were left out.

BOUTELLIS: Such as?

ZAIZAY: *Such as discipline and courtesy, or city geography, where they teach the people how the city works in terms of locating places as an officer—the government officials, diplomatic immunity to respect diplomats, members of civil society, in terms of who are supposedly giving courtesy and what have you. They left out some detailed information about testifying in court, which should be able to give them a particular way to testify in courts, etc.*

BOUTELLIS: Crime investigation.

ZAIZAY: *For investigation, how do you testify in court. So all of these basic things were left out. Detailed investigation.*

BOUTELLIS: How was the curriculum designed? Was it based on a previous curriculum that existed prior to the war?

ZAIZAY: *To some extent. Policing is universal. So most of the courses we have here were borrowed from America. It has been America that has been our role model, set up the academy and so forth, in the late '50s. Based on that, those courses that were there were not much different from other courses that are taught in other academies. In terms of the history and culture of the Liberian National Police doctrine, the value, we're really totally overlooked, because all of the Liberian instructors at the academy were asked not to participate in the training in the initial stages. It was people from Pakistan, from Turkey, Nigeria, Ghana, Jamaica. It was other places, Serbia—people who joined as police, other post-conflict countries who were recruited, too, with low detailed experience.*

BOUTELLIS: The physical academy, the building, had been destroyed during the war?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, some were destroyed, but it was severely looted, the documents—but there was some.*

BOUTELLIS: So the trainings are not taking place in the same building that used to be the academy.

ZAIZAY: *It was taking place initially. The first initial training that they had took place in the building; some classrooms were there. Now, when they decided to do the full-scale training, they erected tents. The tents were used from 2004 up to just the last year; they started moving the tents. Since then they've used the dormitory, but some of the tents are still there. Before they started using the dormitory, they used tents. They brought pre-fab kitchens. That's why we said they had to refurbish the facility we had there, and then build new structures. We insisted on that, for this reasoning: we have new structures there now. We renovated the dormitories that were there, expanded it. I'm told that they moved there now from those old tents. They're building a new classroom by the old classrooms. So those facilities are there. They're working on them.*

BOUTELLIS: You mentioned some of the courses that were left out that were sort of missing.

ZAIZAY: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Otherwise, generally, how would you say that the training met the objectives? What were the objectives, and now in terms of the ability of the police to do their work, how well did the training meet the objectives?

ZAIZAY: *To some extent, the police, in terms of output—it is the public that is evaluating the performance of the police. The fact that the police continue to be condemned, continue to be lambasted, shows that there are a lot of shortcomings in the whole process. The objectives, in terms of meeting the objectives, actually this was met [...] Generally on the average, the materials were taught to the trainees: present guys, they have some technical knowledge about it, but in the application, because they did not have real practical experience, we petitioned them. They have some shortcomings, but on the average, I think they have police knowledge. What is not good is, when they taught them the constitution and the laws of Liberia and the code of ethics. That's one issue that they left out for police officers and other things, given the manner and form in which they were taught.*

Once these things are missing, when people are not rigorously made to memorize some of these values, the police code of ethics, it leaves lots of professional things wanting. Then the testing matters but it is not comprehensive. It was like multiple choice, yes or no answers, true or false. This is not really the proper way to evaluate trainees, as this does not really evaluate trainees objectively. But once they have high school graduation, they should be able to write some composition, to write their own experience. Those things were not done. These were issues that were raised with them. So the misbehavior sometimes we see is a result of ignorance, sometimes no advice...

BOUTELLIS: You mentioned the public was evaluating. What are some of the main complaints that come from the public?

ZAIZAY: *The public is saying that the police have not changed. They are upset that the police have not changed. The police are aggressive. The police are brutal. The police are not fair, do not treat the citizens fairly, the police is biased. These sorts of things, to the extent that they admit the precedent at some point in time of the training, have been ignored—especially some of the key issues. So once the citizens continue to raise these issues, we hope that somebody will train them. Even at that, we desire some in-service training program, where we can have some of the guys for in-service training policing for one month, sometimes for two weeks, at various levels: senior management, middle management, commanders; an investigation course, information course, all of these things. But people are still not internalizing the profession. They look at the profession as more of a profit-making venture than really delivering services to the people. That is the point of departure. That is undermining their own professionalism in a sense. That is what [we are] trying to cover in the objectives, making it appear that really the training objective was not met, because people went into the force for various reasons, to protect their interests, protect family interests, protect the interests of friends and so forth. Also sometimes to also use it to [take] revenge on other people. That is why you have various behaviors.*

There are some people in the organization who are really professionals, show professionalism. On the average there are a lot of problems, lack of experience...

BOUTELLIS: The next area would be integration and amalgamation of services. There seem to be a number of different security services, a number of them belonging to the

police in Liberia. What are the prospects for possible amalgamation or integration of these, and what are the—?

ZAIZAY: *Those views have been expressed, and I think that the following will be, as consideration will be given to it by the government.*

BOUTELLIS: What are the rationales?

ZAIZAY: *Well, the rationale provided is that most of the organizations are overlapping functions; that is one key issue, as was said. We also talk about capacity.*

BOUTELLIS: How many different services are there?

ZAIZAY: *Well, we have the police, we have the Ministry of National Security, where I work. We have the National Security Agency [NSA]. We have the Drug Enforcement Agency, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and the Fire Service, not to mention the Ministry of National Defense.*

BOUTELLIS: Second part of the interview with Mr. Peter Zaizay. We're talking about the integration and amalgamation of police services. You were mentioning the different police services.

ZAIZAY: *We talked about the Liberian National Police, which you know of, where I work. Then there is the Ministry of National Security. We have the National Security Agency; you have the Drug Enforcement Agency. Then you have the National Fire Service. You have the National Bureau of Investigation. These are key security institutions that are created by acts of national legislature. They have complementary roles in the security industry of Liberia. They are still security agencies.*

Others are corporate security agencies like the Free Port Security, LSP [Liberia Seaport Police], RIA [Roberts International Airport] Security. Some are plant protection security like the Firestone, the [...], the [...].—these are plant protection security forces. Industrial security, APR Security, [...], other areas.

But in talking about the national or the state security institutions, these are the institutions I just told you about. They've said that the National Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Ministry I work for should be dissolved and integrated into both the National Security Agency and the Liberian National Police. The reasons for that that are provided. First, the government is an emerging democracy. This government is emerging from crisis. It does not have the resources—it cannot afford the luxury to function and finance these state security institutions that have duplicating functions, according to what they have said.

The Ministry I work for carries out both economic crime investigation as well as social, political, cultural, and political intelligence. The same thing our NSA [National Security Agency] does, NBI [National Bureau of Investigation] does the same thing. NBI does the investigation of major crimes. The Drug Enforcement Agency, as you are aware, is a politically created institution. The United Nations convention on crime and drugs control program says that every country should have a drug enforcement agency to work complementarily with the police. They're saying the police are also enforcing drug laws, arresting drug traffickers, drug users, drug dealers, and so forth. The DEA is doing that. So they are saying that the DEA should be dissolved and this agency integrated into the police.

The NBI should be dissolved and its agents integrated into the police. MNS [Ministry of National Security] should be dissolved and integrated into the NSA and do state intelligence work. Then the coordination role of all of the security agencies should be given to the National Security Council, where all of these security institutions are represented.

BOUTELLIS: So right now, how is the coordination happening currently?

ZAIZAY: *The coordination is being done through the Joint Security, and that is being done by the minister of justice presiding as head of the Joint Security, and then coordination is being done by the president herself. She chairs the National Security Council that the United Nations is part of. We also have a security pillar under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper program; that is a security pillar. We also meet there to discuss security issues, in a political sense, to look out. It is important.*

BOUTELLIS: You were going to say there's another school of thought in terms of—?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, the school of thought is that we need to have—there is a school of thought that says there is a need to have two intelligence-collection, two intelligence institutions for verification, for corroboration, etc.*

BOUTELLIS: Checks and balances?

ZAIZAY: *For checks and balances, and so forth. What they're saying is, you can have the second thought—formerly there were two intelligence agencies, so let's have one. Strengthen the police and the others, and you've got criminal intelligence and other stuff. So that school of thought seems to be winning: dissolve some of these institutions. So as we speak, the National Security Act is being prepared to see how it can be debated by the public to decide on some of the key issues. As we speak, our institutions are in transition to be dissolved, integrated into a National Security Agency. But there are still some second thoughts, so we don't know whether there is going to be a final decision on dissolving or not, but we hope the government will be able to convince the financiers or the donors—will see reason that, coming from conflict, there are a lot of security issues that need to be addressed. There is lot of disgruntlement, lawlessness, criminality. We have a huge Liberian population out there who are refugees, who acquired different skills, both good and bad skills. We want to come and market. So these are key issues that we are looking at. Because back when Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone—we also have refugees who are integrated into here, who remember the history about it, the attitude. There is a need to really have this institution, even if it could be reduced in size to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness; that could be good. We are focusing back on that; we're trying to reduce our work force. The whole thing is, we have no money. We have no money to pay some of the agents off. There was a vetting process done in my own ministry, where about 205 of the guys supposed to be under review retired.*

BOUTELLIS: Early retired, compensated.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, we call it deactivation. One of the key motivations. Getting the police, and today the SSS [Special Security Service] and the military. Even though the money given was not sufficient to help with the resettlement, or even to build a home, if the retiring packages are attractive and can afford a retiree to build a home, I think many of them want to retire early to be able to do some other things. This is a key thing to consider. The donors could shift some of their resources and targets, providing attractive incentives to be able to deal with that.*

So as we speak, there are plans to amalgamate state security institutions. That will be decided by the national legislature, and when the act is submitted there, they will say yes, and that will solve it, or they will say no. If they say no, it means that these institutions will have to stay, and the government will be under obligation to find the money to finance it.

BOUTELLIS: So the Act will go in front of Parliament?

ZAIZAY: *The Act is coming from the executive and will go to Parliament. These are the efforts that we want in order to make sure that our security institutions are effective and efficient, are manageable, will be affordable. These are the key parameters that we are looking at: affordability, accessibility, availability of skilled personnel. And then the effectiveness and efficiencies of them in delivering quality services to the people of this country: these are key issues that we are looking at.*

BOUTELLIS: Mr. Peter Zaizay, thank you very much. We'll try to continue this interview at a later time.

ZAIZAY: *Thank you.*

BOUTELLIS: Today is the 13th of May, and we're back with Mr. Peter Zaizay for a follow-up of the interview we had yesterday. This is the third part of the interview. We left it at integration and amalgamation. Now I'd like to talk about internal management. By internal management of the police, we understand all the finance, procurement, all the support offices, administrative, recordkeeping, discipline, and so on, and I was wondering if you were involved in the strengthening of the internal management, or at least the thinking process over strengthening of the internal management of the Liberian National Police.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, I did participate in some of those aspects as administrator. In the Liberian National Police there are three major departments. You have administration, you have operations, and you have training. These are the key areas that the LNP have. I was in the administrative department. In the administration department we have the deputy director for administration, you have the assistant director, and then under that you have the personnel, you have public affairs, the assistant director for public affairs. You have the chief of personnel, the chief of records, the chief of logistics, which is procurement. You have the chief of maintenance. You have the chief of motor pool, control the fleets of the [...] That is headed by a deputy director for administration. Now they call it a deputy inspector-general for administration.*

It is routine in the security department that control mechanisms are set up. There you have the Professional Standard Board. You also have the Internal Board of Investigation, which used to be called the Internal Board of Inquiry. Those institutions are part and parcel of administration. Before I left I was chairing the review policy of the duty manual, the SOP [standard operating procedure] for the LNP. We developed one in collaboration with the United Nations police, working with the international police. I chaired that committee. I worked with my counterparts from the UNMIL police, UNPOL [United Nations Police]. We developed, we reviewed the duty manual. We developed a model manual. The Liberian National Law Enforcement Association [LINLEA] served as lead consultant on that committee. The head of that group, once they had specifics, helped to develop this SOP for the LNP. That SOP is there to guide police officers in terms of handling disciplinary issues. If a police officer acted

officially, there is a mechanism through which they can be reprimanded, to correct wrongdoings within the organization.

BOUTELLIS: So there was an existing SOP that was reviewed?

ZAIZAY: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: What were some of the key areas that were highlighted in the process of reviewing that? What were the key novelties?

ZAIZAY: *First we were looking at the job description, what the function of the director of police is, the deputies, their assistants, the chiefs, up and down to the line of patrolmen. What are their functions? What is the function of a commander, the deputy commander, the chief of operations; what are they supposed to be doing. So that took care of that. Then we came down to disciplinary issues. What an officer is supposed to do, what they are not supposed to do. Just a uniform code, dress code. We looked at mannerisms. You're not supposed to get drunk on duty. You're not supposed to take drugs on duty. Using profane language. You need to make a duty manual part of your life. Memorize it so they can internalize it. So all these things were outlined.*

In the previous duty manual developed by former Director Clarke, Wilfred Clarke—again, a veteran police officer developed that. It had regulations in it, in the operational area. When do you discharge your arms, when not to discharge arms, all those safety regulations important to the duty manual. That whole document was reviewed, and new values were added to it to reflect best practices. That's what we did. We were taking, learning from the experiences of other police organizations represented in Liberia. That helped us.

BOUTELLIS: Was the Internal Board of Inquiry a new institution created during the reform?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, it was a professional standards board where the mechanism is of complaints from the public. When there is police impropriety, the citizens have the right to complain about these officers to the director of police. When they write their complaints it is to the attention of the Professional Standards Board, and it goes down to the Internal Investigation Unit to investigate that police officer. Then they take that to the Board of Inquiry. There is a court, a mini court that adjudicates this between police officers and civilians. Whatever decision is taken, it is respected by our judicial system. If it is criminal, the police officer is discharged from his police immunity and sent to court. But anything that has to do with administrative misdemeanors, administrative issues or administrative procedures not being followed is through the Board of Inquiry. But if it is criminal, the police officer is immediately discharged and forwarded to the court for prosecution.*

BOUTELLIS: Do you have any specific examples to illustrate, for instance the kind of cases that this internal Board of Inquiry deals with?

ZAIZAY: *Well, cases like police brutality—for instance, if the police want to arrest and they kill and use excesses, and then they deny ever doing this. So the Internal Investigation Unit will conduct an investigation and establish the facts. Once the facts are established as far as they go, then the investigation unit will testify and find that this has happened; these are the facts. Then the board will come up with a ruling: yes, the police officer did this, and this is the penalty. Either they suspend you, [or] they dismiss you if the case was grave. That would give the*

opportunity to the victim or the complainant to take you to court, because you are a civilian and would not be covered by the immunities of being a police officer.

Then if they are criminal cases, like I said, there is no time to waste time with a board of inquiry. The investigation—once it is established that the action was criminal, you are dishonorably discharged from the service and you are hauled into court. There were cases where some officers were accused of payroll fraud, taking personnel checks and cashing them even during the deactivation process. Some officers were linked to stealing checks of dead officers or other things. These officers were dishonorably discharged and were sent to court. Some of them were acquitted because the accusers did not have sufficient evidence. There was no evidence found during [...] background checks to establish the facts. Once the court rules in favor of the defendant, there is nothing you can do but to honor the court, because the court is supreme so you respect the court order. So these people have to be reinstated. Those who have interest in the police, some have found other jobs, lost interest in coming back to the police.

So these are the mechanisms through which discipline is being restored into the organization. There are other things, other supports for the mechanisms that are being suggested. There should be a civilian oversight board of the police, even the internal selection of the leadership of the police. That board would be an independent, professional body that would be able to vet our professionals to head the police organization so they can really support the democratic aims that this country has achieved thus far in this post-conflict period. So these are key in the security sector reform effort. All of these are being given consideration.

BOUTELLIS: So this is being discussed.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, and the Civilian Oversight Board, the parliamentary oversight, and all of these things are being considered in the reform processes.*

BOUTELLIS: Currently the Liberian National Police falls under the Ministry of Justice?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, it falls under the Ministry of Justice. The Liberian National Police, the Bureau of Immigration, the National Fire Service, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, even the National Security Agency already are under the Ministry of Justice.*

BOUTELLIS: Even the Ministry of National Security?

ZAIZAY: *No, that is independent of the Ministry of Justice. All of the other line security agencies fall under the supervision of the minister of justice. The minister of justice chairs the Joint Security. But over time, before the crisis, there was a suggestion by security veterans that the minister of national security should be the coordinating arm of government to coordinate all the security agencies, and the prosecutorial role should be assigned to the minister of justice, so when it comes to security issues, crime issues, the minister of national security should coordinate all of the national security agencies and then be able to brief the cabinet about security matters, about crime issues and other key issues that tend to affect national interest items. Cases for prosecution for court action, the minister of justice should be able to represent the executive to prosecute those cases.*

BOUTELLIS: Currently how does the minister of justice articulate with the minister of national security?

- ZAIZAY: *We collaborate at upper levels, particularly in the joint security. We meet in Joint Security meetings that are chaired by the minister of justice. We share expertise in terms of information that is available to us, build analysis and take positions to see how best they can be implemented by our line officers.*
- BOUTELLIS: One critical issue in a post-conflict environment is the community relations and the perceptions. Have there been efforts to improve community perceptions and the relations of the Liberian National Police with the communities?
- ZAIZAY: *Yes, I worked closely with the community when I was there at Public Affairs to articulate the view of the police. I worked closely with the United Nations. We developed a community policing policy. There are several policies that were developed through international treaty on behalf of UNMIL or UNPOL. One is the community policing policy. I happen to be the first focal person. Through that we established a series of community policing forums, two in Monrovia, two in the countryside, to set as a bridge between the police and the communities. These community policing forums are headed by civilians, credible community members. These community-police forums were from the block level, and then they went down to living-room levels and other things. So they have to give information to the police in terms of crime and also check police conduct in the community.*
- So if there are police improprieties, they can be the ones to encourage reports to complain against the police officers to the Internal Board of Investigation or the Professional Standards or the board of inquiry, through the director of police. So these networks are there within the community as we speak.*
- BOUTELLIS: When were they established?
- ZAIZAY: *It was established in November 2004.*
- BOUTELLIS: Who sits on this board? You mentioned that the heads were the civilians.
- ZAIZAY: *Yes, the community elects their members, and the police are represented on the forum. Every police depot, or every police zone, has a representative on that community policing forum. They have meetings to discuss community problems, the issue of crime. Some of them meet monthly; some of them meet weekly depending on the gravity of the situation that they have. They decide their own meeting time. They may try to amalgamate into a loose network where forums that are organized in one county have an umbrella organization, the Community Police Forum Association of this county or that county, and so forth. Most institutions are being gradually formed so that a greater network is being established, so better information about crime, information about police impropriety can be quickly disseminated or appropriate action taken by the authorities responsible.*
- BOUTELLIS: So who is coordinating these forums—you say a loose network.
- ZAIZAY: *The forums are being coordinated by the police through the Public Affairs Department of the Liberian National Police; they coordinate it with these communities.*
- BOUTELLIS: Since 2004, since they were created, has there been sustained interest? Have people still been—?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, the momentum is growing. That's a fact. Other local and international NGOs are supporting these forums at various levels, through training, through awareness raising, and other things, like the Liberian National Law Enforcement Association through its international partners has conducted a series of workshops. How to do crime reports. How to get information about crime. How to relate to the police when there are issues in the community, then how to handle community problems with the issue of justice, so that the issue of mob justice can be avoided and people can seek justice through due process instead of beating on people, brutalizing them. They try to encourage them to stop taking the law into their own hands but be able to seek justice through the due process. So these kinds of workshops, these kinds of awareness, respect for human rights and respect for children, respect for women and others of these problems. It is done through these forums.*

Even the Carter Center is also working with the police. A lot of counties are using the traditional methods of mediation, traditional methods of justice to see what impact it makes in terms of enhancing the rule of law in the rural communities. They are working with the police; they are working with the justice sector. Even the corrections are interacting at the right levels while the training is simultaneous. We are training public officials, we are training corrections officers; we are training police officers so that the justice sector can be strengthened in a meaningful way, in a holistic way, to address the issues of justice in the world.

BOUTELLIS: Have there been any public perception surveys in Liberia on the police?

ZAIZAY: *No. There has been nothing as such except what sometimes people try to do on these local radio stations, phoning in. What do you make of the police? What is your take on the police? Those kinds of phoning in. But in terms of a sustained program, kind of a survey to really gauge the performance of the police, that has not been done, to the best of my knowledge.*

BOUTELLIS: The next category is the depoliticization of the police force in a post-conflict environment.

ZAIZAY: *Depoliticization?*

BOUTELLIS: To have the police as neutral and not used by one party or another. First, are there concerns about possible politicization, and what are the efforts to avoid potential influence?

ZAIZAY: *Right now it's difficult to avoid politicization of the police, because the mechanisms to avoid politicization have not been established. We talked about a civilian oversight board. If there is an independent professional body through which a vetting process can be conducted as far as the managers of the police organization, then that is a step forward in terms of depoliticizing the organization.*

Where we have the appointment powers in the hands of the president, they are negative. One who appoints, your service is to the person who appoints you, so that becomes a problem. So if there are political influences. But by and large we require of those who are appointed [that they] act in a professional manner and develop their own professional integrity, to be able to say to political authority that this is not correct. You cannot do this. This is a violation of democratic values and democratic institutions. But we haven't had the opportunity to be able to depoliticize. Besides the police, the security institutions heads are all—I mean, all of us are appointed by the political authority of the day.

But if you are nominated and a second body—or even if that appointment power or that nomination power is taken from the legislature and given to an independent body that we were talking about, a civilian oversight body, or even the LINLEA, which is a professional law enforcement body—to vet professionals, then you will surely see some merit to the executive to do the appointment. That can drastically reduce political influence and political interference, because if those bodies are going to come back to do monitoring, to do an evaluation of the performance of those people who have been vetted and selected—.

BOUTELLIS: So it is a work in process.

ZAIZAY: Yes, it is a work in process. It has not been formalized.

BOUTELLIS: Have there been any instances in particular in the last few years where there were concerns expressed by the public or the international community about politicization of the police?

ZAIZAY: Yes, there have been a lot of concerns over the years. People, police or the security operate as to the whims or accomplices of the powers of the day. Those calls are made. There were a series of abuses in the past. Unlike this present regime that is more tolerant to different views, in the past there was repression. The police were factionalized. They were loyal to the powers that be and against the people; they brutalized them. The military, the state security agents. All of them had designs. Because of that the citizens detested them. They didn't like the security, they thought that they were not protected by them, they were being brutalized by them and so forth.

The international community, I would say even Human Rights Watch; all of these institutions were critical of the security, the police in particular. That is why the comprehensive peace accord calls for a reform of the security institutions. There is a call for comprehensive reform of the police and the military because of their overall politicization. Even the politicians, the political parties, opted for that. There was a need for the security architecture to be reformed and restructured to reflect democratic values.

BOUTELLIS: Are there specific units within the police that have been particular targets of complaints from the public or some—?

ZAIZAY: Yes, before the war. This was started in 1989. There was a series of transitional periods. When there is a particular crime that is persistent, that the population is fearful of, usually the police authorities develop mechanisms to address those crime issues, that fearful issue. In 1993, 1994, 1995 they used to have a special task force, and that special task force was working under operations, when there were riotous situations. There were labor disputes; there were student demonstrations. This task force responded to this kind of situation.

Then during the post-conflict era, there were armed robberies by elements from the belligerent forces that were participating in the Liberian civil war, in Monrovia. It necessitated the establishment of a unit called the Special Operations Division. That division was divided into two. It was established in 1994, late 1994 to 1995, under the then director of police, who is now the minister of national defense, Brownie Samukai. That operation, the Special Operations Division, had two units, the Special Task Force and the Rapid Response Unit.

The Rapid Response Unit operated at night to deal with armed robberies and violent crimes at night. The Special Task Force operated in the day, provided VIP protection for VIPs, and responded to demonstrations. They responded to violent things in the day. So that mechanism was in place until the 1997 elections, when Mr. Taylor won the election. He utilized the SOD; he took over the running of the SOD and brought in loyalists. So that began another turning point in the politicization of the police. Brought in ex-fighters and filled the ranks and file of the police with loyalists. Then their actions were loyal to Mr. Taylor. The police, the SOD, the operational division took a new form, new outlook, with misfits, with drug addicts, with drunks, but these were loyalists to Mr. Taylor who took orders to hoodwink and terrorize the population. So for them, that was the order of the day, so there were no democratic sentiments, no matter who came in.

BOUTELLIS: So of course they were carrying weapons. The Special Operations Division had been dismantled.

ZAIZAY: *Yes, it had been disbanded, or dissolved. The STF still remains, the Special Task Force. But it appears that the Special Task Force—there has been a new unit that is being trained. They were trained in Nigeria. They call them—.*

BOUTELLIS: The SSS?

ZAIZAY: *No, not the SSS. I forgot the name. I think they call them the Police Support Unit, PSU. The name just slipped from my mind—but that group was developed through the help of the United Nations. I will get to the name later when it comes. But even at that, there is another group that has been formed called the Emergency Response Unit, the ERU. That is in training. Before the Emergency Response Unit, they had another group in the police that was created by the help of the United Nations to respond to violent crimes and riotous situations, which is the PSU.*

BOUTELLIS: So the Emergency Response Unit is a very new creation?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, the Emergency Response Unit is very new. They are still being trained. But there was another unit that wears a tactical uniform—how do you call them—the PSU, as I said earlier, that is the name of the Unit I told that I forgot the name. We can come back to that later.*

BOUTELLIS: So let's come back to the—the STF remains, and they do close protection and so on for officials?

ZAIZAY: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Now the Emergency Response Unit is—.

ZAIZAY: *The Emergency Response Unit is going to serve as a buffer between the police and the military. When there is a riotous situation, if the ERU fails to deal with it then the military can come in.*

BOUTELLIS: So they're still in training. How big will be the ERU?

ZAIZAY: *The ERU will generally be about 500 to 600 men.*

BOUTELLIS: Are they from the regular police and just being trained?

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- ZAIZAY: *Yes, from the regular police and people who have had good records in other organizations, the military, the police.*
- BOUTELLIS: This unit is designed to be armed. The regular police doesn't carry weapons? The ERU would carry weapons?
- ZAIZAY: *Would carry weapons, yes. They will be armed.*
- BOUTELLIS: So if the regular police can't handle an armed robbery, for instance, they can call the ERU.
- ZAIZAY: *Yes, if the conflict becomes violent then they will call the ERU to deal with something like that. If the armed robbery becomes—if it will be engaged in bank robberies, highway robberies, and other things, the ERU will be deployed along those lines, to be able to respond immediately when those kinds of situations erupt.*
- BOUTELLIS: The ERU responds?
- ZAIZAY: *Then the military come in if this is seen as a real, immediate threat in order to deal with this kind of situation.*
- BOUTELLIS: Where does the SSS stand?
- ZAIZAY: *The Special Security Service is for the protection of the president and those immediate to the president.*
- BOUTELLIS: How is it different from the STF?
- ZAIZAY: *Normally, the SSS does close protection for VIPs, only but STF provides for parameter security like building security, where they stay, public buildings, public institutions—in their visible uniform, they're respected.*
- BOUTELLIS: They have their uniforms, armed with weapons.
- ZAIZAY: *Yes, with weapons. At this point in time they are using batons; they really don't have weapons to carry. But the people as a rule that carry the weapons are the unit that was trained in Nigeria. I forget the name of it. They were trained. It is called the Police Support Unit, PSU.*
- BOUTELLIS: We can add it afterward.
- ZAIZAY: *It came into being in 2005. Almost every public official wanted the presence of this unit.*
- BOUTELLIS: The next area, the last area actually is the non-state security groups, such as private companies, vigilante, traditional sort of provincial groups. Can you describe some of these groups?
- ZAIZAY: *What is it?*
- BOUTELLIS: Non-state security groups, meaning groups that provide security, whether they be private security or vigilante or whatever.
- ZAIZAY: *The vigilante is not allowed in our dispensation, because they are a respector of the rule of law [...] Our custom of private security is for profit motive, like*

businesses, private businesses or private homes. Those areas where police do not cover they can hire private security. So some ex-police officers organized private security groups: gave them a uniform, gave them other accessories, flashlights, batons, to provide perimeter security, to control access to those homes. You see that sometimes in supermarkets, when you are entering. You see some private security. They are not armed, but they are providing perimeter security. They are there to control access.

The American Embassy security—Intercom is also helping those areas, they also take some private contracts—the UN security, the UN premises, UN homes, UN staff members; this private security is provided. The Watch Team is different from that. The Watch Team is a community effort to assist the police, and sometimes they transform themselves into vigilantes. The vigilante is not being encouraged under the community policing policy. It is not police-initiated. Vigilantism does not respect the rule of law. It is not encouraged under our democratic dispensation.

BOUTELLIS: Because—?

ZAIZAY: *Because they carry out instant justice. They do a lot of violations of due process in this course. But the Watch Team, they watch throughout the community and give information to the police about known criminals, about violations in the community, so that the police will use due process to take these violators of the law to the law.*

BOUTELLIS: So in general, the relations between the police and these groups is generally good?

ZAIZAY: *Yes. The private security is an extension of our role, of the function of the police. They do investigations in their area of operation. Then once it becomes criminal, the matter becomes a state issue. So it is turned over to the police for investigation.*

BOUTELLIS: In terms of vigilantism, have there been instances of vigilante groups being set up, and how has the state dealt with it?

ZAIZAY: *Vigilantism is being discouraged by the government. We are not a nation of constant support for vigilantism. We encourage the community Watch Teams. We support the community policing forums that set up these Watch Teams. These Watch Teams are not to only keep watch at night; they can keep watch both at night and day depending on the situation. But the vigilantes, these are people who want to keep watch with cutlasses or machetes, or blunt objects or other things to terrify the community. They think they will be terrifying perpetrators of crime, but in the final analysis they turn on some innocent victims. When you see somebody just proceeding to be a criminal and then they beat on the person, end up murdering the person, and you cannot find the actual perpetrator—that is why they're being discouraged, vigilantism is being discouraged under the community policing initiative.*

BOUTELLIS: We've covered a number of different areas. Now I'd like to take the bigger picture of police reform and restructuring. What are some of the broader challenges, and what, in your opinion, are the tasks that should be prioritized?

ZAIZAY: *Well, there were some efforts made by the Governance Commission in identifying the security environment. He also may have read the Rand reports on Liberia, and then the Governance Commission report also was giving an assessment. All of these are points to some of the key challenges and how these*

challenges can be surmounted. One of the key issues is the issue of lawlessness in this country, which we talked about the other day. It is a major challenge.

The issue of drug abuse among young people which is really forcing the lawlessness and also giving rise to criminality in the society. The issue of land, land disputes. As we speak there are some disputes in the countryside where [...] some elements are attacking one another over a piece or a parcel of land. We also have the issue of diseases: HIV/AIDS is a major challenge in our own community. The other issue of mineral allocations, mineral resources, etc.

BOUTELLIS: Management of resources.

ZAIZAY: *The management of mineral resources is a big issue. If you go to the mining site, it is like no man's land. Lawlessness is pervasive. Every county has an illicit mining area where people go and mine diamonds, mine gold, and so forth. They come and obtain their licenses from the Minister of Lands and Mines, and so forth. You also have the issue of the latex business, the rubber business; that is another area that causes some potential threat to national security because people want to have quick money. They want to go at night and attack people, get a latex and go sell it. In the process people are maimed, people are killed, and so forth. So these are all potential threats, and it poses serious challenges to the efforts of the police in terms of dealing with these issues.*

Right now, we cannot talk about political intolerance by the government. The government is tolerant to a lot of views. There are many views. There are no political prisoners, due process is allowed to take its course, and so forth. So we cannot talk about those things as major challenges. What needs to be done is to provide frequent education for the police to deal with these challenges that tend to pose threats to a secure environment. Also look at the original dimensions, mercenaries within a sub-region, because some of the fighters are underground, some of them are in refugee camps, some of them are into neighboring countries. They could be hired by other people as assassins or other things, for subversive activities. So all of these are threats. Even the deactivated officers who did not get proper and lucrative retirement benefits. So the ability to readjust and resettle into the communities is difficult; you find it difficult in every part of the countryside. They want to stay in the urban community to see if they can find jobs.

Since the '50s up to the '60s, the countryside has been neglected because of the organizations, because of the mining sector being established, the agriculture industry, Firestone; other companies were established. So people who were dependent on subsistence farming began to move into these concession areas, to the mining sector, to find alternatives sources [...] of living. So that was exacerbated during the war. People who were in the countryside who took up arms and moved into Monrovia, some of them were given factional appointments in government to move their family, their relatives. So they are finally going to move back home and settle, and they don't have the skill to make an income through honest means. So these are all threats the police will need to be trained to deal with. The police also need to be trained to be politically tolerant. Orders that would lead to excesses, that would lead to international and domestic public outcry against it, should not be executed.

BOUTELLIS: These last few years, in the process of reform, restructuring of the Liberian National Police, are there some innovations or some experiments that have been tried that you think merit attention, some successes or some key steps forward in the reform of the police?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, there have been some successes. We can't just condemn the whole process; we have some successes. But again, this is a small community; Liberia is a small community. Liberia is almost a monolithic society. Because of the intermarriages everybody seems to be one family. If you look at maybe the ethnic interaction, every ethnic group in this country has intermarried even in some regions. So that has helped to anchor and locate all of the ethnic groups into the other ethnic group through blood relations and what have you, through the intermarriages.*

So by and large, the ethnic and geographic balance in this reform effort is also a plus; it is one thing to look at. It's random—you will point out that geographic is dominating in this area, so that is a flaw that we can look at, because the way, the manner and form, people are being selected. The vetting process is helping to at least address one of these key issues so you don't have one group dominating in the security arena, and that is a plus. But in terms of best practices, we need to also look around the sub-regions to see what pertains in Sierra Leone, how Ghana succeeded in the reform effort of the police. Look beyond, look at Nigeria and other post-conflict societies outside of the sub-region, maybe Uganda. Look at the South African society—that is a divided society—how they transformed the police to be tolerant in terms of people. They may not be perfect, but there are some pluses and some minuses that we can also look at in terms of the reform effort.

BOUTELLIS: Some of these examples taken from the sub-region have been—the Family Support Unit in Sierra Leone has been sort of imported here with the creation of the Women and Children Protection section.

ZAIZAY: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Is this a unit that has been—?

ZAIZAY: *I think it was copied from the Family Support Unit in the Sierra Leonean police. One of the assistant inspector-generals of police in Sierra Leone for crime services now, for training [...] was instrumental in the training and the establishment of the Women and Children Protection section within the Liberian National Police. The UN was also instrumental in collaboration.*

BOUTELLIS: When was it established here?

ZAIZAY: *The Women and Children Protection was established in 2005, and it evolved out of the Sexual Assault unit in the CID and the Juvenile Section within the Patrol Division. So these two sections were blended because they were dealing with women and dealing with children, so they were blended and formed the Women and Children Protection unit. Instead of just copying directly from Sierra Leone and saying Family Support Unit, they said Women and Children Protection Unit. There are issues of child abuse, there are the problems of nonsupport of children, rape, sexual assault cases, gender-based violence issues. All these issues are in that section. There was training being supported by UNICEF and other international parties strengthening the capacity of that section.*

BOUTELLIS: So three years after its creation, has it been a success? Has there been support from the community?

ZAIZAY: *Yes, there is wide support. AFELL, the Association of Female Lawyers, is even supporting it; they have been one of the major supporters of the Women and*

Children Protection Unit. They are collaborating in prosecuting rape cases; they have been very instrumental in dealing with the rape cases that are brought to their attention. The staff there are trained in documenting rape cases and investigating rape cases and even how to protect the victims or survivors of rape. There are other groups like THINK Liberia [that] provide safe houses for the survivors of rape so that their identity is not revealed to the public. All of this is a plus that we can count in the reform effort.

There is a series of administrative programs to extend the capacity of police officers in investigation training, information gathering training, which we call crime intelligence training, middle management training, commander schools, we talk about senior management schools. All of this training has been very instrumental in strengthening the capacity of the police. It may not be honest to say they are people building their CV, but in the long run it will have the desired effect in terms of coming back to reassess the output of the police. By the time these young guys who are coming to the police get matured in the profession, they will be able to take us on a fairer ground in terms of what you expect them to have real loyalty [to] in this country.

BOUTELLIS: So the last section—now I'd like to turn to the donor community and the United Nations. You have been involved with the United Nations, particularly UNPOL, in the reform process, as well as some bilateral donors. What would be a general look on their contribution, and maybe some things that have been positive, and some things that could be done better?

ZAIZAY: *My only problem I have with the UN—we are like hungry people, or drowning people. When someone is drowning, even if they can feel a shark in the water, they want to go onto it to save their lives. We are emerging from a protracted period of civil conflict. The state, as we said, failed, and because it failed it collapsed. Now we are in the process of reconstructing, reconstituting a state. Because of that, our needs are very enormous. So we take from anyone who wants to help us. It is like somebody whose house is on fire: everybody is coming to help put it out, to put the fire out. One of the key problems is sitting with the beneficiary of the donors, of the donation, to really let the beneficiary say yes, I agree, you are giving me water to drink, but I drank enough water already; I want something else. If you give me something else that is going to help me immensely to improve—. Sometimes the donors, the nations, have constraints. They will already tell me the needs. For instance, at the academy there was some good will that came out immediately for the training. A million dollars was given by the American government initially for training. Over half of that was just used for tents and prefabricated kitchens. They told us they spent \$300,000 for tents and \$290,000 for kitchens, prefab kitchens to cook faster... Then the contract was given to private institutions—when we have people within the organization that had the capacity, all they needed was to upgrade the capacity to the level they wanted to serve, but now—and they should also be there to help people to earn an income. By and large some of the contributing factors of the war were the issue of poverty, the issue of access to resources.*

Then we bring you resources, how can you redistribute this resource to trickle down to the ordinary beneficiaries. They would not then be seeing huge reconstruction or infrastructure that will not have long term effects. Like those tents. We were suggesting that there was a need to refurbish the existing structures to improve on them so you have a durable infrastructure. They were talking about an immediate plan. We we're saying: you're not being attacked. The Liberians are peaceful, they're not attacking you, they're a people who love friends as well as strangers—why do you want to be rushing? Why don't they

take the time to do this also, so that when you leave we will have the use of these facilities that you are putting up for us? These were key questions that we raised.

So yes, there is general good will for Liberia, and we appreciate that. But all that we can add: it is good for the donor to sit with us. Instead of saying, we got this for you, what do you think would be best to be utilized? Then we tell you, OK, we could better utilize this and better utilize it here or there. But we got this. We don't want to spend it on this. You've got money, you're generous, this is what you want to do. We don't want to tell you not to do it because we need it; it will benefit us in the long run; that's what you've got, that what you want to do. We could tell you right after this: no, we need it for that. Some of the people also look and see a security threat, all of the international organizations that are here. They come with money, they look outside and bring in foreign stuff, what have you. There is also income disparity, which is understandable. Now when they leave, when these institutions are closed and [...] these Liberians who have been accustomed to setting their income beyond the average income level of government, and with the slow pace of the public sector development to provide the needed jobs—that is also going to produce some social problems. It will be a potential source of insecurity, because people are beginning to find ends to meet: how do they sustain all of their life what they are enjoying [...] from the international community. These are key questions that we need to look at. Donors should look at other priority areas in terms of strengthening income and also looking at strengthening private sector development to support the security structures, enhance national security. That is the key point that I would say. There is a lot of goodwill for Liberia, but sometimes the priorities of the beneficiaries and the priorities of the donors are different.

BOUTELLIS: Has there been a national donor coordination mechanism set up at the level of the ministry or the police?

ZAIZAY: *That is ongoing now, to see how bad the behavior streamlines and locate and be able to keep track of official development assistance, that assistance that accounts to the government or government parastatals. So that mechanism is being worked up from the office of the president to the Liberian Development Resource—Development and Reconstruction Committee. They are working with other line agencies, line ministries, the minister of planning, the minister of development, the minister of public works, to ensure that all official development assistance and help is channeled and is factored into our project. If the donor is giving money to Liberia, how can we track it in our national budget and expend it on national priority projects.*

So the line ministers are happy now to coordinate that, so that all official development assistance can be channeled through government institutions and be able to be tracked. That is going to help to improve all of the system accounting to the government, so that donors will not just come and go back, so they will not just give a donation and then it's back again to the donor countries' economy. We still have the problem of dual currency in Liberia, which is posing a serious economic problem.

BOUTELLIS: What are the biggest challenges you think the police will face when the UN and the donors progressively withdraw?

ZAIZAY: *The biggest challenge is the issue of receptibility, acceptability, whether the police will be accepted and respected when the UN leaves. There's a little dissension and a little disgruntlement within a society. People feel they were*

unfairly treated, their professional career was short-lived. Their professional career was abused and not respected. So they vent their frustration on the police, the guys that were seen in the uniforms, in the military. It could be any of them. But if they feel they are not up to their level in terms of experience and so forth—. These are potential threats, acceptability with both the military and the police. That is one of the key things.

BOUTELLIS: Before we wrap up the interview, do you have any final comments?

ZAIZAY: *The only comment is to express my thanks and appreciation to you for your research. I hope that I have given a clear picture of our country, as to what the international community is doing in this country and what we have to strengthen the bridges of hope that the Liberian people will be able to cherish, forging alliances with their lives, to rebuild this country, to have a vibrant society, the posterity of all will always be appreciated, so that we don't relapse into conflict. We hope that all those reports, all that research that is being done in Liberia, will take us through to the desired mission that we have for our country through our president.*

BOUTELLIS: Peter Zaizay, thank you very much for your time.

ZAIZAY: *Thank you.*