



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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SCHER: My name is Daniel Scher and I'm the associate director of the Innovations for Successful Societies project, and I'm here in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on the 11th of August 2009. I am here at police headquarters with ACP [Assistant Commissioner of Police Lucas] Kusima, ASP [Assistant Superintendent of Police] Mahumi, ASP Obassy, PC [Police Constable] Robert and PC Dominique. Thank you very much for taking time out of your very busy schedules to meet with me.

MULTIPLE: *Thank you very much.*

SCHER: I'm here because I've heard a lot about the Tanzanian police reform program. I'm very interested to learn some more. As you know we've developed some questions, but I'd like to really encourage you to interject and tell me if I'm missing the point, or tell me if there are questions that I should be asking. I'd like to now just sort of dive right in and talk a little bit about some of the challenges that the Tanzanian police force were facing that really necessitated a major reform effort.

So prior to the start of the reform program, what were the major challenges that the force was facing?

KUSIMA: *Thank you, thank you very much for being here with us today, and we are happy to participate in this interview. My name is Lucas Kusima. Taking the first question I would like my colleague, Mr. Mahumi, to get to the first question.*

MAHUMI: *Thank you very much. My name is Mahumi, assistant superintendent of police. Of course, there are a number of challenges which necessitated the onset of the Tanzanian police force reforms and if I tell you we go back to 2005, there were just a number of issues pertaining to safety and the security of the country, in particular to the police force. The force was facing a number of challenges. The first one was on the human-resources management. That could range from recruitment—we had a number of shortfalls in our recruitment systems; training; promotions; transfers, as far as to the exit pay structures and the like. And we had a number of problems to the extent of not much vetting the police officers to do their work very efficiently.*

Also the other challenge was on the aspect of the financial constraints. The force was of course facing a number of shortfalls in terms of sources of finance. We of course could only depend on one source, and that was the government sources. And as far as the legal and the regulatory system was concerned, we are not allowed to have any other source from outside the government circles. So of course the government itself had just very little capacity to finance the force. So that was the second challenge. And the third challenge which necessitated the reforms was on the aspect of legal and equipment Regulatory framework [3:29]. This could be looked in two dimensions; the legal framework which supports the mandate of the police force, of course, was becoming questionable. It had some discrepancies which would not facilitate the well provision of safety and security as mandated to the police force. And secondly, of course, we were dealing with some outdated laws which of course had lost the publicity before the public. So it was just very necessary that we could undertake some reforms on that aspect to rectify the situation.

Also the other area which, the other challenge which of course prompted the reforms was on the so-called infrastructure and equipment. We had a number of problems in that area. If you are speaking about the infrastructure, you are speaking about the offices, the accommodations, the equipment and the like. The Tanzania police force by that time and until now had just a very poor

infrastructure system which would not support the better life to its employees and the other functions of the force. So, of course, that necessitated the force to undertake such holistic reforms.

Also we had some challenges in ICT (information and communication technologies), as it can be called, the technology and sciences that are advancing every now and then, but the force was just lagging behind in that area and that could be just locked into two phases. In the first phase, the force had no capacity of utilizing the ICT innovations in fighting crime. So it was just very necessary that we could target in that area to harness the ICT in fighting crime. Also the ICT on the other side of the coin was just being used by the so-called criminals. The criminals were just using the ICT in trying to facilitate their other criminal activities. So, of course, that was a very big challenge to us and there was a very big address of embarking on the reforms.

The other big challenge was of course on the confidence, erosion of the confidence of the public towards the police force. There was just a number of dissatisfactions amongst the public and the other stakeholders, and of course they went as far as questioning as to why we police should exist. Of course, you can see how difficult this situation was, and this prompted us to take just a major step towards reforming the force. Those were just among several challenges which prompted us as the force to undertake the ongoing reforms.

KUSIMA: *If I can add one or two things on that aspect.*

SCHER: Sure.

KUSIMA: *Globally, police forces are now looking at the community as a source of policing. So they are moving to community policing. We thought maybe if we could follow the global trends—what our colleagues were doing in other countries—whether we could, I mean, upgrade our services. And again, the ratio between police officers and the public, according to internationally agreed standards, is one police officer to 400-500 people. But with us, we had a ratio of one police officer to 1,300 people. So it was an area that we had to look into.*

SCHER: You mentioned a number of issues, but I'm quite interested in this question of why this particular moment was chosen for reform. Was there any particular event that made the reform of the police more urgent, or did all these different factors just come together and make it necessary at this time in 2005?

KUSIMA: *In fact there were, say, two very big factors. One is that there was a change of government at that time. It was juxtaposed directions, and we had a new inspector-general who was a very dynamic fellow. Actually he is the person who is, what can I say, not the mastermind, but like I mean he is the father of all—.*

SCHER: The driving force?

KUSIMA: *The driving force behind. Again, there was a very alarming crime rate of armed robberies, especially financial institutions. So these two things, in addition to what we have just said, necessitated a very quick reaction.*

MAHUMI: *Maybe, too, even the political support we are just enjoying from the top leadership of the country; of course, it could be accounted just among the factors which prompted the reform.*

- SCHER: Had any attempts been made to reform the police before? Had there been other programs or other attempts?
- KUSIMA: *There had been attempts, I mean there have been attempts since way back, 1961, when we got independence. Like, for example, Africanization, because former inspector-generals were whites. So putting in a Tanzanian inspector-general was one of the reforms, so to say.*
- SCHER: I see.
- KUSIMA: *There were attempts, say 1975, where there were massive retrenchments of officers. That was also an attempt of actually reforming. But recent cases were, I think in 1983 there was an attempt to look at the scheme of service, in the police service Regulations... no, in 1995, that was 1995, the police service regulations were enacted and trying to delegate the disciplinary authority to regions. It was thought, maybe, if the disciplinary authority went to the down, down bottom, maybe there would be more discipline and better performance. The scheme of service looked to improve allowances and salary scales. All these were just sporadic attempts at reforming the force, but they did not take a holistic approach as what we are having now.*
- SCHER: So I'd like to if we may move on and talk a little bit about the medium-term strategic plan, which is what I understand to be the current framework for the reform office. Am I correct?
- KUSIMA: *You are quite right.*
- SCHER: So I'd be interested to know a little bit about how this reform plan was developed. I mean, you mentioned that the current IGP [inspector-general police] was the driver for a lot of this, but I'd be quite interested to know a little bit more about the process of planning a reform effort such as this.
- MAHUMI: *Of course, the medium-term strategic plan was drawn first from the national vision for development 2025. Also we have the so-called MKUKUTA, the national strategy for poverty reduction, and the other macro policies which govern the day-to-day functioning of the government. Also we could draw from the ministry, the then ministry of safety and security vision, and we came up then with some ideas which were collected from among the police colleagues from different cadres, and we could just undertake some sort of research. Research was then undertaken, was administered within the force and beyond the force, where some data were gathered and this could of course help to set out the medium strategic plan which thus really could give results to the so-called reform document. Of course that was part and parcel of the formal document.*
- SCHER: So I understand that a team of experts was put together from within the police to assist with the development of the program. Was that what you were mentioning about getting input from different cadres?
- MAHUMI: Yes.
- SCHER: So I'd like to know a little bit about how these experts were chosen, and were they high-ranking, medium ranking? Did you try to get a range of views? How did you try and get the best input that you could?
- MAHUMI: *The team of experts comprised internal experts, that is police officers and also external experts. We got assistance from the University of Dar es Salaam, we*

had two professors working with us. But from inside we had high-ranking officers from the police headquarters, from the training department and planning department. We had two commandants from police colleges, police college in Zanzibar and police college in Dar es Salaam. We had experienced regional police commanders who had been in the field for quite some time. We had experienced investigators from the criminal investigation department. We also had lecturers from those colleges that I mentioned.

KUSIMA: Those were mid rank officers.

MAHUMI: Yes, the lecturers were middle-ranked officers, but the others that I have mentioned were very, very high-ranking officers: deputy commissioners and senior commissioners. From the university we had two professors.

KUSIMA: Yes, we had two professors and two assistant lecturers who hold master's degrees in different disciplines.

MAHUMI: Also in terms of ranking, of course, we had even the low-ranking officers. I was by then a constable because I was among the selected team.

SCHER: So within this team you must have had an incredible wealth of knowledge, and it must have been very helpful in providing input and making suggestions on how to go about—.

MAHUMI: Exactly, exactly, that was the intention.

SCHER: So is it fair to say that this team was sort of the backbone of the reform?

MAHUMI: Exactly.

SCHER: Now I also understand that you held workshops and some seminars over the two-year planning period. I'd be interested to know who was involved in these. Was it a different group to the team of experts? And were there attempts to involve perhaps civil society or members of the public?

KUSIMA: Because he was part of the team, Mr. Mahumi will explain that one better.

MAHUMI: Of course, the workshops and seminars were held for different stakeholders including the internal ones and the external stakeholders, and of course the aim at the outset was just to sensitize people on what will be happening in the force. And the workshops and seminars were also administered after the collection of data and just the compiling the reform document to inform the people what was contained in the reform document. Of course that would be the way for us to inform the force. So the workshops and seminars can be looked at as those two phases. Of course a number of stakeholders were involved. They could involve even the high-ranking government leadership. We went as far as to meet and discuss some issues with the incumbent president of the United Republic of Tanzania and the president of Zanzibar, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Also we visited, we could discuss with the retired presidents. We had two of them. We could meet with the prime minister and the other ministers, amounting to nine of them.

Also we could discuss with permanent secretaries of the ministries. We could also meet with the other notable public figures, the business community, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and the other members of the public in general,

could go as far as to meet with people in the markets to discuss and have some of their views pertaining to what we are just trying to do.

So of course to my side I could see the process of the endeavor was very inclusive. It could involve a number of stakeholders having to harness the views and support and the like.

SCHER: Can I just ask you a question for my own clarification? So you have a number of different things happening. You've got workshops, seminars, you've got a team of experts. Who was actually directing all of these different things that are happening? Who is setting up the meetings with the presidents? I mean, were there particular units within the police or elsewhere that were dedicated to just sort of handling the logistics of the process?

MAHUMI: *Of course, what was done was just to form an internal committee to engineer the initial stages of that forum. So that internal committee was responsible for making some arrangements and their other endeavor was to facilitate the entire process of workshops and seminars.*

SCHER: So as I mentioned you've got this team of experts with this wealth of knowledge and presumably a wealth of opinions on what the focus areas of the reform program should be. So how did you go about choosing the focus areas for the reform program and settling on a document that everybody agreed on?

MAHUMI: *The document was just a product of the views from both the internal and the external stakeholders. We could, as I could say earlier, we prepared a questionnaire which asked everyone who was administered that particular questionnaire to list out—of course, we had some guidance on how to fill out the questionnaire, but everybody was at liberty to air his or her views on what is concerning the police. So after gathering all the views from the people who were just given the questionnaires we could then rank those problems which were articulated by those people, and then with the assistance of the experts then we could group those specific areas of reforms then, the focus areas.*

So the focus areas were just the product of the views from all the stakeholders, be them internal or external.

SCHER: So what were the type of reform options or strategies that you considered to deal with these different areas? I mean, were you looking at other countries for advice or were you planning on creating something that was more homegrown?

MAHUMI: *Of course, our aspiration was to have a homegrown reform program, but that does not mean that we were barred from learning from other forces. Of course what we did was research as the first point. We did comparative studies from a number of police forces in the world, and our major focus was to extract both from the developed and developing countries. We could visit a number of reforms which were undertaken, for instance, in the U.K. and the U.S.A. We extracted something. Then we went to other developing countries, including some Asian countries like Indonesia. Nigeria, where we could fetch some examples on failing police reforms from Nigeria. Yes, I think you know.*

So we had a number of countries which we visited in terms of literature, including Kenya also. So we harnessed a number of assistance and literatures from other countries.

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- SCHER: Was there general agreement over the way in which the reform should be approached, or were there divergent opinions on the strategies that should be adopted?
- KUSIMA: *At the outset there were a number of views on how to approach that first. There were those who were of the opinion that the reform should be partly undertaken, should be dealing with just an issue until its completion, then we take another one.*
- SCHER: So one particular problem at a time.
- KUSIMA: *Yes, one at a time, that was one thinking from the members of the team. But there were those who were of the opinion that there should be a holistic approach. After we have discovered the focus areas it is better that we go with them together, but by phases. So there were differences. But the agreed approach was the second one, the holistic approach, attacking the reform in the holistic manner to address those challenges which I've explained.*
- SCHER: As you mentioned, the program has enjoyed a lot of political support. You have had access to the opinions and inputs of very high-level ministers and high-level government officials. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about how having this high-level backing has affected the development and the implementation of the reform program.
- KUSIMA: *Maybe I can say that, because this, the process was evolving. I mean, political leaders were involved right from the outset, so they knew what was going on and what our intention was. So we had the greatest support from them. Again, because they were also concerned—because the crime rates had increased, public trust and confidence to the police force had gone down—they were also supportive to see that this situation change. So we had the best support that we could expect from political leaders.*
- Fortunately we enjoyed this support at the beginning of the reform program, and we are still enjoying it to date.*
- SCHER: I'd like to, if we may, move on and talk about some of the specific aspects of the reform program. I understand that a number of programs and policies have already been put in place organized around three clusters: community policing, professionalization and modernization. I was wondering if you could tell me a little bit more about the goals of these programs and in particular how they relate to some of the challenges that you mentioned earlier. That is quite a big question. We can take it one by one, maybe talk about community policing.
- KUSIMA: *Yes. Of course, I have some sort of hesitation because we have just changed the approach, but these three clusters they are to stay as the high goals.*
- SCHER: OK.
- MAHUMI: *You're going to see when we talk more in the coming questions that we have changed the approach. But what can I say about, that after collecting the ideas, views and the other inputs from stakeholders we could come up with these three underpinning issues which we thought were very central for reforming the force. I could say earlier that the relationship between the police and the public by then was not good, so it was desired first to build a functional partnership with the members of the community and the other stakeholders so that we can gain public support. So it was very imperative that we could do a number of strategies to*

revive or if not to strengthen the relationship between the Tanzanian police force and the members of the community. So that was about community policing; I'm trying to highlight.

But if at all you come to this so-called professionalism, referring back to human resources. We had a number of shortfalls in human resources in terms of training as an educated area, in terms of recruitment itself. We could not get the right people in the right job. So if at all you are speaking about police force from the professional point of view, we were losing the direction of being a professional body. So dedicated efforts were needed to take the police force in the professional direction. So our aim then was to use the human resources to have modern equipment in undertaking policing functions sometimes without compromising with the other specifics like human rights and rule of law. Of course that was the new process. We were to use ICT in professionalism to build some new ways of policing. So that was something to do with the professionalism. We were trying to revive the professionalism, and we were making a counterbalance then between the community policing and the professionalism. We are trying our best to deliver them to have a proper balance in this.

Then modernization. We were talking about the advances making in science and technology. If at all you are not modern, then you cannot just tackle crime which arising every now and then using sophisticated modern ways of just facilitating them. So of course we are trying to modernize the force in terms of equipment, whatever. If at all you see these three clusters, these were not working in isolation. These were interlinked.

If at all you are drawing the so-called intersecting sets of circles, you can draw them, there will be a certain place where these three clusters were intersecting, so they are not working in isolation. They are so intertwined to the extent of just producing the same impacts in the long range. So the first plan of implementation we formed then each and every cluster had its own goals, it had its own—it had the goal, it had objectives, strategy objectives and a number of line objectives to achieve the goals within a specific cluster.

We went on this type of arrangement in terms of implementation. But we noted that we are failing because people were thinking that if a person is assigned the community policing cluster he or she should be solely dealing with that particular area and forgetting other areas. So we saw that the reform program was fragmented. Then we revised the implementation arrangement strategy, and we have a new arrangement where now we are using normal or routine working arrangements within the force. So we just revised the implementation plan arrangements.

SCHER: Can I ask for some clarification on that? When you say you would assign somebody to community policing cluster, how exactly would that work? You would take a regular officer and, say, in addition to his register responsibilities he is also implementing this aspect of the program or—I'm trying to get a handle on how you sort of went about taking from the document and sort of enacting it into the force itself.

KUSIMA: *Of course we formed the so-called implementation committees, and these were ranging from the national, regional, district and the station level. We formed, for instance, the steering committee at the national level, which was led by the inspector-general of police and the other members who included the four commissioners who were assisting the IGP, the inspector-general of police. Each*

cluster then was assigned to a specific commissioner. For instance, community policing was assigned to the commissioner of operations and training, who was responsible for each and every thing that was under this particular cluster in terms of goals, objectives and line of actions.

Then professionalism was assigned to the director of criminal investigation, the commissioner of police, who was to deal with all such issues which were under this particular cluster; and the modernization was assigned to the commissioner of administration and finance and also he was in charge of everything that was taking place in that cluster.

Below that we had some technical committees. Each cluster then had a number of technical committees which were responsible for planning, implementation to other aspects which were within their areas, controlling. Then that format could trickle down, then up to the regional level, where the regional commander was in charge or the chairman of the steering committee at the regional level. The same template was then repeated at the district level to station level, and the feedback was taking place within those lines then if at all you are speaking about the upward or downward communication.

SCHER: But then you mentioned that this was perhaps too, each cluster was a bit too isolated.

KUSIMA: Yes.

SCHER: And the new system, how does that work?

KUSIMA: *The new system is a little bit different. The goal is still the same, but we have one program goal. That is, we want to improve policing services in terms of access, quality, timeliness, operational efficiency and effectiveness. Now, the three clusters now are now regarded as strategic objectives of the program. But we have added one other cluster, so to speak, or strategic objective. We still have modernization, we still have professionalism, but we think it is also important to strengthen the operational capability of the force. Of course we have community policing in engaging the community in policing. These are the strategic objectives.*

Now, under these we have key result areas. We think through these key result areas it is only when you can achieve the strategic objectives. The key result areas we are talking of here: One is looking at the systems, systems for improving policing operations. We are looking again at legal, regulatory and institutional structures. And of course we have ICT, we have human resource management, we have infrastructure tools and equipment, we have involved the community in policing, and finally we have program governance and management arrangements. So there is no question now here of each cluster being on its own, being isolated. So the key result areas, you can clearly see that they are mixed or interlinked, so that is the only difference now between the old perception and the current one.

MAHUMI: *And to add, the reform activities have been mainstreamed in the daily working life of the staffs, so there is no separate meeting saying this is for reform program and this activity is routine. So we have just tried to interlink, to mainstream the entire reform program.*

KUSIMA: *Into the daily routine.*

MAHUMI: *Yes, into the daily routine.*

SCHER: I see. So, I'd be interested to know a little bit more detail on some of these, how the programs were structured. So, if you're talking about something like human resource management and in particular, say, recruitment, you mentioned that there were some problems there, I'd be quite interested to know a little bit more about how you went about addressing specific aspects. What was your strategy for dealing with recruitment issues, with promotion issues and other issues of that nature?

MAHUMI: *If you're referring to the first document, we have tried to break down these key result areas into attainable broad interventions. We have a number of broad interventions within which there are some very specific activities to be performed that pertain to the particular area of intervention. For instance, if we're speaking about human resource management, we have a number of broad interventions. In terms of recruitment, we have interventions there and several activities which are to be performed to attain a particular output within a given intervention. So every issue that was seen as a problem then is addressed and has been designated with a particular intervention to alleviate it.*

KUSIMA: *To be specific on human resources, you're asking. We are looking at strengthening the human resource processes and systems. We say systems like recruitment, promotions, appraisal. We are trying to strengthen those systems, and managing human resource information is also a key area, to develop leadership within the police. Of course we are also looking at issues like combating of HIV-AIDS and addressing the gender inequality in the force.*

MAHUMI: *Plus corruption and human rights.*

KUSIMA: *Of course, those are very important matters: corruption and human rights.*

SCHER: I wonder if I could ask just a really specific question—sorry to push this issue of HR management but we're quite interested about the specific details of what the strategy is. So if you're looking at the issue, say, of recruitment or perhaps if training would be easier to talk about, what are the interventions that have been attached to these areas? What are the changes in the way that you are doing things in, let's say, recruitment or training?

KUSIMA: *Maybe I'll speak on one aspect of recruitment. Formerly recruitment was just done—how should I say it?—haphazardly or serendipitously. There was no, if you wanted to join the police force you did not know what to expect, the remunerations, the terms of service. Everything was conducted sort of in camera, in secrecy. But now we have established an open system of recruitment.*

MAHUMI: *Transparent.*

KUSIMA: *So here there is no question of nepotism now. A person who is recruited must really qualify for the job; so that's the difference. Because we had seen there was a problem in recruitment, once you do not recruit well, definitely you won't get the expected service for the people; that's how we have gone about it. Promotion likewise. People were getting promoted at the whims of their superiors. Now we have put standards and criteria for promotions; it's transparent.*

SCHER: How have you made it transparent? Are there public postings? Is it a publication?

KUSIMA: Not quite publication, but we have put criteria and standards, so that if one knows that I have this level of education, I have this experience, and I have been in the service for this number of years, definitely I get promoted.

SCHER: And people have been made aware of this?

KUSIMA: Yes, people have been made aware of that, and they have a right to ask, if I'm not promoted, why. Then you tell him the reasons, of course; so it is more transparent and more involving.

SCHER: We covered a little bit about the planning and technical committees, which was one of the questions I had but I'm particularly interested in learning more about the quick-win lines of action which I read a little bit about that the technical committees have been challenged to develop. Why I am particularly interested in this is that reform programs are difficult processes, and they take a long time to show the types of results that people often want or expect. So having something, a quick-win line of action, something that can quickly show a result is critical. I'd be interested to just hear a little bit more about those.

KUSIMA: As my colleague said, these technical committees were mandated to plan and to supervise whatever activities they had come out with. So they were also told to look for quick wins, quick wins, lines of action, that did not involve financing or with very little or minimal finance. I'll take one simple example. For example, we are looking at involving the community in policing. The regional police commander or your commanding officer of policing district, who knows his environment and his people, he can come up with programs to engage the community in policing. That will not need finance; it will just need interaction. That would be one quick win.

MAHUMI: Of course the issue, quick-win lines of action, as has been said, could involve those activities, or subactivities that could just need very minimal resources. Also those which could show the outcomes or the outputs in a very short period of time so that you know this situation was at that particular time. So there was just a necessity of undertaking activities which have direct impact to the public and to the political leadership, that the policy is doing something for the betterment of their safety and security. So it is just very imperative then to sit down, plan and come out with those quick wins so that we can demonstrate what the policy is just doing, allows us to alleviate the frustration in terms of crime.

SCHER: Are there any examples that stand out in your mind as particularly successful quick wins, just off the top of your head?

MAHUMI: Yes, for instance, a place where we could just harness a very good result was on community policing. Community policing, it was just an interaction using a different forum. For instance meetings, workshops and the like where we just invited, we could speak with members of the public, other notable figures within the government. From there then we got support in terms of materials. We could get equipment, we could get some people who were just volunteering to build the police stations and the like. So that was just counted as a quick win at that particular time, and of course that served us very much as a force.

SCHER: I'd like to if we can now move on and talk a little bit about the specific challenges. We've touched on this a little bit, but in terms of when it came to implementing reforms. You've had a very thorough planning process. You have an excellent reform document and I guess what we mentioned about the clusters not quite working as you envisaged is an example of the types of challenges it

would be interesting to hear about. What were some of the other perhaps unexpected obstacles that you encountered when you were trying to turn the reform document into reality?

KUSIMA: Any change brings with it some problems. The first one is the change of mindset. People who have been sitting in one situation comfortably for a number of years are not willing to change overnight, so we had to, not to fight but we had to find ways to overcome: change of attitude, change of mindset within the police ranks itself. And, of course, even the members of the public, too, because they would not believe that these policemen are changing now. They are coming to us now seeking for support, which was not the case before. That was a challenge that we had to overcome, and we are still dealing with it. So now it is not very pronounced, people have understood, and people, our officers within the ranks, they have understood the benefits of reform and the general public are now very supportive. That I would say is one area where we had challenges in implementation.

Another one of course, again, is resources. Because our reform program is homegrown, there was no outside support that we could depend on or count on, we had to do everything using the ordinary budget that is allocated to us. So it was, and it still is, difficult. What is driving us is the determination that we have of changing. Those are the challenges. Again, we still have a problem of legislation, the legal framework. With the reform program, most of the things are changing, but the law is static. So we have to—because amendment of laws is not within our jurisdiction, it is the jurisdiction of others, so we have to work within an old environment, which is again very difficult. But of course we are trying here and there to persuade and to influence that some of the laws are amended to suit the current situation.

Another challenge is of course the human resources, the number of police officers that are required. We are still very far from reaching the international ratio, although we have got permission to recruit; now we are increasing our numbers. Those I would mark as challenges we had to face during the implementation of our reform.

MAHUMI: Of course, these changes have been discussed, but my concern is on the financial support. We are relying on the government and the few members of the public. You can see that this is not a conflict-torn country in which the donors and the other development partners are just putting their efforts to support. These peaceful countries like ours are just the latest of those development partners. So we are digging in our pockets in terms of financing the likes of—of course, that is a very big challenge, then.

SCHER: Just on those, and this is sort of my next question, I mean you mentioned the second challenge—sorry, the first thing you said is whenever you're trying to do something different you encounter resistance, and I'm interested to know any sort of specific strategies you use to try to get the police force on board. How did you build support for the program among the police force itself? How did you sort of sell the reform program and emphasize the benefits it would bring to them?

KUSIMA: Mostly it was done through seminars and capacity building. We had to travel around the country to sell these reforms to officers on the ground. Fortunately because when the reform document was being drawn, the team of experts had occasion to visit officers all over the country; they covered almost all over the country. So now when the reform document was drawn and at the stage of implementation, we had to visit them again and tell them now that what you

contributed as ideas have now been put into implementation so we ask you now to really understand and join the bandwagon, so to say, so that we can bring change to our institution. So capacity building, seminars and meetings, we had them all over the country.

SCHER: And that way the police members who had been consulted felt that the process was in somewhat theirs.

KUSIMA: *The members that were consulted now felt that the process now did not stop midway somewhere; now it is coming*

MAHUMI: *Of course, the other technique was just to task them then. If I told you we have put in an implementation arrangement, then everybody was involved then. He or she was needed to perform his particular task related to reform. So that was the sort of indoctrination. You were being tasked, you do it, and people are expecting for result. We could just form our own result framework from which people were tasked to perform at a certain level, and indicators were set there to see themselves where they are. So this of course prompted them to be part and parcel of the reform process.*

SCHER: We talked a little bit about how the program has been modified a little bit, and I was wondering about where the program has been implemented. Was it a countrywide implementation, or did it start maybe here in Dar es Salaam and then extended out from the capital or how did you go about deciding, I guess, where and when to implement the program?

MAHUMI: *The program started all over the country, all at once.*

SCHER: You thought it was important to do it that way rather than have a sort of pilot area or test area first?

KUSIMA: *The way the program is structured, it would not have been possible to start in one area. So it was important that it starts all at once all over the country, that we involve all the stakeholders.*

SCHER: So now in my understanding, the program has already achieved quite significant successes in terms of improving the police force's linkages with other government departments and enhancing the police force's relationship with the community and also a lot of what I've heard is just instilling a new ethos within the police. So I was wondering if you could tell me what you regard to have been the program's greatest successes thus far.

MAHUMI: *The foremost achievement was about winning the public trust and confidence. That was very important for us, and of course we are proud of it. Members of the public and the other safety and security stakeholders now are confident in the police force and they are supporting it. Also reform understanding. For the reform to be understood with the most figures within or beyond the force, that is just a very great success to us. Also we have public support by this time in terms of finance, logistics, technical and the like. We are just enjoying such support from all directions within and beyond the country now.*

Then, of course, the reduction of incidences of the underpinning types of crime by then. For instance, robberies which were just directed to financial institutions have been at the minimal by the time being as compared to past years where the situation was very alarming and very discouraging. So it is just a very good area where we can say we have gained some sort of success.

Also, improving the relationship between the Tanzanian police force by other government institutions, as you have said, and the other stakeholders, be they the NGOs and the other notable groups. Of course, that is a very good achievement also.

KUSIMA: *Even the way now that our capability to handle crime now. Because now we are involving other law enforcement agencies, we are working very close together than it was the case before. Our capacity now to solve crime has increased. Working alone as a police force, well, it used to take quite some time to solve crimes. But nowadays with the involvement of the community and with the involvement of other stakeholders the rate of solving crime has gone very, very high. If a robbery is committed today, even if it is in the middle of the night, in less than one week suspects are apprehended through the use of information from the general public or through working together in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies. That to me is a very, very great success.*

MAHUMI: *Of course I can add on that we are more proactive than reactive. We are trying to be more proactive than just sticking on solving crime after it happens. So we are trying to prevent them. And of course, that is being capable of making the crime rate to be down.*

SCHER: *One of the difficulties sometimes is to measure how well a system is working now. You have very clear indications that things are improving if the level of the number of armed robberies have gone down and if you're solving crimes much faster than you used to. But in terms of something like, say, improved relations with the community, how do you assess that things have improved and that the community has more confidence in the police?*

KUSIMA: *Generally the public opinion, media. And when you have people understanding your problems now and coming forward to assist you in terms materially, for example, coming forward, understanding that you have a problem here, you need a police station here, coming forward to build a police station using their own resources and efforts or supplying you with vehicles, motorcycles. I mean it is a clear indication that they accept your services, I would say. That is judging by public opinion. That's one area.*

Of course through statistics again you can know that the crime rate is decreasing. In some aspects there may be an increase of crime, but as an indicator of success. I'll give you an example. We used to have very few reported rape cases, but now reported rape cases have gone on the increase. Why? Because now people have more confidence in coming to the police and complaining. The way they're handled now at the police stations, at the front office. The way they're treated, the way the cases are solved, the way the culprits are taken to task, give them confidence now to come forward and report.

Again we have many evaluation tools that help us to know where we are going, whether we are doing it right or wrong, so that we can take some measures.

MAHUMI: *What of course we have also the program of effort that we are speaking about, that reform program, we have that research framework from which we may measure progress in given activities, be they broad interventions and the like; so we have the result framework. Also on the issue of reform we have established the complaints unit, so the number of complaints which are being received by that unit which of course indicates clearly that how much the police is not being part of the unit which is not satisfying in the provision of services. So you can see*

we have number of, very small mechanisms, but we have also the so-called suggestion boxes all around the police stations in the country. From there you can have the opinions of the customers who are in this particular case members of the public. You can see how they trust the police or how well we are in terms of achievement.

SCHER: Did you say you established a complaints unit? Was that a new unit?

KUSIMA: *Yes, that's a result of the reform program.*

SCHER: That's a part of the reform, the complaints unit?

KUSIMA: *Yes.*

SCHER: So you can see the number of complaints declining?

KUSIMA: *Declining, yes.*

SCHER: It gives you a sense of—OK, I see. I wanted to just ask you on the issue of the number of rape cases being reported, I understand that there have been women and children desks established in all police stations or planning to be established in all police stations. I was wondering if you could tell me a little bit about that aspect of the reform program in particular.

KUSIMA: *Yes. In almost all police stations—not all over the country as yet, we are still rolling them out—to have desks that are specific for women and children, because that's a vulnerable group. When a victim comes to the police, she or he if it's a child, must be given different treatment, must be attended in privacy. He or she can make a complaint in private, a statement recorded by a trained officer. So this has given them confidence to come forward now, because they know that they have special treatment when at the police station.*

SCHER: I wonder if we could just look ahead a little bit to the future. This is the medium-term strategic plan that you're working under now and I was wondering what you see as the long-term strategic challenges for the reform of the police. You've achieved a lot so far, but what do you see as your major challenges for moving forward from this point?

KUSIMA: *Then I would say, honestly, financing is still our biggest challenge. We still depend on the annual budget that is being given to us. Of course, we are looking at possibilities of sourcing from development partners, members of the public, but from that side I think they cannot be very substantive financing; we still depend on the government. I can say the government is still very, very, very supportive. We are now looking at possibilities for securing a loan maybe, government-supported loan, to take care of our accommodation office and residential accommodations. But financing is still the biggest challenge so far.*

Again one area that I'm looking at—awareness is a challenge. Because now the general public is much more aware of what we are doing and what we are supposed to do because we have opened up now. We tell them what we are supposed to do and what they should expect from us. So there is very, very high expectation from the members of the public. Now, I don't know whether we are able to deliver according to the expectations. That we are looking at it as a challenge.

Again another challenge that I can think of is the rate of technology change. Technology is changing so fast. I'm wondering if we are able to keep pace with it, and there is no way that we can afford to lag behind; we have to keep pace. But with the resources that we have it is very difficult to keep pace. I am looking at that one, again, as a challenge. Another area is currently we are enjoying support of the political leadership; I'm not saying that it is going to change tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, but suppose there is a slight change in leadership then maybe we won't enjoy the support that we are having now. Those are a few areas. Maybe my colleague can add one or two, but those I see as the main challenges.

MAHUMI: *Those are the main challenges.*

SCHER: Can I just ask you one question on that. You mentioned that you are very open with the public and then now have high expectations. I was wondering how you've gone about winning that public support, or getting the public on the side of the police? Have you opened media units or just increased the amount of information that you are passing on to the public?

KUSIMA: *There are a number of things that we have done. At first we released telephone numbers of all regional police commanders, all the top brass at the police headquarters from the inspector-general downwards, we put on the calendars, in newspapers, everywhere, so that the public is free to call anyone at any time. Again, we started programs in the media, the TV, where we go on air every week to tell the general public what we are doing, what we were supposed to—I mean how the public was supposed to assist the police and our responsibility towards them. And, again, through community policing, and through these technical committees that we talked about.*

The people in their areas of jurisdiction were to hold meetings, to educate the public on their rights and our responsibilities to them. So there has been a lot of advocacy of program, and I mean opening up on the police force. We are no more closed, as it was before.

SCHER: Did that publication of everybody's phone numbers, how was that received? Were the officers inundated with phone calls?

KUSIMA: *They were also excited because this was a new thing, a reform program which was—we had a common, shared vision of a reform program, so they just knew that we have to change, we have to open up. So they were happy to give the numbers and the public was even more happy to receive those numbers.*

SCHER: Another question I had was, I understand that you have approached organizations such as the Legal and Human Rights Council and CHRAGG [Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance] to provide human rights training for the police. That's in—in my experience that is quite unusual for the police force itself to go out and say, please train us in these methods of doing things. I was wondering if you could comment a little bit on the inclusion of human rights curriculum in training of police.

KUSIMA: *We have included that in our training curriculum at all our colleges. We have also trained officers on human rights that train at both colleges, but again, when we have meetings, annual meetings, we invite them to come and give presentations. Recently, I think it was only last month, we invited them to give us lectures, we had also commanding police districts from all over the country and personnel officers from all over the country and members of the CID, CID investigators at*

regional and district levels all over the country. We invited human rights commission to come and give them, I think they had two full days of giving presentations on that.

It is a process of opening up, making the police know, I mean, how to handle these issues. It's part of the reform.

MAHUMI: *Part of the reform, yes. As has been said, in all of the colleges including the preliminary, the so-called leadership course for those officers who are being recently recruited, we have a specific subject on human rights which is taught throughout the course which almost takes six to nine months. So you can see how serious the force is. All the promotion courses, the human rights is just part and parcel of the subjects which are being undertaken there.*

Of course we are realizing with the number of other human rights advocacy rights, as it has been said, they are always called in and facilitate a number of issues pertaining to human rights, because we are very serious and this is part and parcel, it is the package within the reform document that we go through this, so yes.

SCHER: Thank you very much for your time, and I know everybody is very pressed for time and I was wondering if I could perhaps ask one more question. And that is what advice would you offer for people in similar positions in other countries who may be thinking about embarking on an ambitious reform program such as the one that is currently underway here? Perhaps another way of thinking about this question is, if you were starting again with the reform program, what would you do differently?

KUSIMA: *Well, not differently. I would just go again along the same lines. That's the way I feel anyway, because a reform must be homegrown. It should not be externally imposed. Because you know the problems, it is you who is going to deal with the problems. No one can come from outside and tell you that these are your problems and tell you how to deal with them; a reform must be homegrown. Again, you have to involve all stakeholders because they have a stake in whatever you are going to do. The way we did it, we went to all the people in all walks of life, because as police officers we touch the lives of all people; so we had to get the opinion of all the people on the ground, all the people mainly from the government, some of the leaders, science institutions, political, the simple people on the ground, in the market, learning institutions. So reform must be involving, because they know what they need from you and you have to work to take that into consideration.*

Now again, before starting implementation, the people who will be involved in the implementation process must know what it is all about. Because they are the people who are going to implement the reform, they have to know it thoroughly well to be able to implement it to the letter. Here, I mean we mentioned the question of implementation arrangement. We started with technical committees, and then we thought it was not the best way because the reform activities were not mainlined in the day-to-day activities, so we had to look differently at implementation arrangements.

So when formulating a reform program, when implementing it, this is an area that one has to be careful about. Again, one important thing, that is the political support. Without political support you cannot move. Of course, we work in a political environment, and if it is not conducive you cannot move an inch. So the

first thing to do is to have adequate political support that can drive you all the way. I think change agents are very important.

In the beginning with change comes resistance. Now how do you overcome that resistance? You must have dedicated staff that will drive the agenda forward. To me, I think those are the areas that one has to look into when initiating a reform process.

MAHUMI: *In addition the other thing to consider is about resources in terms of finance, human and the other material resources which are required to facilitate the entire program; that is very essential. So you should not overlook this. Also the reform, the issue you're addressing, the reform should address the right problems. If you are told you are initiating a certain reform program which does not attack the real problems, then of course you will not be gaining support and you'd be doing that. You have to address the right problems which is underpinning the majority of the targeted people.*

SCHER: Well I'd like to just before we wrap up perhaps give you an opportunity to say anything that maybe I've missed. Are there questions I should have asked? I just want to give you an opportunity to reflect on anything perhaps that I haven't raised. If there's nothing, that's all right, but I did just want to give you a little chance.

KUSIMA: *I think you have been very, very thorough. I think you have not missed anything. Maybe my colleague, if you think maybe there is something that is missed out?*

MAHUMI: *No, the questionnaire, whether it is well structured, we enjoyed on how to answer them, so thank you very much.*

SCHER: Thank you