

quickest way of achieving disarmament and putting the armed groups out of business.”⁴²

Davis, Johnson’s adviser, was responsible for analysis and for engaging the experts needed to identify who was eligible to participate in the program and to determine how much money the government should pay to buy back their weapons. Determining eligibility was not an easy task. Davis said that, among other things, it meant deciding “whether or not you treat people who were taken to prepare food, to carry munitions and things of that nature. Do you consider them combatants or ex-combatants? Because again, by so doing, it changes the dynamics and the numbers of them, the settlement arrangement, and all of those kinds of things.” In the committee, Davis worked to reach a compromise between the warring factions, which wanted a broad definition of combatant in order to qualify more of their people for payments, and UNMIL, which faced tight budget constraints.

To implement the arms-for-cash arrangement, Blaney, UNMIL, and the Liberian government set up a site just outside Monrovia, called Camp Schieffelin. After the facility opened in late 2003, the number of ex-combatants coming in for payments overwhelmed the United Nations staff that ran the operation. Riots broke out at the camp after the facility had decommissioned only 7,000 guns. The protests continued for several days, and the transitional government, UNMIL, and Blaney decided to suspend the process in order to make more-substantial preparations. The disarmament committee redesigned the process, calling for more camps and larger numbers of peacekeeping troops. It also increased the number of education and training programs to cut down on the long waits ex-combatants had to endure before accessing the services.⁴³ After this “tactical setback,” as Blaney called it, the transitional government restarted the disarmament process in April 2004.⁴⁴

Organizing the elections

With the disarmament process under way, Bryant turned his attention to another critical activity: organizing national elections. Like other aspects of the transitional government’s mandate, the peace agreement laid out many of the requirements. The most pressing was an October 2005 deadline for the national vote, and Bryant and others knew that the transitional government might encounter attempts to delay the election.

The peace agreement required Bryant to appoint seven new commissioners to a National Elections Commission. Nominated by civil society groups, the commissioners had to have backgrounds in civil society or justice and had to come from different counties in Liberia. Bryant selected the commissioners from a list of 40 nominees, and the legislative assembly quickly confirmed the appointments.⁴⁵

In April 2004, the assembly approved Bryant’s selection of Frances Johnson-Morris to head the commission. Johnson-Morris, a former chief

justice of the Supreme Court and head of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, had only 18 months to prepare the country for elections. Infrastructural damage from the war had rendered large parts of Liberia inaccessible by road, thereby adding to the logistical challenge of registering and educating Liberians about the elections. Cell phone service reached only half of those unfamiliar with electoral processes.

While the commissioners met to discuss these hurdles, the assembly drafted legislation on electoral reform, in line with the peace agreement's provisions. The law, passed in December 2004, required candidates for president and vice president to win an absolute majority of votes cast; runoff elections would decide the winner if no candidate received a majority. The law also removed a condition stipulating that presidential candidates had to have lived in Liberia for at least 10 years.⁴⁶

To support the resource-heavy work of running elections, the United Nations and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, a United States-based nonprofit organization, provided technical and logistical support, and external partners covered 75% of the nearly \$20-million election budget. UNMIL helped the commission hire 19,000 poll workers, and other international partners assisted in a voter drive that registered more than 1.3 million Liberians, or 90% of those eligible.⁴⁷ (For more on the conduct of the election, see companion ISS case study “[A Path to Peace: Liberia’s First Post-War Elections, 2004–2005](#).”)

Blaney said Johnson-Morris faced tremendous pressure from several constituencies to postpone the elections, and a late crisis nearly forced her to do so. After the elections commission rejected applications from five presidential candidates who lacked adequate voter signatures, the applicants argued to the Supreme Court that they were entitled to a seven-day grace period to rectify their faulty documentation. The court ruled in favor of the applicants just two weeks before election day. Because complying with the decision would likely require the reprinting of ballots and a delay in the voting, Johnson-Morris appealed to ECOWAS chief mediator Abubakar. After negotiations, Abubakar managed to get the candidates to withdraw their nominations for the sake of the peace process, and the elections proceeded on schedule, as required by the peace accord.⁴⁸ “If you make a timeline, you must stick to that timeline,” Johnson-Morris said. “You don’t waver on this kind of issue.”

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

Disputes and demands by the warring factions threatened the transitional government many times during its two-year tenure. To keep the peace, Waritay said “the chairman himself was sometimes literally compelled to mobilize unbudgeted resources for heads of warring factions who demanded that some food and cash incentives be given to their men for adhering to the peace process.”

Corruption and financial mismanagement threatened the legitimacy of the transitional government throughout its tenure. Doss said disappointment among international donors set in within months of the transitional government's taking power. In his memoir, he wrote, "President Kabbah [of Sierra Leone] confided to me his exasperation about this state of affairs, having seen a huge bill for expenses from the Liberian government for a short visit to Freetown funded by the Sierra Leone government. The European Union and the United States were especially frustrated as they struggled to get the rehabilitation of the power grid and other infrastructure projects under way. The Chinese ambassador too privately expressed to me his intense frustration with the way China's aid was being handled."⁴⁹

The event that precipitated action by the international donors was a financial audit of the transitional government completed by the European Commission (EC) in early 2005. Bryant had initially asked the EC to audit the Liberian government from the Taylor years to the present in an effort to uncover the full extent of corruption and financial mismanagement under his predecessor, but lack of documentation from that time meant the EC quickly moved on to the financial dealings of the transitional government itself.⁵⁰ The audit report laid bare the extent of corruption and underscored the fact that Bryant had little control over his own cabinet.

The EC delayed the initial release of the report because of fears that it would arouse an explosive response.⁵¹ The anticipated reaction came swiftly. During an annual progress meeting for the Results Focused Transitional Framework, held in Copenhagen in early May 2005, contact group members pointed to corruption as the main factor holding back Liberia's economic recovery. In response, the leader of the Liberian delegation, Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs Christian Herbert, capitulated to donors' demands for a greater international role in the country's public financial management.⁵²

The international partners took that admission as their cue to send a clear and strong message to the transitional government. That message came in the form of the Economic Governance and Action Plan, the first official iteration of what later became the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, or GEMAP. Presented to the transitional government in May 2005, the draft plan referenced the EC audit as a catalyst for concern within the contact group.⁵³

The plan's provisions went well beyond improved budgeting and tighter management controls. For example, it proposed creating an externally managed agency to manage procurement, with strict oversight of concessions and contracts. It recommended asking judges from neighboring countries like Sierra Leone to serve on Liberian courts as an anticorruption measure. And it set up an Economic Governance Steering Committee—co-chaired by the Liberian government and international partners—that would exercise veto power over "any government policy, contract, concession, travel advance,

waivers on duties/taxes, disbursements.”⁵⁴ Davis said he advised Bryant and others that “this is not something that’s going to go away.”

In June, the transitional government countered with a proposal of its own that rejected several aspects of the contact group’s first draft, including the steering committee’s veto power and the introduction of foreign judges into the Liberian judicial system.⁵⁵ After joint discussions, the contact group submitted the final version of GEMAP to Bryant on August 3, with a one-week deadline for agreement. The EC even added a personal letter to Bryant, clearly stating that future aid for Liberia hinged on the transitional government’s acceptance of the arrangement.⁵⁶

Davis recalled that Bryant was furious after receiving the EC letter because he considered GEMAP an infringement on Liberia’s national sovereignty. But further pressure from the United States and the EC in the form of threats to revoke foreign assistance weighed heavily on Bryant. Finally, in his penultimate month as head of the transitional government, Bryant signed the GEMAP proposal.⁵⁷

The final, September 2005 version of GEMAP pinpointed the need for better financial management, referenced the EC’s audit and other findings on corruption, and designated the Results Focused Transitional Framework as the guiding document for donor coordination. The plan contained six interlocking components: bolstering financial management and accountability, improving budgeting and expenditure management, improving procurement practices and the granting of concessions, establishing effective processes to control corruption, supporting key institutions, and building capacity (exhibit 2).⁵⁸

To strengthen financial management and accountability, under the terms of the arrangement, Bryant issued an executive order creating a central treasury account into which all revenue would flow. The plan gave international experts binding co-signature authority in five of the country’s state-owned enterprises: the National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, Liberia Petroleum Refining Co., the Forestry Development Authority, and the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. To improve budgeting and expenditure management, GEMAP called (1) for the enlistment of international experts who could build the capacities of the Bureau of the Budget, the Ministry of Finance, and other ministries, as well as the Cash Management Committee (an interministerial group responsible for implementing cash-based budgeting), and (2) for the establishment of an integrated financial-management information system. International experts also had binding co-signature authority over decisions made at major financial institutions such as the Central Bank of Liberia and the General Auditing Office and assisted the General Services Agency, the Governance Reform Commission, and the Contracts and Monopolies Commission.

Because procurement processes had long been easy targets for corruption, GEMAP called for implementation of a basic electronic

procurement system that would require mandatory listing, open competitive bidding, and publication of public tenders. To empower a judicial system weakened after decades of civil war, the plan also called for the deployment of international legal experts who could advise the Liberian judiciary, and it mandated the establishment of the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission.⁵⁹

Despite Bryant's acquiescence to GEMAP, the job of implementing the plan fell mostly on his successor, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was elected later in 2005, and took office in January 2006.

ASSESSING RESULTS

"With transitional governments, we have to be careful about what the expectations are," cautioned Gyude Moore (a distant relative of Bryant), who later became minister of public works under President Sirleaf. "This wasn't a cabinet that was intended to deliver services, to grow the economy; that wasn't it. The primary objective, the overarching need for this cabinet, was the ability to keep the country stable enough into an election. And as long as the factions from which the cabinet ministers were chosen remained happy with the arrangement and had no reason to renege on their promise to end the war, then it was successful."

Bryant's transitional government faced a significant, multifaceted challenge but had few resources. Overall, the government's performance was mixed, succeeding on some fronts and failing on others. Belleh said: "Our biggest achievement was to stabilize the country and hold free and fair elections within the time frame established by the Accra peace agreement. Various elements tried to convince us to maneuver so as to remain in power for additional years. Chairman Bryant and I did not share those inclinations and views. Our mission was a mission of peace, and it was simple: disarm the warring factions, stabilize the political situation, and hold free and fair elections." The National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center called those elections the most competitive in Liberia's history, thanks to an election day that was "violence-free, orderly, and well-administered, despite the massive logistical difficulties."⁶⁰ Belleh also pointed to \$500 million of donor assistance as a major accomplishment.

Davis said shortcomings were inevitable because the transitional government was meant to be inclusive rather than technocratic. "You just have to accept the inherent defects that come along with this decision that was made. And let's see now how we can cross this river and get successfully to any elections."

To assess the transitional government's overall performance on its chief mandate to implement the peace agreement, Nelson, the advisor to the chairman on the "scrupulous implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement," prepared a report for Bryant in December 2005. Nelson found that of the peace agreement's 37 articles, the transitional government and its international partners had implemented or completed 26, with the remaining

articles—mostly longer-term initiatives like refugee resettlement—in progress.⁶¹ Michael George, Johnson’s administrative assistant, echoed the findings of Nelson’s report, stating that the transitional government had implemented every aspect of the agreement “to the letter.” Doss, who worked on peacekeeping missions in post-conflict Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, said that of the peace agreements in those countries, “only in Liberia was a peace agreement actually implemented more or less as expected.”⁶²

Analysts from the United Nations and the World Bank around that time took a similar favorable stance on the transitional government’s performance on the Results Focused Transitional Framework, which hewed closely to the articles of the peace agreement. Published in July 2006, their final report said, “There has been noticeable progress in key . . . result areas, including: security sector reforms, re-establishment of rule of law, access to all counties and districts; disarmament and demobilization of over 101,495 (children, women and men) ex-combatants; return and reintegration of over 500,000 [internally displaced persons] and refugees; gradual restoration of state authority; and the successful completion of the all-important October 2005 elections.”⁶³ However, the report went on to attribute much of that success to robust international participation, and it tempered optimism by stating “the political will and capacity of the [transitional government] during its tenure to frame and implement governance reforms, rein in corruption, control off-budget spending and provide the most basic of public services for the Liberian people remained questionable against an uneven performance record at multiple levels of government.”⁶⁴ The report pointed to the transitional framework’s cluster committees in particular as weak points in implementation because the minister in charge of each committee demonstrated apathy toward coordination and therefore received limited financial support to carry out activities.⁶⁵

Criticisms of the transitional government centered on corruption and financial mismanagement. Moore recalled that the transitional government’s reputation was so toxic that “when President Sirleaf came to power, for at least eight or nine years [she had two 5-year terms], she avoided hiring or appointing anyone who had been in Gyude Bryant’s cabinet because that government is basically remembered for being one of the most corrupt in terms of governing the country.” The many incidents that precipitated such a sweeping reform as GEMAP spoke to the scale of corruption in the transitional government. When Transparency International released its corruption rankings in October 2005, as Liberia was conducting elections and the transitional government was preparing to hand over power, the country ranked 137th out of 158 countries surveyed.⁶⁶

Still, Waritay asserted that assessments should take context into account: “While no one wishes to give a pass to those [transitional government] officials who indulged in one form of corruption or the other, the nature of

the government was such that censoring or sanctioning or outrightly dismissing such officials was not only difficult but ill-advised given the volatility of the situation and the reality that officials drawn from warring factions still had ready access to weapons.”

Despite the country’s legacy of corruption and financial mismanagement, the transitional government and its international partners succeeded in achieving three crucial goals that previous interim governments had failed to achieve: keeping the peace, carrying out disarmament and demobilization, and implementing elections. Aside from periodic skirmishes and firefights, the peace established in Accra held, thanks in large part to UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping forces. According to database ACLED—the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project—after a peak in violence at the end of the war in 2003, with 324 battle deaths reported, 2004 and 2005 saw a total of only one death in battle.⁶⁷

After the false start at Camp Schieffelin, disarmament continued apace, culminating in the demobilization of more than 100,000 combatants and the destruction of 27,000 heavy weapons, 6,153,631 small arms and ammunition, and 29,794 other types of ammunition and explosives.⁶⁸ In October 2005, more than 700 candidates from 21 political parties ran for office in what international observers deemed a well-managed and neutral election. After a runoff election in November, Liberian voters elected Sirleaf, Africa’s first female head of state, as president.⁶⁹

REFLECTIONS

The democratic election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf did not mark the end of Liberia’s postwar reconstruction and reconciliation process but, rather, a beginning. Chairman Gyude Bryant, his transitional government, and their international partners had ushered the country through democratic elections, but Sirleaf still had to deal with many of the same problems Bryant had faced. Antoinette Sayeh, who served as Sirleaf’s finance minister, recalled that she and other new cabinet members found their ministries overstuffed but bereft of capacity. Donald Booth, who succeeded John Blaney as US ambassador to Liberia, recalled that vehicles and furniture disappeared from the ministries during a chaotic period between the Bryant and Sirleaf administrations. Having few systems to build on, Sirleaf established her own policies and procedures with regard to cabinet management.

However, there were also important differences in the situations of the two leaders. The transitional government had amplified the voices of a few—mainly, the warring parties—for the sake of peace. Sirleaf had to restore the representative equilibrium as head of a democratically elected government and incorporate the many voices of her country. Moreover, Sirleaf could build on the partial foundation laid by the transitional government. On top of disarming and demobilizing the militias, Michael George, assistant to the vice chairman of the transitional government, stressed the establishment of

important institutions such as the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission, the Governance Commission, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, all of which Sirleaf reinforced.


Alan Doss, who represented the United Nations in various roles, said the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, or GEMAP—developed by a group of nations and regional organizations—“came too late to save the reputation” of the transitional government, but “it did have an important impact on the government and governance after the elections.”⁷⁰

Several factors outside the government’s control contributed to successes during the transitional period. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement negotiated in Accra laid the foundation and set concrete dates for democratic elections, which gave the transitional government a clear sunset at the end of its two year-mandate.

Robust security, financial, and technical assistance from international partners proved essential to the transitional government’s success. For those international partners, momentum was an important factor, as Blaney and General Jacques Paul Klein, who led the United Nations Mission in Liberia, later wrote, “One needed to create the impression that the proverbial ‘train was leaving the station,’ and that those who wanted a stake in postwar Liberia had to get on or be left behind.”⁷¹

Personal relationships and deep local knowledge helped the head of the transitional government navigate the political world of postconflict Liberia. As a “Monrovia boy” who’d never left his hometown, Bryant was acquainted with many of the influential people in the small community of Liberian elites and factional leaders. When he felt it necessary, Bryant made concessions to keep the peace process moving, which almost caused his undoing. During Sirleaf’s administration, Bryant was arrested and charged with economic sabotage, theft of property, and embezzlement, though the charges were later dropped.⁷² Despite an uneven legacy, Bryant managed to help lead Liberia toward a new era of peace.

Exhibit 1: Results-Focused Transitional Framework Implementation Structure



(From the Results Focused Transitional Framework, Annex 4. Accessed at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6294478732FFBCCE85256FF6005D9711-ntgl-lib-30apr.pdf>.)

Names and Associated Acronyms for Exhibit 1

ACF	Action Contre La Faim
AFELL	Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia
ARC	Agricultural Research Consortium
AU	African Union
BOCERO	BOCERO
BSE	Bureau of State Enterprises
CBL	Central Bank of Liberia
CCC	Community Care Center
CCF	Christian Children Fund
CDA	Cooperative Development Agency
CEA	Community Empowerment Approach
CENDE	Center for Democracy and Elections
CMC	Mining Contractors, Incorporated
CSA	Civil Service Agency
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General EC European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States EOC Emergency Obstetric Care
EU/ECHO	European Union/European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAO	General Auditing Office
GBC	Governance Reform Commission
GRODP	GRODP
GSA	General Services Agency
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCS	Humanitarian Coordination Section
HIC	Humanitarian Information Center
IACFT	Intra-African Trade Fair
ICGL	International Contact Group on Liberia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IMC	Implementing Monitoring Committee
JMC	Joint Monitoring Committee
JPC	Justice & Peace Commission
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
LBA	Liberian Business Association
LBDI	Liberian Bank for Development and Investment
LCC	Liberia Council of Churches

LEC	Liberia Electricity Corporation
LFZA	Liberia Free Zone Authority
LMA	Liberia Marketing Association
LPMC	Liberia Marketing and Produce Corporation
LRDU/RFA	Liberian Rubber Development Unit
LRRRC	Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission
LTC	Liberia Telecommunications Corporation
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
LUSH	Lush Cosmetics Inc
LWSC	Liberia Water and Sewerage Corporation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MC&I	MC&I
MCC	Monrovia City Corporation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MLME	Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy of Liberia
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOHSW	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOL	Ministry of Labor
MOPEA	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs
MOT	Ministry of Transport
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
MRD	Ministry of Rural Development
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
MSPA	Maritime Security Patrol Area
MYS	Minister of Youth & Sports
NARD-TRA	NARD-TRA
NCDRR	National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
NEC	National Elections Commission
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NIC	National Investment Commission
NPA	National Port Authority
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
NTLA	National Transitional Legislative Assembly

OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
PBRC	Peacebuilding Resource Center
PUL	Press Union of Liberia
RC	Resident Coordinator
RSO	RIMCO (RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee) Support Office
RUDAP	Rural Development Animation Project
RWC	RFTF Working Committee
SDP	Sime Darby Plantation Berhad
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	The United Nations Environment Programme
UMFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USA/DOD	United States of America, Department of Defense
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WHOCHIRRC	WHOCHIRRC

Exhibit 2: The Six Components of GEMAP

Component	Goals	Plan
(i) Financial management and accountability	To address extensive revenue leakages and protect the revenue streams of key revenue-generating agencies and institutions and to obtain revenues from customs duties, import levies, and taxes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under terms of the arrangement, Bryant issued an executive order creating a central treasury account into which all revenue would flow • Deployment of international experts with binding cosignature authority in five state-owned enterprises • Enforcement of (1) Bryant’s Executive Order No. 2, which centralized the authority to collect revenue at the Ministry of Finance and (2) government accounts at the Central Bank of Liberia • Establishment of a new post of chief administer of the Central Bank of Liberia, who would—together with an international expert given binding cosignature authority—oversee internal controls and audits for the National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, Liberia Petroleum Refining Corporation, the Forestry Development Agency, and the Bureau of Maritime Affairs
(ii) Improving budgeting and expenditure management	To rehabilitate the budget formulation, budget execution, and financial-reporting systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building across the Bureau of the Budget, the Ministry of Finance and other ministries, and the Cash Management Committee (an interministerial committee responsible for implementing cash-based budgeting) • Provision of an integrated financial-management information system • Development of realistic cash and procurement plans • Establishment of an adequately staffed technical secretariat for the Cash Management Committee
(iii) Improving procurement practices and granting of concessions	To safeguard against the loss of natural and financial resources through stronger and more-transparent procurement, concession, contract, and licensing practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of a basic e-procurement system that requires mandatory listing, open competitive bidding, and publication of public tenders • Coverage of procurement disclosures in print and other media • A strengthened compliance role for the Contracts and Monopolies Commission • Liberian accession to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to enhance transparency in revenue flows associated with natural resource extraction
(iv) Establishing effective processes to control corruption	To empower a judicial system weakened after decades of civil war and lacking adequate resources, trained manpower, or proper facilities and to combat corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of policy advice, technical assistance, and support for renovation of facilities through the international community • Establishment of an independent anticorruption commission, with technical support from the subregion to assist in fraud and corruption investigations • Deployment of international legal experts to advise the judiciary
(v) Supporting key institutions	To build capacity and remove constraints across major institutions related to economic governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of international experts with binding cosignature authority in such institutions as the Central Bank of Liberia and the General Auditing Office and international assistance at the General Services Agency, Governance Reform Commission, and Contracts and Monopolies Commission • Hiring of an external audit agent to support the General Auditing Office and offer technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance
(vi) Capacity building	To sustain the interim efforts of international experts in their advising on Liberia’s economic governance for the long term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a plan for major national capacity building that would specify activities planned for building local capacity, a timeline for measuring results, and an exit strategy

- (MODEL) and the Political Parties.” August 18, 2003; <https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003>, 35-36.
- 17 Jacques Paul Klein. “Liberia: Current Trends, Future Dynamics.” Keynote address at American University, July 19, 2005, 4.
- 18 Blamoh Nelson. “CPA: Status of Implementation.” Office of the Advisor for the Scrupulous Implementation of the ACPA, December 27, 2005.
- 19 E. Philip Morgan. 2006. “Liberia and the Fate of Interim Government in the Regional Vortex of West Africa.” *Strategic Insights* 5(1):6. See also Morten Boås. 2009. “Making Plans for Liberia—a Trusteeship Approach to Good Governance?” *Third World Quarterly* 30(7):1329-1341.
- 20 “Scramble for goodies ahead of political handover.” *New Humanitarian*. November 21, 2005. <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2005/11/21/scramble-goodies-ahead-political-handover>.
- 21 “Liberian New Leader Makes New Appointments In Government.” *The Perspective*. October 16, 2003; <https://www.theperspective.org/inquirer/newappointments.html>.
- 22 Emmanuel Goujon and Terence Sesay. “Liberia’s new leader begins forming government.” *Agency France Presse*. October 15, 2003.
- 23 Alan Doss. *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People’s Wars*. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2020), 104.
- 24 “Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties,” August 18, 2003; <https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003>, 21.
- 25 “Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties,” August 18, 2003; <https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003>, 46.
- 26 Nakomo Duche. 2016. “Power sharing study of the National Transitional Government of Liberia.” Center for Policy Studies, 12, 2016, and Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003, article 26, p. 19; <https://peacemaker.un.org/liberia-peaceagreementlurdmodel2003>.
- 27 “Liberia; LURD Drops Threat to Hold Up Disarmament.” *Africanews*, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, December 3, 2003.
- 28 “Liberia; US Envoy Asked to Intervene in Disarmament Dispute.” *Africanews*, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, December 2, 2003.
- 29 Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General’s on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. United Nations Security Council (S/2004/229), March 22, 2004; <https://undocs.org/S/2004/229>.
- 30 Liberia: Civil Society’s Role in the Political Transition. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, January 2004; https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1710_lr_civilsociety_010104_5.pdf, 7-8.
- 31 “Joint Needs Assessment.” National Transitional Government of Liberia, February 2004; <http://apps.who.int/disasters/repo/12605.pdf>, 8.
- 32 “Joint Needs Assessment.” National Transitional Government of Liberia, February 2004; <http://apps.who.int/disasters/repo/12605.pdf>, 8.
- 33 RFTF Final Report. United Nations and World Bank, January 2006.
- 34 Aaron Weah. 2018. “African Transitional Justice Research Project: Case Study on Transitional Justice in Liberia.” The Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; <https://www.csvr.org.za/project-reports/Liberian-Case-Aaron-Weah.pdf>, 24.
- 35 Paul James-Allen, Aaron Weah, and Lizzie Goodfriend. May 2010. “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia.” International Center for Transitional Justice; <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Liberia-Beyond-TRC-2010-English.pdf>, 3.
- 36 “National Transitional Government of Liberia - Results focused transitional framework.” ReliefWeb, April 30, 2005; <https://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/national-transitional-government-liberia-results-focused-transitional-framework>. “Final Report:

Results Focused Transitional Framework January 2004 - March 2006.” United Nations and World Bank, June 2006.

³⁷ RFTF Final Report. United Nations and World Bank, January 2006.

³⁸ RIMCO Newsletter, October 2004, Issue No. 1.” RIMCO Support Office;
<http://apps.who.int/disasters/repo/15224.pdf>.

³⁹ John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate. June 2010. “Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia.” Stanley Foundation;
<https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/LiberiaPAB610.pdf>, 4.

⁴⁰ Ryan Nichols. “Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls,” *Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region*. May 2005:113.

⁴¹ Alan Doss. *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People’s Wars*. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2020), 112.

⁴² Alan Doss. *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People’s Wars*. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2020), 112.

⁴³ Joachim A. Koops et al. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. August 2014, 697.

⁴⁴ John W. Blaney. 2010. “Lessons from Liberia’s Success: Thoughts on Leadership, the Process of Peace, Security, and Justice.” *PRISM* 1(2):106;

https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_1-2/7_Prism_101-110_Blaney.pdf.

⁴⁵ Michael Scharff. *A Path to Peace: Liberia’s First Post-War Elections*. *Innovations for Successful Societies*. October 2011;

<https://successfultsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/path-peace-liberias-first-post-war-elections-2004-2005>, 2.

⁴⁶ Michael Scharff. *A Path to Peace: Liberia’s First Post-War Elections*. *Innovations for Successful Societies*. October 2011;

<https://successfultsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/path-peace-liberias-first-post-war-elections-2004-2005>, 1.

⁴⁷ Michael Scharff. *A Path to Peace: Liberia’s First Post-War Elections*. *Innovations for Successful Societies*. October 2011;

<https://successfultsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/path-peace-liberias-first-post-war-elections-2004-2005>, 1.

⁴⁸ *The Liberia 2005 Elections: A Record of Carter Center Involvement*. 2005. Carter Center;

https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/liberia-2005-final-rpt.pdf, 19.

⁴⁹ Alan Doss. *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People’s Wars*. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2020), 112.

⁵⁰ Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey. May 2006. *Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP)*. World Bank Fragile States;

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 7.

⁵¹ Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey. May 2006. *Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP)*. World Bank Fragile States;

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 7.

⁵² Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey. May 2006. *Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP)*. World Bank Fragile States;

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 10.

⁵³

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, Annex A.

⁵⁴

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 15.

- 55 Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey. May 2006. Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). World Bank Fragile States; <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 12.
- 56 Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey. May 2006. Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). World Bank Fragile States; <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 13.
- 57 Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey. May 2006. Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). World Bank Fragile States; <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf>, 13-14.
- 58 Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program. National Transitional Government of Liberia and International Contact Group for Liberia, September 9, 2005; <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LIBERIAEXTN/Resources/GEMAP.pdf>.
- 59 Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program. National Transitional Government of Liberia and International Contact Group for Liberia, September 9, 2005; <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LIBERIAEXTN/Resources/GEMAP.pdf>.
- 60 National Democratic Institute and Carter Center, Observing Presidential and Legislative Elections in Liberia: Final Report. November 8, 2005; http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/FinalReportLiberia2005.pdf.
- 61 Blamoh Nelson. "CPA: Status of Implementation." Office of the Advisor for the Scrupulous Implementation of the ACPA. December 27, 2005.
- 62 Alan Doss. *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People's Wars*. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2020), 237.
- 63 "Final Report: Results Focused Transitional Framework January 2004 - March 2006." United Nations and World Bank. June 2006. 8.
- 64 "Final Report: Results Focused Transitional Framework January 2004 - March 2006." United Nations and World Bank. June 2006. 11.
- 65 "Final Report: Results Focused Transitional Framework January 2004 - March 2006." United Nations and World Bank. June 2006. 106.
- 66 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2005." Transparency International; https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005/0.
- 67 "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Data Export Tool." ACLED; <https://www.acleddata.com/data/>.
- 68 "DDRR Consolidated Report Phase 1, 2 & 3." National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Joint Implementation Unit. 2004; https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1258.pdf, 1.
- 69 Michael Scharff, "A Path to Peace: Liberia's First Post-War Elections." *Innovations for Successful Societies*. October 2011; <https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/path-peace-liberias-first-post-war-elections-2004-2005>, 3.
- 70 Alan Doss. *A Peacekeeper in Africa: Learning from UN Interventions in Other People's Wars*. (London: Lynne Rienner, 2020), 113.
- 71 John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate. June 2010. "Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia." Stanley Foundation; <https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/LiberiaPAB610.pdf>, 4.
- 72 "Gyude Bryant: Charges dropped against Liberia ex-leader." BBC, September 27, 2010; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11422589>.



Innovations for Successful Societies makes its case studies and other publications available to all at no cost, under the guidelines of the Terms of Use listed below. The ISS Web repository is intended to serve as an idea bank, enabling practitioners and scholars to evaluate the pros and cons of different reform strategies and weigh the effects of context. ISS welcomes readers' feedback, including suggestions of additional topics and questions to be considered, corrections, and how case studies are being used: iss@princeton.edu.

Terms of Use

Before using any materials downloaded from the Innovations for Successful Societies website, users must read and accept the terms on which we make these items available. The terms constitute a legal agreement between any person who seeks to use information available at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu and Princeton University.

In downloading or otherwise employing this information, users indicate that:

- a. They understand that the materials downloaded from the website are protected under United States Copyright Law (Title 17, United States Code). This work is licensed under the [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.
- b. They will use the material only for educational, scholarly, and other noncommercial purposes.
- c. They will not sell, transfer, assign, license, lease, or otherwise convey any portion of this information to any third party. Republication or display on a third party's website requires the express written permission of the Princeton University Innovations for Successful Societies program or the Princeton University Library.
- d. They understand that the quotes used in the case study reflect the interviewees' personal points of view. Although all efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the information collected, Princeton University does not warrant the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or other characteristics of any material available online.
- e. They acknowledge that the content and/or format of the archive and the site may be revised, updated or otherwise modified from time to time.
- f. They accept that access to and use of the archive are at their own risk. They shall not hold Princeton University liable for any loss or damages resulting from the use of information in the archive. Princeton University assumes no liability for any errors or omissions with respect to the functioning of the archive.
- g. In all publications, presentations or other communications that incorporate or otherwise rely on information from this archive, they will acknowledge that such information was obtained through the Innovations for Successful Societies website. Our status (and that of any identified contributors) as the authors of material must always be acknowledged and a full credit given as follows:

Author(s) or Editor(s) if listed, Full title, Year of publication, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, <http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/>

