ASSERTING THE PRESENCE OF THE STATE, ONE STEP AT A TIME:
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL, 2008 - 2010

SYNOPSIS

Beginning in the late 1980s, Rio de Janeiro suffered increasing urban violence as the drug trade moved south from the Caribbean. The favelas, shantytowns and slums on the hillsides surrounding Brazil's second-largest city, saw a rise in both inter-gang violence and clashes between police and drug traffickers. Innocent bystanders often died in the crossfire. In 2007, working with the support of the governor, the state's secretary for public security, José Mariano Beltrame, and his colleagues tried a new approach. Instead of repeated military-style interventions to oust the traffickers, Beltrame created the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP, or Peace Police Unit), to provide a continuous police presence and help extend the reach of the government into contested areas. Beltrame's team rolled out the program on a pilot basis and identified communities where early success would boost the image of the government in the eyes of Rio's population. This case study outlines the development of the new approach, the problems encountered in implementation, and some of the results from the pilot program’s opening months.

Richard Bennet drafted this policy note on the basis of interviews conducted in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in August and September 2010.

INTRODUCTION

On a warm night in August 2010, José Mariano Beltrame, the secretary for public security for the state of Rio de Janeiro, lined up next to Capt. Glaucio Schorcht and the young officers of Schorcht's Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) in the Morro da Providência favela. The members of the special military police unit were not in the favela to conduct a typical operation against drug traffickers and armed gangs. Dressed in their finest white uniforms, Beltrame and his men waltzed with the favela's residents in what was Providência's first debutante ball.

Although the ball attracted criticism from some as a lavish use of scarce public resources, it also elicited requests from other favelas for similar events and focused public attention on
a transformation. Crime and violence had increased in Rio since the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, the number of firearm-related deaths per 100,000 people in any given year was four to five times greater than it was in New York City.¹ Expansion of the retail drug trade triggered violence between competing gangs in the city’s 1,000 favelas, the shantytowns that housed over 37% of the city’s population. The newly recruited UPP team offered a promising new direction, even for communities that remained hesitant to trust the police. After the state’s elite special-operations unit had worked for several weeks to clear the favela of guns, the UPP moved in to provide round-the-clock crime prevention and control. The program involved 15 units covering 59 communities during its first two years. The strategy initially focused on the most visible favelas, creating a replicable platform in a small number of communities where increased security would allow for improved service delivery and coordination between the government, residents and civil society.

Within nine months Providência, one of the pilot locations, had changed from the site of violent confrontations between the police and the drug traffickers to a place where the police danced alongside local residents. “The first thing you notice when you come here now is that the people are calm,” remarked Ivan Blaz as he walked through Providência’s streets. Blaz, a captain in Rio’s special operations battalion, BOPE (the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais), pointed out corners and alleyways where he had conducted night operations, hunting the drug traffickers that controlled the slum. He commented that some of his friends from his former unit preferred to not come back to Providência, where they lost many fellow police officers. “For me it’s gratification,” he said. “It makes it seem like it was worth it.”

The progress in Providência resulted from the government’s commitment to a long-term follow-up on the quick in-and-out military operations that had characterized Rio’s police actions in the past. After 100 BOPE soldiers, backed by 150 riot police, secured the area, a newly recruited team of police took their place. This team, the UPP, constituted an example of Rio’s latest response to the endemic violence that had paralyzed large swaths of the city for decades. Although the program did not solve all of the problems in the city’s favelas, it offered residents a glimpse of hope and the government a chance to build citizens’ trust.

THE CHALLENGE

Heavy force had been the dominant theme of Rio’s past policies regarding crime in the favelas. From 1897, when Morro da Providência was established, until the fall of Brazil’s military government in 1985, the state of Rio de Janeiro had sought to remove or break up the shantytowns. Later, unable to disband the shantytowns, the police relied mainly on periodic raids to try to control violence in the neighborhoods.²

Like other Brazilian states, Rio used the military police (Policia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro) for public safety services and employed the civilian police mainly for criminal investigations. Under the authority of the state rather than the municipal government, the military police were soldiers, trained to carry out direct-action operations. They entered communities to remove criminals and then retreated after each raid. The strategy had predictable consequences. Indiscriminate use of violence and deaths of bystanders stoked the animosity of the residents toward the police. To resist, drug
traffickers armed themselves and the neighborhoods they controlled. Inevitably, inter-gang violence and civilian deaths rose further. The temporary nature of the police actions also deepened the drug traffickers’ control over the areas, as gangs became the main source of law and order in the absence of the state police. Private militias sprung up in many favelas, particularly in the western areas of Rio, exacting payment—often of a brutal variety—for protection. Underpaid and poorly trained, officers sent to the favelas were susceptible to bribes from traffickers who wanted them to look the other way while the dealers battled each other for territory.

Centrist political coalitions in the federal, state and municipal governments at the time of Sergio Cabral’s election as governor in 2006 provided the political cover necessary to appoint professionals to cabinet positions, bringing expertise that political appointees lacked. Cabral sought to break with the past. He identified reformers to address security, as well as health care and the state’s finances. First on his new security team was José Mariano Beltrame. Beltrame had joined the federal police in 1981 and worked in narcotics investigations, intelligence operations and efforts to combat organized crime. Originally from the state of Rio Grande do Sul rather than Rio de Janeiro, he was an outsider, without extensive ties to the Rio police. He was also a professional, with technical skills and an understanding of police work, not a politician—a fact he considered very important.

Seeking to respond to public concern about crime, Cabral and Beltrame initially kept up the combat-style police raids that had failed so many times in the past. By 2007, however, violence in the favelas remained a serious problem. The homicide rate in metropolitan Rio was close to 80 victims per week, with an annual rate of 39 murders per 100,000 citizens. This rate was down from 62.8 per 100,000 in 2002, but it was still four times the rate of São Paulo, Brazil’s largest city. Local business and civic leaders worried that the violence posed a serious threat to the city and to their operations. Rio was competing to host the World Cup in 2014, and in 2007 it would begin its successful bid for the 2016 Olympic games. Violence might impede preparations and reduce attendance, and the respective selection committees would certainly consider the city’s security when making the awards. Beltrame thought Rio needed a different strategy—one that would succeed where past reform efforts had failed.

FRAMING A RESPONSE

Beltrame reviewed the many programs in Rio’s history that had met partial or fleeting success, analyzing the problems that had derailed the reform efforts in the past. Despite the tendency for the police to adopt more militaristic operations, there were exceptions to this more combative approach.

Col. Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira, the general commander of the military police for both of Gov. Leonel Brizola’s two terms (1983-1987 and 1991-1994) was the first prominent voice to establish community policing and human rights as the foundation of a new relationship between the state and the favelas. In the early 1990s, Cerqueira created a pilot project in Morro da Providência, but with Cerqueira’s departure in 1994, the experiment ended. Subsequent administrations and the general commanders they appointed did not share his philosophy that police should ultimately function as a service for the citizens rather than as a protector of the state. However, many of the
principles Cerqueira introduced formed the basis of the next generation of reforms.

Cerqueira had tapped Luis Eduardo Soares, a well-known sociologist and anthropologist with a background in policing issues, as a consultant. Cerqueira's influence persisted even after the initial change in direction failed, in part through Soares' continued work with the police service. In 1999, Soares, appointed to the state government as an undersecretary charged with the coordination of security, justice and citizenship, began developing plans to redefine the police and their interactions with the favelas. “We came to understand that there was something missing, something lacking,” Soares said. “We needed to understand better the complexity of security, not only the social, cultural, economic causes but also specific dynamics. We had to understand that besides the important and urgent changes in social and economic structures we simultaneously needed specific polices oriented toward the reduction of crime, mostly violent crimes, and more importantly, homicides. We needed to change the police to do that and to develop violence prevention policies.”

In 2000, during the term of Anthony Garotinho, a center-left governor, Soares' plans resulted in a new pilot program, the *Grupamento de Policiamento em Areas Especiais* (GPAE, or Police Grouping for Special Areas). The favela of Cantagalo-Pavão-Pavãozinho, located between the upscale areas of Copacabana and Ipanema in Rio’s Zona Sul, was one of five areas to receive a GPAE unit. This action was a response to an incident in which police killed several civilians, sparking riots that spread from the favela down to the streets of Copacabana and Ipanema. The political fallout signaled to Garotinho that he needed a new approach.

The GPAE program featured 24-hour policing of the favelas and an emphasis on improved community relations and partnerships with non-governmental organizations, most notably Viva Rio, an NGO founded in 1993 by Rubem César Fernandes. An anthropologist and philosopher by training, Fernandes helped organize Viva Rio in 1993, after the killings of street children in front of the Candelaria Church, an important historical and religious landmark, shocked residents and the international community alike. Governed by a board that drew from the city's business, union, civic and cultural communities, Viva Rio billed itself as a laboratory for innovative social programs on urban violence, particularly targeting at-risk youth. It developed conflict-resolution initiatives, job training programs and social activities, as well as disarmament efforts. Viva Rio also worked to create reporting mechanisms so that the community could hold the police accountable.

The GPAE program specifically targeted teenage youth in the favelas, the demographic deemed most likely to be involved in the drug-related violence. Homicide reduction became the primary indicator of success, and police focused on confiscating guns in order to eliminate shootings. In many instances, however, police and drug traffickers made deals where the police would let the traffic continue so long as there were no shootings. While the 24-hour presence increased the reach of the state into the favelas, it also put the underpaid police at risk of further corruption. In some instances the community was able to report this corruption, but in other favelas the problems pervaded the program.

The government chose the location of the first GPAE in response to a public-relations disaster that followed police killings of civilians.
in 2000. The response set a precedent for future decision makers. GPAE forces would enter a favela only in the aftermath of a serious public incident, as was the case in early 2002, in Tijuca, where exceptionally high levels of violence between competing drug gangs attracted deep concern, and in Vila Cruzeiro, following the death of a reporter that drew attention from the international media. The government’s reactive policy inherently lacked the strategy and infrastructure required for comprehensive reform, and the proper preparation and intelligence gathering necessary for effective operations and service delivery.

A rotation of unit commanders in the GPAE districts, specifically in Pavao-Pavaozinho-Cantagalo, weakened the units’ relationship with local NGOs. Police began abusing residents in some neighborhoods, and in one instance, a GPAE officer killed a resident, sparking protests from which the program could never fully recover. In certain areas violence increased, while in others the drug traffickers simply bribed GPAE soldiers, thereby delegitimizing the broader effort. Beltrame, reflecting on the GPAE program, said, “The police went in and were essentially in a ghetto of their own. … They were absorbed into that system. Many became corrupt, others just essentially looked like they were working, observing what was going on and coexisting with the crime.”

Soares recognized that without comprehensive police reform, the government could not respond effectively to the violence. He identified the reorganization of the police system as a necessary first step and began lobbying for changes in the bureaucracy. His initial attempts at reorganization were met with threats to his family and additional killings in the downtown areas, allegedly committed by elements of the police and meant to destabilize Soares’ office and Garotinho’s administration as a whole. “How could those organizational moves provoke such violent reactions?” Soares asked. “I learned very quickly that the best friend of corruption and brutality is anarchy, institutional disorganization. It is the absence of control tools and governance tools. … When they felt the anarchy would be replaced by a basic form of organization, they understood and predicted the development that would come from that first step.” Soares pushed forward with his reform agenda.

In 2002, with an 80% approval rating, Garotinho resigned his governorship to run for president. But as the center-left already had a natural candidate in Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Garotinho had to refashion his candidacy to appeal to voters in the center of the political spectrum. As a result he reorganized Rio’s government, changing secretaries and reshaping the coalition. Soares’ policies were the first to go.

While the police had placed GPAE units in six favelas by 2005, the service abandoned plans for the accompanying social programs with the election in late 2002 of Garotinho’s wife, Rosinha, to succeed him as governor. Political considerations of the centrist coalition dictated a show of force, and thus community-policing efforts were implemented on a limited basis with mixed results. Successes during Rosinha Garotinho’s term from 2003-2006 were a direct result of innovative individual GPAE commanders who, without adequate government funding, negotiated with utility companies to improve community services.

While the political left supported reforms such as the GPAE, including proposals for adding a services component to the program, the municipal government from 2003 to 2006...
was led by Mayor Cesar Maia, who used individual cases of GPAE corruption as political fodder in his attacks on the center-left state government. This politicization of the GPAE raised skepticism from local citizens, as it became clear that the federal, state and municipal governments had conflicting approaches to reform. In response, many residents rejected the GPAE, fearing retribution from gangs and drug traffickers if they cooperated and the program fell apart after a single administration’s term.

When Sergio Cabral was elected governor in 2006, a few GPAE programs still existed nominally, though lack of funding, damaged public perception and politicking had halted their expansion and limited their success.

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

Cabral’s management style emphasized broad decentralization of authority among members of his cabinet but demanded concrete results. With pressure from the private sector to quell the violence, he approved Beltrame’s plan to change tactics and adopt a community policing strategy in the form of the UPP.

Beltrame began collecting intelligence on favelas in strategically significant areas of Rio with high public visibility. Among them were Providência, symbolic as the first favela and overlooking the business community in the city’s center; Cantagalo-Pavão-Pavãozinho, whose proximity to the tourist-filled Copacabana and Ipanema areas made it the subject of close scrutiny; and communities known for violence, such as the infamous Cidade de Deus (City of God). Beltrame created a detailed, long-term action plan that represented a sharp departure from the past reactive placement of GPAE units. “People didn’t seem ready to accept or deal with the issues. … People didn’t want to see what was going on, wanted to sweep the problems under the carpet,” he said. “We started mapping these areas with a higher rate of criminality and less state influence.” Beltrame’s team gathered intelligence on geography, population, crime rates, socio-economic and cultural factors, numbers of children and school enrollment, the presence of public institutions, the repercussions of crime in these areas, and other variables. From this information they identified 100 favelas with especially high crime rates or high visibility, and made plans to establish units in 40 of them by 2014.

Added pressure and momentum came from the October 2009 announcement that in addition to the 2014 World Cup, Rio would also be the host for the 2016 Summer Olympics. Security had to be improved significantly and quickly: The Olympic village was planned for the western portion of the city, Barra da Tijuca, next to more than 100 favelas dominated by militias.

First on Beltrame’s strategic list of favelas was Santa Marta, a small community of 6,000 residents in the centrally located Botofogo area. The BOPE, Rio state’s special operations battalion, conducted weeks of operations in Santa Marta to remove weapons. Many drug traffickers fled to other favelas, but Beltrame’s stated aim from the outset was to re-establish the state’s presence in these communities rather than wage a war on drugs. “We do not plan to end the drug trade. There are drugs in New York; there are drugs in Paris. Wherever you have demand, you are going to need supply,” he said. “What we want to do is maintain free access for the people in these areas to come and go safely.
Our main goal is to disarm and then implement public and private services effectively in these areas.”

After operations by the BOPE reduced the number of weapons in Santa Marta and drove many drug traffickers to other favelas, Beltrame’s new “peace police” unit moved in. Modeled on principles similar to that of GPAE, the UPP in Santa Marta comprised 120 newly recruited soldiers, led by Capt. Priscilla de Oliveira. That Beltrame chose to have the UPPs commanded by captains was significant, as the established hierarchy of colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors often had ties to political parties in their areas, or had personal agendas. Having young captains lead new academy graduates reduced the likelihood of corruption and helped Beltrame to establish new norms. Previous attempts to staff GPAE units had required commanders from other battalions to contribute specified numbers of their soldiers. Often they sent their worst, furthering problems of corruption and inappropriate violence. “It was often the case where commanders would say, ‘OK, let me send my worst guys,’” said Fernandes of the NGO Viva Rio. “Naturally, nobody is going to get rid of his best people, ever. You keep your best and get rid of your worst. So the worst would often go to GPAE, which was really defeating.”

The UPP recruits attended additional training in a doctrine that emphasized partnership with the community and placed the police in service of the citizens. Viva Rio participated, engaging the young military police recruits in discussions of specific case studies and in role-playing exercises designed to prepare them for community interactions. Such training was especially important because of their youth and inexperience.

As would become the strategy for future favela operations, after the BOPE had finished clearing the area of weapons, the UPP replaced them and occupied Santa Marta. They built police stations at strategic areas throughout the favela, not simply at the entrances as had been the case in the past, and staffed the posts with UPP officers 24 hours a day.

Staffing the new units was a challenge because the favelas could be dangerous. Conditions for police in the favelas were far less comfortable than they were in other areas of the city. To address these concerns, Beltrame’s UPP recruits received an additional 500 Brazilian reais a month (about US$300), along with the newest uniforms and equipment. The military police as a whole experienced a 70% increase in salaries under Beltrame.

As security conditions improved in the favelas, UPPs found themselves overburdened with non-security-related duties. In many areas, drug traffickers had provided security for the residents, and their presence had helped reduce petty crimes. Although the UPP occupation eliminated the violence that was the result of fighting between the police and gangs, residents of the favelas no longer had their traditional methods of resolving disputes. As a result, young and inexperienced police officers often were thrown into dispute resolution roles, with mixed results. Petty crime increased in many favelas in the short term, burdening a force designed and mandated to keep the peace rather than to conduct investigations.

As had been the case with public security secretaries during the early GPAE successes, Beltrame had neither the resources nor the authority to deliver services to the residents.
Basic sanitation and a steady supply of water were among the most urgent needs identified by the UPP officers. Education levels, especially for teenagers, fell far below the standards of the rest of the city. But the police had limited ability to produce these services. Community associations, selected from among the residents themselves, had existed in the favelas for many years, though identifying credible partners and seeking their input on service priorities proved a challenge for the UPP commanders.

Under these conditions, a captain in the UPP had to be a jack of all trades, the person to whom many residents turned for everything. The sub-commander of the UPP in Cantagalo-Pavão-Pavãozinho estimated that 30% of the UPP’s interaction with the people consisted of attending to everyday needs, including handling domestic disputes and appeals for better water service, and, in at least one instance, delivering a baby.

The presence of NGOs was common in many of these communities, largely because smaller favelas in and around Zona Sul were also the most permissive for NGO work before the UPPs showed up. The NGOs conducted a wide range of activities, including job training, fast-track schooling, operating samba and soccer schools for youth, and providing basic health needs. UPP commanders assigned officers in their units to work on community outreach and with NGOs, helping to monitor the needs of the population and the civil society. Opening communication channels between the UPPs and the leaders of the community associations was an important aspect of this process.

Most UPPs were too small to manage social programs as well as security. In Providência, for example, a 200-member UPP worked 12-hour shifts policing a population of approximately 10,000 residents. Although the ratio of police to residents was extremely high in comparison with many other countries, it was in line with the ratio of security personnel to residents in some other very high risk areas, such as post-conflict Kosovo and Bosnia.

Diversion to serve social needs threatened to reduce effectiveness. As a result, the UPPs needed support from other parts of Rio’s government. Cabral appointed another technocrat, Ricardo Henriques, formerly from Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento, Brazil’s national development bank, and charged his team with the task of coordinating the UPP Social, a supplementary unit that could act as a liaison between cabinet secretaries, the police, the communities and civil society.

Silvia Ramos, the undersecretary for public safety working on Henriques’ staff, emphasized the coordinating role of the Social UPPs, with the creation of a central governance unit that communicated between the state and municipal level secretariats, offering a forum in which the different levels and sectors of government could agree on priorities and action plans for each targeted community. Henriques’ team then planned to mirror this coordination with civil society groups and the private sector. Each Social UPP would have a local governance coordinator, typically a post-graduate, with a team of 3-4 people charged with the role of listening to the community and communicating their needs to the governance unit. Early programs focused on job creation, and Henriques’ secretariat acted as an intermediary between major industries and the local communities, enabling training programs for laborers and other entry-level job-seekers.

The UPP’s critics claimed that Beltrame’s plan addressed only the highly visible areas in the Zona Sul without offering any effective
response to the far larger problem of violence in Rio’s more than 1,000 favelas. The UPPs, they argued, were merely cosmetic, a public-relations campaign without substance. But Beltrame was quick to articulate his goal from the outset: to first target those communities that would resonate loudest given their profile. Cabral threw his political weight behind the new unit. “They decided to make [the UPP] the symbol of the government, and by doing that there was this incredible reversal of public opinion,” said Soares. In picking smaller favelas in highly visible areas like Santa Marta, the public security secretary was able to get a quick win for his new program. And by focusing heavily on communicating their strategy, Cabral and Beltrame managed to enlist the support of the media, thereby amplifying the initial successes.

Thereza Lobo, a sociologist and executive director of the NGO Rio Como Vamos, described the effect. “For the first time living in this city, we begin believing it is possible,” she said. “The message that the state government is sending to the society, to the drug dealers, to those who work in the drug traffic, is that business is not as usual.” Early success led to further success as clearing operations became easier for the BOPE and the prestige of the UPP grew in the eyes of the population.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

In the first two years of the program, the government planned to create 15 UPPs to police 59 communities. The targeted favelas varied in size and often overlapped, allowing one unit to secure multiple communities in the unit’s area of operation. A byproduct of the early success of the initial UPP units was an increase in the demand for the replication of the program on a larger scale, in a shorter timeframe than Beltrame had initially envisioned. This created a need for additional recruits and placed an extra burden on the police academy and training facilities. The GPAE and other earlier programs had not received the funding necessary for expansion, and these additional costs associated with extra recruiting posed a challenge for the UPP planners.

Once the program was in place and began to show success, however, the private sector started to provide financial support. Beltrame and Cabral’s communication strategy that focused on highlighting early successes in the media had paved the way for increased public confidence. In August 2010, billionaire Eike Batista announced a donation of 20 million reais (about US$12 million) to support the UPPs, along with a commitment to deliver that same amount every year until 2014, exclusively for training and equipping the units. Private corporations and other individuals also contributed to Batista’s fund, including Coca-Cola and the president of the Brazilian Football Confederation, Ricardo Teixeira, who donated specifically to the UPP in the City of God. The increased funding allowed Beltrame to add staff to the training academies and speed the rate at which new officers could reach the streets. Rio’s government invested 15 million reais, planning to enlarge the force by 60,000 officers by 2016. Where past setbacks had stalled funding for the GPAE, the UPP managed to consolidate early gains to secure the financial backing necessary for program expansion and replication.

ASSESSING RESULTS

In establishing the UPP, Cabral’s administration managed to side-step many of problems that had stalled earlier programs. By
integrating service delivery to the favelas as a key component of sustainable security, the UPP program attempted to demonstrate that the government's intentions went beyond near-term political calculations.

The success of the program was underlined by skyrocketing real-estate prices in and around the favelas that were initially targeted for UPP intervention; some properties doubled in value, others increased 10-fold. The rising cost of housing drove many poorer residents to favelas farther from the city center, those without the protection of UPPs. But at the same time, residents who could afford the higher rents moved to the safer, pacified favelas, lured by the increased security.

Drug trafficking in and around Rio de Janeiro did not abate with the advent of the UPPs, nor did the presence of the UPPs eradicate it in the targeted favelas. But by removing the weapons from these communities, the UPP program eliminated or sharply reduced homicides and forced the drug traffic to move elsewhere. By announcing ahead of time which communities the UPP would clear next, the police allowed the high-level drug traffickers to move to other areas. This was of little concern to the residents in the pacified areas, the ultimate targets of the program, according to Beltrame. The government aimed to slowly expand its zone of control, isolating and marginalizing the drug traffickers favela by favela and limiting their freedom of movement.

In the initial stages of the UPP program, Beltrame sought to create a police unit free from the corruption that permeated the rest of the police force, but he stood short of attempting comprehensive police reform in the overhaul method that Soares and others deemed essential to sustainable improvements in public security. According to Soares, police reform remained the essential element. “You have to change police. It’s impossible to give it stability, continuity, sustainability, with police deeply broken and deeply connected [to crime], and more than that, a source of crime,” he said.

The way in which the UPP program attempted to redefine the role of the police in the eyes of the citizenry created an alternative model for police conduct that could be replicated, as the state planned to increase recruiting targets to 60,000 new officers by 2016. “We initially identified 100 favelas that had especially high crime rates. Of these, 40 were chosen,” said Beltrame. “We hope to meet the goal of 40 by 2014. Even when we meet this goal we are not going to say that Rio de Janeiro state is 100% pacified, but we have a strategy that aims to reduce the crime to much lower levels.”

Despite the training of new recruits, the scale of the overall problem outweighed even the most ambitious plans. With more than 1,000 favelas in and around the city, many of them far larger and more violent than the ones initially targeted by the UPPs, the program lacked the manpower and resources required to operate beyond the targeted areas. The limited nature of the UPP program caused many critics to dismiss it as merely another iteration of the same government policies that would inevitably fail to receive the proper support and priorities in order to be effective on a larger scale. Thus the goal for Beltrame, Henriques and the other members of Cabral’s cabinet was to define the program as a permanent state policy rather than the policy of a particular governor. Success—and the public communication of that success—would make it more difficult for future administrations to deviate from the program.
REFLECTIONS

José Mariano Beltrame, Rio de Janeiro state’s secretary for public security, defined his mission as extending the arm of the state into areas where government was only a shadow, and demonstrating that the state could indeed be effective in providing protection and services. “We needed to show society that it is possible to improve the public security situation,” he said. “We know that crime goes where the state is absent. We knew that these islands needed to be occupied by the state; they needed to have the presence of the state.” The new UPP program aimed to do exactly that, and by extending the reach of the state into these areas, Beltrame was slowly able to begin changing the image of the government in the eyes of the favela residents.

Luis Eduardo Soares, having seen past programs stalled and limited in their success, emphasized the importance of building the trust of the residents, a goal requiring the kind of long-term planning inherent in Beltrame’s UPP strategy. “If you have the constant presence of police, working honestly, doing their job constantly... then you have the restitution of the democratic state, the restoration of legal order in a place which had been taken from the authority of law. This is, in itself, extremely important,” Soares said. “You are not part of a community under a different power with its own laws. You are now a citizen.”

2 Perlman, J. *Favela*. 52-53.
3 Perlman, 171.
Terms of Use

Before using any materials downloaded from the Innovations for Successful Societies website, users must read and accept the terms on which we make these items available. The terms constitute a legal agreement between any person who seeks to use information available at www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties and Princeton University.

In downloading or otherwise employing this information, users indicate that

a. They understand that the materials downloaded from the website are protected under United States Copyright Law (Title 17, United States Code).

b. They will use the material only for educational, scholarly and other noncommercial purposes.

c. They will not sell, transfer, assign, license, lease, or otherwise convey any portion of this information to any third party. (Re-publication or display on a third-party’s website requires the express written permission of the Princeton University Innovations for Successful Societies program or the Princeton University Library.)

d. In all publications, presentations or other communications that incorporate or otherwise rely upon information from this archive, they will acknowledge that such information was obtained through the Innovations for Successful Societies website. A suggested citation format is below.

   [Document author if listed], [Document title], Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, accessed at http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties on [date accessed on web]

e. They understand that the quotes used in the case study reflect the interviewees’ personal points of view. Although all efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the information collected, Princeton University does not warrant the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or other characteristics of any material available online.

f. They acknowledge that the content and/or format of the archive and the site may be revised, updated or otherwise modified from time to time.

g. They accept that access to and use of the archive is at their own risk. They shall not hold Princeton University liable for any loss or damages resulting from the use of information in the archive. Princeton University assumes no liability for any errors or omissions with respect to the functioning of the archive.