COALITION BUILDING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY:
BIHAR STATE, INDIA, 2005-2009

SYNOPSIS

Nitish Kumar was elected chief minister of Bihar, India’s poorest state, in December 2005, when the state’s government was weighed down by two decades of institutional decline, widespread lawlessness and a society deeply divided by caste and religion. To win the election and to implement his reform agenda, he engineered a grand bargain whereby almost every distinct social group had a share in state-sponsored development. This paved the way for more fundamental reforms in law and order, administration and infrastructure. Although Bihar’s more intractable issues remained in 2009, the state had begun turning the corner. Two separate memos, “Clearing the Jungle Raj” and “Reviving the Administration,” describe Kumar’s efforts to improve law and order and administration in Bihar, respectively.

Rohan Mukherjee drafted this policy note on the basis of interviews conducted in Patna, Bihar, in July 2009.

INTRODUCTION

A month into his job as Bihar’s chief minister, Nitish Kumar said to a journalist, “When I walked into my office, all I found was some old Remington typewriters and moth-eaten paper. There was no carbon paper, so I wrote my first order by hand and copied it out by hand.” Bihar lacked not just the structural components of good governance, but also the basic elements of everyday administration. A financial scandal in the previous regime had constricted government decision making. The government’s absence from society had allowed criminal elements to proliferate. On a more fundamental level, deep social divisions hampered public policy. As a result of these challenges, Bihar lagged behind almost every Indian state in terms of human development, public-service delivery and administration.

Kumar’s strategy for standing Bihar back on its feet was politically based. Instead of indulging in the patronage politics of his predecessors, he aimed to provide development for all parts of society by starting out with relatively neutral issues like infrastructure. At the same time, he used social-sector programs to reach out to groups that had been historically excluded from political power. In this manner he was able to develop what Shaibal Gupta, member secretary of the Asian Development Research Institute, one of Bihar’s leading think tanks, called a “coalition
of extremes.” The coalition contained groups from both ends of the traditional caste hierarchy. With their political support, Kumar was able to implement major changes in public administration and law and order in Bihar.

Context
Kumar was aware of the scale at which he had to mobilize support. Bihar was roughly the size of South Korea, yet its population of nearly 83 million was larger than Germany’s. Bihar was largely agrarian, with 90% of the population living in the countryside and 80% of its work force employed in agriculture. Socially, Bihar was deeply fragmented along caste and religious lines. Hindus were broadly divided into upper castes, so-called “backward” castes (which were further divided into upper backward castes and extremely backward castes), and lower castes, also known as scheduled castes or Dalits.

Social and economic inequality overlapped, as shown by landholding patterns that favored Hindus, particularly upper and middle (i.e., backward) castes. Land ownership had been a major source of conflict between social groups since the 1950s. In the late 1970s, the rural dispute over land gave birth to a Maoist peasant movement (known as the Naxalite movement) that was virulently opposed to the state and its constituent landed classes. The Naxalites remained a major threat to security and state legitimacy when Kumar took office. Upper-caste landowners maintained private militias to protect their interests, and civil society was often a battleground of caste and class antagonisms.

Social discord and poor administration left Bihar bereft of human capital and productive potential. The economy consistently underperformed. Between 1991 and 1998, while economic reforms saw India’s economy grow 6% annually, Bihar’s grew at a 2.7% rate. Annual per-capita income in Bihar was the lowest among Indian states, calculated by the government of India in 2008 at 10,570 rupees (roughly US$264 at the time), which, according to the International Monetary Fund, was lower than countries such as Eritrea, Malawi, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone.

Bihar exemplified in many ways the case of a deeply divided agrarian society suffering from institutional decline in the face of serious challenges to state authority and legitimacy. In his 1990 book “Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability,” Princeton University Professor Atul Kohli wrote, “If Bihar were an independent country, such conditions of breakdown would by now have precipitated a military coup or external intervention, or some combination of the two. Being a part of the Republic of India, which operated under a federally organized parliamentary system, Bihar faced unique opportunities and challenges in comparison with countries with similar circumstances. The federal government was more centralized than other federalist countries such as the U.S., Germany and Australia, and it exercised significant financial control over state governments.

As a result, Kumar did not have the autonomy to make some important decisions. At the same time, however, the federal government provided a safety net for states that struggled to build the required institutional capacity for good governance. The federal government was also able to provide greater shares of national revenue to needy states such as Bihar. Despite these factors that made Bihar’s situation unique, the case offers important lessons. Most important was the manner in which Kumar built a social and political coalition for reform in a deeply divided society.

THE CHALLENGE
In February 2004, a survey article in The Economist labeled Bihar an “area of darkness”
and said, “Bihar ... has become a byword for the worst of India: of widespread and inescapable poverty; of corrupt politicians indistinguishable from the mafia dons they patronise; of a caste-ridden social order that has retained the worst feudal cruelties; of terrorist attacks by groups of “Naxalite” Maoists; of chronic misrule that has allowed infrastructure to crumble, the education and health systems to collapse, and law and order to evaporate.”

Many Indian observers who had witnessed a period of extreme institutional decline in Bihar during the 1990s shared this judgment. Although many of Bihar’s challenges had existed earlier, the government’s fragility became evident at a time when other parts of India surged ahead on a wave of economic reform. Bihar’s problems appeared to peak during a series of governments under the leadership of Lalu Prasad Yadav from 1990 to 2005. When a financial scam implicated his government in 1997, Yadav resigned and made his wife, Rabri Devi, chief minister. Through her, he continued to exercise great control over the government. Yadav was widely credited with mobilizing and strengthening the political power of the backward castes (specifically Yadavs, his own caste) and Muslims in Bihar. However, he was also responsible for indulging in a kind of politics that equated economic interests with social identity. Caste became the primary axis of differentiation in the political sphere.

Although caste had always played a prominent role in Bihar’s society and politics, and many saw the rise of the backward castes as a deepening of Indian democracy, Yadav’s politics were exclusionary. Ascendant groups soon replaced their erstwhile oppressors (the upper castes) in dominating state resources and oppressing the lowest castes, who had seen no improvement in their lot since India’s independence. The dominant castes in politics and the bureaucracy had little incentive to provide public goods or invest in infrastructure that might benefit other groups.

Politically, caste antagonisms remained a major challenge to Bihar’s institutional development. Leaders who could stake a claim to power would inevitably face strong patronage pressures from their castes or regional bases. The caste-based vote blocs of the various parties in the state ensured that as long as one could obtain electoral majorities by relying on appeals to specific social groups, there would be no penalty for defaulting on governance. Historically, this had precluded the kind of broad-based and inclusive development that Bihar needed, and that other Indian states had achieved to a greater extent.

Cultivating support

Kumar’s first challenge was to break the former government’s hegemony and to build popular support for his party and his reforms. Yadav’s party had governed Bihar for the previous 15 years by nurturing a Muslim-Yadav voting bloc. In Bihar, politically mobilized caste and religious groups contested elections to win power for sectarian ends. Democracy flourished but with little consequence for development. Prominent Bihar scholar Shaibal Gupta said in an interview, “When Nitish Kumar came to power, while the democratizations in the society or in the polity had reached a very decisive level, in contrast the state structure was in shambles in Bihar. So the immediate challenge of Nitish Kumar was to build the state structure.” Prior to even this basic step, however, Kumar faced the challenge of cultivating support for his reform agenda.

Kumar and Yadav had common political roots. Both had emerged as socialist political leaders in the heady days of political and social activist Jayaprakash Narayan’s student movement for “total revolution” in 1970s
Bihar. Although both were originally from the same political party, Kumar split from Yadav to start his own party soon after Yadav became chief minister and turned from socialism to populism and corruption. While Yadav took pride in his grassroots credentials and often resorted to popular symbols and caste allegiances to buttress his party’s rule in Bihar, Kumar was described by Bihar scholar Ashwini Kumar (no relation) as a “technocrat-turned-socialist” leader.

Nitish Kumar had never fully immersed himself in Bihar’s politics. His focus was more on the federal level, where he had kept a relatively low profile as a member of the Indian Parliament from 1989 and as a cabinet-level minister in the Indian government from 1999. In 2004 Kumar’s political coalition at the federal level, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), lost the parliamentary election to a rival coalition led by the Indian National Congress party. Although Kumar remained a member of the federal Parliament, he had to wait for the next election, in five years, for another opportunity to enact policy at that level.

A reform moment

In 2005 Kumar and the political party he led teamed up with the BJP to contest state-level elections for Bihar’s legislative assembly. Their main opponent was an alliance of Yadav’s party and the Congress party. The February election resulted in a hung assembly, as neither alliance had the requisite numbers to form a majority government. Political chaos ensued, and in March the federal government used a constitutional provision to dissolve the state government and declare “president’s rule” for a period of six months. (India has a president who is a ceremonial head of state). During this period, the governor, who in the Indian system was a state-level figurehead appointed by the federal government, administered Bihar with the help of senior or retired civil servants. For six months, the state functioned without an elected government.

President’s rule created an important opening for reform. Whereas previously the chief minister and his council had kept a large portion of decision-making authority and power to themselves, the interim administration devolved authority to the senior bureaucracy and began streamlining a number of administrative processes. This helped reform-minded bureaucrats to get things done. For example, Alok Chaturvedi, an Indian Administrative Service officer of the Bihar cadre, returned to the Bihar government as secretary of expenditure in the finance department during president’s rule. In an interview, he recalled that during this time there were wider consultations among senior bureaucrats on policy issues, and officials had greater freedom to adopt their own ideas or to “put in place what you think is right,” based on experience. “Procedurally it was much faster to put in place new ideas because of the president’s rule,” he said.

Although the interim administration under president’s rule laid some important groundwork for future reforms, it was not an elected government. Moreover, six months was not enough time to bring about the kinds of changes required in Bihar. Two decades of institutional decline had brought the government to its knees. A World Bank report released in 2005 noted, “Most state governments are characterized by poorly defined service norms, political interference, and a large non-meritocratic bureaucracy. Especially so in Bihar, this is compounded by a highly centralized administration with the kind of incentive structure that thwarts decision-making and can cause major delays.”

Administrative structures had crumbled in the face of corruption, inefficiency and political interference. An inactive and unmotivated bureaucracy struggled to
maintain a minimum level of governance. Kidnapping, extortion and murder had become cottage industries, providing far more lucrative opportunities to disaffected youth than nearly any legitimate vocation. In November 2005, on the eve of a second election to resolve the outcome of the first, hundreds of Naxalite cadres disguised in police uniforms laid siege to the town of Jehanabad in South Bihar to break their comrades out of the local prison. This unprecedented and daring attack on the government cast a pall over Bihar's voters as they went to the polls for a second time that year.

FRAMING A RESPONSE

In the midst of the second round of campaigning in November 2005, The Outlook, an Indian weekly news journal, ran an article on Kumar. The writer said, “After a decade of fighting and losing to the RJD [Yadav’s party], Nitish appears to have tapped into that intangible mix of caste, chemistry, and credibility that have added several inches to his stature in Bihar. From being a mere neta [leader] of the Kurmi caste, he is now being seen as a pan-Bihar leader.”

Kumar’s own voting bloc was rather narrow, consisting mainly of the upper backward-caste Kurmis. To seek a mandate for change, he knew he had to expand his social support base. Disaffection with Yadav’s government among non-Yadav backward-caste communities, as well as many in the Yadav community itself, provided an opening. Kumar developed an electoral platform focused on “development and social justice.” The promise of change and a better deal for non-Yadav backward casts, as well as the extremely backward castes.

Building a coalition

While each caste or religious group had a party claiming to represent it, Kumar’s was the only campaign to make a broad-based appeal to all Biharis. This was a difficult path, particularly because of his pre-election alliance with the upper-caste-dominated Hindu nationalist BJP party. Kumar, however, was careful to portray himself as ideologically and politically distinct from the BJP. He avoided BJP campaign rallies and focused on including more Muslim candidates into his party’s electoral slate. At the same time, his party’s alliance with the BJP ran a sophisticated campaign, with party leaders from diverse social backgrounds regularly addressing different constituencies.

The numbers, however, still did not add up. The Dalit vote remained with another party, and Yadav still retained support among the Muslims and his fellow Yadavs. At this point, Kumar’s relationship with the BJP played an important role. Together with the BJP, his party could muster the required number of seats after the second round of polling to legitimately form a government in Bihar. In the final tally of the November 2005 elections, Kumar’s alliance held 146 of 243 seats, while Yadav’s alliance with the Congress party had 65. The result was a marked improvement for Kumar’s alliance from February, when the party tallies were 92 and 75, respectively.

By focusing more on Bihari identity than narrow patron-client political traditions, Kumar was able to avoid a trap that had ensnared reform-minded leaders in the past. In assessing Kumar’s electoral victory, scholar Shaibal Gupta credited him with the ability to foster a “coalition of extremes” that included Dalits, backward castes, Muslims and upper castes. The key to his success was his ability to articulate a “subnational agenda” for Bihar, Gupta said. The clearest indicator of Kumar’s success was the sharp decline in the vote share of independent candidates in the second round of polling; most of those votes went to his alliance. Independent candidates in Bihar
were usually locally powerful landlords or strongmen who derived political power from patronage or criminal activity. Their decline in the face of Kumar’s ascendency vindicated his pan-Bihar stance.

Media commentators credited Kumar for eschewing the politics of caste and focusing on development and governance as electoral issues. In an opinion piece on the November election, prominent Indian commentator Prem Shankar Jha observed, “Localised voting wrought a failed state. Now Bihar kills both cause and effect.”

Some observers heralded the election result as “a new phase in the politics of social justice in Bihar.” Those with more nuanced views knew that caste was uppermost on Kumar’s mind as he forged his winning coalition. The difference this time was that development would be for all castes and communities, not just for those who supported the winning candidate.

Kumar’s electoral strategy was a calculated gamble, as was the faith that many voters in Bihar put in this little-known candidate for chief minister. Kumar recognized the importance of following through on his electoral promises. Chirashree Das Gupta, a fellow at the Asian Development Research Institute in Patna, said in an interview, “If the electoral promise of good governance had to be delivered, then whoever was going to come had to take on the question of administrative reforms....” In some ways, therefore, Kumar’s electoral promises predetermined his post-election policy platform. The fact that the entire country and even many parts of the world were watching developments in Bihar closely after his election also played a role in crystallizing Kumar’s reform agenda.

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

Kumar’s election campaign had been fought on the promise of good governance, development and social justice. Three priorities emerged from these assurances. The first was to rebuild the institutions of governance and revive the state through administrative reforms. The second was to engineer development by expanding and improving infrastructure, including roads, bridges, electricity, health and education. The third was to widen the government’s social coalition by attending to the needs and demands of almost every caste grouping and major religious community. This last step would occur in a diffuse manner but would have the widest impact in terms of consolidating the government’s position for future reform.

While governance reforms, mainly in administration and law and order, were underway, Kumar turned to development and social justice. For him, these were deeply interconnected. Development without social justice would be an improvement on the previous government’s policies, but it would be politically unsustainable. Social justice without development would continue the previous government’s approach, but this time benefiting a different caste grouping. This, too, was clearly infeasible, given the public groundswell for change that had brought Kumar to power. He understood that the simultaneous pursuit of development and social justice was necessary not only to ensure his political survival but also to create a solid platform for his reform initiatives. The only way to do this was to ensure that every caste or religious group in Bihar would experience the benefits of development.

Development for all

Providing development for all was a challenging goal. Members of Kumar’s caste and of the socio-economically powerful upper castes represented in his government by the BJP placed considerable demands on him. Upper castes permeated the top echelons of
the state bureaucracy. To complicate matters, lower-caste communities also had high expectations for Kumar. In walking the line between the upper and lower castes in his social coalition, Kumar ran the risk of pleasing nobody by trying to please everybody. He therefore started with caste-neutral sectors—roads, bridges, schools, health centers and electricity-generation plants—basic infrastructure that could be provided to everyone without favor. An enlarged state budget, supported by federal transfers, helped him to expand public-service provision across the state.

Kumar revived the almost defunct state-owned Bihar Bridge Construction Corporation and empowered it to transform itself into a profit-making venture that rapidly built bridges all over Bihar, which was riddled with rivers and prone to flooding. His Education Department built new schools and made plans to hire 200,000 new teachers with World Bank assistance. His Health Department outsourced key medical services like radiological and pathological testing to private parties and subsidized these services for the poor. The Bihar State Electricity Board reorganized into six different government companies focusing on different aspects of electricity generation and delivery. Kumar also took pains to implement the federally mandated national rural employment guarantee program in every district, making Bihar the first state in India to do so. To curb corruption and abuse of the federal program, Bihar’s rural-development department devised innovative technological solutions, including electronic onsite identification systems and direct payments to beneficiary bank accounts.

While Kumar’s caste-neutral reforms drew little significant criticism from any particular community in Bihar, he chose to defer action on more difficult and entrenched problems like land ownership. He established a Land Reforms Commission in mid-2006 but did not take any action on its report, which was submitted by the commission in 2008 and remained an unreleased government document as of 2009. Similarly, the recommendations of the Common Schools Commission and many recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission remained unimplemented in 2009.

**Targeting specific communities**

Aside from caste-neutral sectors, Kumar also focused on addressing the specific concerns of communities. In agriculture, he faced a difficult situation with competing demands from upper and lower castes. Agricultural-marketing committees had existed in Bihar for decades, with the objective of linking farmers with markets. Although these committees were traditionally dominated by upper castes, Yadav’s social revolution of the 1990s tipped the scales in favor of the lower and backward castes. When Kumar came to power, there was strong demand from the upper castes for greater representation on the committees. Faced with the need to nurture both sides, Kumar decided to abolish the committees. Faced with the need to nurture both sides, Kumar decided to abolish the committees. Although the official reason cited for their closure was the need to facilitate freer agricultural markets in Bihar, analyst Chirashree Das Gupta suggested that the real reason was the underlying caste antagonism over the future of the agricultural committees.

Kumar also reached out to Bihar’s Muslims, who constituted 16% of the state’s population, with three bold overtures. The first was to order the fencing of graveyards throughout Bihar, a simple act that had profound meaning and consequence. Bihari Hindus and Muslims often clashed over alleged encroachments on graveyards, most of which were unfenced. Previous attempts to fence them had been unsuccessful. Kumar’s action provided assurance to a substantial religious minority while improving the environment for law and order. His second act
was to appoint Muslim bureaucrats to two influential positions in his administration. Afzal Amanullah was made principal secretary of Home Affairs, and Amir Subhani became principal secretary of Administrative Reforms and Personnel.

Third, Kumar addressed long-standing grievances of Muslim families affected by the 1989 Hindu-Muslim riots in Bhagalpur district, during which more than a thousand people, mostly Muslims, were killed. Kumar ordered a judicial enquiry to ensure that those accused of the killings were tried for their crimes. In addition, he provided monetary compensation to victims’ families. These three acts helped Kumar build support among the Muslim communities of Bihar.

In a similar vein, Kumar reclassified a subgroup of the poorest of the lower castes under a new label—Mahadalit—the more oppressed of the oppressed. Officially, the term referred to “those sections within the scheduled castes [i.e., constitutionally protected castes] who had lagged behind in the development process.” In 2007 the Bihar government established a Mahadalit Commission to identify the specific castes to be included under this newly invented label, and to recommend measures for their “economic, social, cultural, and educational upliftment.” The commission submitted two reports, on the basis of which the government devised a special package of social-sector initiatives for 20 of the 22 subcastes within the Dalit community of Bihar. This helped Kumar carve out a constituency in a community that otherwise would not support him. At the same time, his government received credit for delivering the benefits of development to the most disadvantaged sections of society. Kumar’s move was controversial and drew the ire of Dalit political leaders. In addition, the National Commission on Scheduled Castes deemed the Mahadalit Commission unconstitutional in a report to the federal government in October 2008. Although the controversy remained unresolved in July 2009, the Bihar government created a Mahadalit Vikas Mission, or Mission for the Development of Mahadalits, with the aim of improving these communities’ socio-economic position.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

Kumar also took steps to broaden popular support for his government and its reform agenda. Four months into his new administration, he launched Janta ke Darbar Mein Mukhyamantri (the chief minister in the people’s court), a weekly public forum at his official residence, where he would meet with the public to hear complaints and accept petitions. Senior government officials were required to attend these events. Complaints were assigned numbers that could be used for tracking subsequent progress. By mid-2009, the Darbar had become a regular fixture in the chief minister’s schedule, and citizens from all over Bihar came to submit grievances.

Kumar’s initiatives took the idea of reform from abstract to concrete. In January 2009, Kumar undertook his first Vikas Yatra (development journey), a month-long trip through rural districts, where he replicated the Darbar model at the village level. At these meetings Kumar was known to give out the cellphone numbers of senior government officials, including the chief secretary of the state administration, so that citizens could follow up on their petitions. While many dismissed both the Darbar and Yatra as populist gimmicks, the initiatives helped Kumar bolster his public image and “demystify the state structure,” according to Shaibal Gupta, who added, “People cannot imagine ever interacting with the chief secretary or with the principal secretaries of the departments.”

In this manner Kumar was able to develop the strategy that had won him the
election in 2005. He continued to build on his coalition of extremes by undertaking neutral reforms that could benefit all communities while simultaneously reaching out to specific communities to build support for his government. As a result, he was able to strengthen his political position relative to his rivals and buttress his ability to implement his reform agenda. His careful political management ensured these fundamental changes didn’t upset the diverse groups from the newly formed Mahadalits to the upper-caste-dominated BJP.

Kumar had a reliable and trusted ally in Sushil Kumar Modi, the BJP leader in Bihar and deputy chief minister and finance minister in Kumar’s government. Modi, too, was a product of the student movement from which Kumar had emerged, and he and Kumar knew each other for many years before coming together to form a government in 2005. In general, the BJP in Bihar was known for underplaying its Hindu nationalist roots and focusing more on economic and governance issues. This tactic had helped it win over large numbers of Congress party supporters in Bihar during the 1990s. The BJP, therefore, did not place any significant hurdles in Kumar’s way as he expanded his coalition to include Dalits and Muslims.

ASSESSING RESULTS

Kumar’s social coalition worked well. Bihar’s voters endorsed his brand of politics in the May 2009 national elections to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament. Kumar’s party won 20 of the 40 elected positions allotted to Bihar. This was a significant improvement over the six positions the party won in the previous national elections in 2004. Lalu Yadav’s party held four positions, down from 22 previously, while the BJP’s tally rose to 12 from five.

In 2009, many observers predicted a victory for Kumar in Bihar’s next state elections in 2010. However, some felt there would likely come a point when Kumar would have to turn toward Bihar’s more intractable issues. Prominent among these were caste-based socio-economic inequality, left-wing radicalism and land reform, each of which overlapped with the others. These deep-seated issues represented important hurdles for Kumar’s social coalition and could derail the long-term reform process.

Historically, observers of Bihar’s troubles agreed that land reform might be the key to lasting peace and development in the state. But Shaibal Gupta suggested, “In Bihar, if land reform is implemented, it will be very difficult at this moment. The whole coalition of extremes may break.” The strains were already evident at that time. For example, Chirashree Das Gupta argued that while other types of crime had diminished, the incidence of crimes against women, particularly rape, continued to increase in Bihar. Das Gupta argued that this exposed the upper-caste influence on Kumar’s political coalition, as rape was traditionally a common form of asserting caste dominance in Bihar. “The systematic rise in rape actually significantly points to that, because traditional upper-caste hegemony has always been on jameen [land] and joru [wives],” said Das Gupta. As the diverse communities in his coalition started benefiting from his “development for all” strategy, Kumar was likely to face greater pressure from all corners. Many believed that the resulting push and pull might fracture his grand social bargain.

Kumar was aware of the pitfalls in his strategy. Those close to him suggested that the first phase of his plan was to achieve relatively noncontroversial targets. A second term in 2010 would provide a platform to
tackle Bihar’s more intractable issues, they said.

REFLECTIONS

Bihar made significant strides from 2005 to 2009, as Kumar and his senior administrators worked to reverse the conventional wisdom that the city was beyond repair. Amir Subhani, principal secretary of Administrative Reforms and Personnel, summarized a philosophy that previously would have struck a hollow note in Bihar:

“The moral of the story is that it is possible to bring about revolutions, make fundamental changes and produce miracles even in the most adverse situations… . The only thing is that you have to find the ways of how to do it. The task itself is not impossible.”

Bihar in 2009 appeared to have touched the impossible. While it was uncertain whether the state’s citizenry would allow Kumar another term as chief minister to consolidate his gains, the mood in Patna was hopeful.

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7 Government of Bihar, Information and Public Relations Department, Bihar Information, June 2009.
8 Government of Bihar, Information and Public Relations Department, Bihar Information, June 2009.
9 Ibid.
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