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LEMAY-HEBERT: Good evening, and thank you very much for sharing some of your precious time with us. My first questions will be about your personal background. Would you tell me first about the jobs you held before you took this position, and maybe briefly introduce yourself?

HAVERIA: OK, I am Police Chief Inspector Ramchrisen Haveria, from the Philippines, and I am already 16 years in the police service in our country. The positions that I held before are, first in the regional operations office in our country, in the national capitol region, and then when I was transferred to the station, I held positions like station chief of the Police Community Relations Office, and the same as concurrent chief of the Internal Affairs Office. After that, I was transferred to be the chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit in our station, and then enforcement followed to be the assistant chief of our Special Operations group handling different crimes, thefts, other specials. Again I was returned to the new Drug Enforcement Office in our station in our country, because they have a new law, they call it the PDEA Law or the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who is now the sole office concerned in drug enforcement, but they still have the agreement with the police to work with us, to assist them. So we are working now in partner with the Drug Enforcement Agency. We call it the Anti-Illlegal Drugs Task Force of the Police, so I was again the chief of that office until such time that I was assigned again. I was lucky to be part of the UN Police in Kosovo in 2004-2005. When I came back, I was working now at the national headquarters of our police in the Philippines as the director of operation at one division, which I am qualified to be as the deputy of the one division, Special Operations Divisions. We are dealing with visiting people of other countries; we are setting up security for them, and also from the local dignitaries. That’s all.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What are the main differences and maybe similarities between the mission in East Timor and the mission in Kosovo from your point of view?

HAVERIA: Well, basically, it’s the culture; it’s the culture of the Kosovar compared with Timor Leste. It’s the number one [thing] I observe, and in their implementation of the UN guidelines, it’s almost the same. They have the same things, only some, I know, they are correcting—for example, the capability of the internet is not much good here, but now I think they are already doing better than when I first I arrived here.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Very briefly, it would be helpful to hear your own description of the history of the mission, the goals and the current objectives. We welcome comparisons to Kosovo, but I would like to have a little bit about your point of view about the history of the mission and the goals of the mission. Can you describe these briefly for us?

HAVERIA: Basically, the prime reason I know is for them to stand on their own, which is always the objective of the UN to assist them, since they want independence on the part of their country—and I know that on that approach of the UN, you cannot really rush them, because, for example, I am always telling our people here, our fellow UNPOLs [United Nations Police], you cannot rush them. For example, they are already here 5 years as police officers, and they already have practices that they do. To consider also the culture, you cannot implement—for example, if you are dealing with culture against the laws, there are conflicts. For example their culture is kind of—they take time, but under the law you cannot take time. You have a grace period once you arrested someone, so you should introduce that to them, to follow the law; however, you cannot do it easily. That is only one
example that I see. It’s the same with other matters when you check on how they—what is their culture. It is not good if you are going to change their culture, plus it is hard to accept but there is a lot, you just try to give them some sense for them to later on accept that this should be the right thing to do.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have a specific example of this?

HAVERIA: An example of this is the grace period of the criminal procedure: they have 72 hours to detain a person. That is only a maximum to file a case, and they are taking more than 72 hours because in their culture [...] It doesn’t matter what time. The point for them is, as long as they accomplish their task, that is already a conflict. So only to introduce to them that based on the law, these are the things that you need to follow. But you cannot rush them in. That’s why from my first mission to the second, I understand now what the UN wants now. They are taking this time because it is hard to accept that in a short period you can—five years, you want it in two days, it cannot be done. So that approach is appropriate.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What would you say is the major challenge that faced the mission when you took this job? Let me—we’re going to talk about your own challenges especially in Baucau, but could you tell us a little bit more about what you think was the major challenge the mission faced?

HAVERIA: On my part—not national, but on this level of district where I am working—the challenges I can see is for them to be at par with the other police officers of other countries, because that is what I am telling them. I am talking with the PNTL [National Police of East Timor, Policia Nacional de Timor Leste] a little better that we want you to become, if not better than us as a police officer, at least the same level. So that is a challenge that is really hard to take it in a short period of time. But we really want them to stand on their own, that they understand these things. But we are lucky that what I heard before, the same people from our country are the ones who are being assigned here. So I was surprised that they know the same tactics that we are using. That makes it easy for it, but the hardest is to make it more progressive then, more appropriate for them to follow.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you think the previous missions were successful in this regard, especially concerning the PNTL and actually the police reform in general?

HAVERIA: I think, yes, but the problem is the government, their government. I think the failure comes from the government because I know that the UN already left them alone, to stand on their own, but I think there is a mismanagement, a little; that’s why they again need the assistance of the UN. That is the reason I think they’re only [...] these people.

LEMAY-HEBERT: We talked a little bit about the status of public order and crime in the country when you arrived, but maybe also specifically in Baucau. And maybe you can contrast it with the current situation. So have you seen any evolution in this regard concerning the status of public order and crime?

HAVERIA: Public order—based on what you can gather from the past, there are improvements in the peace and order, and also even how many months that we are already here, we are teaching them. They have already learned about those things that they need to change in terms of how to implement the public order, how to maintain. So they already accepted it, but we need more to refine what—it’s more that I can see their attitudes compared to others, like I said, on previous
missions. I can see that at least it’s still very manageable here in the current situation, because imagine when you find some crimes that happen, it’s really brutal, like some of them are really—you could say it’s not human what they are doing.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Here.

HAVERIA: Here, but it’s very rare, and once it happens, after we just count one, two days, the suspect will surrender. He finds this guilt that, because we have the same religion, I cannot do that—that kind of attitude, how come they can do that, I thought we were the same? But later on I recognize that their religion is still strong because they surrendered after finding what they have done, so.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have a specific example of this?

HAVERIA: Yah, like the killing that happened before here, that they used the kind of...

LEMAY-HEBERT: Machete.

HAVERIA: Yes a machete, they used a machete. It is, really, how many cuts do you have to suffer from the victim from the back. I was surprised to see that, I said it’s very inhuman, you cannot do that; in our place you cannot do that for a religious person. But it’s really in another way, another point, you can see that in two days, three days they go to surrender. They find that they are very guilty about it that they surrender about what they have done. So I say, it is still good.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And how would you explain this? I mean not the crime itself but the surrender? Do you think it is due to the religion, as you mentioned? But do you think also it is due to the influence of the traditional system of justice or the influence of the community in general?

HAVERIA: It is the same, the influence and also the religion, because it also happens—like there’s a crime yesterday. There was the influence of the people around him makes him surrender.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What are the major threats to security and the public order that you face here? What are the major crimes in Baucau?

HAVERIA: So far, from the last UNPOLs, I know they had problems with the elections, but in the time I am here, it’s only really minor, very minor. Only this one, some incidents have happened. Mostly it is kind of domestic, majority of the cases, domestic. So it is not very—it’s not, how you call, a degree you consider very serious; it’s only really within them.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And was it different in Kosovo in this regard?

HAVERIA: There are incidents; there is a little difference because—let me give you an example. Compared to other districts, I can’t say [...] because you have police instinct; we always use that. When I arrived here in the other district, you could see that people are very unfriendly. I was surprised when I arrived in Baucau; it’s different, it’s very friendly here. So you can see the environment, you can feel it, and you can even use some tactics to identify, to know if they are really that serious, because as a tactic, for example, I will give you one. When you look on their face you can see that they are looking strangely, like very sharp to you.
So one tactic like we use—an example for me, what I use is just to look at them; if they don’t look back, then you know there is a problem with the guy. But mostly if they greet already—because they already showed themselves, it is to know what kind of thinking that they have in their mind by means of these tactics, and, like I said, you can feel the environment. In Kosovo, when I am going around I feel safe, I can even walk there without firearms on me. But I know that sometimes only they have trouble, very minimal.

LEMY-HEBERT: But you experienced the 2004 riots, right?

HAVERIA: I believe we are there because of the riots. So the riot happens in March; we are called there to investigate these riots. And the same attitude. Only you can see there are also good points of the people here and there, but only on that approach, mostly on the end. The same, they have the same guilt like when you have already caught them.

LEMY-HEBERT: And you mentioned you tried to greet the people on the street, and if they don’t greet and they don’t respond, actually, there is a problem. So what is the next step, if they don’t answer to your—.

HAVERIA: We don’t mind, because you are doing it mostly on patrol duty, so you just identify the areas. So next time that you’re patrolling, what areas that you need to avoid, because they are throwing stones here at the vehicle, damaging the glass. So those areas, even when you first arrive in the area, you can see that your mobile cars are already guarded with metal. So you already know this area is trouble. How come they are using it? How come the areas are not using? Although you just arrive, you can already estimate. So on your own you can already—when you are doing patrol, you can estimate those, and then you ask yourself and your fellow officers what trouble is here and then you also make some research like that. When you greet them, you can ask is there really trouble.

LEMY-HEBERT: How would you explain this behavior, this stone-throwing?

HAVERIA: It is more childish, because they are [...] adults. Even when I was thinking—because they are how many, one group reacting very sharply, look at these people. And then they even show sometimes that they are aiming to throw a stone at to you, at your vehicle. And then I say, look at these people, what are they doing? What I also say to my colleague: they are children, children—I just think, OK, maybe they go later. And then, like here, it is more than you need to teach them, it is more community policy work that you need to, until such time. Even now I heard that they used—it is very different compared to when the first time we arrived, almost every day you can heard reports that they throw stones at the vehicle, but lately it is very, very minimal now.

LEMY-HEBERT: Can you briefly discuss the programs that you are implementing, or that you implemented, actually in Baucau specifically—because, as you mentioned, the situation here is different from Dili or different districts?

HAVERIA: So the UN guidelines program is more mentoring now, because we are now for the purpose for them to be certified as police officers, and anyway they were already given this responsibility before. It only happens that when the problems arise before that, we need to refresh them again. But consider us next to the other district—you can see on the lineup—we are one of the districts who can be earlier, we turn over in terms of the PNTL, but other aspects, there are more
aspects to be considered. Of course, the number one problem is logistics, so that will take time—because how can you provide those things like vehicles, fuel, so that is another problem.

LEMAY-HEBERT: That’s the biggest problem.

HAVERIA: That is the biggest problem, I’ll tell you. The PNTL, no problem because they are really wanting to work; they are...

LEMAY-HEBERT: No, please continue.

HAVERIA: They are willing to work. They are very eager to learn, and you know that they really want to have the responsibility. So for that, it’s an advantage for us, because we can easily teach them because they want it. You know the procedure that if you don’t want to learn, it is hard to teach.

LEMAY-HEBERT: So you don’t face any specific problems or obstacles in your mentoring program with the PNTLs.

HAVERIA: On the mentoring program, no problem. But before that, because as part of the mentoring, what we are doing here is, like I said, when we are trying to know what are the other issues that we need to address, like—an example: they don’t have the same procedures that other countries are using. So we are trying to discuss with the Commander how it is doable, and they accept. So lately it is very easy for us to implement also the investigation tactics, administration. We are surprised lately that they want to know more. It’s only—I don’t know, maybe there is only a gap that they are not talking before us. So now we are implementing that from the guide of the UN, and also co-located. We are joined together, for example, like this one; the Commander of the UNPOL, the commander of the PNTL. The same admin office of the PNTL, UNPOL community policing, investigation. They are co-located. So anything that they need to learn is very easy, because their counterpart is already there. So we already encourage them, ask things you don’t know about. So they’re surprised and they are very appreciative of what happens, plus they are also proud because they learn about, they learn something.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Can you tell us a little bit more about the different programs that you are implementing? You briefly mentioned the mentoring program, and this is very interesting, actually. Could you tell us a little bit more about the other programs maybe related to CPU [Community Policing Unit], for example, or different areas? If you have any programs that are actually specific to Baucau?

HAVERIA: The only specifications that mentoring—we are concentrating on the mentoring, because by mentoring, already all of the aspects that lie in logistics have already been tapped. All of them—the only thing that we are adding is like what I said, when we are initiating a training or information for teaching them. What would be better for implementing—like problems with law, problems with administration, how to manage—those are additional things that we are just injecting to them. It is also part of mentoring, because mentoring is also teaching them.

LEMAY-HEBERT: So you don’t have any programs that are actually aimed at the local populations—for example, the problem with the stone throwing?

HAVERIA: What we do there is, the community policing and our community policing unit is the one going around, so when they identify all those problems, they are the
ones who initiate the meetings with the Suco chief and the other sub-district administrators about what are the problems there, and they discuss those things. And it happens that when we found that the issues are a little higher-level, we interfere, like what happened in the double killing. We, ourselves and the district commander, call on those leaders, and we discuss with them the problem and find solutions to solve it. Because those problems really arose where we had information that even the community would like to leave their place, would like to evacuate their place. So we call them up and tell them the situation; we give them some census and we say that evacuation is not one of those options because it is not good. There are people who are fighting, actual children, and you are the ones who are the leaders and mature people there. And you are the ones who are going away—that is not good.

They got the census; we gave them some information or ideas, and they were surprised. And in the past, we were surprised that we knew, that they knew, but maybe because of their panic and their way of thinking that they forgot that this is the better approach that you need to do. So we assist them, we implement; now they are already quiet in those areas.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Can you tell us how concretely it works, the relationship between the UNPOLs and the local community? Do you have any specific examples or personal stories or maybe other stories from other UNPOLs, your colleagues, that you want to share with us?

HAVERIA: Regarding the community?

LEMAY-HEBERT: Yes, just to give us a little bit of a better idea about how concretely it works?

HAVERIA: We get—as I advise to them, going around to community policing, try to know their problems, and then we address it to the proper person. For example, mostly the problem here is irrigation, and some lands are being robbed by someone, so those are most of the issues they have there. So what we do there is—yes, we know their problems; if others, we can assist them, but mostly, we talk to the right person. For example, like the land-robbing, if we need interference of the sub-district administrator, the Suco chief, we come up to them, to meet with our police community relation, UNPOLs and the counterpart PNTL. They discuss together about these issues, and they make follow-ups to those issues, so they know the progress.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have specific examples of successful process, or maybe if you have an example of an unsuccessful process, maybe in the first stage?

HAVERIA: Unsuccessful, yes, because somebody set up a meeting—what groups, what parties agree to go in the meeting, later on the other one will not attend. So that will take more time that you need to reset. Sometime that happens like three times, and the third meeting, the person arrives at the meeting. And there is also an incident where I think this person is only trying to disturb the other group, so it is already being handled by the Suco chief. He says he is already going to control it, because in that matter the other person doesn’t want to agree or to discuss those issues.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Are there three groups?
HAVERIA: Two groups, so the Suco chief is the actual leader of the area—they call it Suco chief—so they are the one who is negotiating with them, and if it needs to arise to the sub-district administrator they elevate those levels. Like I said, one example of the success is the scaling that we address them—we assist them to go into those areas, and also the leaders of these groups are with them. So the basic principle there is, the people around them can see them combining all their efforts together, working so they know that they are united in doing these things.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And the unsuccessful one is because there was dissention?

HAVERIA: Yes, because of the delays. And this one would say that this is my land and don’t want to show up for the meeting, and then after a long time again. So I heard this once already, how many, two years? How many times, he shows up again and say, this is my land, and they are going to show in a meeting again, he will not show up. So the Suco Chief said, next time do this again, he is going to have problems later, so he cannot be given a good—. Their point of view is already on the side of the one who is there.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Based on your experience, are there any principles or suggestions you could offer others to make their efforts to work with traditional religious leaders more successful?

HAVERIA: In the community?

LEMAY-HEBERT: Yes, so the relationship between police officers and—based on your experience—UNPOLs and the local community. You describe it pretty well: how you were able, for example, to solve this murder case with the help of the local community. Do you have any advice or suggestions for other police officers that are maybe working in different missions around the world?

HAVERIA: Yes, because that’s the same even in our place; it is always the involvement of the community. We are not Superman; we cannot do that alone as police officers without the help of the community. We cannot do, we cannot progress, and we cannot always be successful in that in the community, because there are the ones involved, and the crime always involves the community, where people can see them, not the police, not all the time. So without the involvement of the community, I don’t think it would be a success, even our place. Always the involvement of the community is essential on dealing with crimes or problems in that place in the area.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have any advice or suggestions for other police officers, maybe very practical matters, that you think might actually make their efforts more successful?

HAVERIA: Yes, to make it more successful, I suggest to always involve the community on matters involving policing, because policing must always involve the family. The police cannot work alone; always involve them. It is easy for them to report incidents if they know that the police is considered as part of their neighbors, because we are always there with them.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Is it the general UN procedure to actually rely on the local community as much as you are relying right now? Or it’s only based on your own policy, your own perspective? Are you the only one implementing this? Do you see—it is also the case in different districts, with your different colleagues working in the—?
HAVERIA: I know it is already a part of them, because by the structure of the police office you can see already the community policing; they are already involving the community. Only it happens that some examples, some UNPOLs, if you are assigning that community policing and you’re not more experienced in that unit, you seem to get the idea but you are not implementing it. So you need only to remind them so they get the idea of this one. Plus, like I said, I am working with the community policing before, so I am always dealing with the community. But if you are always in a different investigation, you are not dealing with how to communicate better or to have a good relationship with the community people, which is very important.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What was the situation in this regard in Kosovo concerning the relationship with the local community?

HAVERIA: Oh the same, we are doing the same; we even go around, even go down on patrol to talk to them, ask them the problem. We are doing the same.

LEMAY-HEBERT: I have now some questions about what your daily routine looks like, so what does an average day look like for you? Is it office work, eight to five?

HAVERIA: Yes, it’s more.

LEMAY-HEBERT: It’s more patrolling? Could you tell us what average day looks like for you?

HAVERIA: Before I went to the position, I was on patrol, because always when we start we go on patrol, which is appropriate because you know the area by patrolling. So it is really a good approach that once you, UNPOL, arrive in a mission you should patrol the area.

LEMAY-HEBERT: This is a policy, so is it always the case here, no?

HAVERIA: I don’t know. But here it is always the case, you go to patrol.

LEMAY-HEBERT: In Baucau?

HAVERIA: Yes, you always go to patrol. It is good because you know the environment, and you know the areas that you are patrolling.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Even the district commander goes on patrol?

HAVERIA: Yes, you go there, for example—are you talking about the PNTL or the UNPOLs?

LEMAY-HEBERT: UNPOLs.

HAVERIA: He is also given time to go to patrol because he—you should really know the place. For example, if I don’t go to patrol it is hard for me identify when the radio is telling me there is an incident on the radio or the patrol team are in this location doing a patrol. It’s hard to know, so it’s better like, for example, I work there for at least three months. If they have a person there working less time than me, you can analyze because you are already going to pretty remote areas, and he doesn’t know this place—of course I patrolled this place before, it is better. So in—what was the question about?
LEMAY-HEBERT: What an average day looks like.

HAVERIA: An average day, yes: so mostly, on the level of the district and service commanders, you always check your mail, because there might be some instructions there given to you; you always do that. Even when I was reporting the operations, because after patrol I become the chief of operations, some instructions comes late, so sometimes it’s either, I leave the office late, or I come back late to check if there are new orders to be done in the early morning, because they are doing escort jobs or there are some visitors coming. Those are most of the instructions that are happening. So you should know it because you are going to be late giving those things. That’s the basic thing you do, and then you check around, go around places; you check, you monitor the radio. If there are really some issues that you need to assist, then you assist. And now as we are concentrating on mentoring, you always monitor what’s going on in mentoring.

LEMAY-HEBERT: You mentioned it, but you have other responsibilities that you cannot address every day: for example, planning, strategy, assessment, monitoring. Would you describe these responsibilities? I think you described pretty well the mentoring, but the other responsibilities, and say about how much time you are able to spend on them, compared to your daily routine you just mentioned, the emails and—?

HAVERIA: Oh, it is not much at all, because we have the mentoring unit, so you just check on how they are doing. We are increasing our personnel mentoring, because they are really rushing this mentoring for them to complete the course. So what I heard from the district commander before I left, because before I left for my break, the commissioner asked me how to, how can I set this—?

LEMAY-HEBERT: Commissioner [...]?

HAVERIA: Commissioner [...], in my view, how can I make it a little faster on this fast-track mentoring? So I said we need to add—I am going to pull out some resources or personnel to add to the mentoring unit. It will make it better and give me more mentoring officers from other districts to assist me. And then on the communications with the UN, I think they need more, so we again are adding more UNPOLs in the mentoring unit to catch up on those requirements that they are setting up for us.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What are the requirements specifically?

HAVERIA: We need them to—the guideline is for them to have 40 hours training, 40 daily mentoring records. It’s hard for us because in some districts in our area, there is one sub-district that you need three hours to go there. You go there for three hours, and then you need to go back three hours again. How many times—you only have two hours there—that’s why we—I heard that that they bargained that we need to stay there for one day to make it easier. We already catch two days rather than sitting six hours for coming back and forth from that area. And then we need to increase the detail and personnel to cover up the sub-districts.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And then, are there any other requirements for the mentoring? You mentioned logistics and the hours in training?

HAVERIA: In the peace and order of the area. In peace and order, no problem; we are only concentrating on the two issues. The training for the PNTL and the logistics.
LEMAY-HEBERT: OK, and who is going to provide the logistics in the region here? Is it the government’s responsibility or your responsibility to provide the logistics for PNTL?

HAVERIA: After, it is their government who should provide, but I don’t know if the UN—I know they will assist them, but I don’t want to go ahead of them, because it’s their call. But it is the government that should be providing, because if they want to stand on their own of course, they should be the one who should supply those things for their people.

LEMAY-HEBERT: So what can you do specifically in this area, you are just—?

HAVERIA: We just recommend to them what are the basic requirements that they need to stand alone, for them to [...]?

LEMAY-HEBERT: And could you tell us what are your perceptions of this—what is your assessment in this regard?

HAVERIA: It’s doable, I know it’s doable.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Just because we need—I would like to know specifically what are your assessments in this regard. For example, one computer per PNTL.

HAVERIA: Per office.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Per office. Can you tell us a little bit more about this?

HAVERIA: If it is provided?

LEMAY-HEBERT: Yes, if it is provided, but also specifically what is your assessment, what is your point of view on that? What kind of advice you gave the government in this regard?

HAVERIA: I know it is very hard for them to buy those things. Really, I can’t say—if the UN could provide some of them, I think it will be better.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Has the staff in Baucau changed since your first days on the job? You mentioned that there are more people now working on the mentoring, but can you tell us, have you perceived any change, reduction of personnel or anything of this sort here?

HAVERIA: Changing?

LEMAY-HEBERT: Could you tell us what is the evolution in this regard? More personnel working in Baucau or less personnel, and which unit specifically?

HAVERIA: The district commander did this, because we have two UNPOLs per unit, so we only ask them to assist, like the deputies, to assist with the mentoring on a given day. I think three days a week to assist on the mentoring, and then we say that if we need personnel, if the need arises in the patrol, even on our level, we are going to assist them. Just to add the manpower, if they really need it, so we are sacrificing ourselves just to make this successful in the mentoring process.
LEMAY-HEBERT: Did your predecessor leave you any records or advice that you found especially helpful on your first days on the job?

HAVERIA: On my first days, because I am on patrol, so we did not see those records much.

LEMAY-HEBERT: But after, when you took this position?

HAVERIA: I check, I see that there are records here, like admin in the station; they have their records, and even the report of the UNPOL who are working here said that they are surprised that we have good record management of investigations. I say that’s good.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Have you been able to meet with your predecessor? I mean the deputy, the former deputy district commander?

HAVERIA: There was no deputy district commander at the time that I arrived here. So after four months I became the Deputy.

LEMAY-HEBERT: OK, I see. Where else have you turned for advice about how to handle problems, because you obviously you didn’t have any predecessor to give you some advice about to handle those problems as a district commander?

HAVERIA: If a problem involves a unit, we call them in a meeting, we discuss what’s the problem, and we go to the PNTL to join us. We discuss a problem and solve it at a meeting.

LEMAY-HEBERT: So you try to find information from your colleagues and from the PNTL as well?

HAVERIA: Yes, I don’t work alone. We always work—we always make a meeting to discuss what’s the problem.

LEMAY-HEBERT: It is often said that the key to all effective policing is intelligence and situational awareness: being aware of crime problems and threats to public order. You mentioned how you were actually all participating in the patrol on the first days, which is very interesting. But can you talk a little bit more about how you and the mission here in Baucau gather information about the environment you are policing?

HAVERIA: We have an intelligence unit to gather this information, to give us threat situations. Even if there are some activities, it is automatic in our operations. That is always a standard, that you need additional intelligence information, not only before but for the whole duration. Before the duration and after the duration, they need to always update us if there is any threat.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And can you tell us a little bit, from your own knowledge, how are they proceeding to actually gather this information?

HAVERIA: They are working with their counterpart PNTL officers who are also in the field, and our officers who are assigned intelligence actually are selected who can speak Bahasa so they can relate with people in the community. So it is easy for them, even if you are afraid of the intelligence officer but you can speak the language—very hard for the barrier. So the process is easy because they can speak with them.
LEMAY-HEBERT: And do you speak any of the main languages used here?

HAVERIA: Only basic.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Bahasa, Tetum or maybe Portuguese?

HAVERIA: Actually, I only know basic.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Only the basic Tetum?

HAVERIA: They are only the basic, they are very few words that are similar with our language in our country.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And how many of your most important top staff members speak these languages?

HAVERIA: I think all the Malaysians can speak Bahasa and one El Salvador intelligence, he can understand.

LEMAY-HEBERT: How do you think language differences influence your ability to be effective?

HAVERIA: It only takes time because you need to translate, that’s the barrier. Not like when you speak directly, because the time consumed doubles up when you need to translate it.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Can you describe a little bit your induction training here in East Timor? Can you tell us a little bit more in your induction?

HAVERIA: It’s good, because they teach us the culture that you can expect there, what conditions they have, so basically you already have information in addition to what you have learned from the records from what’s happening here. So all the things that you need to know about your personal things, you can have the UN and the people that you meet. It’s a good thing that you learn something.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And once you arrived at the mission, what training did you receive?

HAVERIA: I joined the […] training, the triage training here, and I am supposed take up the human rights training, which is mandatory. However, it was the next human rights training that I want to join because it was given to all our members here. It just conflicted with my break, so I said maybe next time when I come back. So I have the triage, the presentation. I think that’s all.

LEMAY-HEBERT: I would like now to turn the conversation to some of the broader challenges that often affect the efforts to build or reform the police institution. First of all, what kinds of allies in the host country do you think are essential for success of the reform?

HAVERIA: Allies?

LEMAY-HEBERT: Yes.

HAVERIA: I think all.

LEMAY-HEBERT: All of them?
HAVERIA: Yes.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Can you mention them?

HAVERIA: All countries?

LEMAY-HEBERT: I mean, no, specifically in the country. Maybe international NGOs, but specifically not just inside UNPOLs, but also from the perspective of the reform process. Not just NGOs, but maybe, for example, you mentioned Suco chiefs—what kind of allies you think are really essential not just useful. You can also explain to us which one are really useful and which ones you think are really essential for it.

HAVERIA: The number one is religion, because they are, here they are more than 98% Catholic. It is very essential, because the religion—because they are very fanatic, so it is very essential that they believe.

LEMAY-HEBERT: So that is the Bishop's Office, right? I mean who is representing the religion?

HAVERIA: The Bishop and the Church.

LEMAY-HEBERT: OK.

HAVERIA: The Church.

LEMAY-HEBERT: So you meet with them? Because they are essential, very essential for the reform process, obviously you meet them?

HAVERIA: Suco chiefs are also essential because they are the ones immediately in the community. NGOs are also there; they have more and more construction. We also deal with them because we have lots of colleagues here who are Filipinos who are working with the NGOs, so we always talk to them with issues around—The UNPOLs, those two groups are very essential here.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have any advice about the best way to build support among these people? Maybe you can take each one separately?

HAVERIA: On the part of the officers? Can you repeat that question?

LEMAY-HEBERT: If you have any advice for other police officers around the world about the best way to build the support you need among these people. For example, you mentioned the religion, the Church, and the Bishop. Could you tell us a little bit more—I know you mentioned it before in previous questions, but I would like to discuss it a little bit more.

HAVERIA: When we make relationships with the PNTL officers, we always need to help to show them that we are sincere, because before I could see that some UNPOLs just talk to the PNTL because they needed to do—they needed something from them, and they forgot that they are also people who think. They underestimate these people. You should find ways to approach them so they will know that you are really sincere on what your intention is to them. That’s what I am doing with them; that’s why I have a good relationship with their commander and deputy
commander. I will support them if they need something that I can do; I will provide them with those things.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And during the period that you worked in East Timor, have you ever been unable to proceed with an initiative or hampered in management practices by the lack of capacity in other parts of the government or lack of cooperation in the community? If yes, could you give us an example?

HAVERIA: In my early station patrols I didn’t have any problems. I don’t know of my predecessors, because they are the ones handling on their level. Because I only saw that one when I was already here on the patrol level, it is easy for me; I never saw any contact with them.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And in Kosovo, maybe? When you were in Kosovo?

HAVERIA: No, I didn’t have problems. I was working there as investigation, so when you—some may be reluctant, but when they analyze it, they will work with you.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Are there underlying political, social, or economic conditions that have made the reform harder or easier in your current job, right now?

HAVERIA: Economic is actually the main issue here. But for us, it only affects—it affects, but it’s controllable. But you know that’s really always, even in other missions—it is the economy always.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What do you mean the economy always?

HAVERIA: It’s the one that affects, because if people are working there’s no problem but—.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Unemployment is a major problem?

HAVERIA: Yes, unemployment, because those people, for example, who are making trouble because they are doing nothing, if they were very busy working, they would not do this.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Can you tell us about one cultural difference that has required you to actually change a proposal you have made or a program or action that you supported?

HAVERIA: No, because I already studied the culture before I did something. That’s why. Sometimes, yes, others might have some, if they don’t know much of the culture. Some UNPOLs tend to not realize those things; that’s why I say, stop it, because it’s their culture.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Are there any innovations or experiments that you know about, either in your current position or in your position in Kosovo, which you think merit more attention—maybe some other officers might be interested in knowing more about it?

HAVERIA: Experimental?

LEMAY-HEBERT: In general, general projects that you have seen or you heard about?

HAVERIA: After when we have something experimental, we always discuss this in a group, because I cannot do that alone if I am going to enforce it. I know it is going to
break down; it will not be successful, so I always discuss it with those groups and the PNTL counterpart. He would also inject ideas, so you can realize and make it complete and acceptable for them, and it will be supported. We cannot play with that kind of thing.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have any specific examples in this regard?

HAVERIA: Yes, an example, like you give them some ways how to document arrests. We discussed it with the commander and the unit concerned, and after finalizing the output of what we discussed, again we consulted them to see if there were more things that need to be corrected on this side, and then—.

LEMAY-HEBERT: I have now questions regarding the UN itself, and the UN internal management, and also questions regarding the relationship between the UN and the host country personnel. If you could create a wish list, what two or three changes in the UN internal management or policy in order to be more effective in your job?

HAVERIA: Changes?

LEMAY-HEBERT: UN internal management. You can also refer to your past experience.

HAVERIA: For me, the management is OK. The only problem is combining different countries, different cultures. That is the real problem, because of course attitudes are different. But the structure, it's OK.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Do you have a specific example?

HAVERIA: Of course, when people are very long on a mission, maybe they become stressed. Some conflicts are already with them. You just try to minimize it, to just level with these people. Of course, if you try to argue more, it is not better with fellow UNPOLs. I think it is because of the cultural difference; it is very hard. But the structure, I don't think there is a problem, because it is OK. Example: here, when I see the structure, it is the same with our structure. The only thing is, of course, in your country you are in control of the people there—not like here, it's a different country. That only caused a minor problem.

LEMAY-HEBERT: In your line of work, is there an aspect of UN policy or management that works better now than it used to in the past—especially, you worked in Kosovo before. So do you think, have you seen any aspect that now works better than it used to?

HAVERIA: I have observed almost the same aspect that they are doing. That's why, like I said before, I was also eager when I was new to make it faster for them, so they could learn easier. Then I recognized what the UN is doing and, like I said, the culture, it made me realize better on the second mission that you should not rush these people, because it is hard to change things that they already learned from a long time already. Only let them think of—acceptance is better, because if they accept, it will be easy for them to change.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And are there two or three mistakes you commonly observe in the way donor countries or international organizations like the UN make with respect to the relationship with the host country personnel or local population?
HAVERIA: Here, I know even the Timor government requested for the UN, so it cannot be wrong because they are the one who is asking for the UN’s assistance. So it is easy like that—only maybe on the aspect of when they are agreeing on what will be the authority of the UN in the country. It’s only the problem they are discussing, but on assisting the country, no I don’t think there is a really a problem.

LEMAY-HEBERT: And with the local population? Do you see any mistakes usually made by the UNPOLs?

HAVERIA: No, I don’t think so. It’s more the local population who doesn’t want to accept the support of the UN. There are groups like that, I know, but maybe I was thinking it’s only part of what they feel. But inside, I know, they know, something is happening better for them, other than land.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Can you offer two or three recommendations for improving UN UNPOL recruitment, for example to increase the talent pool or find people better in tune with local conditions? Do you have any recommendations in this regard?

HAVERIA: For recruiting?

LEMAY-HEBERT: For recruitment of UN police officers?

HAVERIA: I cannot say with other countries, because I only heard and I don’t want to discuss rumors. But in our country, it is good because they give us an examination, very strict. That, really, if you cannot pass the standard of the UN, you cannot join the mission.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Would you tell me about a home-grown success, a story about a problem that local personnel—for example, PNTL in this case—solved on their own without your help? Do you have anything in mind?

HAVERIA: After all the cases here now, I was surprised—when I was in Dili, we are the ones patrolling the area in Dili. When I arrived here, I was surprised that the PNTL were working here, we were just here to support them. So all those cases that we were handling here, actually the PNTL was working already. We were only there to assist them, to check what they were doing, if they did it right—if they committed some mistakes we tried to encourage them: try to do this one. But actually they were the ones doing it already.

LEMAY-HEBERT: What are the biggest challenges you think the police force, the PNTL, will face when the UN will withdraw?

HAVERIA: Well, the full responsibility of being a PNTL officer without the UN, that will be the responsibility and if they will accept what we left them to follow, if they follow it, I think they will succeed.

LEMAY-HEBERT: I have just one more question, if you are willing. If you have the chance to write a handbook for the people, for other police officers who have to build civilian police units in challenging environments, what kinds of topics will you consider most important?

HAVERIA: Well, topics are police procedures, but mostly the book will be based on how they—because we have different procedures. It is almost the same, but a little different, so you should adopt what is there; that will be the handbook, it’s a
handbook, a police handbook that I am going to make. For them to be guided in all these things and also to be guided with what are the cultures to be considered based on this. So this handbook will always be followed while doing all police functions in that area.

LEMAY-HEBERT: Thank you very much for your time.