A NEW FACE FOR A TIRED CITY:
EDI RAMA AND TIRANA, ALBANIA, 2000-2010

SYNOPSIS
When Edi Rama became mayor of Tirana in 2000, he confronted a population that was disillusioned with the way democracy had played out in the capital city. Albania had sunk into a political morass after a brief period of cheer that followed the eastern European country’s emergence in the early 1990s from decades of isolation under a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. But change was in the air at the start of the millennium, as national reforms began with the support of a forward-thinking prime minister. Seizing the moment, Rama aimed to restore public confidence in government by building an administration based on professionalism rather than political connections, sprucing up the drab city, improving services, encouraging citizen complaints and leading open discussions on Tirana’s future. He repaired city hall, cleared out public spaces, painted colorless communist-era apartment buildings in bright hues and planted thousands of trees. Although his reforms lost momentum after Albania’s leadership changed and he became more deeply involved in national affairs, Rama’s accomplishments as mayor demonstrated the value of responsive, participatory government in regaining citizen support and attacking entrenched municipal problems.

Tumi Makgetla drafted this policy note on the basis of interviews conducted in Tirana, Albania, in June 2010.

INTRODUCTION
“This is our Tirana—Tirana of contradictions,” the mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama, rapped in a campaign music video with a popular Albanian hip-hop group, West Side Family. “This is the place where the snobs with Rolex watches go to the gypsy market.” Images of children selling cigarettes at the side of the road, rundown buildings and Mercedes Benz automobiles accompanied the mayor’s lyrics.

Interwoven were shots of Rama singing from a podium in a bright purple vest.

Rama’s frankness, his youthful appeal and his novel approach marked him as unusual in Albanian politics. He favored brightly colored shirts when he first entered the government, a mode of dress that clashed with the drab suits worn by most other politicians. His concern with style reflected an artistic temperament; he had worked as a painter as well as an arts
professor before he became the minister of culture in 1998. “I entered politics from a completely different background from other people in this field, and that has helped me to see and deal with things differently,” Rama said in an interview with World Investment News in 2009.1

More significantly, he lacked the baggage of most other politicians whose political histories stretched back to the country’s communist days. Although, he joined the cabinet of the Socialist Party government in 1998, he ran as an independent candidate with the party’s backing in Tirana’s mayoral race in 2000. Rama won with a 54% majority.

His later success at the polls indicated the degree of public support for his management of the city. He won the 2003 election with almost 59% of the vote and in 2007 began a four-year term as mayor.

The decade following Albania’s transition to democratic government in 1992 had been hard on the country’s capital and its people. From extreme isolation under the Marxist-Leninist dictator Enver Hoxha, the manner in which Albanians embraced democracy—as unfettered freedom to pursue one’s self-interest completely—looked like anarchy. “During the communist regime, everything belonged to the state,” said Eduard Shalsi, the city’s chief of staff and then deputy mayor from 2005 to 2009. “The Albanians perceived democracy as the freedom to do something wherever they want, however they want, whenever they want it.”

The city came under strong pressure in the 1990s, when hundreds of thousands of migrants streamed into the city, doubling the population by the end of the decade. Illegally constructed buildings popped up around the city. Former parks were overrun with hastily erected bars and restaurants. The rapidly growing population, combined with poor maintenance, strained municipal services. Garbage piled up in once carefully maintained streets.

Although the problems were evident, the solutions were not. Any effort to clear out illegal construction faced opposition from powerful interests. Several members of Parliament and other politicians, as well as people involved in organized crime, had ties to illegally constructed businesses.

Conditions, however, were propitious for Rama. First, the national government took decisive steps to decentralize power in the first few years that Rama was mayor. Tirana took advantage of its vibrant local economy—the capital was home to about 40% of the country’s enterprises—to boost revenue by collecting small-business taxes and service fees. Although the central government previously collected these taxes, beginning in 2002 the city could directly administer the taxes and set rates as it saw fit.

Second, Rama enjoyed the support of the national government from 2000 to 2005, when the Socialist Party, which backed him in his first mayoral race, was in power.

Third, the turnaround of Tirana dovetailed with the country’s broader reform efforts in the wake of an economic and political crisis. The collapse of government-endorsed pyramid schemes in the mid-1990s eroded the savings of large numbers of Albanians. The downturn sparked widespread turmoil in Albania, as citizens plundered government weapons depots and criminals took advantage of the chaos to establish smuggling networks. An intervention force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization restored order and oversaw fresh elections in 1997. In the years after the crisis, foreign governments continued to support the government to ensure that it did not experience a relapse.

Conditions changed for Rama, however, when the Democratic Party won the 2005 national elections. After these elections, the government began to roll back decentralization efforts and assert its authority in the capital. In
one instance, it tore down infrastructure worth millions of dollars built by Tirana Municipality that it claimed fell outside of the city’s mandate.

Rama’s early efforts in Tirana reflected a strategy to win public trust through high-profile action in key areas, all designed to show that he was not a run-of-the-mill leader and that government in Tirana would no longer be conducted as business as usual. His initial steps to revitalize city buildings, parks and streets helped to build public confidence that the municipal government was responsive to citizens’ pressing concerns. His team also adopted practices from elsewhere in Europe to infuse the city with new ideas.

Questions about the sustainability of this reform momentum arose when Rama became leader of the Socialist Party in 2006. He had become a member of the party three years earlier. Even close associates conceded in interviews that when his third term began in 2007, he was no longer a bold outsider. He had developed too many political obligations to take the risky steps that had once made him so popular.

THE CHALLENGE

Tirana before the transition to democracy was an orderly but dull capital city. Most people used bicycles, and only a few state cars occupied the roads. The city had no private bars or restaurants. The country’s communist government controlled migration to the city and supplied people with apartments. Even movement within the city was regulated, and only members of the communist ruling elite could travel within the central part of the city called the Blloku, or Block.

When the government lifted these controls at the end of authoritarian rule, the city changed dramatically. Its population grew from a quarter million in the early 1990s to three-quarters of a million at the end of the decade—representing about 25% of Albania’s total population of three million.

As the population swelled, Tirana’s government failed to maintain its infrastructure, and the quality of service delivery declined. The poor condition of roads and the growing number of private cars irked city residents. There were about 600 cars in 1990, “all for the use of the communist hierarchy,” Rama said in a published response to questions on the World Mayor Website, adding that about 100,000 vehicles traversed Tirana daily in 2004. Citizens also complained about garbage piling up around the city; a 2008 report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization concluded that the volume of waste produced in the city doubled during the 1990s.

Illegal construction became a serious problem. Hastily built structures went up on public land, lining the Lana River that wound through the city and crowding the Youth Park, a public space in the center of town. These buildings were illegal because the owners did not have permission to build them; nor did they own the land on which they were built.

Most of these buildings were bars and restaurants, and at first many people enjoyed the hitherto forbidden pleasures of drinking and dining out. Soon, however, noise, squalor and crime overwhelmed initial enthusiasm. Residents began to long for the days when they enjoyed Tirana’s open spaces and parks.

Tirana’s citizens speculated that many of the people building the new bars and restaurants had ties to criminals and corrupt politicians. Organized crime had blossomed in the crisis of the mid-1990s following the collapse of the pyramid schemes.

Some of the illegally constructed buildings were residential, serving the needs of incoming migrants. Half of the city’s housing was built between 1991 and 2001, and most of these buildings did not conform to the city’s building
code. Also, many residential and commercial buildings were not connected to municipal electricity and water systems.

The municipal government, which was responsible for addressing many of these problems, was not responsive to the needs of Tirana’s inhabitants. Citizens who wanted to make requests or file complaints to the city administration had to line up outside a shipping container with a corrugated roof in the city center. “People would stand in line for hours in rain and cold waiting to get to a window,” Rama said in an interview for The American, an Italian magazine. “When they finally got to the window there was just a slit; you could not see the person behind it. No face. You would then make your request, whatever it was, and the voice behind the slit would say, ‘No,’ or, ‘Come back tomorrow.’”

In general, Rama found that municipal officials lacked strong motivation to tackle the city’s challenges. When he arrived at city hall on his first day as mayor, he found more television sets than computers, and the rooms were filled with ashtrays. He described the experience as “Kafkaesque” in a published interview. “I saw the biggest quantity of ashtrays I ever imagined. The corridor downstairs was fogging from the smoke.”

FRAMING A RESPONSE

“Tirana is Albania, and Albania is Tirana,” people often said, in a comment that emphasized the importance of the capital’s wellbeing for the country’s overall performance. When the national government began to implement a broad set of reforms to turn the country around in the late 1990s, Tirana’s rehabilitation formed an important element of the effort. The Socialist Party sensed that the population was weary with the older generation of politicians who had ties to the former Party of Labor and were involved in government in the 1990s. The party backed Rama for mayor in 2000, betting that his youth, dynamism and lack of political baggage would give the party a fresh start in the public’s mind.

Rama’s goal was to transform Tirana into a modern European capital. The municipal government aimed to go well beyond simply improving what people had become accustomed to in Albania. “We wanted to compare ourselves with the best practices of well developed countries,” said the city’s deputy mayor, Eduard Shalsi. Many of the city’s reform ideas came from other countries, such as a public parking system that used mobile phone technology.

Shalsi also said that the city developed the norm of working to high standards in its effort to become more modern and European. In some cases, this principle necessitated trade-offs. For instance, city officials deliberated over the best use of its loan from the Council of Europe Bank, debating whether to build seven schools to a high standard or 30 schools of a lower standard. In the end, they chose to build seven and to renovate several others. “We’re not going to do something now and knock it down and build it again,” said Shalsi. While encouraging the debate, Rama also prodded Tirana officials to strive for higher standards, Shalsi said.

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

From 2000 to 2003, Rama developed his team at the municipality, refurbished city hall and made the administration more responsive to citizens’ concerns. Building on his background as an artist, he also transformed the look and feel of the city by having drab communist buildings painted in bright colors and clearing out illegally constructed buildings. These initial reforms won him widespread support, and the electorate returned him to office. His subsequent reforms focused on developing policies such as a regulatory plan for the city.

Rama professionalized the city administration by setting norms of behavior and
brining in young professionals while retaining some of the staff from the previous administration. Rama removed the television sets and declared the premises a smoke-free area. From then on, smokers took in a view of Skanderberg Square and the opera house from an outdoor terrace. The mayor also tightened the dress code, requiring men to wear neckties to work.

Rama tried to motivate workers to feel that they were part of the administration through a number of “small things, small details,” said Dritan Agolli, the city’s municipal manager. For instance, he sponsored a Women’s Day celebration in 2002 at which male staff members donned bowties and waited on their female colleagues. Agolli said that initially people went along with Rama’s ideas, but they still wondered, “Is he serious or not?” As time passed and the mayor held steadfast in support of his initiatives, the staff began to adapt and conform to his vision, Agolli said.

Although it was common practice in Albania for recently elected politicians to replace up to 80% of the civil servants under their command, Rama followed a different path. While he brought in a number of young professionals, many of whom were politically independent, he also retained people who were known to support the Democratic Party. Rama said that if the people could do their jobs professionally, they could stay, stressed Agolli, who himself was politically right of center. Rama’s policy surprised the city hall staff, many of whom had expected that their jobs would be on the line, Agolli added.

The administration also contacted the university in Tirana and identified 40 of the institution’s top students. The municipality invited these students to talk to administrative staff and work on some of its projects part-time. “The relationship helps us identify whomever we might need, and they, in turn, evaluate their career possibilities at the municipality,” said Rama in a written response to questions on the World Mayors website.7

During his early years in office, the mayor transformed the building that housed the municipal administration. The city hall received a new coat of paint—red and yellow—and the interiors were refurbished. Rama designed his own office, outfitting it with marble floors and red furnishings.

Several of Rama’s deputy mayors said that they were astonished when they first entered the municipal building. Shalsi described it as “one of the best offices” he had ever seen in Tirana. People wore badges, were well dressed and were well behaved, he said. It felt like a “modern, foreign institution,” he said.

Shortly after he was elected, Rama sought the World Bank’s help in transforming the way that the city government gave out information and took complaints and requests. The information desk that existed at the time consisted of the shipping container near city hall. With money from the World Bank, the city developed a new municipal information center at city hall. It had 12 posts, where administrators helped complainants to fill in forms detailing their concerns. Complainants would receive written notes informing them when they could expect to hear a response regarding their problem.

The administrator would then transmit the request or complaint to the relevant department within the municipal administration. The response deadlines were always tighter than the legal requirement for municipal processes: If the law said a person should hear back in 30 days, the city would promise to respond in 20. This practice promoted efficient municipal responses well within its legal obligations.

The mayor’s office monitored how well municipal departments performed this process. Departments that failed to meet their deadlines had to explain their tardiness to the mayor’s office. In addition, Shalsi compiled reports of
the number and nature of requests that citizens filed and gave them to the mayor. This procedure allowed the mayor’s office to determine which departments received the most requests and which needed to improve.

Shortly after he entered office, Rama also initiated changes that were meant to make the city more inviting to both residents and outsiders. The project, called “Return to Identity,” became one of the mayor’s signature projects. Implementing this initiative, the city government painted dull Soviet-style apartments and government buildings with bright colors and artistic designs. “This was the first political action to communicate with people, to set up a bridge between the people and the local authority, so when colours started to appear, people were shocked, like shaking and I’m telling them wake up,” Rama said in a published interview.8

The decision piggybacked on a World Bank project to improve city sidewalks. Rama persuaded the project coordinators to paint nearby buildings as part of their effort. In 2002, the city organized a biannual art show in which a number of different artists painted buildings on a single road. Agolli said that the project was not expensive and that the city always worked to find financial support from external donors. Painting the buildings sent the message that “with something small we can make a difference, and things can be changed,” he said.

Not everyone agreed with Rama’s bright color choices, but the public debate about the colors signaled growing civic involvement, a critical shift in citizens’ perceptions of government and their role in it. In response to the heated discussion, the city polled residents on their opinions about the program. Although only 55% of the respondents said that they liked the colors, 85% said that the city should continue—with different colors.

Rama’s next step was to clear out illegal construction and restore the city’s park spaces. The city began by cleaning up the Youth Park from March to June of 2001. Most of the buildings that the city tore down were commercial. By tearing down buildings that cluttered the Youth Park, near the city’s center, the city signaled that “the law has come,” Agolli said.

Building owners resisted at first, and city officials received threats of violence. The first building that the city destroyed was a motel called the Titanic. When the city’s construction police put up a notice that the inhabitants had five days to evacuate, they received death threats from the brothers who owned the motel.

On the final day, the police surrounded the building, and Rama approached the front door of the motel. He knocked and one of the brothers emerged. Rama told him that the inhabitants had 15 minutes to clear out, but the owner paid no attention and continued to issue threats. At midnight, Rama ordered bulldozers to begin working. As the building shuddered, those inside emerged, and city workers reduced the motel to rubble. “From that, things were easier,” Agolli said.

As part of a broader effort to “green” the city, the municipal government planted trees and grass in the square. Park benches in a range of bright primary colors lined the sidewalks. Rama said in a published interview that it was important that the city turned the reclaimed space into a “quality environment.” “Our winning card was the support of most citizens,” he said. “Of course, people did not come out into the streets to help push the bulldozers, but their pressure, expressed through the general enthusiasm reflected in the media, made the resistance of the illegal builders very marginal and weak.”9

His comments echoed the perception of several interviewees who said that the people who put up buildings illegally on public land were well aware that they were violating the law. They had been using land for free for a decade.
and saw that their time was up. They sensed that the public would not support their efforts to resist the government’s efforts to reclaim the city center.

Some commentators said that Rama’s close relationship with Prime Minister Ilir Meta during this period was critical for him to succeed in his effort to clear out the buildings. Socialist politicians with ties to businesses that Rama destroyed would be wary of voicing resistance because of this relationship and Meta’s strong commitment to reform as the Socialist Party’s champion to win the next election for the party. Critically, the government made no distinctions about who could stay and who had to leave, Rama said in a published interview.10

City officials maintained that they did not offer any compensation to the owners of the illegally built bars and restaurants. Agolli said that after the city began to destroy buildings, some building owners came to remove building materials that they could reuse elsewhere. Most of the businesses re-established themselves on land on which they had permission to build, he said. Rama, in interviews about the process, also insisted that “the local economy did not suffer.”11

At the end of 2002, the city turned its attention to the Lana River, which winds through the capital. The city demolished the buildings that crowded the riverbanks, developing broad boulevards on either side of the river and planting grass and trees along them.

From 2003, the year that Rama embarked on his second term, the municipal government began to poll citizens on their opinions about the city and its administration. With money from embassies and other foreign donors, the local government hired a private company to survey 1,500 of the city’s inhabitants.

The company began the survey in September and published its results in November. This survey enabled the city to develop priorities for its annual budget. For example, the city asked people if they would contribute about US$5 a year to pay for the city to plant trees.

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES

Municipal officials decided to tackle the problem of garbage collection around 2006, in part in response to people’s comments on the issue in a survey. They analyzed how much it would cost to conduct garbage and trash collection twice a day and to clean roads twice a day. They also worked out the cost of an exemption for people who received some state assistance and a reduced rate for pensioners.

Based on this study, the municipality asked if people would be willing to pay a higher fee for trash collection—US$50 a year for an average family of four, double the existing fee of US$25. Almost 70% of respondents said that they would pay more, and the municipality raised the garbage collection fee. The 2009 survey showed that nearly 60% of respondents believed that Tirana was cleaner after the city increased the charge.

A change in tax collection procedures helped bolster Tirana’s ability to move ahead with reforms. In 2000, the city had to rely mainly on central-government funding to pay for its public services and investment. Indeed, 80% of the budget came from conditional grants allocated by the central government, said Albana Dhimitri, Tirana’s deputy mayor, who focused on budget policies. However, in 2002 the central government passed a law empowering local governments to set local taxes and collect service tariffs. This new law enabled Tirana to significantly increase its revenues, especially through the small-business tax. Roughly 35% of Albania’s small and medium enterprises were located in the capital. By 2005, 70% of Tirana
Municipality’s budget came from local taxes and tariffs, with the remainder coming from the central government.

The central government, under Meta, also channeled funding to support Tirana reforms. Additionally, the central government helped Tirana with loans, as local governments could not borrow money under existing law. Tirana secured loans from the Council of Europe Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for several projects, including schools and infrastructure development.

The focus of the municipal government shifted in Rama’s second and third terms from improvements in service delivery and clearing out the city to policy development. The city’s regulatory plan was a key initiative in this respect. City executives argued that the plan would help to address the problem of illegal construction as the city paid more attention to Tirana’s future pattern of development.

**ASSESSING RESULTS**

Rama’s performance in the national elections and citizen polls underlined the strong popular support for his reforms. He ran for mayor three times, and in each election won the position with a larger majority. A 2005 survey by the National Democratic Institute, an American non-governmental organization, found that Edi Rama was the most popular national politician in Albania. About two-thirds of those surveyed said that they viewed him favorably, while only about a quarter of respondents said they viewed him unfavorably. The next most popular politician was Rexhep Meidani, who served as the country’s president from 1997 to 2002. About 55% of those surveyed viewed him favorably, while 40% viewed him unfavorably.

The survey also showed that Rama had not fully succeeded in garnering support from across the party divide. Only 26% of the respondents who supported the Democratic Party regarded him favorably, in contrast to 86% of those who supported the Socialist Party. This pattern likely reflected Rama’s closer association with the Socialist Party.

Many interviewees commented that Tirana had undergone a significant transformation during the period that Rama was at the helm. There were more green areas, garbage collection improved, and the roads and sidewalks were in better condition. In 2004, he won the title of World Mayor in an online competition in which voters judged his work against the mayors of London, Rome, Mexico City and other major cities.

However, many problems persisted in Tirana at the time of interviews. Illegal construction of new complexes and extensions on existing buildings continued to plague the city. In particular, construction companies built apartments on the outskirts of Tirana to house the city’s burgeoning migrant population.

Rama often had to field questions about his ties to the construction industry. In a television documentary, for example, an interviewer asked whether he took money for building licenses, as his critics alleged. His response was that it was not the first time he had to answer the question and there was no substance to the allegation. “I think that when I have to answer this question, it’s not the first time, but it seems to me somehow embarrassing to say no because it looks like I have to answer to a kind of accusation and you know, and I think when you are accused it’s the burden of the accuser to prove it,” Rama said. “I just say I’m not interested in it. It’s very simple.”

Many of Rama’s critics said his leadership was too closely bound to his personality and his personal goals. Many people who worked with him described him as an involved and attentive manager who closely monitored projects in the municipality. He was reported to work nearly around the clock, sending text messages at all hours of the night.
Although Rama may have run a tight ship, some people questioned whether he was, after all, just a typical Albanian political strongman. A 2005 profile in the New Yorker magazine said that even the mayor’s friends said he “runs the city by a kind of papal seduction.” Rama dismissed the criticism. Indeed, many people who worked around him said that he encouraged teams and discussions. Still, reforms were strongly associated with him, his individual flair and his ambition.

Rama’s performance can be evaluated separately in different periods. While Meta was prime minister (until 2002), Rama had the strong support of the national government. From 2002 to 2005, the new prime minister, Fatos Nano, was less reform-oriented, and he also competed with Rama for leadership of the Socialist Party.

In 2005, the Democratic Party came to power, and Rama’s Socialist Party links began to work against him and his efforts in Tirana. Soon after the elections, the central government began to query Tirana’s decision to build a highway overpass, claiming that the construction was illegal because the supervisor and head engineer’s licenses had expired. In July 2006, the central government destroyed the overpass, in what many regarded as a display of raw political power. Two years later, the central government reduced the small-business tax by half without granting local governments any compensation for the losses to their budgets. The central government also announced a ceiling for fees on services, such as waste collection.

Widening the political divide, Rama in 2006 became president of the Socialist Party. Rama’s involvement in national politics increased further after he declared the 2009 elections fraudulent and initiated a boycott of the government. By 2010, Rama’s reform momentum had slowed, but his initial reforms appeared to be sustainable. His efforts to improve city facades and restore park areas ignited a sense of pride among Tirana’s citizens. Municipal officials considered it their duty to continue such efforts, said Agolli, the municipal manager. People had grown accustomed to Rama’s vision of Tirana as a modern European city.

He and other municipal officials also noted that Tirana’s citizens had raised their expectations of government as a result of the city’s progress. Their concerns evolved as the municipality addressed their basic problems. Further, mayors in other parts of the country sought to emulate Rama’s style on the painting of buildings, and some tried to adopt his direct approach and policies to involve citizens in municipal processes.

**REFLECTIONS**

Many of the reforms that Mayor Edi Rama introduced in Tirana were not novel from a global view, but in Albania they were “revolutionary,” Eduard Shalsi, the city’s former deputy mayor, recalled in 2010. In a city with a long track record of unresponsive governance and failed reform, Rama’s ability to achieve quick and important gains restored people’s faith in the government and introduced public debate as a means of building civic involvement.

Developing the trust of the citizenry and involving them in municipal processes were important elements of his reforms. Rama emphasized that if the government failed to make people feel as though they were a part of municipal processes, the job of keeping the city clean and maintaining order would be exceedingly difficult, Shalsi said.

“We got to the point that the municipality is responding to citizen needs and expectations through a long process of building trust,” said Albana Dhimitri, the deputy mayor. “Mayor Edi Rama succeeded in creating a model of good governance in Albania.”
4 Ibid., p.2
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