“Lead Us Not Into Temptation”: Reducing the Opportunity for Corruption

Prosecuting corruption is time-consuming, demands highly performing investigators, requires coordination across organizations, and carries political risk. Instead, are there ways to reduce corruption by limiting temptation?

Reformers in Liberia, Georgia and Colombia changed simple things, like working hours, office layouts, and task definitions, in order to alter three elements of the corruption calculus: the willingness of citizens to “pay extra,” the ease of monitoring those who might demand a bribe, and the numbers of people in a position to collect. Case comparison suggests that these steps are more effective in some settings than in others.

Alex Cuffy and Liberia’s International Airport

Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program

Financial Controller Alex Cuffy had to reduce the hemorrhage of funds at Liberia’s airport, Roberts Field. To reduce opportunities for corruption, Cuffy:

- required airlines, rather than airport staff, to collect passenger service fees on tickets and deliver funds to the accounting department;
- worked with airlines and businesses to deposit cargo fees directly to Roberts’ bank account;
- identified reputable vendors, set up a regular schedule of purchases to eliminate intermittent supply shortages, increased competition among suppliers to reduce costs; and
- randomly spot-checked procurement by accompanying airport officials during trips to Monrovia to pick up goods from suppliers.

Continued on next page
nickname, “the humiliator.” Working with Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus, reformer Liliana Caballero pursued several tactics for changing both the perception and the reality of corruption.

“It’s happened to all of us,” said Caballero, “if we’re asked for more paperwork, we assume that the public servant is asking for some type of bribe.” Part of the solution was to make it easier for citizens to get the services they wanted. Caballero also increased observability, and:

- created a one-stop shop for services, expanded the work week and office hours, and set up kiosks near bus routes so that people would be less pressed for time and therefore not as likely to pay an “expediting fee”;
- used open halls, with no walls, that made any illicit dealings immediately observable; and
- separated payment from service delivery, collecting all fees at the one-stop shops at two banks located directly outside the main entrance.

The initial steps in these cases enabled reformers to build public support and shift public perceptions. They helped build auditable trails. However, the cases suggest that there are some limits and these bear further scrutiny. People learn; no solution is forever. Although petty corruption diminished at first, it began to assume new forms later. People started to pay bribes at different locations and the forms of bribes changed. As employees found ways to work around the new arrangements, routines had to change again in some instances.

Where distrust runs deep and people fear others will find ways to get the upper hand, the sustainability of the reforms in high-value services, such as land registries, may be more limited. Although the principle may carry over to high-value transactions, anti-corruption agencies that have strong investigation and enforcement powers will still prove necessary for handling major political corruption.

television, he made the operations of INEC open and transparent.

Without time to radically reconstitute INEC, he left the staff mostly intact and worked to earn their trust. To make up for weaknesses in the institution, he built a scaffolding of civil society partners, who provided critical advice, training, and ground-level reports.

A small team of young computer engineers led by Nyimbi Odero, who had previously led Google’s Lagos office, deployed homegrown technological solutions to register 73 million voters from scratch, capturing the fingerprints and photographs from the alleys of Lagos to remote rural villages. Defying the advice of international experts, they pioneered the use of open-source software that delivered a credible voter registry on time and well under budget. They released this voter registration software freely online for the benefit of other election commissions worldwide. Ultimately, the voter registration exercise was one of Africa’s most ambitious uses of information technology, and, said Odero, “It was designed, developed and supported purely by Nigerians.”

To staff Nigeria’s 120,000 polling stations, Jega negotiated the redeployment of the National Youth Service Corps. Conscripted to work on development projects nationwide, the Corps members were young, college-educated and isolated from local politics. Jega recruited professors and vice-chancellors from universities to collate and report vote counts.

Harnessing the energy of voters, Jega asked all citizens to serve as poll observers, monitoring the vote count, watching over ballot boxes, and recording evidence of fraud with mobile phone cameras. Millions of Nigerians

As the 2011 elections approached, Nigerians braced for trouble. When illness forced the resignation of the sitting president, the succession rules handed the presidency to Vice President Goodluck Jonathan and pitted the largely Muslim north against the largely Christian south. Given Nigeria’s history of flawed elections, many feared the polls would trigger bloodshed on a national scale. Instead, Nigeria held the most free and fair elections in its history, lauded by international observers as transparent and orderly.

Nigerians credited this success above all to Attahiru Jega, the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Appointed by the president in June 2010, Jega brought proven reformist credentials to the task of turning around the beleaguered institution, which voters blamed for mismanaging the discredited elections of 2003 and 2007. As a former professor, university vice chancellor and union leader, Jega had proven himself as a thinker, an administrator and an activist. And as a Muslim northerner with a national reputation for integrity, he had the potential to bridge Nigeria’s divides.

“Jega represented change, and people were willing to give him a chance,” said Amara Nwankpa, a youth activist. Citizens who had earlier rallied against government corruption and inaction were eager to show their strength at the ballot box, demanding a fair vote.

While the electorate’s support buoyed Jega politically, high expectations could sink swiftly if Jega failed to negotiate the obstacles ahead. The constitution mandated an election by January, giving the commission only seven months to prepare. The voter registry was riddled with omissions and false entries. The state-level INEC offices most prone to fraud were hard to control. Corruption allegations tarnished the reputations of INEC staff, who felt threatened by change. Rumors circulated through newspapers, radio and mobile phones.

Jega first bought himself time and resources by building a political consensus for a fixed, ample budget and a constitutional amendment to delay elections by three months. He met regularly with party delegates, religious leaders, and civil society representatives to hear their concerns and enlist their cooperation. From managing an INEC Twitter account staffed by young volunteers to broadcasting vote counts on national
How and Where Cities Lead the Way in Innovative Service Delivery

Some of the most innovative ideas about improving service delivery or reducing conflict have their roots in dynamic cities. Drawing on hundreds of interviews in the Philippines, Egypt, Colombia and South Africa, our research reveals important urban innovations, and suggests lessons learned from innovative urban centers.

- All of the highlighted cities prioritized and engaged in innovative means of generating revenue and improving infrastructure, two tasks critical for implementing effective city reforms.
- Leaders behind these innovations identified “early win” projects, such as city beautification, often to build trust within the community.
- Innovations enhanced citizens’ voices by encouraging two-way communication between public servants and constituents.
- These cities often used technological solutions to address previously intractable problems.
- Behind most city innovations were strong mayors—often elected as the opposition candidate to an incumbent—who made themselves accessible to the people (e.g., through “office hours”) and worked with a trusted team.

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Cape Town, South Africa offers one example of the kinds of changes mayors have piloted around the globe. In South Africa’s transition to majority rule, Cape Town was pressed to extend services and infrastructure to previously under-served areas, improve efficiency and effectiveness, and address severe financial woes. Mayor Helen Zille and her team opened tender deliberations to the public and created an oversight committee to monitor the tender process. The government created a complaint tracking system in which residents could voice concerns and make requests, and the city could monitor its own responses. The city also introduced innovative water management devices, saving money and millions of liters of water each month. The city’s revenue generation allowed Cape Town to quintuple spending on capital infrastructure projects. By 2010, most rankings of South African metropolitan areas rated Cape Town as having the country’s best government. The central government’s auditor general praised the city’s sound financial management in 2009, and the city’s credit rating improved.

This case study, Municipal Turnaround in Cape Town, South Africa, 2006-2009, can be found on the ISS website.

Check out innovation profiles in these cities, through ISS case studies and interviews:

- Tirana, Albania
- Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
- Bogotá, Colombia
- Medellín, Colombia
- Qena, Egypt
- Bangalore, India
- Solo, Indonesia
- Beira, Mozambique
- Lagos, Nigeria
- Naga City, Philippines

Nigerian Elections, continued

shared such messages over social media and mobile phones, enabling authorities to swiftly detect electoral crimes.

Despite careful preparations, the legislative polls opened on April 2 to reveal a shortage of official results sheets. Rather than improvise a solution vulnerable to fraud, Jega made the difficult last-minute decision to postpone the polls. Jega’s demonstrated reputation for integrity and forthrightness paid off. He weathered a storm of criticism and opened the polls a week later to unprecedented voter turnout. International monitors reported the elections to be largely free, fair and safe, beyond their expectations.

While the presidential elections also proceeded fairly and safely, the announcement of Jonathan’s victory triggered a wave of ethno-religious violence that claimed over a thousand lives, including a dozen Youth Corps members, and left tens of thousands homeless. An inter-agency security committee established by INEC helped coordinate a swift reaction by security forces and the situation was contained within days.

INEC spokesman Kayode Idowu described the elections as “not a benchmark but a ... springboard for future improvement.” Defying international warnings of an electoral catastrophe, Nigeria’s voters proved the resilience of their young democracy. With their support, Jega has already begun to push for deeper electoral reforms in the years ahead.
In any country, patterns of crisis and opportunity, as well as the bargaining skill and personal temperament of senior officials, shape the effectiveness of a president’s office or a prime minister’s cabinet secretariat. Most of these elements remain largely beyond anyone’s control. However, organizational design and management practice, which are more amenable to adjustment and direction, also influence how well a center of government is able to plan, monitor, manage and communicate.

A new ISS research line asks whether there are ways to structure these offices in order to enhance the functional capabilities of governments in the especially challenging contexts that fragile states present. In particular, ISS examines the kinds of organizational structures and policies that states successfully emerging from conflict or collapse have used to help compensate for key handicaps: 1) temporary shortages of specially trained personnel, 2) limited ability to rely on institutionalized departments to carry out the daily business of government without close monitoring, 3) the need to devote substantial time to the construction of a political community, 4) a tendency for other countries to cultivate client relationships with senior political advisers, and 5) intensive interaction with aid donors.

What Do “Centers of Government” Do?

At a minimum, a center of government typically bears responsibility for seven key functions, including strategic planning, legal review of draft laws and policy proposals, preparation of government sessions/cabinet meetings, coordination of policy implementation across ministries or departments, coordination with other branches of government, negotiation with outside actors to win acceptance of policy proposals, and communication with the media and the public.

Although there are few established metrics for evaluating effectiveness, a high-performing center of government is able to develop affordable and realistic priorities, deliver well-drafted legislative proposals, win implementation of top priorities, respond quickly to crises, and keep members of the government, legislators, civil leaders and the public apprised of its actions. The division of responsibility is such that the head of government is able to delegate effectively. ISS case studies describe reforms at the center of government that result in improved governance.

An Example: Sierra Leone’s New SPU

In 2010, President Ernest Bai Koroma struggled to implement his development agenda for Sierra Leone, unable to count on consistent follow-through by his own ministries. He had won the 2007 election, five years after an 11-year civil war had decimated the civil service and destroyed much of the West African country’s infrastructure. Early in his presidency, Koroma had established an advisory group called the Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU) in a bid to monitor ministries’ progress on major projects and to hold ministry staff accountable.

During 2008–09, the SPU had made a few notable gains, such as creating performance contracts with ministers and steering completion of a giant hydroelectric dam. But by 2010, major elements of Koroma’s development agenda had faltered, and the president knew he had to improve coordination and accountability at the center of government in order to address Sierra Leone’s daunting challenges.

The revamped SPU held regular coordination meetings of the president and ministry officials that strengthened monitoring and accountability, and identified logjams and bottlenecks that required presidential intervention. By late 2011, the unit had increased interministerial coordination and significantly improved progress on priority programs. The country implemented free maternal and child health care and launched a national feeder roads project, which aimed to connect rural farmers to larger markets for their goods.

For more examples of ISS work on centers of government, visit the ISS website. Recent case studies profile innovations in Malaysia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Forthcoming cases feature Latvia and Lithuania.

ISS at Oxford University

Oxford University’s new Blavatnik School of Government co-hosted a conference with McKinsey & Co. in December 2011. The theme: Challenges of Government: The Innovation Imperative. ISS Director Jennifer Widner addressed issues of building accountability and increasing transparency in the public sector, sharing findings from Brazil, Colombia and Indonesia. Her co-panelists included high-level officials from Kenya and the White House, as well as other scholars. Conference presenters discussed ways in which information and communications technology (ICT) can strengthen government accountability, enhance transparency, curb absenteeism and limit corruption.
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