Series: Civil Service Reform
Interview no.: ZP3

Interviewee: Stanley Murage
Interviewer: Rushda Majeed
Date of Interview: 12 July 2012
Location: Nairobi, Kenya
MAJEED: This is Rushda Majeed on the 12th of July, 2012. I'm with Mr. Stanley Murage who is former Special Adviser to President (Mwai) Kibaki from 2003 to 2008. Mr. Murage thank you so much for speaking with us today. We really appreciate your time. If I may start our conversation by asking you to speak a little bit about your current position but also the past experiences that brought you here.

MURAGE: I am currently involved in engineering consultancy. I do do some advisories to government but not specifically on policy and study. But in that period you mentioned I was the policy and strategy adviser to the President. I'm sure you don't want to get into the engineering consultancy.

MAJEED: We would be very interested in hearing about your policy experience in government and also your career trajectory in terms of getting to that position.

MURAGE: Before I joined the President in State House as a policy consulting adviser I had been in government for many years as a Permanent Secretary from 1994 until 2003. I had been a Permanent Secretary in various government ministries. I had been involved in the reforms then spearheaded by the World Bank. At that time it was mostly rightsizing, streamlining and cutting costs.

I was then Permanent Secretary for Labor for a couple of years and Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Transport and Communications and Public Works, which were the key infrastructural ministries. That is what gave me the first opportunity for reform, particularly in the roads sector and in the transport sector and in the telecommunications sector. So I was very privileged to be one of the key players in Kenya for the privatization of Kenya Airways from a loss making parastatal to a private company where government only owned 23% of shares and later on was to make a lot of profit every year since 1997.

Then I was involved in the reform of government communications and the introduction of the use of internet in government. I developed the first internet policy for this country. Then I had reforms in the air traffic control in the country, which were very interesting. This involved mainly engineering and human resources reforms.

What was characteristic of those reforms is that they were like structural adjustments really. They were not real, real changes. They were rightsizing, optimizing the size of staff required, trying to see how best to deliver services but not in a structured way.

It was not until 1999, when I started to look at results-based management in a focused and structured manner. We wanted to carry out reforms in the public service that would get targeted results in a sustainable manner. This is when Joyce (Nyamweya) and I started discussing how we could introduce results-based management in Kenya public service. She was still working with the UN (United Nations) in charge of reforms for the United Nations worldwide. That is how the Results for Kenya Program began.

We began when I was in government just as a Permanent Secretary but she was not in government. We started to strategize how to introduce the reform strategy in government. We did not succeed much until 2003 when the current President took power. (You can put this in brackets, he took power in December 2002.) When the President, the current President was campaigning for presidency we asked him, that is Joyce and I asked him if he could consider implementing
public service reforms for service delivery as a key strategy for improving development goals for Kenyans. He was very excited about it. It was then that we began in 2003, a bit late, but went into full gear in 2004. That is when the real Results for Kenya program started.

MAJEED: If I may interject and ask, you said in 1999 you started looking at results-based management in a focused and structured manner. What prompted you to start looking at results-based management at that time?

MURAGE: What really challenged us to try and do that were challenges like we continued to spend money in government, money whose budgets grew by minimum 10-15% per annum but we did not see real results in a measured manner. We continued to get methods, for example, of tendering, in my case from infrastructure. We still received lowest tenderers to whom we awarded contracts but we never received bargains even with the lowest tenderer.

So the methodology may have been met but real results were not achieved. So the economy was not achieving value for its money in money spent. So we looked at different ways of getting value for money and that is why results-based management was very useful. Of course you are interested in Rapid Results and Rapid Results was one of the tools that we used in each sector to achieve targeted results. This is how we did it.

The country had, I think Joyce did present to you the medium-term strategy for wealth creation.

MAJEED: The economic recovery strategy?

MURAGE: Yes. In that strategy the country’s economy was divided in different sectors and they had defined targets by government what they wanted to achieve in each target sector. So it was very clear what we should achieve but it was not clear how we would do it.

MAJEED: Right.

MURAGE: That is how we then started a reform strategy that was citizen-centered. That is one major difference, citizen-centered. How did we do that? We did that by involving the citizens in stakeholder forums to influence what we called service charters. So for every sector like health, infrastructure, energy, the concerned stakeholders, that is the general public, companies that participate in that sector, they were offered the opportunity to give their views as to how we should achieve the results we seek, whether those results were strategic or not and if we should change our targets or not. Together with government, for the first time in our history, we involved the general public to set sector targets and we translated this into what we called service charters for each sector led by a government ministry or department.

I think that was the first strategic move to show results because for the first time government was not grading itself and saying let’s see what we have done. We now have the public with an opportunity to say fine, you say you achieve this but according to the targets we set you did not. For example if it is roads, we would define how many new roads, how many kilometers of new roads would be built, how many kilometers of old roads would be maintained in a certain measure, like so many kilometers per year. It was very clear that there were targets for maintenance, refurbishment and new roads. Then there were targets equally
which were sustained by a budget. You could not overspend on one at the expense of the other.

So for the first time we experienced what we would call results-based financing or budgeting. So we organized—once we had the targets for the ministry or for the department, we then developed targets for individuals, the leadership in the ministry or the department. We organized Rapid Results strategies to achieve those results. We started with 100-day Rapid Results, which we called quick wins.

We identified together with public participation, we called it the demand side. We organized targets for 100-day Rapid Results. That was a sweetener to do now the medium-time reforms. Basically Rapid Results identified quick wins specific to the sector and specific to the wishes of the country rather than government alone.

Like if it is Lands Office we agreed access to the forms that people have to fill other than being stored in one spot in Nairobi, they were made available in other parts of the country. Some of the forms were put online so they are accessible to individuals wherever they are.

Then we agreed on timelines as to how long certain tasks should take. For example, for one to get the transfer of their property, for one to get to obtain search information for land registry, and all types of information as contained in a service charter. The same thing happened for Ministry of Health and health delivery. The same thing happened for immigration. The same thing happened for example for the Solicitor General’s civil registry. We had very successful Rapid Results programs in those areas, particularly in the Solicitor General’s Civil Registry, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Immigration Department.

MAJEED: Good.

MURAGE: We then had a communication strategy that communicated to the public why they should be involved in pursuing results in a manner that has been declared in the service charter and their role in making sure that they obtain those results. We then got feedback, regularly, from the public. Some ministries even had public platforms for obtaining results. This was good pressure on what I would call the supply side to actually make sure they achieved targets.

In the performance contracts that we organized to achieve rapid results—these two are linked—it was therefore very easy for agency-level, departmental-level and ministry-level to assess progress based on the targets that had been set and the results achieved. So really it was as easy as that and annually these results were publicly announced and the winners were well recognized and rewarded. The not-so-good performers were given a yellow card.

MAJEED: When did you start doing this particular kind of award ceremony or event?

MURAGE: I think we started that in 2005. Now it is an annual event that is either chaired by the President together with the Prime Minister who is in charge but in those days they were all chaired by the President. He is the one who personally gave the awards.
MAJEED: How did the ranking or the rating work? Which office was involved? When you say “we” did it, I was just curious to see what the institutional structures were.

MURAGE: The organizational structure was that we had formed administrative departments to execute the reforms. Besides the office of the Secretary for Public Service Reforms, who was Joyce, we had another office for performance management where we had another Secretary who had a team, a Secretariat whose work was nothing but to track results and then on an annual basis to publish these results for the accolades review.

MAJEED: Do you feel that had an effect?

MURAGE: I think so. Whatever is measured they say it always gets done. We saw a big turnaround because at an individual level and a departmental level people were measured against targets and it started to change the philosophy of people. For example, one of—I believe that Kenya’s economic turnaround began then. Most of our government agencies are like parastatals who are loss making behemoths. Since 2006, a year after the measurements and RRI (Rapid Results Initiatives) there has been phenomenal growth, I would say in like more than 90% of those parastatals and the economy started to do very well. We rose from a percentage growth of 2.8% in 2003 to 7% in 2007.

MAJEED: Right.

MURAGE: So I think that it is the application of Rapid Results Initiative as a strategy to achieve development results was like the icing in strategy. Because objectives and strategies for reforms existed even before. Supporting RRI with performance management including measurement was something that even the clever people could not avoid because you had to be measured, assessed again at a certain target. If you are not performing you will be known, action will be taken against you. So there was no escape, both at the institutional level and at the individual level. That is what has persisted actually.

MAJEED: Right.

MURAGE: I think one thing that is worth mentioning was the political steering.

MAJEED: Yes, that was one of my questions.

MURAGE: The whole reform of the Results for Kenya program.

MAJEED: Yes.

MURAGE: The President had a strategy, we used to call it the three E strategy for reforms in Kenya. One was that we would have to have equity, an objective to have equity. That is to equalize everybody in terms of ability to obtain services. That was equity. So you and I will get the same equity of services in public health, in local government—.

MAJEED: Education?

MURAGE: In health. So I did not have to be a powerful person to obtain services and somebody else who is not powerful is not able to obtain services. So to achieve this we even coined a slogan that it was in Swahili saying that “reform is your right as a Kenyan.” In Swahili it was “huduma bora ni haki yako.” So this slogan
went all the way to the village. Some people could not believe it. You mean it is my right to be served by my chief? Yes. It is my right to be served by my district commissioner? Yes.

That is how we were able—we kept pursuing this strategy of equity. Then he had another strategy of empowerment. His idea was if you are doing reforms the whole idea is to have results that empowered the average Kenyan person. So if it is what they used to call cost-sharing payment in a hospital and the public were to pay a certain amount, he wanted to make sure that that payment was not going to be exploitive, but it was going to empower the average Kenyan to afford a service that he could not have afforded before because it wasn’t there. So it was available at a reasonable cost. So he empowered the average public person.

Of course the final E was efficiency. You would receive this service efficiently within reasonable time. His political steering was done by making sure that he made it known to the public that they should expect services at affordable prices with efficiency and without what I would say, without any favoritism.

MAJEED: Yes.

MURAGE: I think this general philosophy with the strategies was very helpful. So we made sure, for example, for every sector, like if it is health we would make a political message, it is your right to obtain the best health services from your local area. It must be affordable and it must be efficient. If it is not, report back to government. This really worked well.

What we used to do under his instructions is that for every public engagement he had, and there were many, I would say like one to two per week, in his speech, every speech had to include a reform message. Whether it was the need to establish service charters, whether it was in the reality of establishing achievable results targets, whether it was in the need to be available to be assessed, in my performance, in my department’s performance. It was common knowledge that each one of us including State House actually, was to be assessed, how did you achieve the targets set for you.

We also set up a unit that used to set targets for each department.

MAJEED: So these units were in every department?

MURAGE: They were centralized. What they used to do is—they had a policy units that used to set targets. Then they could coopt experts in various fields like health, infrastructure, to help them understand what types of targets they should set. So they would move from one sector, from one to the other. They will sit on one side and the public service leadership will sit on the other side and they would negotiate the targets. Right in fact like a price negotiation of a commodity.

For example I remember many times we would be arguing how many kilometers of road shall we build. If you go through the data of how many resources are available, how much technical ability there is in the country to build such roads so how much is possible and how much is achievable. The same thing to do with maintenance.

So it was really interesting. It wasn’t just talking off people’s heads. These were performance targets, clearly strategically acculturated both by the supply side
and the demand side. Come the day when we assess and you bring the results and we all agree yes it has been good or it has not been good. When we formed what we called a round table where industry, private sector and industry, we formed what is called KEPSA (Kenya Private Sector Alliance).

MAJEED: Mr. Murage, when you say we, who is the core team?

MURAGE: Government, the core team was really the Office of the President. They facilitated so that KEPSA, which is an organization of the private sector, can be a competent partner for government target setting including monitoring and evaluation of what we have done. One of the areas I was in charge, for example, also simultaneously besides being policy and strategy adviser, I was in charge of the infrastructure policy and target setting unit where I had Permanent Secretaries in charge of infrastructure ministry. We would for example decide on roads, energy, telecommunications and transport and we would sit and do individual policy targets for those. Then we would have a team that would come and sit with us to either accept those targets or change them according to the public interest.

That really was, I would say that was where the rubber met the road.

MAJEED: This Central Policy Unit was in the office of the President?

MURAGE: The Central Policy Unit was in not just in the office of the President but in the State House. It was set in the office—.

MAJEED: The physical location.

MURAGE: Where the President is. Every day I reported to him the statistics of where we were going, every day. I sat and traveled with the President everywhere on all official functions I was present. Then through me and the head of the public service we would then instruct the different permanent secretaries in charge of different ministries. Then they would work with Joyce who was in charge of the implementation and the rolling out of individual RRIs.

So for example, if it was—I remember one that we worked on very quickly, very wisely, was at the Ministry of Agriculture. I would sit down with the Minister of Agriculture and then Joyce and we would agree how do we carry out the RRI. We would come up with a vision, a strategy. Then we would coin out an RRI strategy, RRI targets, areas. We could choose one area then go to another area. Some could be in a hundred days now, but others would begin a hundred days in a month’s time. It was quite focused. I would be seated in the office where the President is.

The Office of the President was a different place. I used to sit in the State House with the President every day. I would then make update reports of what was going on, how we were achieving our targets, did we have problems like funding. Then we would deal with those.

But one of my experiences was interesting. As much as people say financial resources were important that was not the problem. Yes, we could have done with a lot more money. Our biggest problem was human resource focused on achieving targeted results. Yes people could achieve results, but they were not targeted for other reasons. Every year we used to conduct what is called
expenditure review. So for the seven ministries and agencies, we would do an expenditure review.

I would have stated as Permanent Secretary that for sure I spent say 30% of my income, supply income, on maintenance of roads, maybe another 50% on building new roads. Me and my officers would state so. We made sure. We had an audit, a technical audit for that expenditure. Did that money actually go to maintenance? Actually go to building new roads. It was the expenditure review that helped us to focus RRI more specifically. We learned a lot, particularly in regard to what we called results-based budgeting.

We then institutionalized what we now know as Monitoring and Efficiency Unit. We still have it, a Monitoring and Efficiency Unit.

MAJEED: In terms of organizing the center of government, where you have the policy units and you were meeting regularly with the Permanent Secretaries and then with Joyce Nyamweya and the Public Sector Reform and Development Secretariat at the time. Were you, in terms of at least the institutional setup did you learn from other countries, did you look at other models?

MURAGE: Yes, we learned from a couple of countries. The first one on the list is Canada. We actually had a high-level training workshop for all our team, including myself, in Canada to learn how to initiate reforms, how to conduct and implement a reform framework, how to execute RRI, how to budget for Rapid Results. We continued to exchange staff in training with them for the last few years.

We also did that with Malaysia. In fact Malaysia gave us one of their experts to serve on our National Economic and Social Council, a council that met between government and private sector to discuss reforms. We learned from the UK (United Kingdom) Prime Minister’s reform unit. We sent a few individuals, in fact Joyce—.

MAJEED: The delivery unit?

MURAGE: Yes, the Prime Minister’s delivery unit. They helped us quite a lot. Then we learned from the South African model of a policy unit. The major contact I would say officially was Canada and Malaysia where we had formal communications at the top of government to collaborate on reform and Rapid Results.

MAJEED: In terms of just getting more specifics of how the setup worked, how often did you meet with the Permanent Secretaries or even with Joyce Nyamweya at the Secretariat; how did the day-to-day work out in terms of schedules and so on?

MURAGE: The structure was that the Reform Department was headed by Joyce. In that next to that department was a Performance Management Department and they did measuring and reporting. But the Reform Department was responsible for Rapid Results. It was responsible for the Secretariat of the National Performance Management framework. So the secretariat helped after these people set the targets they helped achieve the targets.

I met the heads of the departments like twice a month. Then you had Permanent Secretaries who were responsible for all ministries met with Joyce at minimum once a month. Then they had meetings with their heads of departments responsible for each sector. So it was really continuous.
MAJEED: And you met with the President every day.

MURAGE: Every day, yes, every day. I made reports as to how we were doing in terms of targets, in terms of creating new or modifying new Service Charters, in terms of new RRI initiatives. We would have one or two in Health. The ministries where we had many of them were Agriculture and Health. Then we did one in Education for example which was interesting because we were doing the free primary education. We worked it out to make sure that we could even achieve a free high school education. It was all dependent on RRI pilots. Interesting.

MAJEED: In terms of the RRIIs themselves, when did you first hear about Rapid Results Initiatives because you had been considering results-based management in 1999 and onward?

MURAGE: I think I first heard about Rapid Results in 1999.

MAJEED: The Rapid Results Initiatives, the RRIIs?

MURAGE: Yes.

MAJEED: Ok.

MURAGE: Before that I knew about results-based management but it was very general as a focused management. But it was very difficult to see the handle that produced the results which was really RRI. But RRI in my view cannot stand on its own without a broader reform pie, which includes measurement, goal setting, a framework for communication and a framework for changing strategies.

MAJEED: If I may ask you to go back to some of the early conversations. You had met— which actually I was not aware of, you said you had met, you had started discussing with Joyce earlier in 1999.

MURAGE: But we did not start until 2003.

MAJEED: The implementation actually started in 2003. So what were some of those early discussions and then what enabled the actual implementation in 2003?

MURAGE: The most noticeable things that happened between 1999 and 2003, I don’t know for what reasons government did not accept to have a focused reform program, least of all Rapid Results. And least of all targets that are set with the public involvement. It was a no-no in that government and that was before the current president came to power.

I was Permanent Secretary in the previous government and I actually also served as a technical adviser to that president and he did not quite see the role of the public. That’s why I think it was very significant when the new president came with an agreement; we cannot to do it any other way other than to involve the citizen. They had a name, the average citizen as the center of reform and RRI. So I think that made the difference. Certainly whether one can call it a political strategy, whether it is a philosophical strategy, that the citizen is the center of the service reform.

MAJEED: And the economic recovery strategy was prompted by that impulse as well?

MURAGE: Yes.
MAJEED: In terms of just the Rapids Results Initiative or the RRI component of the entire reform strategy, were there any other tools that were considered do you think or was it clear that RRIs were the way to go in terms of using them as a tool to implement the medium-term plan?

MURAGE: We had experimented with other tools during the World Bank structure adjustment period. You see we had, for example, my service, Permanent Secretary, I used to have a committee of heads of departments and I would sit with them and we would plan what we were going to do but at times it was like we were speaking to ourselves. When we came to Rapid Results and it was a chain involvement, from the top to the bottom in terms of tasks, in terms of service, it made all the difference.

MAJEED: So one of the things that I wanted to ask, you were trying to put all these things in motion and there were a number of things going on in terms of the reform strategy, going back to the early days and even later on, how did you— I'm sure you must have met with some resistance or inertia in terms of moving things along. How did you—what kind of resistance did you face if you did?

MURAGE: We actually faced very substantial resistance, in very high places. Among some of the Permanent Secretaries there were centers, of course our own human, soft skills of dealing with people helped, but I think the major one was the political steering. The political leadership stated this is the way we are going to go as a country, not as a government, as a country. In his political speeches he made it very clear that this is the way the country would go and any government that thought they were to serve this country they had to put the citizen at the center of reform. So service delivery was gauged on satisfaction of the citizen consumer.

It revolutionized, it gave the President and the legislative machinery power to almost overrun resistance. So we could smile with them but we knew it was a question of time before they were either removed in the opposition or they changed to align with the times. This is what happened. I believe it was 2007, in 2007 we won the International Reform Award. It was such a major impetus. Since then it set up a fire for reform in Kenya particularly RRI and up to date, both RRI, performance management, policy and target setting, they have remained a constant feature of a reform program for the Results for Kenya Program.

MAJEED: One of the things you said earlier was very interesting, that RRI itself as a tool may not work as well without the framework—

MURAGE: I don’t think—in fact, I cannot even, I should not even use the polite word “may.” RRI will not work without the accompanying reform structures like: 1. There has to be a policy-setting body. The National Performance Management Team must seek to set policy and strategies of how to implement reform first, across the board.

Then you must have a communication mechanism to inform one and sundry in the whole country what you are doing. Then when you set the targets for RRI you’ve got to have a mechanism for how to set those targets and how to measure the progress of those targets. So as I said, if you just go and say “This is RRI and we want to achieve the following targets” first of all, how did you arrive at those targets? How will you measure and assess progress without I’ll say a parallel unit that is not necessarily under RRI but is working together with RRI?
And how will people know the impact and the import of RRI if you don’t have a counterweight communication strategy and then a national performance management and team that sits together to redirect the compass in the right direction according to public assessments? So that’s why I am saying I don’t think that RRI can just sit pretty on its own.

MAJEED: Thank you for that. In terms of, we talked about resistance from different quarters earlier and there are different kinds of reforms that are unfolding, there must have been ministries or places where the reform strategy including RRI had worked particularly well and somewhere it didn’t work as well.

MURAGE: Yes.

MAJEED: Where do you think this approach has worked best, where it has made some progress and where it has not worked?

MURAGE: I think RRI worked very well in sectors that had easily measurable targets. Where the targets were not easily measurable, for example like in foreign affairs, commerce and industry. Some targets were measurable, others were more difficult to measure. People spent quite a while measuring some targets and they could not agree as to whether that was a true measure or not. It was much easier to deal with such targets where the targets were very easily measurable such that even an opposing party would not contest measured target or measured result. We found there it was easy to implement RRI. So measurement is one technique that I would say has direct impact on RRI. The measurability if I can call it of a target in terms of progress. For example, how do you measure progress in your foreign affairs implementation? You have to be very good in putting targets that are measurable. Then you can know the progress. That is one aspect of RRI.

The other one of course—I already said this and I learned this in the Results for Kenya program. It doesn’t matter how focused RRI is, if you don’t have the requisite human potential. You have to have bleeding edge capabilities. This is where the old structural adjustments strategy helped us. Do you have not just the right size, do you have adequate and requisite skills? You can have an RRI program but you don’t have the skills so you may be achieving some results but not the way you want.

So measurability, relevant skills and of course resources, financial resources. I would say those are the three key. The skills, both for leadership for RRI and the implementation in the little tasks, in the various units of the sector and the resources necessary to execute. And of course fourth is skills for monitoring and evaluation. You don’t have to wait until the end of the evaluation period to do a look back. I don’t know whether you get me.

MAJEED: Yes.

MURAGE: That way, in mid-stream you can do a look back and repeat and do the right thing. Then in the first hundred days or 90 days, you are bound to get very good results.

MAJEED: As long as you can do like a mid-course correction.

MURAGE: Yes. And you don’t even have to wait for expenditure review to get to know that you are not using your money correctly if you can capture that in monitoring and
evaluation. In fact currently one of the things I’m discussing as adviser to government is expenditure evaluation based on expenditure review. Because of very strict Rapid Results targets, because of very strict measurement and performance assessment, currently government is not spending as much money as it is supposed to. Currently we have that problem. In fact, it is such a big problem because of the efficiency of RRI—it is almost an irony.

MAJEED: It is.

MURAGE: Yes, it is. So what the Minister of Planning is asking me and a few people to do is to find ways of increasing skills that can increase absorption.

MAJEED: Because absorptive capacity is an issue.

MURAGE: Yes, it is now an issue even in a country like Kenya that has had seven years, eight, from 2004 to now, eight years, that is now the position. My view, unless we deal with that, we may begin to get diminishing returns. Yes, you go up to here, you get high efficiency and now you are getting diminishing returns. But I’m happy that they have realized that and are working on it. Between this year and next year we should come up with sector responses, both from a macroeconomic point of view and a sectoral point of view. Very interesting.

MAJEED: Absolutely.

MURAGE: In fact, I am told, I haven’t been able to read the documents they have given but I am told that we haven’t achieved, very few ministries have actually achieved more than 70% of their absorption. It is quite serious.

MAJEED: Yes it is.

MURAGE: But what is interesting is the level of efficiency, my three Es, because we are still going to achieve our 4-5% economic growth. Isn’t it interesting? It means that if we are able to tweak the absorption rate to say overall 80%, so we should see growth rate toward 7 and 8.

MAJEED: Percent.

MURAGE: So this is very interesting macroeconomic balancing. The point that I wanted to highlight was the need for requisite, competent skills. Many, many countries have educated people but not skilled people.

MAJEED: On that point one of the things you had said very early in our interview was that one of the issues you were facing early on in 2003, 2004 was that you needed human resources that were focused on results. So how did you at least get the skills component in place?

MURAGE: What we did to get the skills was to get the target-setting team and the target-implementing team, to discuss the requisite skills and to change the human resource structures for those ministries. For example, if I discovered that for me to achieve the targeted results for my department I needed X specialist engineers say and I only have half X and I have 2X of other type of engineers, but I am not really focused on the RRI, I’d be allowed to exchange horizontally, what we called horizontal transfers. I’d be allowed to do that, to be able to engage the people I need.
But now we have gone with what are called growth up to a certain level and now this growth has grown that it requires more requisite skills than we currently have. The numbers are many but we need more and more focused. In this regard I would really like to comment—one of the drums I’m beating in the reform structure of anything we are doing is skilled, competent and skilled manpower. Men and women who are not only educated but they’re skilled. I tend to believe there is a big difference. They are skilled.

What do I mean? I mean for example, one of the features we found in the Results for Kenya is a lot of our senior, senior managers, even including Permanent Secretaries, while they knew how—while they knew what the targets were, many of them did not know how those targets would be achieved. So they were to rely on lower cadre of staff. That’s one.

Two, they did not see, they did not know how to relate the achievement of those targets and the amount of money to be spent to do that. That was shocking. So here was a manager of a very important ministry, they had the will, they had the wish and they knew what targets they should achieve but they did not know how to achieve them. Some of their people knew. Then they could not relate in their own mind how much money would be required, not just intellectually but functionally to achieve it. Now that is the type of human resource skill we are talking about. I do not think that we can achieve much by putting merely well-educated people; they have to be skilled. They have to be skilled managers of people; they have to be technically competent in the area of that sector.

So when a report is made for example that we cannot achieve a particular target they would want to understand the reasons why and they would know in their own mind what an alternative is or what alternative is possible. They would also understand how to use the money they have. For the first time we have the type of manager in government that you need in a private company and that is a major change. I think that is really making a big impact at the moment. We even had to check their salary scales so we could attract people from the private sector to lead.

Now we are even further finding that the salaries are good but the competencies of the people we have hired are not adequate. So you have to have—I dare say—a multi-talented person at the top of those ministries. Then you have specialists in the different areas. But the multi-talented people, men and women who are able now to deal with for example if it is in agriculture they are able to deal with livestock. They are able to deal with plants; they are able to deal with agricultural research and to deal with the issues that are there.

Some of those ministries where we have such multi-talented individuals we have been very political, in our political steering, we have been very careful not to move those Permanent Secretaries. They always remain permanent because they are very professionally fitting, so you can’t move them if you want results there. Do you get me?

MAJEED: Absolutely.

MURAGE: I think this is where many African countries have failed because most appointments at the top are political. They are not skill dependent. Now for the first time in Kenya we still have the political, but for the first time we have seen how skills are influencing appointments in those political positions. I don’t want irony, but it is working, it is working.
MAJEED: Thank you for that; that is a very interesting analysis. In terms of the Results for Kenya program, with the grand coalition that came in in 2008, did things shift a little bit?

MURAGE: Things shifted, yes things shifted a lot. I think this is one of the things that has affected it because of lack of focused political steering.

MAJEED: So what have been some of the changes? You think the program itself—?

MURAGE: I think the program has operated less efficiently and less effectively because of lack of political—what I’d call adequate and requisite political steering, because of different political thinking. It is really anywhere you have a coalition. You can see what is happening in Britain at the moment. The same people in the same government but they have different political manifestos, different political objectives. So the way they steer RRI for our department is not the way another party would steer RRI. In my opinion coalition governments would do very poorly in Rapid Results or reforms for that matter. Of course they have to because it is the human skill that drives results.

It doesn’t matter how smart an engineer you have; it is the human skill of how you motivate them, how you involve the process of assessment and measurement. Metrics don’t matter, the human skill matters. If people feel that the metrics being used to grade them are not personal, they’re not motivating, then they just go through a process, not getting results.

Coalition governments are not really known for homogeneity in political steering or political focus. So that is admitted, you experience less effective, less efficient systems, maybe the same resources, the same people.

MAJEED: I know that we are short on time but I just want to ask you about some final reflections. Based on your experience what do you think are the lessons learned in terms of the Results for Kenya program and the overall reform strategy that would be useful for other countries who might be trying to implement something similar?

MURAGE: I think it is the last one that I mentioned, the adequacy. The sufficiency and adequacy in the human skills, at all levels of the Rapid Results Initiative, at the managerial level, at the technical level and at what I’d call the shop floor level. So at the shop floor level there is adequate and competent skills to do the job, to assess what is being done on a regular basis and to do a look back. I think that is going to be ever a cyclical problem, because every year a government is losing skilled people either to retirement or death and you are getting less skilled people every year. So somehow a government must find a way of injecting more skilled people because of growth every year. This is going to be a major challenge particularly for African governments that don’t think proactively about input/output and their relationships.

That will be, and should be in my view, a major challenge for the political steering and number crunching for political leadership in our government. The input must get a certain output. Because of these losses that occur for those reasons that we mentioned, our government must find a way of injecting more output by bringing in skills.
I think that the partnership between governments and the private sector will play a major role in helping overcome that difficulty. So if I am asked human skills, adequate and competent human skills at all levels. I should say local, local people. You can have foreign leadership, but at the middle level technical and shop floor level it has to be local people. That is one of my political messages to political leadership in African countries.

MAJEED: Thank you so much Mr. Murage. Is there anything else I have missed you would like to add?

MURAGE: Yes. I think one of the things I would want to add through experience is the process of setting targets. I think that it is suicidal for a country to set targets without a demand side. No matter how uneducated, uninformed those people are, speak their language, they will tell you. Yes, speak their language, they will tell you, they can tell you what they think the targets should be. Then you can translate those targets into polished professional language and so on as you carry their meaning and they understand it.

MAJEED: Thank you so much.