



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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SCHER: My name is Daniel Scher, and I'm the associate director of the Innovations for Successful Societies project, and I'm here with Mr. Ts'okolo Koro in Maseru, Lesotho. Mr. Koro, thank you very much for taking time out of your schedule to meet with me. As I discussed a little bit before, we're very interested to learn a little bit more about your experience in relation to the police force and the various positions that you held. Before I ask you some questions about the police itself, I wonder if you would mind introducing yourself and just telling us a little bit about the positions that you held within the police.

KORO: *My name is Ts'okolo Koro. I understand the record is why you're here. I'll give you a little bit of my background in the police service. I joined the police service with the rank of trooper some years back; I think that was around 1979. Then I worked through the ranks until I was appointed deputy commissioner of police in 2000. I accepted that rank for four years. In 2004, when the then commissioner of police retired—that would have been around February—I was appointed acting commissioner of police for most of the whole period from February 2004 until December 2004. So I accepted the office of the commissioner of police for 10 months. Then from there I retired. I would say retired because I was offered a job to head the new office that was going to be opened, the office of the inspector of police. But for one to get into that office, you had to cease being a civil servant. So I had no option but to “retire.”*

I accepted the job. I retired from the police service and took over the new post, and that was under contract for five years. So I sat in that office, built it up. In fact, when I got there it was just myself. I had to set up the office. It was a really tough task because I didn't even know how to get the office to get the way I wanted it to look. But I was guided: one year into the office I was sent for study to the UK [United Kingdom], where our office has its roots. We were advised on the setting up of that office by a British, at least to have an idea of what it has to look like or what it has to do. I was sent there for two weeks, studied, looked at what sorts of things people were doing, what they had, the sort of roles they played.

So I started participating in things that I thought I would be able to assist in it. I think around 2007, everything was in place to get the office functioning. The first inspection we did was in 2007.

Of course it takes a long time to bring in people with government procedures. You try to get one person into place, you spend a whole year. I spent the whole of 2005, 2006 just trying to recruit people. The establishment had been approved, but the processes are just too hectic, they take too long. So I accepted that office for five years. Barely at the end of December 2009, they told me that I'd been removed. I am now sitting at home doing some other things, out of government, very relaxed. I wake up when I want to.

SCHER: So proper retirement now.

KORO: Yes.

SCHER: Not just retirement from the police and then to a new job.

KORO: No, no.

SCHER: I still have a few questions for you. I'd really like to hear more about the challenges of establishing the Inspectorate from scratch. As you say, it was just you at the beginning. But before we get there, I'd just like to draw a little bit on your experiences within the police itself.

KORO: *All right.*

SCHER: So at this time, when you are in the commissioner's office, you've moved up through the ranks, and you've got a very good idea of all the things that are happening within the police.

KORO: Yes.

SCHER: What would you say were the major challenges the police were facing in 2004-2005?

KORO: *The whole time we'd been trying to do our jobs there, we had always been handicapped by—I wouldn't even say shortage—we always had a lack of material and resources that we were going to use. That resulted in some of our officers losing motivation, because they were looking at the sort of houses they were staying in, and they're still staying there. You look at the sort of vehicles they were using, look at the sort of hassles they would have to go through to get their uniforms. All those things. Our training facilities as well. Look at the police training facilities: the conditions there, not very good.*

We always had problems with trying to provide people with in-series training and development. If we had a recruit course running, it would mean that this course goes for six months or nine months or 12 months, and for that period we would not be in a position to take anybody in their place, because the recruits would occupy all the resources. So it had a very negative impact on our training ambitions.

SCHER: I see. But what about coming out of the '90s, when the police had some very big problems and there was quite a bit of instability around the armed forces in general. How did these problems of the mid '90s affect the police at a later stage?

KORO: *It did, and I would like to give a little background of how that came about. If you look at what the army did, it would be different for the police. But they just consented, and then they picked it up and came up as one thing. With the police, prior to 1993, the police, the army, the national-security services were all responsible to the minister of defense and the prime minister. Then we had this break around 1993. Ever since, the police have been separate from the army; previously they were always seen as one entity.*

To break it into phases, 1986 and 1993. That was the time when we were ruled by the military. Then, very unfortunately, that was the worst time for the police service because they were literally militarized. We were taking instructions from the military, everything was just militaristic. We were seeing ourselves as one with the army.

You've got to recall that we didn't have a constitution. Everything had been suspended in 1970. So we actually saw ourselves as—what? That's why we were always referred to as members of the armed forces, not the police.

So the connotation there was that we are actually disciplined members of the force. By then the police—everything that the police did, promotions, appointments and the like, were determined by the military person. Within the military junta there was what they called the Defense Commission, which was actually administering all the activities of national security, the army and the

police services. Of course, the commissioner was always a member of that, but he was working with soldiers.

Then came 1993. In 1993 we went for first election since 1970, democratic elections. They were very unfortunate; the people who came to power were people who had been in the opposition the whole time or who had left the country for one reason or another, because they had to leave the country. It means they struggled. It means there's no peace. It means they'd been tortured, it means they'd harassed, and very unfortunately they'd been harassed—by who? By the police.

They knew each other quite well. The police they knew exactly who was who, who did what. But they were in the government now, and the first target they had was to say it has always very wrong for the police to be responsible, to be so closely attached to the army, because the army's functions are actually different. But there had to be a very straightforward effort to demilitarize the police services and try to make it a little bit more civil, or try to adapt itself to democratic ways of policing. There was a new democracy.

So the decision was, immediately, before anybody else, the police were the first to be dealt with. They were moved from the army, from the Ministry of Defense, and sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs. That's where the issue came up. We became very uncomfortable because we didn't understand why. We thought, these people want to deal with us the other way around—you know, they have even separated us from our brothers, our friends. There was a lot of suspicion. The idea was very good, we could see it later, but the thing is, nothing was explained. There was no cooperation between the management of the police service and government there. So the decisions that actually affected us were not communicated to us. They were just made. Obviously, people became suspicious.

Management could not explain to junior officers why the decisions were made. Everybody was saying whatever they wanted to say, so it caused a lot of confusion. Meanwhile, if you are in management and people started saying, "Is it true that these people want to separate us from the army because they want to send us to prison?" You cannot explain that, because you still don't know yourself.

From government level now to management level, within the police services now, junior officers could not actually deal with that. We did not know. They said, "OK, these guys are actually working together with that government." So we suspected government. Our junior officers suspected us. The police service, even when we have such a situation, depends on discipline. Everything we do depends on discipline, and everyone handled that. That was when the trouble started. Now, especially now, the police were saying, "No, we don't want to go there." So they did all the things, and for the first time they went on strike.

Going on strike, they felt it was not enough to just complain about being moved, because they felt that this was not hefty enough, so they had started coming up with a lot of things: salaries, demanding a lot of things. But we knew that the main thing was the suspicion they had against that decision. So for the first time they went for a strike. Now we can understand what happens if the police are on strike. There was everything.

SCHER: Was that legal? Because in some countries it is illegal for the police to strike.

KORO: *By law we are not allowed to strike. They just took the law into their hands, they didn't ask anybody. They just decided not to go to work, harass people, whatever. Now they were joined sometimes by the army. They joined hands. The army had their own problems, so it became chaos. They became very politicized. Now, as they were complaining against the decision that was made by government, the opposition took the chance to start brewing and saying, "Yes, we support these people." They had someone who was sympathizing with them, and that was good enough for the opposition. The police felt: yes, these people are with us. And this was when government—so that's where the whole thing started.*

You could see a police service that was breaking, because there were some who felt this has nothing to do with politics. There were those who were suspicious—and people knowing what they had done earlier. But as you can bet in a society, it doesn't matter whether it is police or not; all these people have their own political inclinations. But if there is chaos—it was bad. Even amongst our officers now, people who were suspected to be pro-government were just detained by police. Senior officers, the commissioner was pushed out of office.

I remember when he was expelled, I was with him in Botswana, attending a regional meeting there. We were told out there, we should not bother to come back. It was a coup within the police service there. They put their own people, appointed their own commissioner, appointed their own deputy.

SCHER: These were younger guys?

KORO: *Yes, yes. Those who they felt were actually pro government—some were asked to retire, just to go home, some were arrested, and they spent nights and nights waiting in police cells. It was a huge loss for discipline, because everything in the police service hinges on discipline. So if young officers go out on their own and arrest their superiors, imagine what situation that brings about when the whole thing happens and then people have to come to work. Unlike in the army, with us there was a commissioner. In fact, he just didn't go to office but after some time he had to go back. Then he was brought in; they broke up that thing, then we had to go back to work.*

SCHER: That was the second strike that the army broke up.

KORO: Yes.

SCHER: So one thing I've been wondering is: you yourself said that the police and the army used to see themselves as brothers, as one unit. So how and why did the army on the second strike turn against the police, or why did they break it up?

KORO: *The army, I think, were forced into that situation. They all had their own problems, but like in the police they should not be seen as a single entity. There were some who still felt that what the police was doing was not good enough; they were not supposed to do it either. But there were sections sympathizing, and so forth. The army commander was put under a lot of pressure. Of course, the government was saying, if you are not going to crush this thing, we are going to bring in foreign forces—.*

SCHER: The government said they'd bring in foreign forces?

KORO: *Yes. They said, we are going to bring in foreign forces. You can imagine. If you are here as an army and you cannot crush a police strike and we bring in people,*

what's going to happen to you after that? So they had to sit there and sort themselves out.

SCHER: What did they mean foreign, like South Africa or SADC [Southern African Development Community]?

KORO: *SADC. They would not want to involve South Africa because they would not want to involve a foreign government. Remember when things happen that way, like they did with the army—remember when the army was in there, they had to bring in SADC. [...] And they knew that was going to happen, because negotiations had already happened. So the army commander had to talk to his people, and then the appropriate thing happened.*

SCHER: Sure. I've been wondering about that, because it is not immediately clear why the army would take those actions when there seems to be a history of cooperation, working together.

KORO: *I think the army, too—the army commanders wanted to show themselves as capable of taking care of the police.*

SCHER: I see. One thing I read was, I thought it was after the first strike, was that when the commissioner and you were in Botswana?

KORO: *No, it was the second time.*

SCHER: Because I read something about the commissioner returning and redesigning the uniforms, abolishing the military-style uniforms and banning the carrying of side arms for rank-and-file officers.

KORO: *That was after the first one.*

SCHER: Was that an important symbolic thing to have a different type of uniform?

KORO: *Really, it was just emotion. We were trying to buy back public confidence because that uniform—the brown one that they were using—was always associated with the bad things that happened with the police detail. So we are trying to say, let's reshape, let's try to show the public that we're different people, let's get away from this problem. We got away with the problem but still bought the same pattern, in blue. We said: this brown, the members of the public see this and they see people going around with arms, they still see the same ruffians that they saw during the strike who were perpetrating bad things. So we were trying to say, let's try to look different. That was just trying to buy back some public perception. For us it didn't mean anything, but we're saying no, let's let our public see a different police officer in the street, that is all. Internally it didn't have anything.*

SCHER: Then after the second strike, you obviously are confronting the situation where you have a very high level of ill-disciplined junior officers. So what were some of the steps that you took to try—you and your senior, higher-level officers took to try and instill discipline within the lower ranks and to try to get the force under control again?

KORO: *After the first strike, we tried to look at all the things that we thought contributed to the strike itself. The government on its own said, even though we made that decision, we don't think we're right. They said, the decision we took was too rapid and caused a lot of confusion. We're not ready as the government to say how we*

deal with the police in a situation—I mean the ministry itself, the minister of home affairs where the police were—was not put in. They didn't know how to deal with us. They didn't know how to handle our things.

So the government said, we are not going to move the police service out of the Ministry of Defense, but how well can they be accommodated so that when they break away there is no suspicion? So they consulted the British government, and then there was this guy called Peter Payne. He was sent in as a consultant. He came from the Home Affairs in the UK, where they already had that experience of police being under a single authority.

So he was brought in here as a consultant. He was not a police officer. He was just a civil official, and he was given a very broad mandate to look at all the things, look at the laws and everything: how well can the police be administered within the Ministry of Home Affairs. So he came, I think, in 1995, worked through 1996, and then produced a report. He had a lot of consultations with all the people he thought could be of value on what we were supposed to be doing. Then after that, he wrote up a report with recommendations—they were very impressive—from laws, structures that had to be put in place. But for the first time, all those consultations resulted in what you call a consolidated—one paper, the Police Act, because previously there were pieces and pieces all over. That was very impressive. It covered almost everything that one could think of at that time.

So the recommendations were all taken up. Then there came the government white paper, which was discussed in Parliament and throughout with consultations all over. Then it was sent into Parliament to be law. Then in 1998 it came out; there was now the new Police Act of 1998.

They covered a lot of things and all the changes that had to be dealt with. First thing, it outlined very clearly the roles of the police, the appointments of all officers, the commissioner, deputy commissioners, assistant commissioners, senior officers. It stipulated very clearly the relationship now between the commissioner and the Police Authority, which is the minister, the sorts of things that the commissioner would have to do—that actually the minister was responsible for what the police was. Before that, we were our own masters. Nobody could tell us what to do before that. That's why most people didn't like that act, because it actually brought us where we are now, under control. We were made to be accountable for everything that we did.

The act itself came up with reforms that demanded that the commissioner—while in office would have to submit reports to the minister as the minister may require, written or whatever—stipulated that the commissioner would have to draw up an annual police plan, and that would have to be approved by Parliament, stipulating exactly what it intends to be doing in that year, so that everybody knows then, that if they would disagree somewhere, that would have to be rectified. It would have to be approved by Parliament, that it is tabled before Parliament, and it stipulates everything.

Again, in that report, in that plan, the commissioner does not just say we do this; he has to go out there and consult members of the public—getting their ideas, how they want to be policed—and that would form the basis of the annual policing plan. That is, we would help to come up with this directly, saying those things were not there; come up with this annual report, and then to report to the Police Authority on the activities that have been taken. So all those were new things which came up immediately after the strike.

SCHER: So these things were a result of the 1998 Police Act. But it took a little while for things like the Directorate and the Inspectorate and the Police Complaints Authority to actually be established, to come into being.

KORO: *OK, yes, I think I skipped that. The first recommendation from the Payne report was to establish an office within the ministry that would deal directly with all the activities that come from the police. It was supposed to be a sort of a secretariat, as anything that the commissioner would send to the minister should not go into the normal flow of things. It should be directed to a certain office, and then to the minister.*

Because some of the things we deal with are confidential. Actually, the police directive was set up even before the act came out, because it was sent up in 1996. Immediately he submitted the report, even before the act came out. That recommendation was taken up, and the office was set up. But also in the report was the establishment of an external, independent complaints authority. He recommended that because, he said, as a result from the experience, it was even worse, all the things that the police did during the strike. It actually cannot convince members of the public that if they have any grievances, that those aren't investigated by the same people who did them. So we said that there was a good justification for that. We said, there are things that will have to be investigated out of this department. Who is going to do that? The same people? Even if they do, members of the public won't believe it. So he recommended that. Then he said again, with this new responsibility of accountability, there is a need to actualize that idea in an office, an independent office that would audit now the performance of the police service in general. That's where the establishment of the Office of the Inspector of Police came in.

Imagine, the Police Act came out in 1998, and then nothing was done. I wouldn't say I know why. Nothing was done to set up the Police Complaints Authority. Nothing was done to set up the Police Inspectorate. Nothing, there was nothing. I don't know why, but the ministry just felt it was tied. But what was happening behind closed doors was, I wouldn't know. But it took all those years—'99, almost—

SCHER: So then, the 2004 police reform committee that you sat on—what was that? Because you already had a number of recommendations that hadn't been implemented. Then there was a new committee that was set up. So can you talk a little bit about the purpose behind that?

KORO: *The 2004 committee was done through our initiative. That was the then commissioner and I. We had the same problems with the army, with discipline and the like. But too much work on restructuring the army had been done, because immediately after their strike and mutinies a lot of consultants were brought in from Botswana, a lot of training programs. India was involved in trying to reform the army. But we had the same problems, and nothing was being done for the police. We could see that all this involvement was bringing a lot of changes. People were getting more resources, people were getting more training. People were getting the things we were trying to see very fast, and we're still left with the same thing.*

We said, look, we think this is not fair. The police have the same thing happening. The strike was over, but the impact that it had on the people still remained and it could be seen. We had a lot of police officers who were involved in crime and some going to prison. A lot of things were happening. Now we

approached the minister, and we said, you're not blaming the police for anything, but we're operating with the same people, same faces that I've already sent to prison and who before sent us to prison. So what are you doing? Why are you not doing anything now for them? So our minister took that up with government. Then the prime minister said, yes, we have been neglecting these people. We have been blaming them, but at the same time they have got reason to complain, because surely we are doing a lot of things for the army and doing little for the police. So who is to blame them?

So that was our initiative. It didn't come from government, but it was taken up.

SCHER: It was taken up by—

KORO: *The prime minister said, set up a committee that will look into all things generally, because nothing had been done. It was only the Payne Report that did, but these structures didn't actually address some of the things—.*

SCHER: The core problems.

KORO: *Yes, the core problems.*

SCHER: I see.

KORO: *So this committee was to look at all that was left out that the police would need. Also, it was not an internal thing; SADC was also involved. We had people from Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique. Then there was now another office which looked at the stakeholders; that office did well. I don't know why it was not implemented. I know we submitted it, but now the person who was actually driving it, who was the minister of home affairs, immediately after the report was submitted, he was transferred from the ministry to another ministry. So I don't know whether the person who came in even knew about that report, but it was never taken up.*

SCHER: Which minister was this?

KORO: *The minister then was a driving force behind that, but immediately after the report was completed he was moved to another ministry, and the report just disappeared.*

SCHER: I see. That's very unfortunate, because as you say the report was able to identify those—.

KORO: *It was a very good report. Now we wouldn't know for this other committee, the one that was established, in 2009; that was the government initiative. I think during a lot of political upheavals in some places, maybe the government felt that the police were not as loyal as expected.*

SCHER: Not as loyal to the government.

KORO: *Not as loyal to the government. A lot of things triggered the government to say, let's look closely into this. I don't know whether they'd forgotten about that report, but they wanted another one. But when the government saw this one, they said, no, there's nothing we can do. Everything that can be done is in this report. So all we could do is to suggest to the government that they look into consultations. Let's draw up an implementation program to amend things which might be outdated in the report. So I know from the meetings—I had not been in one of*

them, but I could talk with them, let them know all the things that were in the report have been taken right now and then broken down into—. I didn't know whether they were going to implement it this time.

SCHER: I see. But the 2004 committee, at least, seems to have resulted in bringing attention to the issue. Because it was in 2005 that you have the Inspectorate and a Police Complaints Authority finally being established. You think there was a relationship between—?

KORO: *There was, because in that report there were questions. We have a Police Act here, we have a structure that is supposed to be in place; why are they not in place? So they strongly recommended that since these structures are in the law and they were meant to do good support service, let them be implemented. Not unless this government is no longer interested. So you are right, that could have been one of the traitors, that we had that report in that long. Nonetheless, the government had said—but they didn't have anything. I think it did—.*

SCHER: But that at least produced some concrete results.

KORO: *Yes, that report, if you had a copy of that—but I don't think they would give it to you, because they still consider it as confidential. The only thing: there was no concerted effort to implement the report. There was no guidance or push from government.*

What happened was, we took up some of the things that we felt we could do. So the report was not fully neglected, because LMPS [Lesotho Mounted Police Service] by itself, there were issues where it felt this was no good and they started taking them out. But now you see, you take things piecemeal, it means you only take those that suit you. So that's why we say the report was actually ignored. But then you look at the report, and you look at some of the changes that are there in the police service. The police tell you that they started working with the report even though officially we were not told to do that. We felt this was a good report and some of the issues—

SCHER: Cherry picking the things that were—

KORO: *But the worst thing was, those now that were the responsibility of government could not be dealt with. So LMPS has only two goals; that is where we see its mandate. It means they will not make any changes, because they will look at resources, provision of resources, structures and the like, vehicles and all that. LMPS could not do anything about that, so they still had to be left out.*

SCHER: I see. So now if we can talk a little bit about the Inspectorate. In 2004 you sat on this committee, and then—who offered you the job of the director of the Inspectorate? Was it a government-appointed post? It wasn't an open competition?

KORO: *No, that is a statutory appointment. The law that established that office actually makes it very clear that the appointment is made by the king on the advice of the prime minister, but even the minister—even though it doesn't mention the Police Authority—he being responsible for that, I think, he has a say as well. He'd have to know who is going to get into that office. So it is not something that is open; it is not advertised. They are just consulted. We need for you to take this office—are you happy? Then you say yes. That's what happened to me.*

SCHER: Can I ask you, why did you say yes? What was it about working in the new Inspectorate—because I mean you had a long career in the police and had advanced very high up the ranks? What appealed to you about working in the Inspectorate?

KORO: *You know, it was a new office, and for me I felt it could be very challenging. I'd be looking at police work from a different perspective. I won't be the one who is doing it, and I'll be saying, why are we not doing these things the right way? I'd look at the roles, though they were not very clear. I felt this was different from what I'd been doing all this time. I'd already reached the highest ranks, so all that was left for me was to be the commissioner of police. Since I would not be assured of that, I felt I would not be leaving anything, because there was nothing more for me.*

Another thing, I felt, looking at it, to be given the importance that it deserves, would eventually help the commissioner. To say, if the commissioner is looking at certain things, there's somebody else who would support the commissioner and say, this is what we actually need. So that would be a very good service, to say independently, I agree with the commissioner of police, and I would be looking at those things that we have been crying about, housing, offices, and the like; I'd say, these are the things that we've got to see, we want to set this as what we need. So I thought I would get the challenges and everything with them.

SCHER: You mentioned earlier it was a big challenge when you moved into the office, and you said it was just you. So you've got an office, and you've got a mandate to do a lot of things, but there's just one of you. So I wonder if you could tell me a little bit about the challenges of staffing an office and finding the right people for the jobs, and then getting those people into the position.

KORO: *Because first thing, as I got in there I definitely didn't even know what sort of people I wanted. So that's why, immediately, I went into the office in 2005, and before the end of that year, that's when I went to the UK because I said, I don't even know what this office has to look like. So whatever I did it would be baseless. My minister helped me and then sent me to the UK with one lady from the Police Directorate. I think she was in charge of police standards and the like within the Police Directorate. So I was sent there with her. My office now has—and what she does would be related. She works with police standards and inspecting the same things. So we went out there, met these guys from Inspectorate Constabulary. Even the guy who came, Payne, took the same model, the UK model, but very different because theirs is a big thing. Except for one national force, small as it is, you don't need all those structures.*

So I went out there to see what we could pick. Then they gave us their own structure in the office, and then they advised that no, for your size, you would not need—you can see it yourself. Then with their help—deputies, you would need your own accountant, you need your own researchers because these will be the functions.

So when I came back, I took those ideas and then drew up a structure, sat down together with the minister of the public service to say, this is what I want, let's agree now on the skills. Do you agree with this and this? They assisted me to get the right people, to set up the descriptions, qualifications for people who do not even know what a researcher would need to know to be a good researcher. But they said, "We will draw that for you." So for every office—we just agreed with the structure, and they drew up the job descriptions and personnel-specific qualifications. Then we went out there and advertised.

So it was not a one-man job. They actually consulted with people, many times, for what sort of people you do want. He was my assistant commissioner, and the other lady was also a police officer.

I was advised, for starters, it would not be appropriate for you to take people who had no police background, because you actually are dealing with issues that relate to police things, so they would have to understand and be accommodated maybe by their fellow police officers. So that is why I actually focused on the LMPS, though it caused a lot of rub because now it is small, LMPS is small. It is not a big office, it means you're breaking the commissioner's knee as well. So it was a struggle. But obviously, we would have to see them and say, "But I'm doing this for you. I know it is making you suffer. We can promote. But if these people do what they're supposed to be doing, obviously, you are going to be the beneficiaries, not me. This is your office." But this aspect—

SCHER: I see. And you said it took a while, even after finding some of the people, to get them sitting down in their office ready for work, right?

KORO: Yes.

SCHER: Up until 2007?

KORO: Yes, until 2007. I think when [...] came in 2007.

SCHER: Yes, I think—

KORO: *All I had at that time, because it was very difficult for me to get these two. We still hadn't got the third one. All I got in time was the support staff. They were shifted around. I was able to get the typist, to get the secretary. Now when it came to researchers, it was difficult. You want to get good people, those were higher officers. You need people who have actual experience, and to get them was not easy, because they are people who are still working somewhere. Some would not want to come in and say, "I am now working with the police." I would have to go around and tell them, "No, we are not police officers; you are going to do that, you are going to do this."*

Then after 2006 I got two. Immediately they came in, they spent about—they came in, this was not what they were looking for, so they just left.

SCHER: So you had to start from scratch.

KORO: *In that case you can't go less than six months before you get somebody.*

SCHER: It's the same with the university where I work; it is at least six months.

KORO: *Staffing was really terrible. Most of the people who were supposed to be going to do this—the support service, accountants and the like—they just came in. All of them were transferred from other ministries.*

SCHER: So you got them.

KORO: *Some, say, administrators, came from the ministry. That was good. It was easier for them to be absorbed. But to get researchers which are the actual people that are supposed to be doing—. Even if [...] didn't come in—even I had researchers I*

couldn't have done—because that's what we do. So it was also difficult for me to get them. I got them, they left. They've never been replaced even up to now.

SCHER: Still you don't have researchers?

KORO: *They have to transfer some to me, and this year they transferred another lady from passport services to fill it; one is still not there.*

SCHER: So there is just the one then.

KORO: *Now we have three.*

SCHER: Three?

KORO: *We have three, yes. We were left with one, but at least—even with two we were able to work, because if I take them out as a team—. From that time, 2007, I think, we conducted an inspection—we had an occasion in 2006, I had to go alone then. I had to borrow somebody from Police Directorate. That was 2006. That was the first one I did. That time I was still alone in the office. I think I was with my secretary. There was some disturbance and people were killed, and all they did was to complain about police rule, provision of services being poor, police being involved in that. So the minister directed me to go and see that. How did the police contribute to the situation being as bad as that? So that was the first one. I went on that one, came back with a report, the very first. I was very fortunate; that was the first report that had an impact, the recommendations that I make in the report. That was good.*

Then I went for another one—that would have been 2007—where I had to go and inspect police, because there was this complaint—. The minister was getting reports that over the weekend people are getting shot by police, and when they get shot, the argument is that these police officers were not on duty, so the government cannot take responsibility. But as you dig deeper, you find that, yes, he was not on duty, but he was carrying his service pistols. So the question was, how does a person who is not working get his service pistol? So maybe there is something wrong with management of the national armory.

So I went out there, investigated that, inspected that, and made recommendations. Some of them were adopted, but some maybe they still have to—I don't think they were adopted, but we made some—have to work on that.

SCHER: So can I just ask, did you have the authority to initiate your own investigations, or did you have to get the minister's approval before you could go and do something?

KORO: *We worked with the minister. He may initiate something, but if there is public outcry or with my observation or experience, I may say I want to look at this thing, I think there is a definitely [...] here. But all I do is to get his authority. I get to him, tell him, sit with him, give him a piece of paper. I'll sit with him and say, "I think we have a problem here. There is too much outcry on this and that. Don't you think we should investigate and find out what is happening there? What is the police role in this thing?"*

SCHER: I see.

KORO: *He would say, "Yes, go out there." Then I would write the commissioner a letter—"We intend to look at one, two, three, four, five, six. Can you please make*

arrangements for that that work.” The way we work it, even, it allows the commissioner to say, “Inspector of Police, I think I have a problem here but I don’t know what it is. Can you please go out and look it up for me, not for the minister, for me. So go out, do that inspection.” But that has not come up; there is room for that. But the office will do that for him; then the report would go to the minister. “This is what we found out from the local scene.” They’ll pick it up from there.

SCHER: I see.

KORO: *To follow up on your question, last year I had to initiate—I was looking at stock theft in general. I was reading papers, listening to the news, all the noise, and I said, “Mr. Minister, there is something very wrong here. I want to look into this thing.” I was very particular. All I did, I drew up a paper and said, “I want to make it the policies and strategies that the LMPS have, then see whether they are working.” I was just looking at policies and strategies, not looking at stock theft in general. Seeing: what policies do you have to deal with stock theft? Do you apply them? Are they working?*

If they say they’re working, I say, show me. Definitely after that, there was a lot of good work on policies, strategies, but implementation—even when they said it was not there, so we had to open it up for them and see. You have a good strategy, but you’re not applying it. It is not working. So we submitted that report. I think if they were to use it, maybe it could benefit.

SCHER: You mentioned how the commissioner could ask you for assistance also. But one of the things I’m wondering is, you’re in a very difficult position because you’re a police support service, but also you have to go into the police and say, “Hey, this isn’t working properly,” or, “You’re not doing this right.” So I could imagine that maybe the police are not always going to greet the Inspectorate with a lot of enthusiasm.

KORO: *That’s true everywhere. They are very suspicious of us, and there is still a lot of work to do. You are not to actually question, hassle them—say we are doing this for you, but definitely they are very sensitive, because there are things that they think, if they get to be known the way they are, it might discredit them. Like if you are saying, police officers do not want somebody to start saying it is true that you don’t treat much of the public very well when they come here. Did they think that is too internal? You can go say, “But it is not good enough the way you treat prisoners, even the cells are not good enough.”*

Let’s look at a situation where I am looking at stock theft, and I’m saying, “Look, I have checked at the time when the report was made to you on stolen animals, and I have checked against the time when the first action was taken. It is around four days. This is not good enough.” So they wouldn’t want those sorts of things—but I think there has to be a difference of understanding between operational and police officers and managers, because I wouldn’t think management would peg themselves as part of the fault. So for them, if they try to understand, I would say yes, we have brought up something that we can deal with this. People are always telling us to realize that there are—so you come up with these, we can be able to pin them down.

So there needs to be a lot of understanding there. I think gradually it was good because we were saying, we are your eyes, where you cannot be able to be there. Some of the things are so in depth that you cannot see them from outside. But since we go to records, I could say, people are cooking records. So we tell

them, we have checked your records, maybe on crime, and if we find a lot of misinformation, so can you please look at that. We advised management of that. Of course, we have a terrible procedure. Even if I go out for inspection. We have 10 districts here.

I do my job. First thing, I brief the person who is in charge, what I am going to be looking at. Then every angle of the exercise, there and then. I have to brief him on my findings, because some of the things that are very ancient are so minor that they don't even have to be in the report. But there are things that can have an impact if they are not dealt with. So I brief him on that. We may even desire, so that this one does not even need to go into the report, because obviously it is a minor thing. Or he would say, please don't put these in the report, which would be dealt with...

So because my work is so supportive, I'm not backbiting.

SCHER: Yes.

KORO: *Deals with that and deals with that thing, so fine.*

SCHER: So you give them an opportunity to change.

KORO: *Yes, to change. So what comes into the report, even though there are major issues that have to be dealt with in the long term— . But the minor ones we find out, this is not of essence to put them in here. But to do that also people have to understand. Because we are dealing with somebody who feels, "I'm in charge here, and if I'm exposed to that, I'm not good enough, this is bad for me." So you have to have those considerations and say, "Let's treat together. I'm not here to destroy you." It's a new office, suspicious people. Some of them really are being put into those positions without any form of preparation, so they are lacking in many things. So you have to understand why they are cautious. They are not very comfortable sitting on their chairs because they still feel "I'm not good enough." So if somebody comes in and pulls you, you feel very uncomfortable— I'd feel the same too.*

SCHER: For sure, I would—

KORO: *So all that we need is to try to work very closely together.*

SCHER: But the Inspectorate has no authority to discipline anyone?

KORO: No.

SCHER: You wouldn't recommend a disciplinary sanction or anything like that. You would just say, this is not working properly, maybe you could do it like this. That's more the role, right? To support as opposed to punish.

KORO: Yes, yes.

SCHER: I just wanted to make sure.

KORO: *No, I won't recommend that. Because even if there is some indiscipline, since they're making the report to the minister, I would say, "Minister, I recommend that the commissioner be advised of this situation and try to take remedial action." That may be—.*

SCHER: So you left after five years at the Inspectorate. You had been able to achieve a lot, but I assume still would have liked to have been able to achieve more, like if you had more staff in place earlier and that type of thing. So where do you see, or when you left, where did you see the Inspectorate being in the next five years? What do you think are the types of challenges it will face and the types of resources it will need to do its job even more effectively?

KORO: *There aren't many challenges in that office. Even look at the structure now that is in place, and you'll understand. I have not been replaced to date, but if I were to be replaced tomorrow, and you look at the people who are there, not even restrictions in terms of the manpower they have can stop them from working. The sort of offices they have, the equipment. They have everything that they would need to work. They have vehicles, so we don't want anything. The only thing, big challenge like you said, is understanding between themselves and the police service. Because it is no use if you work for people who are suspicious of you. It creates tension from both sides.*

These other ones who are inspecting might feel—sometimes people get taken up with—they have a bigger responsibility. So I think understanding, that's the challenge now. If the police management could actually see then an acceptance—these people are doing a good job for us—everything would be OK. It would be fine. And another thing which I always said at the end of the report: it will be a futile exercise for me to go out and complain about things, and nothing is being done about it, implementation. So the most important thing is those guys can do a good job, but now they don't have a new way of implementing that.

If there are recommendations I cannot implement, then they are as good as dead. That's one thing they've got to be fighting for. That was the challenge that I was going to deal with. Even if I was still there, since they are still together, I think there will be a continuation of that, because we're saying, "Mr. Minister, we have to meet regularly with these stakeholders, PCA, commissioner of police, and you, so that you get briefed and you give us roles. You question what we are doing." In that meeting—that's why I thought, instead of meeting the minister alone, I'll be able to say my things in front of everybody and say, "I submitted a report, and nothing is being done about it." So somebody should answer that. In that sort of structure, I think the minister was taking it up and saying, yes, in the new year, we are going to arrange, meet quarterly and then discuss things.

So I think that challenge, if they meet that one, then that office will do what it is supposed to be doing. Because if the police have a problem of implementation, then they will have to go to that meeting and say what's wrong. Because normally you would find what we have in the report would be, I have a recommendation that has to be dealt with by the police directly or the minister himself or the police. So either we sit together in a meeting, then we could score points—.

SCHER: I see. That actually brings me to my next question, which is that you have these three bodies and these three support services, and as you said perhaps there is not quite as much collaboration as there could be. Would that be fair to say?

KORO: Yes.

SCHER: So how do you ensure that you're not stepping on each other's toes? Because you each have your own area of responsibilities, but at least from the reading I've done and some of the people I've spoken with, it does seem that there is potential for overlap where the Inspectorate is doing something that the

Directorate could also be involved with, and then maybe should actually involve the Police Complaints Authority too. So how did you handle the relationship with the other support services?

KORO: *Personally, maybe I didn't have, because I think that could maybe be a question of—I won't say the office itself, but myself. Because when I came there, those were the people who actually accepted me there. So I understood exactly. I think even my position from the police made me understand the roles of these offices. So my experience played a very good role, because I was involved in the paid consultancy. I was involved in the white paper discussions. I was involved in drawing up the Police Act. So I understood exactly, which somebody may not be aware. That was my personal advantage.*

SCHER: I see.

KORO: *I knew personally—even people who come to my office and say, "Dr. Koro, I have this, this," I knew where to send them. This I had to send to Complaints or pick up my phone and say, "I have somebody here who is talking about this. She is on her way or he is on his way." "Police Directorate, somebody is in my office." "Commissioner, can you please deal with this." So I understood that.*

SCHER: You had that—

KORO: *Personally, I didn't, but I will say, at the office level, that could prevail. I don't know whether people have the same experience, but for me it was a question of involvement. I was better off than—*

SCHER: So you knew exactly what—

KORO: *I know, when people got confused. I remember when the Police Complaints was established, I actually went to the office. They would invite me. Like when you're going out to meet members of the police, they always took me around to explain exactly what their role is. They didn't understand it themselves, so I had to actually teach to their staffers. Every time they had new staff coming in, they would call me in to give them a lecture. So personally I didn't have a problem.*

But now, what they are working on now, what I have seen is they're trying to work on—because, as I said, from the sensitivity of LMPS, they're trying to—all these three offices—to put down operative procedures for each. So I remember, the last time I left we had a copy of the police directory. Then the LMPS has what they think they're supposed to be doing together. I was told, already after I left you, that that could happen. My office had a similar meeting with an officer of the commissioner of police where they were dealing with that, the one for once, was never finished because it was towards the end. The Police Directorate was doing the same thing. But we're saying with all that, the only thing that would make things easier was frequent meetings, maybe with the minister. Because where people—you give them roles, and they work, and then if they meet regularly they are able to understand each other with authority to present together because they all work for the minister. But this time we'll be sitting in that corner. We always claim that this is my role, that is not yours, it is mine.

But I think with regular—because that's what we suggested, that really we felt without meetings and sitting together there is no way. I feel they're working on that.

SCHER: I think that brings me to the end of the main questions I had for now. I'm wondering if there's anything I haven't asked you that I should have asked, or if you had any particular thoughts about police reform in general that you wanted to share, or maybe we've covered—I mean we've covered a lot of ground, actually, and I've got a very nice picture of the process and the various stages in the reform of the Lesotho police.

KORO: *What one actually experienced when we're dealing with these many levels, these bodies that we're dealing with that has attention on police reform, was: you would have a situation where you find people. That's my understanding, that you have an organization. This organization has a mandate to carry out, and definitely there have to be structures that will actually assist the organization itself to achieve the mandate. We always make mistakes, because when we talk structures, we talk people. We always make a mistake of actually not saying the function of this organization will determine the structures. We do it the other way. The structures determine the function, and that's where we make a lot of mistakes, because function has to determine structure.*

You'll look at some of the structures that we have; you'll find in most cases there's a duplication of effort. You look at this office and say, what is this man doing here? What is that one doing? Fine, no, no, no—this should have been one office. Or this one should have not been there. This thing is only taking resources away from—if they're all put together. Because we wanted all those offices. I was looking recently at the proposed structure for the LMPS which they say is coming to the new reform. To me this is what I'm saying now, because you look—a lot of people, there are so many positions there that have been recommended, and if you look at them, you don't even understand what they're going to do. If that could be approved tomorrow, some of them wouldn't even have offices, because it is so big. And they're saying, Can't you do without this person? Then the worst thing is we always want to have big offices, big men at police headquarters level, not where the core business is. If you want to look at restructuring a police service, you want to restructure down, there where the core business is, not administratively. Here you can have one man doing a lot of things, but if you don't have the right structures down there then you'll always have a problem.

That has been our problem, that we ignored those things down there. You try at a certain time; somebody is commanding a police district he is very low rank and the high officers sit at headquarters and sit around the commissioner, tell him lies. A very low person, unqualified and the like, is sitting down there and raising public concerns when the things don't go wrong; they say that man is stupid.

SCHER: I see.

KORO: *So those are the things that we're saying. What are we reforming for? Is it just for the purpose of doing it, or to benefit the people, or to do what? We have to answer that question, why do we want this reform. What does it have to address. If we can't go through that then we must be wrong, and in most cases we use promotion sometimes—as what? Motivation. You don't prepare people for that. That's the worst thing. Organizations in most cases don't prepare people for appointments into the new position. I wouldn't mind—that's what we always say. Even if you don't prepare the person before, maybe once the person assumes office, then deal with that situation immediately so that you equip the person with the relevancies. But those are yet to be identified—if you don't know them as well, then how do you do that?*

With me that has been the biggest challenge when I was in the police service, because we didn't have the facilities to actually prepare our people. Like I'm saying, it was not good enough to, say, send two officers for a course in the UK or to Botswana and we have left 15 back here. It doesn't have an impact. So we always try to prepare people for positions of responsibility. To me, reform of these types have to be based on that—have the right structures and make sure that those structures are occupied by people who can handle them, perform the core business. Then you can see it. You have a need to restructure, reform. But there has to be a purpose. What do you want to achieve with your reform? Most people—we always do it for the sake of doing it—why do you do it, what do you want to achieve at the end of the day? Why are you not achieving it now?

So you have to say, I want to—now, at this stage, I'm supposed to be doing one, two, three, four, but I can't. I would say why? You have to identify that. Then to answer the why, I have to go one, two, three, four, because I think it will allow me to achieve this. But if we cannot see you have a reason, people always say, but it is time we do things differently. But that's if you can measure the success of what you're doing. To me that makes sense. So that's all I have.

Like you are saying, about reform, we have to identify the need for the reform. Why do we want to achieve, how will you know when you have achieved that, to say my reform was necessary. You maybe did have—the purpose is to say certain things have been done somewhere else. Did they work? If they didn't work, why? You have to do it the same way because we want to be seen to be doing something. I think I'm OK.

SCHER: I think that's a very good note to end on. I'd just like to thank you very much for your time; it has been very interesting, and in particular it answered a lot of questions that I had and just helped clarify the timeline and the course of events which had been quite difficult to do just using Internet sources. So I really appreciate your input here.