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Interviewee: Ahmed Makarfi
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MAKGETIA: My name is Itumeleng Makgetla. It is 26 August 2009. I am here in Abuja with Senator Ahmed Makarfi, the former Governor of Kaduna state from 1999 to 2007 when the state experienced several clashes over the introduction of Sharia law, most notably in 2000. The former Governor has been widely acclaimed for his reforms to diffuse the situation and promote dialogue while also improving service delivery in the state.

Before we begin may I just confirm that I’ve been able to answer any questions you had about this interview and that it is voluntary?

MAKARFI: Absolutely.

MAKGETIA: Thank you very much for participating in this series of interviews with reform leaders. As we begin could you perhaps give me a brief overview of your career and how you came to be the Governor of Kaduna state?

MAKARFI: After graduating from university and doing my national youth service in 1983, I started working with a bank. As a matter of fact, the only place where I worked all my life in a private professional capacity was that particular bank. I rose from supervisor to assistant general manager, holding the role four years. I was an assistant general manager when I was appointed in 1993 to the position of State Commissioner for Finance and Economic Planning. I served for three years.

After that I went into private business in 1997. Of course politics started then with the Abacha regime, but though I became a little active in politics I was mainly doing private business. Upon the 1998 transition that led to this democratic government, I was one of those who were called the conveners to form the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). I was one of the five conveners in my state. We convened and formed the party in my state, the Kaduna state. Of course the rest is history. I actively participated in the formation of the party, in propagating the manifesto, helping to bring the party to the people.

I went in for the primaries, for the governorship. I won and I went in for the election and won. I served two terms. Now I am in the Senate after reaching the constitutional limit on how many times I can serve as governor of the state.

MAKGETIA: Great. So when you think back to those early days of the reform or when you first became governor, how did you set your priority, your agenda for the major issues and challenges that you might want to address in office?

MAKARFI: Well I come from a community that is highly political, right from the time of the struggle for Nigerian independence. Then you had parties in Nigeria that you can call a little bit more radical. I won’t say we never had any socialist or communist party, but more on the left—It was just like, you know, the Republicans are on their side, you know where the Democrats are on the liberal side here on the conservative side. They’re all—I mean some are in line with the Labor or Conservative party in UK. That’s what we have in Nigeria, really, nothing socialist or communist. But if we’re all on the right, some are far to the right and others maybe a little to the left of right.

So my community has been highly political. Right from the time I was growing up, I mean, because we were more on the opposition side, well, we were a little bit leftist. I had seen a lot growing up. Of course we were leftist more because we were fond of challenging the establishment. You know, we didn’t want this monarchy and the way they used to wield their power and influence. We didn’t
want to be put under some kind of restrictions or control. We wanted to be
independent, have freedom to do what we wanted, all those sorts of things. So I
grew up under that.

My parents were key agitators and participants in that and they went to jail
because of it. As a kid I used to visit them even in jail, take food to them as they
were imprisoned just for standing up for their rights. That started molding me in a
particular pattern. So I said “OK, I full subscribe to the ideas for which they were
fighting but maybe when I grow up I will carry on in a different way.” In a different
way in the sense that maybe they were doing it from the point of weakness; I will
try to do it from a point of strength.

I will try to grow, get educated, be a little well off, a little financially and
economically independent while continuing the struggle. I got that opportunity
when I was appointed Commissioner for Finance and Economic Planning. As the
portfolio implies I was in charge of both budgeting and implementing. Not just
budgeting, but also the planning aspect in the medium and long-term. So that
enabled me to know a lot about the past in my state and to try to develop some
ideas about the future for the state.

Of course, I was appointed just after, not long after the Zangon Kataf crisis.
There was an ethno-religious crisis, a very serious one: the first major serious
ethno-religious crisis in Kaduna state. It was during military time. I participated in
a series of meetings in order to bring peace and stability among the Hausa and
the communities. Also that increased my knowledge about the underlying issues
in the state, some of which are ethno-religious, some of which are economic, but
they get all get tinted or a bit clouded as if they were really ethnic or religious
even though maybe they truly were economic issues.

Only that struggle happens between somebody from one ethnic group and
another person from a different ethnic group, or someone from one religious
background with another person from a different religious background, but also
over economic issues. So it becomes interpreted as religious while the conflict is
economic when you look into it.

So with all these experiences, I developed this—look, for one I have traveled
widely across the state for three years, serving in the cabinet. I’ve seen the
topography of the state. I’ve physically seen the needs. I have seen with my own
eyes the conditions under which people live and studied the conditions of
farming, the healthcare system. I participated in budgeting and implementation. I
participated in planning, in supervision, supervising what has been implemented.
I interacted with people working on issues of conflict resolution.

So I really came into office to try to improve what I had seen in those years of
service that I had spent as Commissioner for Finance and Economic Planning.
Even though I did not foresee the problem that came in 2000, I knew there were
underlying issues, more of what we call self-determination issues, because the
state is multi-ethnic, with over fifty different ethnic tribes. I know that some
communities have been seeking for independence from dominance, from
dominance from one establishment or another for decades, in some cases up to
a century. What I mean is that you know here we have emirates and chiefdoms.
The Zazzau emirate was dominant in the state. And the Zazzau emirate was
around right from, no, even before the Dan Fodio time. Even before that there
was the Zazzau emirate. And the Zazzau emirate expanded up to Abuja, right
from Zaria up to here in Abuja. But of course there were limitations when there
was polarization and it was limited to the southern part of the state. In the
southern part of the state the Christians are the majority, and it’s also very, very multi-ethnic. A lot of them were brought under the Zazzau emirate.

So they had been seeking for this self-adage, they wanted to be on their own. They wanted to have their own chief. They wanted to have their own king: they should not be subjugated under one cultural dominance, one traditional dominance. In addition to this cultural and traditional dominance there is also the difference in religion. So the struggle has been going on for up to a hundred years.

I came into office with the intention to look into this, to see how to use not force but dialogue of consensus to make others see wisdom in giving people their self determination within the context of recognizing their independent, traditional identity under their own local chief and the rest. So this was something that people shied away from touching. I intended to break into it because we believed that in doing so the peace and stability of the state would be enhanced. We have not got it wrong because that is what happened. And because we did that and other reforms you can see that there have been other troubles in other parts of the country but not in Kaduna. Before, when there was any form a crisis anywhere in the country, Kaduna would be the first to react.

Either it started in Kaduna, or Kaduna would be the first place to catch on. But because we addressed so many of these social/cultural issues, it went a very, very long way. In my view, the strength of previous reactions was because people felt denied. People felt subjugated. People felt subjected to a system they didn’t like so they were looking for an opportunity to vent their anger. By addressing those issues, that problem was no longer there. So except if an issue really came and touched them personally they were not prone to begin to react to external issues.

MAKGETIA: Perhaps you can go into more detail about the changes that you were able to bring as governor of the state, these reforms that you were discussing. Which would you consider the most important in terms of their impact on the community, or their indirect impact in terms of widening the arena for reform?

MAKARFI: First of all, there was the reform of the traditional and cultural system by establishing, giving each ethnic group its independent identity and traditional establishment. That is a very, very major one. As I mentioned earlier, some of them had been struggling for that for up to a hundred years. We saw evidence that they had been struggling for that, some maybe not for a hundred years but for a couple of decades.

Two, because the 2000 crisis was due to the introduction of Sharia in a neighboring state: we had not introduced Sharia when we had crisis. No, that’s wrong. But in the year 2000 we did not have Sharia law within the context that people are talking of; we only had what had been there right from the time Nigeria came to be. What happened was that neighboring states introduced Sharia and there was agitation by Muslim groups in the state for similar initiatives. Meanwhile there was counter-agitation by the Christian community. So we had a situation where today there would be a demonstration pro-Sharia and tomorrow there would be a demonstration against. It got out of control. They went for each other and the crisis started. We never made any statement or even set up any procedure to set up, to introduce Sharia.

But when that happened was that we said “OK, the worst has happened, we have to talk to ourselves.” We set up a forum with leaders from the Muslim and
Christian community co-chaired by a Muslim and a Christian statesman. We asked them to look into the issue and discuss and let them on their own tell us how they wanted us to approach the issue. So we kind of threw the ball in their court saying “tell us how you want to approach it. Apart from that, tell us other things you think we should do that your people, or our people really want government to do.” That worked very well.

It wasn’t easy. It took a lot of encouragement from us indirectly behind the scenes because we’re monitoring the discussion, and when they are going to derail we would go at night, sit with them separately or together and try to put them back on track. But let them go and talk themselves. At the end of the discussion, at the end of the negotiation and dialogue amongst the people themselves, they came up, and it was also our idea anyway. We sold the idea to them because you see you can’t set up people without you having an objective. When you develop the objective and you send the people, you have to try and push the idea through. So that they will be discussing, but they own up to the ideas that you have. If they own up to the ideas that you have and adopt them and the opposition then it works well.

So we said, “why not have a tripartite legal system?” Let’s reform the legal and judicial system, let’s have a tripartite one. Let’s have the common law, let’s have the Sharia law, let’s have the customary law. Straightaway, in principle, it was agreeable, but how? How was the issue. Of course the Christians started trying to talk about specific provisions of Sharia law. I said it shouldn’t be their business. They should look at how Sharia law will affect them. That also worked. So OK, Sharia law, if and when it is implemented, it should not be wholesome. It should apply to areas where there are Muslims and it should never apply to areas where there are Christians. That’s one.

Two, where is a mixed community, Christian and Muslims coexisting, Sharia law should cover personal issues, not really criminal matters. So issues of marriage, issues of inheritance, issues of—and even that only when it has to do with the Muslims. Then you have the customary law that will deal with the issues of the non-Muslims that want customary law, or common law where both parties are involved or even where it is not both parties: even if you are a Muslim, if you want to go to common law you’re allowed. The thing is, make your own choice. Here are these three legal systems. You have a civil case, chose where you want to take your civil case to.

If there is a criminal case between a Christian and a Muslim, it has to go to a common law court. Certain criminal cases, even if they involve Muslims, have to go to common law. When it is a criminal case a Muslim may not have to go to common law: if he so believes in his faith and wants Sharia law, let him make that choice and then he will be taken to Sharia court. So there was really no compulsion, you make a choice, but all the laws were there.

Every judgment that has to do with capital punishment automatically has to be appealed to the highest court in the land, whether you have the means or not. We made it in such a way that it is mandatory that every case adjudicated in this manner has to go on appeal. So the issue of not knowing that you can appeal or not having the means to do so does not mean that the case should not be articulated. If it doesn’t go on appeal after a period of time, the earlier judgment is quashed.

So we introduced all of this to make sure that we removed exuberances and excesses because experiences elsewhere told us that lower courts were fond of
just passing a judgment in order to play to the gallery, while even the senior Muslim clerics would tell you that the judges were wrong. The only reason why they could afford to be wrong was that they were given total and absolute power at that level. So we say “no, we will not give anybody total and absolute power through our laws. Let this power be exerted to the highest level.

OK, in terms of capital punishment like murder either you behead or stone somebody; we did not exclude any form of execution. We did not make it restricted. We allowed the courts to decide the form of execution, whether it is by hanging—OK, we don’t have lethal injection here. We have hanging, we have firing squad. These are the forms of execution. The other form of—we don’t even have beheading here. It has never happened. While we have stoning in our statutes now, nobody has ever been stoned because it is up to the judge to determine the form of execution.

You see, not only that: you can appeal the form of execution in the language of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, up to the Supreme Court of the Federation. So we introduced many provisions to protect the fundamental objectives of the constitution and the guarantees of individual rights and all necessary things. It was not done in order to refuse to do the right thing, but in order to remove excesses. So that legal and judicial reform was a major issue, apart from the cultural and the traditional reform. We delegated authority to local councils. OK, you don’t want sale of alcohol in certain environment, but why should the state interfere in that? That’s a local or communal issue. Let the local council decide where alcohol may be sold or not sold, where alcohol may be consumed or not consumed.

When we delegated this authority—you see, it didn’t become an issue of Muslims not wanting alcohol in a certain area. There were certain areas where there are Muslims and alcohol is sold. There are certain areas where there are Christians and alcohol is not sold. They say no, we are not drunkards, we don’t want alcohol; even if you sell alcohol you have to sell from this time to this time. So it became an issue not based on religion but based on what people feel is right for their communities. So there was a comprehensive reform of the legislative authority of the local council.

Having a tripartite legal system went a long way in convincing the non-Muslims in the state that Sharia law being introduced was more of a personal issue to Muslims. Even then there was a question of choice, even as it affected the Muslims: even they have choices. So there were no things made in such a way that you have no choice or you have no right of appeal. You have right of appeal from the lowest court of the land, to the highest court: not the highest court in the state, but the highest court in the Federation.

MAKGETIA: That’s very interesting. In fact, I’d like to maybe go into each of those reforms that you’ve discussed to look step by step at what you did to actually implement them and build support for them and maybe also discuss the unanticipated obstacles that perhaps arose. So if we begin with the cultural and traditional reforms by which you gave each ethno-religious group an independent identity and a traditional establishment—

MAKARFI: Yes.

MAKGETIA: Can you explain what were the steps that you took as governor? Did you form committees? Who did you talk to? How did that reform go forward?
MAKARFI: First of all we invited memorandum. Ethnic communities in need should send memoranda, and in the memorandum they should identify—they should make recommendations to the ruling houses, whether they have specific ruling houses or it is an issue open to every adult male or female. They should identify the king makers, those who make the selection, and they should make recommendations for pattern of succession. Because this also—each one of these can become a problem. Even where you have an established system, you get problems over succession.

So taking a community, what has happened in the country and other places, we said “OK, we will not allow a similar mistake. Let’s make a system that will work like a clock, a good clock anyway.” So they sent the memorandum. In some communities there were no problems, but for some of them there were problems even before they could agree on which were the ruling houses. We had a series of meetings with a number of them and then, of course, we had to go back into archives and look at historical documents. Sometimes some families had become influential and all of a sudden they wanted to become a ruling house. So we had to go back and look at the archives and say “no, no, no, on the basis of history blah, blah, blah. You were never a member of the ruling clan. Yes, you are an important family, powerful, rich, but you were never a ruling class. So you can hold on to your wealth and influence, but leave community leadership in the hands of those who, based on historical records, really have the right to ascend to traditional heads.” So it wasn’t really easy. Very few of them, really—and for some we had to make drastic decisions, take it or leave it. This is it. You want this self-identity, this is how you can have it.

For some we had to make that decision because of conflicts even within the community itself. So we had to try to have a hybrid, taking from both sides and saying what can be fair. Just because, if they can’t agree, what would be seen as equitable? If we work it out and we call for a meeting and we lay it before them. Of course they will not agree but then we give the ultimatum, “I won’t wait for you forever.”

Either you remain under the dominance of what you didn’t like, or you take what is offered. Of course, under the circumstances they will take what is offered. Again, there is conflict about territorial boundaries, so it wasn’t ever easy. Particularly Wambai with the old and the biggest Zazzau emirate I—because of Kaduna being the state capital, the Bauchi, which is an ethnic tribe, want to claim ownership of Kaduna. Of course, historically you can say they were the people that were dominant there, but when you look at Zazzau the population is not equally divided, and that’s the state capital.

So we had problems with boundaries. There were some problems with ruling houses, some problems with pattern of succession. In some communities they say “no, we want rotation.” We say “no, no, there should not be rotation, it should be on merit.” But some feel that if it is purely on merit they may not have—they are not assured that their own clan will one day succeed. The only thing that will assure them that one day their clan will rule over their community is if rotation is implemented. So we had all these problems. But you know, nothing is impossible once you go through the issue of dialoging with people.

You need to sit down with people. People will have confidence in you that you are out to do things in their own interest, for their own good. They will give. So that’s how we went about doing this. Every community that made that memorandum, with the exception of one single community got what they wanted, what they deserved as of that time. That single community did not because of a
small—at that time they didn’t even make the request, really, it was later that they forwarded their request. We were looking into that request when it was a little bit too late for us to say that they were going to do anything about that. We left it to the present government to look into it. If they find it worth doing, they’ll do it. But basically we gave every ethnic tribe its self-identity, a structure for traditional rulership, a pattern of succession that is devoid of any possible chance of rancor or conflict. There have been successions since then because there have been deaths. There was very peaceful succession, no conflicts at all because we made the laws very, very detailed, very, very clear.

As a matter of fact, we find that even the older institutions did not have laws this detailed. We knew that if we did not go into so much detail, even for the older institutions, there was going to be conflict. Now we went and did the same for them. We are lucky that we did because some of them—vacancies arose after we did that. If we had not done that, it would have been a tug of war. After we had done that, other states in Nigeria took note of the detail we went through, came and took our legislation to say “look.” They wanted to borrow from how we did our own structure so that they could go and do their own. Otherwise they are likely to run into conflicts and problems too when a vacancy arises for succession for any seat.

MAKGETIA: So from the governor’s office or from the state ministries, how is this—the team that organized the mediation structured? Did you have a commission? How many people did you have going into communities to help negotiate conflicts? Can you just describe that to me, and how long that took?

MAKARFI: This exercise took about six months. It wasn’t a commission. The ministry was there but we didn’t want government directly involved from the beginning or even seem to be directly involved.

MAKGETIA: Which ministry?

MAKARFI: Ministry for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs. But we asked somebody from the university, an academician, somebody with knowledge of the system to actually chair this body, one Dr. Jumari who was a federal—he was in the independent Electoral Commission, had just finished his term at the headquarters here. We asked him to chair, we put our members there. They would receive the memoranda, they would analyze the memoranda. They would make recommendations to government.

But as I mentioned earlier, it was just like the judicial reform. You don’t send people where you yourself want to go. So even as they’re working, they’re keeping us informed of what they are getting, they are consulting us and we are telling them our policy from government, so that at the end of the day the report they gave incorporated incorporated our government perspective to a large extent, even though they were giving us what the committee had brought, what the committees would be happy with.

Of course they were not in a position to resolve the issues of boundaries, the issues of succession pattern, the issue of ruling houses. They did what they could but they left some of the things that they could not handle to government. Those things that they could not handle were the ones that in the process of considering the report, we as a government, had to sit—first of all, we had to sit, even with those that had no problem, to get their confirmation that that was their position. This is your position? Fine. Then you can go. At least we have confirmed that the report we were given reflected their position. For those that
had unfinished businesses, we sat with them and hammered out a deal that was acceptable to all.

MAKGETIA: Did you bring in mediators or this was done within the ministry?

MAKARFI: No, I personally chaired that. You see, you need—at a certain level you need a final authority.

MAKGETIA: You then wrote the law based on that—.

MAKARFI: Based on that process.

MAKGETIA: Were there any obstacles at the national assembly or did it go through—.

MAKARFI: No, all this was within the jurisdiction of the state.

MAKGETIA: Were there any unforeseen obstacles in implementing that reform?

MAKARFI: Absolutely none.

MAKGETIA: It was very straightforward.

MAKARFI: The obstacles would have been there if we hadn’t followed this process. It was to avoid the obstacles that we followed this long process.

MAKGETIA: Can we now look at the other set of reforms that you mentioned, the judicial and legal reforms? Can you also take me through that process? You mentioned that you pulled together, the Leaders of Thought Forum that was co-chaired by Muslim and Christian statesmen. How did you decide who would go into that forum given that you said there were fifty ethnic groups, ethno-religious groups? The Leaders of Thought Forum—

MAKARFI: There was a question and I’ll get back to that. I think I recall you asked about obstacles. Yes, in implementation we encountered obstacles in a few chiefdoms on the appointment of the first chief of the community. Within the communities now conflicts arose. Some of those conflicts were beginning to take on a proportion that we did not like. What we did was say “OK, we made another temporary legislation which gave the governor, that was me, the power so that after due consultation I may appoint from among the community anybody found competent as the first chief. So even though the initial provision gave them the vote and responsibility for nomination, they had a problem even nominating. It was becoming a security threat. So we had to take away that power from them, the power to appoint the first chief. So that was an obstacle we encountered in about three establishments.

So we took over the power even to nominate because they could not do it, and said “the governor shall, after due consultation, appoint the first chief for the community.” We did that and they all followed. But that was a temporary legislation. It only applied to the appointment of the first chief. After the appointment of the first chief, subsequent appointments would have to follow the procedure laid down in the law because the first chief now has a responsibility set up, all the structures and institutions established by the law. I thought I should mention that as an obstacle.

Now the question on the Leaders of Thought Forum. You need to repeat it.
MAKGETIA: Again, if we look at the set of reforms, I’m interested in the detail of how you did it. How did you begin to assemble that forum and identify individuals to serve in it?

MAKARFI: We know everybody. There are religious groups, there are social-cultural groups. There are NGOs (Nongovernment organizations) that are professional bodies. So what we did was get a core representation from the religious group, get a core representation from the social-cultural groups, and from the elders, from the state, get equal representation from both sides. So we went into different groups in the state and made appointments that would be reflective of the structure of our state, that would reflect the divergent views in the state.

MAKGETIA: You mentioned this format and then this led to the decision to adopt a tri-partite legal system. Did the forum produce a report similar to the other committee and it was adopted then and translated into law by the state?

MAKARFI: What they did was not the law, but they preferred the tri-partite system. Knowing that they were heading that way we were also working on our own. We set up a team of lawyers, legal draftsmen indigenous to the state from both Muslim and Christian backgrounds. By the time they finished, having recommended a tri-partite legal system, and some of them had participated in the Leader of Thought Forum, we said “OK, here is this, give us draft legislation.”

So their work—you already have the common law so the draft legislation really had to do with the Sharia law, had to do with the customary law. We also appealed to the area courts because area courts then were administering both Sharia and customary law. So what we did basically was to spread the function of the area courts and provide that instead of area courts you now had Sharia and Customary courts.

MAKGETIA: Did you encounter resistance from people who were in those area courts and how did you deal with that?

MAKARFI: The issue—the area courts personnel, most of them had no problem serving in the Sharia court but there was hardly anyone to serve in the customary court. So they were assigned to serve where they best fit. We had to recruit fresh personnel that could serve in the customary court. Those who even—even the Sharia court said “no, no; not all of them are going to qualify; we are going to conduct an aptitude test.” Fine. They conducted an aptitude test. Those who were found competent were retained; those they did not find competent were at the judiciary. Because they were judiciary staff. If they had a need for them they could retain them, if they didn’t have need for them they could retire them.

MAKGETIA: In setting up this process of appeals that would reduce [end of file 1]

MAKARFI: I thought I answered the question.

MAKGETIA: That’s right. And I was going to ask—you mentioned that one of the purposes of creating this process of appeal was to reduce the discretion of lower judges because that led to excess on occasion. How did those judges react and was that something you had to negotiate, to reduce their area of discretion?

MAKARFI: There wasn’t any reaction from them. The judges were and are still government employees. So it is not as if they have any particular interest other than to interpret and apply the law. So whatever the law is, that’s their job; they’re there to do a job. So we didn’t expect any reaction from them and we didn’t get any.
MAKGATIA: As for the other reforms, were there any unforeseen obstacles that emerged?

MAKARFI: Well, you see, when you are reforming a society, you just don’t approach a society only with the reform itself. You have to earn and repay the confidence of the society you are reforming. We combined these reforms with other government policies and programs that people were interested in. We had this series of town hall meetings, as you can call them. In some of them we reached out to the community, in some of them we let them come to us. We used those meetings to let the people tell us what they thought of our government; let them tell us what they expected from us, their priorities in terms of provision of services or infrastructure or whatever. Of course, these communities said “oh, we don’t have good roads. If only they would do a road for us.”

“So we don’t have any schools or the school we had was blown by the storm sometime ago and it has not been repaired.” “We don’t have a hospital.” “We don’t have good drinking water, access to good drinking water.” So using those town hall meetings—while these reforms were being contemplated or implemented as the case may be because, you know, you do this over a period of time, over years—we used these town hall meetings to listen to other things people were asking from the government. We made sure that as soon as we learnt about these requirements of the people, the communities would begin to see action.

For those who complain of lack of access roads, lack of electricity, lack of—within a short period of time they would see assessors going there to survey, to assess. “OK, I remember what the government was asking, they’re already here, they’re looking.” We may be planning for the next year, but as far as they’re concerned at least we have gone to see for ourselves, the engineers—and whatever. Within a reasonable period of time the people would see government activity in addressing those particular areas. So you see, the reforms came together with doing for the people, serving people, providing to people what they have requested from the government, what they expected from the government, what they identified as their needs. That made it easier for all the key reforms to be accepted.

You see, you can’t reform for a hungry man. You can’t reform for a totally dissatisfied individual. But if somebody—you are satisfying his needs in one form or another, it is easier to reform. It is just like how you train animals. I mean, you have to train animals by enticing them with one thing or the other, and we are all animals. We’re human but we’re all animals. So to make us accept certain things, maybe we need to be getting certain things in return. So we give to them. That’s why, with all sense of majesty we hope that they will continue to talk about our government, that it was only during a period that they knew that there was government. Of course, I have a successor, but I know as well as every other Nigerian, as most Nigerians you talk to, that if you go to the state now, they only talk about the last administration because of what we did to restore peace and because of what we did to meet their needs and reform the entire society.

MAKGETIA: Can we talk more about that? Because I think ideally every government should be responsive to the needs of its people.

MAKARFI: Yes.

MAKGATIA: But sometimes people might say “these are our problems” but they never see them addressed. So firstly if you could just explain to me, the town hall meetings
where the agenda first got set—how often did they happen and how many people would attend typically?

**MAKARFI:** We did not limit attendance. It depends on the venue. As I mentioned, you see, such meetings were either when we reached out to them or sometimes they would write to visit us. When they wrote that they wanted to visit we would see that they come with all the opinion leaders and the leaders from their community, male and female alike, all of them, young and old. So when they came, they paid a courtesy call. They would read out, these were their needs, blah, blah. They just went down and there and then what we could do was tell them “OK, you can have A, B, C, D within this timeframe.” Whatever we tell them, they only see us fulfilling whatever we promise them. If we visited them, the crowds tended to be larger. Of course there would be a spokesman, but he would also worry about all their complaints as a community and would go to them and say “we have heard that within this timeframe you will have this, within that time frame you’ll have that.”

Of course there was some skepticism from the beginning, but once you start to implement, and lines get drawn, they say “oh no, we’ve been to the governor, he promised all this and we’re having it.” So people became patient because they knew that if they don’t get it today, they’ll get it tomorrow.

**MAKGATIA:** So you helped to set people’s expectations by discussing with them what you could do.

**MAKARFI:** Absolutely. We got from them what they needed. We didn’t sit in office to determine what we should do today.

**MAKGATIA:** Was there anything that you needed to know from them? Were there any questions that you consistently asked people in helping to understand what their needs were or did you wait for them to—?

**MAKARFI:** No, you see, even if we knew of such—the issue is if somebody tells you that he has a problem and you are—even if you knew of the problem beforehand, he appreciates it more if you act once he has told you about it. So you see, as a government you have to sometimes pretend that you don’t even know about certain things while somebody tells you about them. He may be telling you what you already know, what you have already planned for. Once he has told you then you can say “OK, blah, blah, blah.” You look into it, you do this, you do that. He will go happy. He has communicated with you, I have communicated with him, and he sees results. So engaging people in a setting such as ours is very, very important. It is good for the people to know that they have an input into what government is doing for them, that the government is not so all knowing and all-powerful that it doesn’t even have time for them, that the government just determines what the people need. No, people don’t like that.

**MAKGATIA:** How often would you go into communities?

**MAKARFI:** Well, very frequently. I mean, if we didn’t go—I went very, very often. I was very engaged in local government.

**MAKGATIA:** So once you had a sense that you were going to do this in this community, how did you make that happen? How did you send the directive to the relevant agency?
MAKARI: I always go to the heads of relevant agencies. What are the issues? Education, agriculture, health, infrastructure such as roads and power. I go to the heads or deputy heads of the establishment. Apart from that I have my own personal staff who take notes in case, you know, duty takes a number of them out. The staff can follow you because certain things may require the attention of relevant heads somewhere else, but notes are taken. When we return we review the notes, then I pass directives to communicate to the relevant heads to look into those things within a medium—not too far into the long term. Because, you see, when you have a number of problems, there are immediate problems and medium-term problems.

MAKGETIA: How did you hold those heads of agencies to account?

MAKARI: It is a budgetary process. Before approving each budget, you see, say for year, a given year, the relevant sessions run from January to July or August were substantially about how we budget for the next year. So the budgetary process and the financial regulations hold people accountable for how they carry out these functions and responsibilities.

MAKGATIA: So if you ensure, say, the Department of Education has an adequate budget to do their work and you’ve asked them to deal with this school in community X but you find within a certain time period they haven’t—or how would you evaluate whether they had, and how would you deal with the situation if they hadn’t?

MAKARI: Well, because we ran a gamut—first of all, these works are public. So it is not something you keep a secret. You publish in the dailies for prospective leaders to bid, you open the bids, you accept the bids, your award is publicly announced. So the community knows that a certain job has been awarded. Because of that openness, if there is no action it also gets back to you from the community.

Two, community representatives in the legislature will also report back to you that nothing has happened with these things that we wanted to do. Three, the head of the councils, the elected local councils, will also report to you that even though they are grateful, this has been addressed but there is no progress. Again, within the implementing ministries or other ministries there are monitoring units. So while the monitoring unit for the implementing agency may not report against itself to you, the monitoring unit of the budget office will track budget performance. And that one is under the governor’s office.

MAKGETIA: If we go back to the fourth set of reforms that you mentioned which was to delegate responsibilities to local authorities and councils, some people have spoken of the difficulty that a leader might face in devolving power because that empowers local people and they may not be sure of the quality of that local individual. They may not have a very strong ability to hold that person to account because they’re chosen by some local base. Was that something that you had to consider or deal with? Did any problems arise because of that?

MAKARI: Yes. Generally, in Nigeria, not just in the state that I govern, the problem of capacity at the local level is a serious issue. There is a serious lack of capacity. You find that they don’t have engineers, they don’t have architects, they don’t have legal personnel, they don’t have medical doctors. We have this problem generally in Nigeria. But the devolution I was referring to was the volition to deal with the judicial and legal issues. So the appointees were not local government appointees; they were qualified state appointees, but then they could make by-laws that had to do with regulating local peculiarities such as—the most common was the issue of legalized prostitution, alcohol, intoxicants. These are the local
issues that were of serious concern to agitators for Sharia law, at the local level. But then they also became issues of serious concern for those who were not agitating for Sharia law.

OK, it’s good. But since the local communities are very interested, let these matters be legislated and controlled by the local councils. So it makes it easier for the community, because things are not going to just quickly reach their local leaders, and together they can address those issues. There is no delegation per se in terms of issues of health, issue of agriculture, because the delegation in terms of services, provision of infrastructure and other things, is provided for in the Constitution. So as a governor I had no priority to interfere in what the constitution of the federal republic has delegated to the local council or what it has delegated to the state.

So indeed also the federal cannot interfere with what the constitution has delegated to the state. But on the judicial and legislative issues, to deal with these local biases—that is where we talk of the issue of legislation.

MAKGATIA: A broad question that I have about all of these reforms is that you mentioned that it was important to give people recognition and you developed institutional forums to give people ways to represent themselves and to represent their interests and to have a community identity that was not in conflict with others. On the one hand that promotes a sort of more inclusive society if people feel that their identity is being respected, but on the other hand people might argue that that would lead to greater divisions and it might lead to those divisions being entrenched. How did you address that?

MAKARFI: Well, the Council of Chiefs. We created the Council of Chiefs, at the state level, all these chiefs sit in a council. They meet from time to time to discuss issues of common interest, issues of general interest. They don’t have to report to government on those issues. On issues they report to the government, they just report to the government. On issues that require government attention, they report to government, but we have an independent state council of chiefs.

In some local councils you may have three or four chiefs. So even though you have this local identity, you have a different level setting, an institution that brings everybody together as one to discuss common issues, to streamline issues involving public enlightenment, health, agriculture, security. So these layers of interaction took care of the issue that I would describe as segregation or separatism. In the new system there was no separatism. There was independence combined with collective functioning as a community. That was built into the way we function as a state.

MAKGATIA: Were there any, again, unforeseen obstacles in the development of this council?

MAKARFI: The only unforeseen obstacle, you see—these chiefs, they are so envious of each other. They like—there is always this issue of ranking, even among themselves. OK, I’m higher in rank than that person, I’m higher than that person. So you have to be careful when going through historical precedents and rank them first class, second-class, third class. Also, we don’t have any class higher than—but even among the first class there are seniors by a certain order.

So the only obstacle was for us to work through and for all of them to define their rank in this order. We did so and it is working, there’s no problem.
MAKGATIA: Great. When you developed and devised these reforms to address the problems you encountered, could you draw on any preexisting strategy? Did you refer to other kinds of experiences? Was there any source of inspiration for these ideas or was it sort of internally devised?

MAKARFI: For the ideas that I had?

MAKGETIA: Yes, for these various reforms like the cultural reforms, the legal and judicial reforms.

MAKARFI: Well, I told you my background. I came from a community that has always been highly political, actively political, political activists right before independence. Even my educational background: I schooled in the eastern part of the country, in Enugu as a matter of fact. People were wondering at my exam what I was going to do in Enugu just after the civil war. So I had these breadth of experiences, contact with people from different parts of the country. So I was, right from my youth, really a reformist.

MAKGATIA: If you had that idea, the reforms that you wanted to advance, how did you build popular support for those reforms, first within the government and then maybe we can talk about how you built a kind of public constituency for their support? Were you able to—did you have to work to build support amongst your cabinet, among your assemblymen, amongst other people within the government? And how did you go about doing that?

MAKARFI: Yes, well, you see, society already desired those reforms but the issue was who would be man enough to face up to the challenge. It was always the issue of the decision maker. Not that the reforms were unnecessary or untimely or nobody was seeking for them. Actually in some of these decades, some of the century, there had been unrest. But who could take the bull by the horns? We did. We did. Yes, what did I do to build that kind of support? I knew where the opposition was going to come from.

MAKGATIA: Where was that?

MAKARFI: From those who are dominant in the system. I went and looked at it in its totality. I was going to please the majority and please even the powerful minority, but I also kind of had to be—had to prepare myself to absorb all insults and intimidation from the powerful minority, not to react to any negativity, not to become annoyed. I even appeared as somebody that didn’t even know what he was doing, but I knew what I was doing. So there were insults, there were threats, there were abuses. I ignored all of them. But I believed that once the reform began to take place people would see wisdom in what we were doing. All of those things would give way. That is what is happening now.

Even those who are vehemently against, calling me names, writing all sorts of articles, all over the electronic media, inciting these people, saying this and that—Now, they are singing a different song. “Sorry, we apologize, we misunderstood you. Now we see the wisdom. If you had not done A, B, C, D, maybe our position would have been this bad or that bad or that bad.” Again, you see, historically we have this—those who come from the urban area and those who come from the rural area. I happen to come from the rural area. Of course we are in the majority.

So those who come from the urban areas were more prone to oppose the reform. So I had to build my support more around the majority rural community where I
came from. I had my solace and protection and support from there. That's it, that's all. The majority, those from the rural area constituted 80% of the populace. So if you are talking in terms of political power, voting power, whether the people in the urban areas like it or not, if the rural communities in the states like you they will vote you into office.

Even in areas suffering from urban decay, in spite of all the insults and the intimidation and the threats, we did not think to deny anybody access to government facilities just because they were against us, against our policies, no. We still provided them with things that they had not had for fifty or sixty years. We provided them with key services.

If you were to go around the urban areas now and drive around, apart from Abuja in Nigeria it may be the best place that you will drive through in terms of easy accessibility and the way things are. So there is that; even in the urban areas we later went on to become kind of a sign of the times. "We have been insulting this guy but he has not taken this personally, he still tends to our needs.” That was our gateway.

You see, if leaders begin to act negatively because of criticism or obstacles or insults or whatever, you made the point. If reform is paining somebody, people cry out; that’s natural. Just like somebody who is vaccinated. Once you know your body, it becomes an external thing; you feel the pinch, but it is for good. That's how it should be.

MAKGATIA: Were the opposition able to do anything to put speed bumps or obstacles in your way to these reforms and how did you overcome this?

MAKARFI: Well, they did, but you see, it was from a weak point because as I mentioned the opposition was from the urban centers—two urban centers for that matter, those that dominated the entire system. Whereas what we were doing was in the interest of 80% of the populace. So the opposition had only about 20% of the populace to do it with, how significant could that be? What they had, you see—we had our way.

MAKGETIA: Did you have to make any bargains with them to get their support?

MAKARFI: Well, they thought we were even going to go further than we did. There was this nagging suspicion that we were even going to go much, much further than what we did. We assured them that we were not heading in the direction they thought we were heading. They didn’t trust us from the beginning but of course when we came out they saw that we did not do it. Even though that suspicion was still hanging the day after or the day after that—but they saw that it was not the case. We made it clear. I think I even made Burka that that was as far as we could go in that reform aspect, and let people adjust themselves to the issue of how we can all work together. We will have what we want as separate communities. Let’s now see how we can work together, bring synergy into the system, let the units work as one for the good of all.

MAKGATIA: What were their fears?

MAKARFI: Well, their fears were that in terms of territory; that we were going to go and encroach more on their territories. We didn’t do that. They even thought that we would go up north where there was no need, no cultural or religious differences; they thought we were going to go there and start creating chiefdoms. We didn’t do that. They even thought that we were going to attempt to dethrone, we didn’t
do that. Because of the opposition, they thought that we were mad at them, that we were going to dethrone some of them. We didn’t do that. It was just natural to feel pain and to resist.

MAKGETIA: You mentioned the town hall meetings as an important way to show people that you were interested in their concerns and to build a public constituency for support of your reforms. Was there anything else that you did to get the public on your side?

MAKARFI: Well, if seeing what—it was important to do whatever we said we were going to do. If we promise, we deliver. Apart from that, you see, on a permanent basis—apart from this institution, you know, why you do certain things—You need people to continue to participate in one form or the other, to deal with some of the issues that could potentially cause a crisis. We created this inter-religious forum, a permanent body that used to meet every quarter. It is made up of religious leaders from the state. They used to meet quarterly, not only to discuss issues of potential ethnic or religious conflict, but they also used to bring to us a report card on government for the area. How do the people see our work? What are people’s expectations on government policies A and B in the area they come from? So we used that to further enhance information flow through the religious leaders. We also set up standing committees within the forum itself to deal with issues that may arise.

So issues will not wait until the meeting. When issues arose the standing bodies would go and deal with those issues and present a report in the next meeting on how they handled the situation. So the standing committee—up to now that institution is in place and it is working very well.

MAKGATIA: Excellent. One question about when you came into office. How did you find the people that had the right skills to do the jobs that you needed to do. As you were seeking to appoint people to important positions, did you struggle to find people with the necessary skills? How did you identify them?

MAKARFI: Having worked in the state for three years, in the cabinet of the state for three years of course I got to know a number of people. I got to know the public servants of the state. I must say that we had and still have one of the best-qualified state public services in Nigeria. Of course, that was the case because this was the capital of the northern region then.

So in terms of public service there were qualified, functional public servants who sought to deliver. What we needed were the political heads, the political appointees, the secretaries of the ministries or the commissioners for the minister as the case may be. To engage people, we called for nomination. We made sure that different parts of the state were represented, and we called those parties to make nominations. Of course we set criteria for the kind of individual they should nominate.

MAKGETIA: Can you give an example of the criteria?

MAKARFI: Educational qualifications. You have to be a graduate, you have to have a certain number of years of experience. You have to have proven integrity. You must not have been found guilty of any crime or breach of trust or whatever. If there is any other information concerning the individual’s contribution to society, the nominating parties were told to provide it. They did that.
In some places we had to take on technocrats on our own. You have to blend in. You don’t just throw away everything in favor of what is to come. So we had to achieve a blend of the technocrats we brought in with qualified nominees for these offices. There was no individual nomination; the people submitted a list of ten or twelve names. Now when you have the list, maybe you only need one or two appointments. So you scrutinize, you assess and make a selection. Then when you have made the selection it is still based on the nomination so the communities are happy to have at least participated in nominating people to serve again. So they see us as their government, because they participated in the nomination process.

MAKGATIA: As you asked the communities to make nominations, was that still on a party, political basis?

MAKARFI: Yes, but I also gave a slot to other political parties because I wanted to form a government of unity. It wasn’t necessary because these groups hadn’t scored even 15% of the votes. In terms of votes they had maybe 30%, but in terms of seats, these groups had maybe 5% or 10%. So we reserved some slots and asked the political parties to make nominations.

MAKGATIA: Was that something that was difficult to sell to your party if you said that you were giving up seats to the other parties?

MAKARFI: No.

MAKGATIA: Great. Did you undertake efforts to train your staff? Was capacity development an important issue for you and how did you do that?

MAKARFI: Train them?

MAKGATIA: Or just ensure that training occurred.

MAKARFI: Well, of course donor agencies helped a lot in training appointees. Apart from training by donor agencies, the other national programs were—all this training was conducted and our appointees participated significantly.

MAKGATIA: Did you take any steps to ensure that your team members and employees devoted themselves to carrying out their mission, perhaps creating incentive systems for them to perform to your expectations?

MAKARFI: Training center for them?

MAKGATIA: Incentives?

MAKARFI: What incentives? Because you see, there is a specified remuneration. I don’t state the remuneration; it is set at the center. At the center we have revenue mobilization and allocation and the fiscal commission—the remunerations for all political appointees at all levels is set nationally. So we have no hand in fixing those remunerations. You know, what your remuneration will be is set at the center. That’s how far you can go. But then if you perform well you retain your job; if you don’t perform, somebody else comes in. So the incentive is that as long as you deliver, you have the chance to serve until the end of the game. If you are failing to deliver, then definitely you will be replaced.

MAKGATIA: Many leaders face pressure to provide jobs to important people, difficult factions or family members. Some of the officials that you appointed may have felt this...
pressure but there are still tradeoffs. You may want the reform to work but you can’t move forward without accommodating some of these appointments. Did this problem arise for you and did you come up with any strategies to balance or manage these different imperatives?

MAKARFI: I never appointed any family member of mine into any position; I never did that. No family member of mine even got any contract under my watch. Except for one, no family member of mine got a piece of land, a land allocation. That one of course followed the—because he is a businessman who wanted land for a showroom and he got it. I even think that it was federal land but, of course, we had a hand in recommending. So you see I shielded my family from governance completely. In my opinion, it was wrong to involve my family in government.

Of course they supported me politically in campaigning for me, certainly, but not in participating in governance.

MAKGATIA: This question also applies to people that come, you know, from difficult factions within the party or to officials below you who felt that pressure and perhaps responded to it or not, but did you have to deal with that pressure on different members of the government to appoint people on some sort of political or personal preference?

MAKARFI: Of course in developing democracy all of us have to deal with that. I had that. But you see, leaders have to take pressure. At the end of the day, it is what you do. At the end of the day you hope the best man for the job is in office, and that he can make the right decisions, the best decisions that could be made. Pressure is unavoidable, but leaders are not there to succumb to every pressure.

MAKGATIA: How would you suggest that people manage those pressures?

MAKARFI: Well, you see, if you are providing good governance, you can easily resist pressure. If you are not, you have to succumb to pressure. The only person that can pressure you is the person that has access to you. A person who does not have access to you cannot pressure you. The person who has access to you can hold you to ransom if he knows that deep down you are weak. But if you are not weak, he can’t even pressure you. So you see, the solution to dealing with pressure is really providing good governance. If you are providing good governance, everybody will be careful on how he relates to and interacts with you because they know that you are not really leaning on them in any particular manner. One on one you can go your way. So either he participates and makes his contribution or he gets out. So the best way to deal with pressure is to provide good governance—then you don’t have to lean on people who will be applying pressure on you in order to extract favors.

MAKGATIA: I understand that after some of the violence in 2000 I believe, the President came to visit the area and made certain recommendations. In general what would you say the role of the central government has been in this reform effort?

MAKARFI: They didn’t interfere in our reform in any way. As a matter of fact they didn’t even think we were going to go as far as we did, but they were supportive. When they understood where we were headed, they didn’t try to stop us. In a way they were a bit cynical in thinking that we may not go as far as we wanted, but we did. And I’m sure they were happy that we went as far as we did. So for the center, it was an indication of our openness to reform, to move forward and reveal our reform style.
MAKGATIA: This project is meant to inform other reform leaders of strategies for how to deal with situations of governance. What would you suggest to other people in a similar position about how to balance that relationship with a central authority on one side and your relationship with your constituency on the other to create that space for reform in your sphere?

MAKARFI: Well, you see environments differ and relationships differ. With the central authority my experience was when the crisis came under—first of all they didn’t believe we could deal with this situation. So you have to show through words and actions, not just with words but with action, that you are capable of dealing with the situation. If the central authority becomes convinced that you are capable, they will give you time and support. If they perceive that you are not capable then you will begin to see interference.

Two, you need to keep the central authority informed, fully informed. If you don’t keep the central authority informed, then misinformation might work. People who might want to abort your reform and have access to the central authority can come and paint a different picture of what you are doing or where you are headed. But when I keep the central authority informed, even if people come and talk, they have heard it from you, they have seen it. It is not just about telling them by word of mouth: you make certain documented facts available, make them available.

Of course you hear their views. They may advise you, they may not like one aspect of the reform, but you don’t have to do what they want; at least you are not keeping anything hidden from them. You are looking at the totality of issues. So one is the issue of having the confidence of the central authority, keeping the central authority informed at all times so that you know busybodies will not—opponents of what you are doing cannot try to create a divide between the central authority, then you find yourself at conflict with the central authority and conflict at home. You lose at the end of the day, no matter how laudable your reform, your objectives.

MAKGATIA: In such a divided society, when you have a sort of competitive process that awards something to one group or one individual and seems to leave another group out of the system, that can cause further tensions. Did you come up with any ways to address this? Do you have any ways of thinking about how you can prevent those tensions from arising when you have something like any form of an electoral process or if you have like a procurement process or something that threatens to create divisions and there is hostility between groups who feel left out of a winner-take-all system?

MAKARFI: I didn’t get your point. Are you talking of the electoral system?

MAKGATIA: It doesn’t have to be a state level election, but just any sort of competition where there is a tendency, or where if you make an appointment and you appoint this person, this group feels left out, or if there is a competitive bid for something and this group feels left out. Do you think there are any strategies for dealing with that kind of situation in a divided context?

MAKARFI: It also depends on how you are running your government. You see, in societies such as ours, it is always good to carry as many people as possible without really going against your principles of providing good governance. If you want to go at it alone, if you want to go in a more restrictive manner, you have to be absolutely sure now the general populace gives you support. If you have a policy that the
general populace supports, you have their good will, you have their backing, then you can damn all these power brokers and go ahead.

What I prefer is to strike an equilibrium; you need to strike a balance. Because you need peace to achieve harmony in order to get anywhere. So I don’t believe in winner-take-all. I think even among your opponents, there are people that can generally help you to achieve your objective. When the time to defer politically comes, you can still defer. But when it is time to serve, bring on board anybody capable of helping you to achieve your objectives and providing good governance. There should be no exclusiveness in that aspect; it is an issue of old. If relations are over, they’re over; bring in the best, deliver.

That’s how you can turn some people from opponents into political supporters. So I am for inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness in terms of governance.

MAKGETIA: As we wrap up I’d like to ask you if there is anything in your management style that you think helped you to achieve these reforms?

MAKARFI: The principle of inclusiveness, the principle of openness and accessibility. I was in government to provide services, not for anything else. Also people knew me; they knew that I was not somebody who would come and start praising you. You start—I don’t like all these sort of protocols. Government is a business; let’s get on with the business of governance. Of course, not like beasts, we’re humans. We can joke, we can laugh, but let’s pay more attention to governance. If you want to socialize, you sit with your friends, you can socialize and laugh over things and take care—whatever, that’s different.

So I think that up to now people continue to follow me; they know that you don’t come to me to talk about somebody else. If you come to me you have to come to talk about issues. Issues and issues and issues and what we should do and where we are and where we should be and how we should get there. Then yes, you get my attention. But if you’re coming purely to tell me stories about some person, know that you will not have my ear. I’m not that kind of person.

People got to know that; people know that. So I left all the garbage and nonsense elsewhere and my quality time was left for provisional governance. Even here for people in positions of authority in our society, you find that they tend to listen to people who bring in stories of who likes them, who doesn’t like them. What’s my business? If you’re doing the right thing, the majority of the people will like you. Some will not like you so much. You are not there to be liked by everybody. But let what you are doing be liked by the majority of the people.

MAKGETIA: How important do you think it is for a leader to have a vision or common story that they can share with people to get them behind their program?

MAKARFI: Without a vision you are not a leader. Leaders must have vision; otherwise, why are you there? It is extremely important that leaders have vision. They have a purpose for even wanting to provide leadership. And not only do they have vision; they have a roadmap. And they don’t just have a roadmap: they’re consciously making efforts to follow that roadmap, to actualize their vision.

MAKGETIA: Thank you very much for sharing your thoughts with us. As I mentioned we’re hoping to enable reform leaders to share their experiences and innovations to deal with challenges that arise. Is there anything that you think we’ve missed out that you would like to add?
MAKARFI: No, not really. There are so many questions, I can’t even remember all the questions you asked; I just talked from the heart so I can’t remember all I have said, but whatever I said I said from my experiences and I believe we’ve covered enough. Reform is not easy. Leadership in an environment such as ours is not easy. But leadership is not really a privilege. I mean, it’s not like—it is a privilege for one to provide leadership because there are many who can’t. But leaders should never think that they’re superior beings. They’re not the brightest, they’re not the most handsome, they’re not the richest, they’re not the strongest, but somebody must provide leadership. If it is entrusted onto you you have to know that it is something you have thanks to the will of the people.

So you owe it to them to provide leadership to them. Providing leadership to them means you are accountable to them. Keep them informed, listen to them. You communicate with them. Leadership without communication cannot work. So I don’t know. I believe these are all the things we have covered so I’m just summarizing; that’s my own idea on the principle of leadership. Leadership cannot be about the accumulation of wealth.

You see, you have to make up your mind: do you want to accumulate wealth? If you want to accumulate wealth, go and concentrate on business. If you want to provide leadership, you don’t have to be poor. Most leaders are not poor. Even if you are not that—maybe after being a leader, even from right here, you may become a little well off. You will not be rich, certainly don’t look for Bill Gates in leadership.

MAKGATIA: Great, thank you very much for your time and your thoughts on this subject.

MAKARFI: You’re welcome.