



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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Innovations for Successful Societies, Bobst Center for Peace and Justice
Princeton University, 83 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, New Jersey, 08544, USA
www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties

SCHER: My name is Daniel Scher. I'm the Associate Director of the Innovations for Successful Societies project, and I'm here in Durban with Dr. Mike Sutcliffe, the city manager. Sir, would you mind introducing yourself and telling a little bit about your background?

SUTCLIFFE: *My name is Michael Sutcliffe. I'm city manager of eThekweni municipality that incorporates the city of Durban. It's a city of about four million people. I'm the head of the administration and accounting officer. The way our local government system works is that the city managers are appointed by the majority political party, in this case the ANC [African National Congress], for terms of contracts which are roughly equivalent to the elected office contracts. I head up an administration of about 20,000 employees and a budget of about 23 billion rand. It's about three billion US dollars, I suppose. The functions of a municipality would obviously be your developmental functions: things like housing, water, sanitation, electricity. In addition, the municipality functions also drive tourism development, economic development, industrial development, and the development of strategic areas, like the port, etc. Then there is a whole range of other things, like art galleries and museums and libraries. So it's fairly wide spanning.*

I earned a doctorate at Ohio State University on Politics of Turf. I then was a professor of town regional planning in South Africa and worked within the liberation movement, the United Democratic Front [UDF]. I was the chairperson of an organization called the Durban Democratic Association that was intended to mobilize whites against the apartheid regime. We organized big movements in the 1980s to open up the beaches and open up the hospitals to all races. I worked also with the ANC from about 1984 on a project entitled Post-Apartheid South Africa.

At that stage, people like the former President Thabo Mbeki, the current President Jacob Zuma, were all quite instrumental from pretty much 1985 onwards, when we were trying to develop policy guidelines. So there was a team of us from inside the country, and a team from outside the country, who were in exile. We worked quite closely together in collaborating on documents which eventually became known as the RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme]. These policies evolved into the constitutional guidelines for Democratic South Africa and became part of our negotiating position. By 1990 and the release of Mandela, I then moved for a couple of years to the University of Durban-Westville as the director of public affairs. But then I went into politics in the first elections. It was a decision taken—given that the IFP won the provincial elections of KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC leader Jacob Zuma and many of the provincial ANC leaders (of which I was one) stayed in the province as members of the Provincial Legislature and did not go to the national parliament. I served in the legislature here under Jacob Zuma's leadership at that stage, from 1994-1999.

In 1999, President Mandela then appointed me as the chairperson of a board called the Municipal Demarcation Board, which was the board that redrew all the boundaries in order for us to hold democratic municipal elections. At that stage, the majority of the country was divided up into white, Indian, and colored municipal areas, and then you had vast rural areas with no local government throughout the country. I was the first full-time chair. In a sense many people joked about the Board, saying it was Michael's Demolition Board, because it was our job to demolish the old apartheid boundaries.

Then in 2002, the ANC decided to redeploy me as the city manager of eThekweni municipality that incorporated about 40 previously racially-based municipalities, as well as some fairly large areas that were part of the KwaZulu-Natal Bantustan. At the moment it's about four million people. In December, it will grow to about five million people, because it's South Africa's main domestic tourist destination. My job today is to try and deal with the myriad of functions and responsibilities given to local government, the most delivery-focused sphere of government.

SCHER: I've spoken with certain parties who advocated federalism as a solution for the shape of the post-apartheid state. One of the things that these players frequently bring up is this specter of the ANC's unitary state, the highly centralized, extremely controlling bureaucracy that they claim the ANC was envisaging as the shape of the post-apartheid state. As someone who was on the project entitled Post-Apartheid South Africa, I wonder if you would comment on what was actually being envisaged as an alternative to the more federal models that were being put forward by other parties.

SUTCLIFFE: *If you go back to where a lot of these post-apartheid projects began, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were probably the key leaders within the ANC that were driving it. I was working within and with them quite closely on that. At that stage, until 1987, roughly, we really had the view that our struggle was firstly for national democracy, and not to waste our time in trying to think of sub-national democratic forms.*

Although, what happened: in about 1985 there was a small group of us that were set up to start looking at the local government question, partly because of the internal struggles that we were involved in with both our underground and the UDF, that was operating legally at that stage. We knew that the reality of South Africa is that the local struggles were driving the struggle for democracy, and that that question had to be addressed. For example, in the UDF, we had in all of our major cities a struggle over "one city, one tax base." So in the 1980s, at an underground level and aboveground, our arguments were to begin to reshape the form, because apartheid divided people on geographic lines: black people, African people, colored, Indian, white. So initially, the sub-national form of the state was not directly part of that agenda. But by about 1987 and 1988, we'd started beginning work on what that future form of the state might be, because we knew that we would have to do something about the Bantustans and provinces in the white South Africa.

So we then produced a little discussion document called the Ten Regions of South Africa. In effect, it was Albie Sachs [Constitutional Court judge] and I who came up with this geographic form. What I had done, in one of the papers and arguments that I developed internally around that time, was to say that the material base of a society, from a Marxist perspective, is what you would work with. Form always follows function. You don't start by saying what form the state takes before you say what functions the state has. We started then to say that the form of that future state is what we needed to talk about through the regions.

When the ANC was unbanned in 1990, it created fourteen ANC regions covering the whole country, in part because of their existing UDF formations, but in part also because of the ANC's own history. There's a bit of disjunction there, because if you look at places like those fourteen regions within the ANC, you had some oddities in them, as it were. By the time we got to 1990, we realized that it was a very important issue that, as ANC, we must start coming to grips with. The ANC at an official level remained a party arguing for a unitary state, and we still

argue for a unitary state, but we have come to realize we must allow for sub-national government.

The model that emerged was to divide the country up into a number of regions, anything from twenty to fifty regions across the country. At that stage, we never really debated that issue, because the historical form of the ANC was to divide the ANC along provincial boundary lines. In the original days, there were four provinces: Transvaal, Natal, Orange Free State, and the Cape. This structure of the ANC pretty much had stayed for many years.

What we were beginning to develop was the idea of saying that that form doesn't make sense, because you have areas that are just economically, functionally, and geographically too vast to deal with things. So we produced a paper around that stage. It was a broad discussion paper on the Ten Regions of South Africa, I think we called it, by about 1990.

That was the work that we were doing within the movement. Obviously, there was also work happening as we started the negotiations process. With Mandela's release, there was then the Fortesque Memo, and it started a negotiations process. Our view was, as we'd outlined in the 1987 document, to get all parties around the table—the two major parties were the regime and the ANC—but to try to make it as inclusive as possible, and that was really our strategy. We had tactics to try and deal with that, because obviously managing it was difficult. I remember the debates that we had around sufficient consensus and the like, but it was really, to a large extent, driven by those two parties.

What became very clear from day one was an argument; I think we called it the PSR debate. It was the Provinces, States, and Regions debate, where all the other parties argued that there should be sub-national government and we must have a form of federalism with the provinces having strong powers. Some argued it should be a real federalism, with states which would have real powers, not just nominal powers. Then the ANC said the country should be divided into regions which would act as oversight areas, as post boxes of national government. That was the kind of debate that occurred there.

What we then did as a separate path—predating 1990—we then began to formulize the local government negotiations. Local government was a critical area. Continuing our theme of "one city, one tax base," in the mid-'90s, we started a lot of local forums, negotiating forums. So we had a local government negotiating forum, which was a national body primarily between the ANC and the National Party government, but at a local level involving many other parties. We called some of them the statutory parties—those who were already in the system—and non-statutory. So it was a process that was already starting to bubble by the late '90s.

These were almost two separate negotiations (national and local) which were going on, and the ANC began to coordinate its approach in both of those, because it didn't want a situation—quite correctly—where local governments then entrenched things that the national negotiations were not going to allow. In some ways, as the ANC, we slowed down the local negotiations. We regrouped. We made sure that we still made advances at the local level, but focusing on the big picture.

It was in the context of the big picture that we really had to talk our way through how to deal with these different models. Basically, we came up with a model that spoke of spheres of government. So we did something in our approach, as a

country that was entrenched in the constitution, to say that because of the history of protest and democracy at the local level, the ANC—which was now a single united organization having collapsed its underground, its UDF structures, and its existing army into a single organization again—needed to start leading at a local level. Obviously, these movements for local democracy, particularly in the bigger towns and cities, were not rurally led compared with the rural campaigns of the 1950s. Since then most of the struggles had been urban-focused. There was a recognition by the ANC then that that the local sphere of government was important. So that's why we introduced this notion of three spheres of government. I think that we're the only constitution in the world that actually entrenches three spheres of government with particular rights in their constitution.

This was confirmed when we passed the constitution in '96. That was the final form the emerging negotiations took. What was interesting about that final form, in 1996, was that we really had in the constitution of South Africa, to a certain extent, a model for three spheres. The local sphere was a bit of a hodgepodge, because of the constitutional court case where the constitutional court ruled that we needed to change the model that we were working on at that stage. It created what are called Category A, B, and C municipalities. So that's a bit of a hodgepodge.

When you got to the appendices saying what are the functions and powers of these three spheres of government, you would find that that's a real hodgepodge, because at that stage, remember, the ANC was fighting for a unitary democracy. We didn't have a chance to engage and debate and understand what the functions and powers of local government would be. You'd find sections four and five of the constitution just saying what happened at local government, then what happened under colonialism and apartheid—just dump it in as a schedule, in the back.

It created its own dynamics, because the subsequent local government legislation started refining that a little bit more, and started talking very centrally about local government as a key vehicle for participatory and representative democracy. It talked very clearly about the local sphere of government being the developmental wing of national government. You'll see the word "development" and the word "community participation" being used much more in that legislation than in any other legislation that we have in South Africa. As the ANC we believed, once we had passed the constitution, we needed to move in the direction of a developmental state where the local sphere is the real developmental wing.

But many of the developmental functions—take health, for example, or housing—in the constitution were lodged at a national and provincial level and not at a local level. Public transport was lodged at the national and the provincial level and not at the local level. So it created its own contradictions, I think, for the 1980s. That gives you a little bit of a snapshot of the kind of processes we had.

By the time we got to 1996 and the constitution was developed, we'd also formalized the process of local government democracy, which then envisaged three phases: one which was called the pre-interim, the second was the interim, and then the third was the democratic phase. The first phase was where we created nominated councils; then we had some interim elections; and then, in the year 2000, we had the final elections for democratic local government.

We could only have those final elections once we had demarcated new boundaries, which was the job that I was given to do with the demarcation board, and once we had created other legislation for local government, such as the Structures Act, the Systems Act, and then later the Finance Act. That was the kind of work that we did towards the end of the 1990s.

SCHER: I heard that the ANC structures began to make more concessions to provincial models and regional models, based on how the UDF structures had been set up and how the UDF support bases were organized. Would you comment on whether that was a significant factor or significant feature in these talks and these processes?

SUTCLIFFE: *It was. There was a meeting that I attended where I made a presentation on the regional base for South Africa, linking the economic base to our existing UDF base to the political base. Out of that emerged a model of ten regions, and eventually we made it nine regions, nine regions that became nine provinces. Within that, there were some disputed areas, and they are still areas that we dispute today. We were able to move quite quickly to that, because at a negotiating level, once we got our nine provinces model on the map, it was then just a question of the National Party and other major players tweaking some of those boundaries. The National Party basically looked at that map and said they'd nab the Western Cape then; they'll nab the Northern Cape; they'll nab Mpumalanga. They just presumed that that would happen. So as they looked at the country, they thought that's maybe where their bases were. So yes, we put on the agenda the nine regions. As I said, we went from the fourteen regions of the ANC, when the ANC was unbanned, to ten regions, and the ten regions keeping Transkei separate. We changed that, and then it became the nine provinces, basically. So that was the process of how we evolved it.*

SCHER: It was interesting that the National Party assumed that they'd win those three provinces.

SUTCLIFFE: *I think that was the logic, because when we took it to the national level—and I wasn't directly in these talks—that was why the cross-boundary problems were created. There was a special commission that we established of mainly the National Party and ourselves to go and look at some of these areas. The National Party wanted to keep all those boarder areas of Mpumalanga in Limpopo. That's why all the protests we had Moetse and places like that. Our own people wanted to take the Kokstad area, Umzimkulu, Kokstad, and Matatiele, back to the Eastern Cape. Under apartheid, there had been about five or six commissions around that particular boundary, and eventually the white areas, the white farms, were all put into Natal. Umzimkulu and Maluti District were left in the Eastern Cape—or left in Transkei initially, and then left for the Eastern Cape. So there had been a whole history to some of those boundary issues, as it were, which came back and flared up later. Then you had the Gauteng-Northwest boundary battle.*

So by the time we got to 2004, 2005, and 2006, there was a whole process of how the ANC tried to manage those boundary disputes, and is still trying to manage them today. If you look at places like Balfour, many of those issues are actually around service delivery and not boundaries. If you look at Kokstad, it's closer in geographical terms to Pietermaritzburg areas of delivery, even Umzimkulu, than it is to, for example, East London or Bisho or Port Elizabeth. If you look at the areas of Moetse, for example, they're closer to those white villages and towns of Mpumalanga than they are to Polokwane. If you look at a

lot of those, it's that people see Balfour, see Johannesburg, but now they're part of Mpumalanga.

So instead of focusing on the service delivery element, the focus was then on changing the boundaries, and that's why I'm a firm believer that you don't choose boundaries to solve functional issues.

My own view would be to scrap the provinces, because provinces are a sphere of government that confuses everything. But that's a personal view. I will remain an activist in the ANC arguing that that's the route we should go, but it's always difficult when you have interests at a provincial level. I will continue to argue that we don't need provinces. I think the nature of the world today is that you have strong local governments and you have strong national and trans-national governments. Those are really the two spheres where there's most contestation. Whether you're in any developed/democratic part of the world, you'll find that's the shape that's emerging.

Even in a country like France, for example, you find that in France you've got 36,000 municipalities, but those individual municipalities are really historic relics. They were there because of the Industrial Revolution, but actually, you've got metropolitan areas now where there's much more integration occurring, a kind of metropolitanisation of Europe. So Europe today is really ten, or twelve, or fifteen maybe, major metropolitan areas, spheres of influence, even though the geographic boundaries don't demonstrate that.

SCHER: You were talking about not using boundaries to solve service delivery problems. Some provinces have functioned much, much better than others, and some provinces have, to all intents and purposes, failed at the moment. Would you comment on why some seemed to have performed better than others, and whether that was something that, perhaps, could have been predicted prior to the formation of these provinces?

SUTCLIFFE: *I think it's a combination of things. I think that for some of them, it's around capacity. We had to construct completely new provinces. People will point and say the local government has failed. Local governments have, as a whole, not all failed. What has happened is that in the case of provinces, we created five brand new provinces pretty much from scratch. Limpopo was largely the Northern Province, but if you actually look at Limpopo, I think there must have been five Bantustans in it. Its job had been to try and merge the very fragmented state back into what was originally the province. With the ANC coming in and swamping that area, you still had a capacity problem, because you still had the white apartheid interests, if you could put it that way, of the five or six regional governments that existed then. There was a Venda state, there was this KwaNdebele state, that state, and the other.*

If you look at the Johannesburg base, you have taken from that and created a brand new province in the shape of Mpumalanga. You can't have had the Highveld and the Lowveld. So you had those areas that functionally were linked to Johannesburg, but now are being put into something that doesn't make sense; the functional link is back to Mpumalanga. If you add to it the kind of conflict at the boundary area between Limpopo and Mpumalanga, again you get a war emerging there. So the ability for provincial leadership to properly manage that process was more constrained.

The second problem was that you were taking the economic heartland of Transvaal out and calling it Gauteng, and the remaining area without the same

economic base was divided into Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces. So Limpopo and Mpumalanga then are faced with the challenges of the lack of existing capacity, hugely fragmented state, a dominant single party, ANC, getting 90% of the vote there. But actually, once it gets 90% of the vote, it has to deal with a whole lot of different interests and squabbles that emerge. And it's got to deal with these boundary issues where people want to be not in Limpopo, they want to be in Mpumalanga.

The result is that the ability to manage becomes constrained because you want to keep the unity of the ANC, which is winning votes wonderfully. It becomes more difficult because once the ANC is in majority, it just rules the roost. The ability for corruption to emerge there and for local interests to start dictating things, becomes ever more significant. Seeing the state as a quick way to get rich, all of those things start emerging then.

So it's both the objective reality of the nature of that state, as well as subjective conditions under which that state was emerging, that influence those spheres.

Free State stayed largely as it was. In the case of Free State, it was the dominance of the ruling party, and then a scrap that emerged between two leaders—Terror Lekota and Ace Magashule—that hampered the ANC's ability to govern. To a certain extent, it was a kind of struggle of the northern part, which was dominant, versus the south. Again, the Free State dynamic, I think, got hampered a little bit. So even though it was a single provincial government, it had to incorporate probably the poorest of all the homeland areas. So it had to bring all these Bantustan leaders into the framework of their political dynamic. Yes, there was some existing capacity in the former white administration and almost absolutely no capacity in the former homelands that had been inherited. So that's its first dimension.

The second dimension is a bit of a struggle. My reading of it was, Terror Lekota was an imposed ANC leader whilst Ace was an emerging democratically elected leader, and that creates its own battleground.

I think in the Northern Cape, there it was really just the vastness of it. When you have a provincial government sitting in Kimberley, the question is: what is it supposed to do when the provincial government is not terribly much larger than the municipality of Kimberley. The personnel are far smaller than the municipality of Durban, but here it's a province needing to have all the trappings of a provincial government. Did it fail? I'm just saying that I think it's more that our model has shown that we shouldn't have provinces. I think that's the more important question that we should be posing.

When you get to the Western Cape, that's the area of the majority of South Africa's wealth, and the apartheid state had invested massively in that area: in the Tygerberg Hospital, Groote Schuur hospital, two of the best state hospitals in the country. So there's a massive concentration of resources there, of capacity with very few developmental challenges in the former township areas that were not needed by the voting base there. The ANC was always going to have difficulty getting a majority in a context like that, where you had such stark developmental and racial differences as you have there.

When you get to the Eastern Cape, again you've got the old two Bantustan problems, both Ciskei and Transkei. Both had coups and both had had incredibly rundown state machinery, but still people are employed by the state there. No one could say that those two had had any kind of functioning, certainly in the last

ten years when they were Bantustans. So suddenly you get an ANC coming in, shifting the base towards, let's call it Bisho and Port Elizabeth, its more developed side, but actually the political base is this rural Ciskei and Transkei. So how do you manage both, and how do you deal with the state apparatus that really hasn't worked for years? How do you get them revitalized to be part of this democratic challenge?

Then you have KwaZulu-Natal. Again, you had an election that was flawed in this province, but in the interest of the national problematic, the ANC in the province withdrew its court case. It had prepared legal papers to challenge the 1994 elections. It was really the intervention of President Mandela, who said, "Look, in the interest of the country, let's move on and deal with it." And progressively since then, the ANC in that province has basically won over the majority some ten years later. So what you had in 1994 was a continuation of a Bantustan administration, because for ten years the IFP controlled the province, initially by itself and then together in coalition. You find, for ten years then, it was basically a Bantustan, extended slightly, and it continued to have battles with the national government. Everything was a battle over the constitution, a battle over the capital, etc.

As I said, the question I would pose is: is it really a failure of provinces, or a failure that we introduced that form of government in a democratic dispensation, the model we imposed upon them? I think it's much more the latter, from the negotiating context. Remember, these were late-night things. There was a coki pen that was used very late at night to decide where some of these areas went in. To a certain extent, what I saw in those provinces when I served under Jacob Zuma here was that even though we only had 30% of the legislature, to a large extent we controlled the legislature, because we were organized and had clear direction and vision. But we didn't control the state. Even though we didn't have 51%, we thwarted the IFP's constitution; we thwarted them every step they tried to take, but we didn't have that state machinery. So I think because there was such political contestation in provinces like KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng to a certain extent, and to a certain extent Western Cape—if you take those three, to a large extent they would at least have been able to keep their administrations running. In the others, there was no political contestation occurring, but you had these massive problems within the state machinery itself because of the Bantustans, and that created its own dynamic there.

SCHER: I want to ask you a couple of questions related to Inkatha and some of the demands they were making. You mentioned the thwarting of the IFP constitution, which some have labeled as a secessionist document. Would you talk a little bit about the dynamic of being in Natal and working with this party that was taking very hard lines on issues that today seem somewhat obscure; for example, the role of the King in the constitution?

SUTCLIFFE: *I have said to people that the real irony of the IFP is that it is not a party. It's a set of interests held together by their leader. I think he's a very talented politician, could well be very well advised. Let me use as an example: if you actually look at the Inkatha Commission, it was a commission set up in the 1980s—you go and find what their model was for traditional areas and for the king, and you'll find nothing. You go and look at the constitution they presented in 1994-95—that we then eventually made sure wouldn't go forward—and you'll find there's no law for the king or for traditional leaders or whatever. It was a secessionist document. Its focus was on, as you said, secession. Its focus was not on the things that as a party they've always argued they stood for. Mangosuthu Buthelezi will always argue that he's always stood for traditional leaders. He stood for traditional*

leaders in his image, that's what he stood for, not for traditional leadership as historically it might have been known. In fact, it was the ANC who legitimized the role and the function of the king of the Zulus and of traditional leaders.

So it's a bit of an irony that you had a constitution being thrust on the legislature here. There are all sorts of things that still stand out in my mind of having Mario Ambrosini, who was, I'm sure, American trained, Italian born, rightwing constitution maker, as it were. When we were in the legislature debating, you'd see him peering through the curtains outside to see what was happening.

Anyway, we technically, strategically, defeated them quite well. There's all sorts of stories we could tell about how we organized our forces. How Jacob Zuma made sure that he organized us well enough on the final nights of negotiations, and we clapped the hell out of them. Excuse the French, but anyway we did. It was down to the final moments, and now we needed to get into battle mode. So the key thing was to keep some of the key groups and forces isolated. As we negotiated through the night, we would have one pocket in a corner here and another pocket of the IFP in a corner there, another pocket there. They were so disoriented and so whacked by the way in which we dealt with these things that they pretty much gave in on a lot of these issues. We at least gave them a model that they thought was enhancing their secessionist vision but was giving us the grounds to make sure that this thing would never get through any constitutional challenge.

SCHER: We haven't spoken much about this issue of violence. During the negotiation period, a lot of these discussions were occurring with a backdrop of unbelievable violence in KwaZulu-Natal, which has largely been overlooked in a lot of retrospectives of the transitional period. For a long time, this province was on a knife-edge due to clashes between Inkatha and UDF and ANC. Would you talk about that time period, and how these issues of violence played into the negotiations and some of the demands that were being made?

SUTCLIFFE: *They obviously played into the negotiations and demands. The IFP would have its list of people who had been killed in the violence. Of course, it would always use figures like 20,000 people, etc. When you saw the actual list, they were never near that number. But, yes, it is true that there was horrific violence going on.*

That's where Jacob Zuma, probably given his intelligence background, really focused on the peacemaking process. If you actually look at what he did, he took the IFP leadership, particularly that leadership immediately below Buthelezi, by the hand and targeted certain areas. And he targeted those areas where violence appeared as if it was between the ANC and IFP; he targeted areas where it appeared like ANC versus ANC. He targeted those areas—and Jacob Zuma's not the sort of person who will ever tell you whether this was the case—but my own reading from being part of that process was that it was his intelligence understanding, of realizing that the nature of that violence was not ethnic—first of all because the ANC in this province, even at the first election, got more than a million votes from people who were defined as Zulu. The IFP got about 1.4 million votes of people defined as Zulu, so it wasn't ethnic. They weren't necessarily completely geographical differences either, although largely too, the south of Tugela was more ANC and to the north of the Tugela was more IFP.

I think, thirdly is that it was clear that this was being managed and handled by elements in the apartheid regime. Whether it was from one spot or a variety of spots, it certainly was. So you had, on the one hand, the IFP as it's now being

shown, and elements within the ANC being handled by the former security branch and the South African system.

But equally, I knew in the 1980s, the Americans were planning—or elements within the Americans, let's not blame all of them—were planning for an armed warfare continuation down here. There's no doubt in my mind, if you could ever get access to the inner reaches of Washington, because I don't think that this was just a South African issue. The anecdotal things that I saw, there were some people on World Vision [a Christian humanitarian network] who were setting up where camps would be and things like that. We knew of a lot of that stuff coming in. Ambrosini didn't just appear. The question is, I'm not saying there was a single conspiracy in this, or a single group that had said this is how you destabilize South Africa, but certainly there were elements like that.

So you had a complex of these things happening, and I think that to a certain extent, if I look back, even though I didn't understand it as much then, I think Jacob Zuma played a much bigger role than we understood. He understood the nature of this complex arrangement of violence that didn't have a material base amongst the people themselves, because all of the people here supposedly have a Zulu background. I think he understood that there wasn't that material base. So to a large extent, this was violence that was being imposed by local leaders, local warlords, right through to those who had the support of state machinery behind them. It influenced, to a certain extent, some of the negotiations. I still remember, because I drove the process of the local negotiating forum in Durban. While I was dealing with some of the national stuff, I also drove the forum here. In all of those engagements with the IFP, to a large extent, I was able to build a fairly rational picture in my engagements with them, including people from the leadership of the IFP right through to the present secretary general, Musa Zondi, with all the people who we engaged around. That, also, was an indication that quite a lot of this violence was not being directed by the senior leadership of the IFP or the senior leadership of the ANC. That's why I said some of it might have been local, but a lot of it was being handled by other state forces.

Our own engagements were affected, but it wasn't at that level, I would say, the dominant issue. The dominant issue became: who's going to have more power than whom? And how can we outmaneuver the others to make sure that we have this part?

SCHER: Excellent, excellent. I think that does bring us to the end of our time. I wanted to thank you very much.

SUTCLIFFE: Okay. Cool. No, that's fine. Thank you. Pleasure. And if there are any other questions or issues that you want to cover, feel free to contact.