



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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Interviewee: Mbaye Faye, Paul Huelin, Alexi Ouedraogo

Interviewer: Arthur Boutellis

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Innovations for Successful Societies, Bobst Center for Peace and Justice
Princeton University, 83 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, New Jersey, 08544, USA
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BOUTELLIS: Hello. Today is April 1st, 2008, and today I'm with the SSR-SA branch, the Security Sector Reform branch, of the BINUB, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi, in Bujumbura. We are with Colonel Mbaye Faye and his team, which I will let you introduce.

FAYE: Thank you very much, Arthur. I would specify, retired Colonel, and I have been with the UN for seven, eight years, in the capacity of Senior Political Affairs Officer, in which I worked in various fields, notably the fashioning of outlines concerning ceasefire agreements. Before beginning in earnest, I would like to say that this branch, SSR-SA, is a branch within the framework of an integrated mission. An integrated branch, because it comprehends elements of the DPKO, as well as of the UNDP, civil, military, police elements, all in one. When I say DPKO, I mean elements of the police division, but also of the military division in New York, and people, as I said a moment ago, from the UNDP, notably the Small Arms Division, the struggle against the proliferation of light and small-caliber weapons. As well as a governing element, which is essentially civil, which includes myself and other colleagues that you have interviewed here. This branch is also integrated regarding a certain openness with our Burundian colleagues who work alongside us, in certain areas and certain positions—you were able to interview some of them here—who lead projects with us. Implementation is essential for security sector reform.

So I would like to speak to you while insisting on the fact that, one, I am from the DPKO, as you realized a moment ago. My deputy must be from the UNDP. We had worked together on a joint program with the UNDP, the UN system, the Burundian authorities, to see how to make progress in security sector reform in the broad sense, with tools developed together with the Burundians, which makes for a very open understanding, which goes even somewhat beyond what is said in the OECD handbook, because we integrate the Mine Action Division, as well as other aspects of security, together with human rights and justice, which are collocated with us here. In other words, it's under the sign of openness and solidarity. "Together" is the motto of the BINUB, and that is how we work together. This is why today I'm with two colleagues representative of this branch, who are going to introduce themselves, now or later, as you prefer. On the military level—

PAUL HUELIN: I'm from Switzerland. I've participated in four missions as a military observer. If I may say, I'm new as a military advisor, active in security sector reform. It's a challenge, because you have to learn on the job, and one thing that is very interesting is to be able to participate in this process together, as the Colonel just said. Because in point of fact, if we worked individually, it would not function.

ALEXI OUEDRAOGO: I'm a police commissioner, and I am from Burkina Faso. As police advisor, I integrated the police unit, under the aegis of the SSR-SA division. This is my first mission to the United Nations. [UNCLEAR 5:20], we are very well supervised, and we try in any case to give the best we have to help the mission succeed.

BOUTELLIS: And you've been in Burundi since—

OUEDRAOGO: I've been in Burundi for one year.

BOUTELLIS: Very good. Well, thank you. In the spirit of the integrated mission, we are holding this exceptional four-person interview, to have all the aspects—not all the aspects, because you mentioned that there are others, but at least a military and

police presence, on the level of advisors, and I therefore invite you to call upon your colleagues.

FAYE: There you have it. Thank you very much, Arthur, for offering us this openness. It's essential. The area we are discussing, with the focus on the police, is very open. We spoke as a preamble about the OECD/DAC handbook, and that already is quite large. Even if the focus is on the police, we cannot but have, in the main, a sector-wide approach, truly open to the whole. Because the issue is the system of force, and in relation to this system of force, I should say, as another preamble, something that is very essential in our reasoning as it relates to the implementation of the mandate we have been given. That is that we are in an eminently private domain. I should say "national". Where we stage foreign interventions very rarely and with difficulty, and even when they are solicited, there are always restrictions, notably insofar as they concern intelligence services, police services, etc. Because for these countries, this is a form of being controlled, more or less, by the Leviathan we call the international community, with its thousand legs, and one does not know who is doing what, who represents whom. Psychologically, it is very difficult.

I say this because I was [Army Chief of Staff 07:49] in my country, Senegal. I spent more than forty years in the army before coming to the UN system, and I know they often prefer bilateral work, based on clearly defined interests. Whereas in the post-crisis situation, the general [UNCLEAR 08:14—moyen?] international community convened in support. It is no longer the little island between two countries; the whole world is trying to contribute by making sure that ultimately, at heart, secondly, and in depth, we are creating conditions favorable to development. And in relation to that, the personnel introduced themselves a moment ago not as military observers, or with UNPOL, but as military advisors and police advisors. That is a fundamental change. Because when one uses these terms, I think that one is no longer within PKO, "Peacekeeping Operations". We are truly within a much more intimate cooperation, in a domain as intimate as national defense, national security, with all the implications, notably windows of vulnerability that we must share, threat assessment that we must share, and other actions that countries are generally reluctant to reveal. How to do it? Here we have profiled an example, under the umbrella of advising, and I think that this state of mind is much more positive.

I have participated in Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Enforcement, chapter 6, chapter 7, in the past. I began in 1978, '79. I was already in Lebanon, in a peacekeeping framework. I was a young commander, like him, and I worked in the [shooting station]. During this period the Lebanese Army had been dismantled, and was in the process of being reassembled with the help of certain countries. The Lebanese "Army," and not "Armée," etc etc., because "to make operational" in French is also "armer". That allowed me to see how one may or may not influence a military system. At the time, the "force commander"--because here we are in an oral tradition—I am a black African, I will speak because this is the discussion tree ["arbre à palabre"]---it was legionnaire [Erskin 10:32]. Erskin was Ghanaian, and we were deployed, UNIFIL, to south Lebanon, the length of the Lebanon-Israel border, with Rosh Hanikra, etc. We had to survey the entire buffer zone, with a composite force, with Europeans, Africans, Muslim countries like Iran, etc.

During this phase, I think one cannot do much. That is why for myself, my experience is that the best conditions for security sector reform in a country, my experience as Army Chief of Staff for a long time and Deputy Army Chief of Staff also, is that during the peacekeeping phase, it is difficult to introduce reform. Why? Because the nation has not finished reconciling with itself, and there must

be elections, after which one can know the direction the country will take. What is the military system, what are the defense and security systems? How they conceive of security—this makes a difference politically. The decision infers political options.

There are armies in Africa that people want to be popular armies. There are also other armies, I think influenced by a former French ambassador to Gabon who spoke of military specificity, highlighting two possible types of armies: the professional army, or the regular army. The formation of these armies—regular or professional—is a political decision to make, and a popular decision as well. Because, for example, here we have a model, an army I would consider professional, whereas in my country we have a conscripted army. Conforming to what was done in France after the 1789 Revolution, and has stopped now. Why? Because it is possible to make the army a source of national solidarity, of civic and moral training for citizens. So, every two years, the young people there leave the army—we retain a small percentage. But the tour of duty must be at the budgetary level of the country. There are certain countries—this is another option—like here, Burundi. I consider this an army of professionals, because they all make it a career, whereas in my country, the officers and petty officers are professionals, but the soldiers, that is, the bulk, are conscripts who cost the state practically nothing, and for whom we have one primary objective, which is to promote national solidarity. So if you are within model A, or B or C, that is an option that you must define, and you must define it through political choices. That is why I said that for a country emerging from crisis, or a country barely entering immediate post-crisis, it is difficult to make these choices before elections, before establishing a system of government. Each time, you can continue assuring security, which is also essential, but for transformation there must be plans, projections, long-term views, and in relation to this, I think these choices cannot be made immediately. In Burundi, with a negotiation panel first, we saw--

BOUTELLIS: In 2004?

FAYE: Already in 2002, we had begun cease-fire negotiations. I myself made the first draft of the cease-fire agreement, in association with our colleagues from DPKO, MPS, Military Planning Service—we proposed two important elements in the appendices of the cease-fire agreement. First, the appendix on the DDR—DDRR, I would even say. Second, an appendix we called FTA, “Forces Technical Agreement”. I myself prefer “Arrangement,” because it is more political and more flexible. Because concerning SSR, I’ll say again, we are at the heart of politics. It is the way of seeing, conceiving, defense and security, imprisonment in secure facilities, and the implementation of [UNCLEAR 15:30—minaire?] as well, securely, to guarantee citizens fulfillment, freedom—freedom of movement for people and goods, and the development of talents, without fear, without famine, forms another, equal part of security and defense.

Because when I conceive of—I have been a Saint Cyrien 15:52] of the class “General De Gaulle”, and when I think of defense, I think of General De Gaulle, what is called the 1959 Ordinance, where he said, “The object of defense is to ensure in all times, in all places, against all form of menace, the protection of people and goods throughout the extent of the national territory, along with keeping watch over international engagements of the concerned country”—that is, France. What this means is that the country is not simply a territory. It is also interests; it is also a very large defense, which is military, diplomatic, even cultural, certainly economic, through customs, through economic protection, the protection of citizens. The struggle against trafficking, etc. etc. This is what he

called “global defense,” in the 1959 Ordinance. I think I will limit—because perhaps we are too oral, we Africans, and I am a historian in my leisure time, military history, and I must say that it helps in understanding, in approaching psychologically, people and their perceptions of defense and citizenship.

BOUTELLIS: You started talking about the fundamental difference between a “peacekeeping” and a “peacebuilding” mission, particularly the fact that security sector reform is so political. Could you give us a brief historical overview—because you have participated in the UN, and now you are a member of the BINUB in Burundi—could you give us a glance at the main challenges the UN was facing, particularly in terms of police reform, and more broadly, security sector reform, at the time, that is, in 2004, after the peace accords. And perhaps now in perspective, after the implementation of the integrated mission in 2007.

FAYE: There you have it. But as a preamble, I would like to reference what I neglected to say a moment ago: there were choices between integration and fusion of forces. In the specific case of Burundi, the army was dominated—82%—by a minority that represented 10% of the population, which had ruled the country for a long time. Apart from the accords, we had to choose from different options. One, integration. That is, the framework is there; come back, rejoin us, everything will work out. Two, fusion. Borrow a segment here, a segment there, and put it together. This architecture had been negotiated politically through what were called the Pretoria Protocols, which were military power sharing, done at the same time as the political power sharing. The Arusha military power sharing was founded not on equity—rather, not on justice but on equity. Why do I say that? Because, to reassure a minority, the Tutsi minority in this country, which held 90% of the military power, we leave them 50% of army and police power. Despite the fact that they are 10% of the population. It is something that must be done gradually. If we take away everything from them, psychologically they will refuse to play the game, perhaps. So they had to give up something, and the other ethnicity—I don’t like to speak of ethnicities, because here in fact ethnicity is very politically forced, and it is regionality that is most important—the other segment, then, is content. 90% of the population, at first hardly represented, accepts the idea of taking half. This is all the same one specific case. And the “un-political parties,” the CNDD-FDD, for example, must take, on the police level, an extra quota—there were quotas for each armed group. It’s a very complex arithmetic--

BOUTELLIS: Former members of the rebellion?

FAYE: Indeed. That is what we call “un-political parties and movements”. The ex-APPM (Armed Political Parties & Movements). So, that is something very particular. Hence the necessity at the time to form what we called the FTA, “Forces Technical Arrangement,” or “Agreement”. And that is what defines the general framework within which the system of force was going to be reconstructed, remade, and gradually transformed, through national plans and programs, supported by the international community. I discussed a moment ago the difference with a peacekeeping mission—often it is conflicted: no one likes having foreign military on their land, nor foreign police officers, with foreign uniforms, especially in large numbers. Especially in a country which has been ruled by the military for a long time. Especially in a young country which needs to affirm itself, and which sees, after colonization, other people arriving with different uniforms, very different behaviors, because it is not the same culture. So there were frictions. That’s normal.

We were operating here under the ONUB, under Chapter 7, because in certain

cases we had to compel the national army or other armed groups to stay with their engagements. For the elections, we had to treat them with equal respect, and keep an equal distance. We had to play at impartiality as it related to armed groups and the army. Consequently, we are forced to be a constraining agent in some ways. They respect us—I think they did respect us—but the cooperation that could not have been formed that way, can be formed now, when we put on the hat “Advising”, that is different. In those cases, we are in the process of implementing, of supervising implementation. Here, in the framework of peacebuilding, we design together and execute together long-term programs, with benchmarks and objectives, evaluation mechanisms, monitoring mechanisms, defined in partnership. Always with firm involvement from the government, as we had in the documents we call the strategic framework for peacebuilding, and equally in the other document, which is a monitoring and tracking mechanism—MTM—a mechanism by which you control—you help the Burundians to control and to coordinate the ensemble of transformations of their system of force, in linking everything to Poverty Reduction Strategies and also to UNDAF, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, and also to peacebuilding strategy and support, which was elaborated through a cooperative liaison with the peacebuilding commission in New York. So you see, this is what guarantees us the participation of even civil society, these mechanisms here. From planning to evaluation. And this happens for the army, the police, and the National Intelligence Services.

BOUTELLIS: Could you give some concrete examples, because security sector reform started de facto after the Arusha Accords. During the peacekeeping period, the UN missions, could you give us concrete examples, perhaps in the field of police reform, of what was attempted, and perhaps some lessons from the first phase of reform?

FAYE: Here, I am going to be a [UNCLEAR 25:02—obdetique?] this time. Arusha, the 2000 accord which is the framework agreement, dates to August 28, 2000. We had President Mandela; we had the American President, what was his name...

OUEDRAOGO: Clinton.

FAYE: Clinton. It was truly a big deal. In the Arusha Accords, the framework agreement, there was a protocol 3 that had to do with the reform of defense and security forces, and it is essential. It recommended, one, a new inter-ethnic partitioning of power in the system of force, ethnic representation to say the least; two, predictably, the suppression of the gendarmerie; three, predictably, the development of the police, which was not represented. The police at the time were only 2,500 people, while the army had 55,000. That is why I insist constantly that the police must not be transformed by itself. We have to transform the entire system. Because in this context, it is a nascent police. And the army is a great power that must be gradually reduced, perhaps by transferring personnel, gendarmerie personnel, because psychologically people will no longer accept seeing gendarmes, and transferred them to the police, and--

BOUTELLIS: Because at the time the gendarmerie was a military force that reported to the Ministry of Defense--

FAYE: No, it was the gendarmerie who did the tortures. So the word “gendarmerie” was poorly perceived. Well, for us Francophones, it was already bizarre. When I arrived, it was already in place. But I had to wait and see; there was much gnashing of teeth: a gendarme who becomes an ordinary policeman doesn't like that too much. Because despite the outfits, the uniforms, it's not so uniform as all

that. People have certain frames of mind. I, as I told you, I'm from a military background, Saint Cyr (French Officers' School), and the colleagues with the gendarmerie were among the military elite. You went to the Legion or the gendarmerie. The others fended for themselves. That is very important. Above all, I will speak to you about numbers. We began with 2,500, split into four categories of police officers. This means that it was the army that formed the police, before. It was the army that arrested people. The army, and the gendarmerie, which depended on the army. And that was rejected by the Burundian people, the Burundian politicians, and those who supported the idea of transformation. So, in the case of Burundi, it is truly a new police. And this new police needs so many things; it is very much under construction.

This is why we must make the effort to, one, train them, organize them, and of course it is not an external influence that does that. It is truly a national effort, a national need. With national partners, who are aided in this construction, this transformation, and the integration of the system of force, capable of fulfilling its function. There was a conceptual aid to help define the roles of the army, the police, and the gendarmerie—no, the army, the police and the national intelligence service. Because if we focus solely on the police, we forget that what it does—there are others who believe that this is still their duty, that is, all the military men who 10, 20, 40 years ago, arrested people, and made the law. We must deal with them simultaneously. Without which you're going to have them in the street and people who are going to return.

I think here we are in an intellectual framework, and we must wait and see what it adds. For example, in Iraq, a speedy suppression, not only by the DDR. The DDR is in the process of downsizing—even there it is difficult. It's a process, a program. "Right-sizing" is very difficult for the DDR. Currently there is a crisis with certain Tutsi officers. 750 officers who have to leave, but who are dragging their heels. Why? Because there are no jobs outside of the state, or with the world bank, the IMF. There is a need to help this country implement a system of force, adapted to threats, but also adapted to the national resources, the national budget. For a time, it must be helped, accompanied, but this cannot last. Let me say, it was 55,000 for a country of 6, 7 million inhabitants. 55,000 in the military and 2,500 police officers. That is the great imbalance that provoked everything we saw. We had to integrate, train, etc., and the Burundians put certain laws, certain rules into place, which allowed the implementation, with the support of the international community, I must add, and especially of certain European countries, at the most critical moments for the launch of the process, to help them launch the process—and it is a process, and not a short one, and not an easy one. So, there are no miracle cures in relation to this.

To help them on the conceptual level, we implemented here, starting on January 1 2004, with the ONUB, a system of coordination that we called ICG, the International Coordinating Group on Security Sector Reform. With all local goodwill, each one tells the other what he is doing. And we, ONUB, were there to advise the Burundian authorities on the possible options, pushing them towards certain ones. Certain options for the implementation and development of the most essential functions of the army, the police, the intelligence services, in an equitable manner. This was done notably through the JCC, Joint Ceasefire Commission, presided over by the force commander, also from the inside, since the Burundians called up the [Joint 32:18] Chiefs of Staff, integrated among the rebels and their chiefs, international, and thus no advice from many of the bilateral partners who were interested: France, Belgium, the United States—I won't list because I'll forget some. Holland was very active also. Many countries, mostly Western, but also China, the Sudan, etc etc.

It is a very difficult field. The major problem when you have this is in the area of our usual mandates. We are not capable of coordinating all this. How do you do it? You help the government to coordinate. That means the sovereign government in its country coordinates the external aid and support—it concentrates them, it manages them. And this is how we, as police, army, intelligence services advisors, help to implement mechanisms that help the Burundians coordinate external support. Because it is difficult—and we knew this from the beginning—all these large countries who were intervening were not going to order themselves, or coordinate, according to a bureaucratic system like the ONUB we have. Because there are national interests, etc. But by making ourselves accepted by the Burundians, and through demanding that they create the coordination structures that we support, we succeeded in seeing, pretty much, and establishing matrices that permitted, in terms of SSR, supervising all the aid, and advising in relation to the gaps that were repaired by the competent Burundian authorities.

BOUTELLIS: Could I ask you to detail these gaps, perhaps what we could call the principal challenges, because you have already spoken of the relative sizes of the army and the police, and perhaps you could detail some of the essential challenges, which calibrated the [UNCLEAR 34:37] response.

FAYE: You know, when we made the amalgam, or the mixture—amalgam is the French term from the time of the Revolution—between these troops of diverse origin, from the same country but with diverse training, there were naturally problems. We had to work on, for example, what we call rank harmonization. How to give ranks to people who have never gone to military school, or sometimes, who have never gone to school at all? And who must become police commissioners? Oh, yes. Even if they don't know the law. Who must become generals, because there are 20,000 soldiers. Etc., etc. So we had to do this—I mean in a structural manner, of course there are gaps. And at first, with the accords, we had planned upgrading training for all those who had the authority without having the competence. That means, from top to bottom, for them logistics meant going to the village next door and taking everything they could. That was logistics for the “guerrilleros”.

And then, command was the guard in his territory, rather than on the national level; so a moral and civic training is essential to understand something more than one's own ethnic group. Something more than one's village. All of this, we had a moral training program, on which they were working when I pulled it, a moment ago, where they had to give people continuous civic and moral information, because they were at war for 14 years, each one defending his own ethnic group or his own territory, his own party. How to transform people from a politico-military situation to a military situation of service to the whole nation and not one part? Because these people it was exactly that, they still saw, even generals still saw themselves as of a particular party. I will not name the party. And they reacted to defend this party, sometimes. It was politico-military. They worked for, essentially, a given movement: Nkurunziza (current Burundian President) was a major military commander, but politically—he was the head of the party. Militarily, he was a Major.

You see, these mixtures in times of guerrilla warfare, when we put things back into a consistent system of force, it is very difficult. As much for those who are coming as for those who receive them. I helped with rank harmonization. There were colonels who said, “But colonel, you can't be serious; you were in the army. I have 35 years of service. This young man of 35 has said he is the colonel. How can you ask me to obey him?” You see. And he says “Yes.” But he

[UNCLEAR 37:35] and so on and so on. He went to the University of the bush. Yes, the university of ambush, of severing hands. The [UNCLEAR 37:45—paie-ou-pas/PUPA?] There must be tit for tat. It is a moral truth, it is a psychological truth; it is realism.

We helped make it the most realistic possible. For example, the people who truly did not know how to write, they could not be generals, they could only do politics. Because in any case, there were political ranks and military ranks. And the ranks were not important. So you see the challenge of training, the challenge of integration, the challenge of acceptance from both sides. The people who had gone to the best military universities—I should say that the Burundian armed forces, at the time, were created to govern the country. There is no officer from the ex-FAB who does not have a degree. And now they were working with people who on average had never in fact been to school. Even among their fellow officers, those who were in the first, second year of school were generals. And they had never finished their studies, because they had been exiled from the country. That is what you must explain to everyone. You must say, “You are responsible for his hardships, as he is responsible for yours, and it is from playing at war.” Because the enemy becomes the one you believe is the enemy, that’s it.

We are in a no-exit situation; how to get out of it? Really, I think that the key is the Burundians, because there was no friction between the troops. There was no shock. Really, they were [disarmed 39:18] and found themselves there, at Tenga, with the help of four countries, who created Camp Hope at Tenga, 20 kilometers from here. At the UN, we were trembling: they are going to flee in the night, they are going to cut each other’s throats—nothing. They put their weapons together, each group held a key. And gradually, trust was established. It required a situation like that, where people were plunged into it. We plunged together in order to swim. That was really the trigger.

But to give a better view of things, there were many activities, within the system and outside the system of the United Nations, in partnership with the whole world, to make joint programs. These joint programs were drawn up among the UN Counter-Team, from 2006, while the international partners, who supported the SSR, the DDR, and others, the development partners, to make 3 central modules, which represent so many of the sections integrated into this mission. It is a joint program, with the [UNCLEAR 40:46—j’y rappelle/GRP?] government: SSR, Security Sector Reform, Small Arms, which means civilian disarmament, with aspects of mine action. Secondly, an integrated program, [atlatc 41:01]. Comprised of the security government and other forms of government on the civil level, like the level of political organization, etc. A third program is Human Rights and Justice. It is these three sections which are integrated, with, as I indicated for another section, elements from many sources, and Burundian nationals working with us, in the framework that has been described, the plan-sectorial framework. We have a sectorial plan for the police, for the military, for the FDN, for the intelligence services. We have not yet succeeded, but we must gradually make sector-wide security systems.

BOUTELLIS: If you’ll permit me, I would like, before we speak about BINUB’s current programs, I would like to revisit training programs for a moment, the first that took place in the upgrading training, as you were saying. You mentioned the principal challenges at the time; so, after 2004, that is the amalgamation of different forces, and the equalization, because you had nearly three quarters of the new police force, as you said, a young police force, not trained as police officers. I was going to ask you at that moment, to what aspect of training would you give

priority, in this upgrading training, and what it would consist of, concretely, how long it would last, what modules are--

FAYE: Here once again I speak as an African, having assumed command responsibilities. In this field, everyone is jealous. I look poorly on sending Russians, trained, I don't know, Turks or Yugoslavs or the French, in such and such terrain, even after conflict, after such and such situation. It is something of the same thing here, doubled by the colonial complex, where when you see once again certain uniforms and approaches, it is immediately off-putting. To do this, we needed to work with a base of national will, which we had to awaken, reinforcing good will, and creating real will, affirmed political will. So, awaken. How? Through dialogue of the two major parties, which are in Burundi Hutu/Tutsi. And by pointing to everything that had been conceptualized in the framework of the accords: military power-sharing, political power-sharing. Also in the spirit of Arusha, which is a spirit of reconciliation. We must train; therefore we must plan. The needs—it's quickly done—the army, like the police, like the intelligence services, put chiefs of staff into place, and training. Which identifies the needs, quickly, because we know who is who. And which develops programs.

These programs are formed with the support of the international community. Certain countries essentially bilaterally, but when there are gaps, we identify them and try to see which countries can come to help with goodwill. Because there are some who would not pick Burundi. And here I must say that we were helped, at least in terms of infrastructure, by certain countries that I do not wish to single out, for the reason that we must really be impartial in this process. But also, I would say, the gaps we were able to help fill, through the resources of the peace-building fund, which permitted putting into place the infrastructure of the camps, the places where we could train people, secure camps, true camps, which permitted the military to stay in the barracks, to have weapons in the armories, to facilitate their contact with the civil population, to facilitate command and control, to give them mobility, permitting command to be present everywhere and to survey the troops, and to work on the civilian level as well, to create possibilities of civilian oversight, through ministerial responsibilities, inspections, which we tried to reinforce with the help of PNUD, etc., which—we saw a certain number of key points. While leaving the initiative and the large works really to the bilateral partners, because we are not equipped to stay long. And in any case, we are so heterogeneous that we can help in the first phases, but undoubtedly no country will let itself be advised by people so diverse as a Senegalese, a Swiss, an American, and—what else do we have as nationalities here?

You see, from the moment the state affirms itself, it has ambitions, it has politics, alliances, which are not those of the international community. For example, the Sudan intervenes seriously here. We are not happy about it, but that's how it is. In the area of intelligence, that is their national choice. We can do nothing; we must live with it. We must try to pull the most out of it, to inform the rest of the international community, not to spend too much money on inter-domain issues, because there are others who are taking care of it—China, which is there, which gives certain things. Two weeks ago, when I was in South Africa—no, in Tanzania for [FNL 47:31]. Someone told me that there was a suspicious cargo load at the airport. The whole community got excited—but it is an independent country. Oh, yes. You cannot control every little detail. So it ended; it is exceedingly delicate. One must respect sovereignty. It is a country that came to help. Now, it is not our [responsibility 47:55] because we were not informed. But you must be vigilant, and follow closely. Once you follow, you return with

counsel. You can't say, "Hey, you there! Don't do it again." Because if one respects principals, Burundi is our patron. It is part of the United Nations. It is not a failed state. And if you don't go in with this mindset of respect, they will not engage with us. They will leave us, with all our counsel, sitting in our corner. For transformation to take place, it is necessary both to persuade and to convince. Persuasion is the art. Convincing is the mathematical demonstration, to the Swiss or the German, or I don't know what. Persuasion is like a religion, because defense, security, is so intimate it's like love. It is not the reason, it's the way it is given. In some ways the hand that gives is always above the one that receives; that already is quite humiliating. We forget it often. But the pill must be swallowed. It's not worth it to give suppositories when you can apply a compress, nor to flaunt certain weaknesses, which are real, but there are ways to cause awareness, knowing that the hunchback never sees his back. Somehow, he must be made to feel it, and transform it, to make it acceptable. That is the great challenge. How to intervene in these intimate domains, practically in family life? In this profound intimacy of nations, of a sovereign state, which, recovering its sovereignty, is all the more possessive of it.

You must not—I remind you that the ONUB was truly sent away, repelled. We had a mission commander who was—two mission commanders, practically *persona non grata*. It's true. But that corresponded to their role. This role was played, in the framework of the PKO, because we imposed certain things, we had a mandate, chapter 7; we could not compromise. If populations are menaced from a certain corner, we go and we say, "Hey, you, don't touch these people. We are assuring their protection." Assuring their protection; if not, we betray the Security Council, boom. That is how we treated them. Before and during the elections, and after the elections. We had a problem. And we continued to speak, to act and to show up always with our varied and diverse uniforms, our varied and diverse mindsets, our diverse attitudes, in a country that is a small country, which finally said, "That's enough." That is to say, a foreigner is always poorly received when he is in uniform. That's how it is. I think that if Senegalese came to Switzerland, or when Senegalese troops, with France in 1870, came into Germany against Bismarck and the others, they were not called. Yes, but this is how people perceive.

So, now, there are weaknesses, needs, that must be filled with the necessary intelligence and courage, and the capacity to adapt to mindsets, which have become very, very anti-foreign. We saw it in the Sudan. We saw it elsewhere—pick almost any country. This is the problem of Africans. They have a post-colonial complex. So, take a man who needs the whole world to govern the end of his conflicts, and development, but at the same time he doesn't want to see them. So, you see—you love your doctor, but you don't want to see him. You have problems; he too has problems.

BOUTELLIS: I would like now to ask you to pass to the current period, perhaps if there are particular lessons from this first phase—here you've already begun to talk about it, because these are very general lessons—but are there particular lessons, perhaps in terms of training, how it was given in times of reform, lessons to learn on a technical level, either because it had relative effects or because it did not quite work, and also because it guides you, perhaps, within the mandate of the BINUB.

FAYE: Here I think I will let my colleagues speak in a moment, but I would like to begin, because when they arrived, I welcomed them by saying, "Everything you learned under a PKO mandate, you must forget. You are advisors now. You are admitted to the court, and sometimes you must persuade rather than convince."

It is no longer reason—we must, almost like a religion, bring people to believe that one, they must accept the other, who was an enemy yesterday, in a context where national reconciliation is still yet to come, where justice has not yet been served. Where you live with the one who killed your father or your grandfather or your brother, in the same building. Where people rub elbows.

What did they call it in the Congo, their formula that was a fiasco there? The “brassages” [mixing]. Words are essential. Already, nothing but that word, it makes grinding motions; it means disorder. “Brassages”, it’s almost—when they could have chosen words that appeal to the intelligence, that appeal to unity also. “Integration”. In France, they spoke of “amalgam,” I said a moment ago, in the historical survey. That is taking copper, iron, mixing them—that’s amalgam. It is a stronger metal, a more noble metal. But here, I don’t know what they did to come up with “brassages”. “Brassages,” it leaves a chaotic sound echoing in my head.

Or then, this must be an initial phase. It is like gathering stones before making a building. To one side. Tac, tac, tac. Or putting the yellow mud here, the green mud here. Everything else remains to be done. You have to make the plans; you have to build the structure. They cannot extricate themselves, content at not having overstepped. It’s a conceptual pitfall. Because the concept is first of all the way one sees things, the vision. The role of the army, security police, in the national-citizen system. But, look, Nkunda, he is not going to budge. There are things—well, briefly. Here, there was integration. Integration, transformation. All of it was done through relying on nationals. The UN must not come as usual, with its science. And we are pretentious. There will be overdeveloped brains on parade for a year, who think they have defined the future of nations. So, this work must be done with a great deal of humility, of knowledge, certainly, but especially of courage. And this works. I assure you that it works, when done with a great deal of courage. It is not simply quid pro quo. The interest is not only, “I’m giving you this cargo, I’m giving you bread.” It is not support programs, but a process of support. Which demands a great deal of investment from the heart. Ask them, really what is needed—it is beyond the rational, because in emerging from a crisis one always dwells in the irrational, especially after an ethnic crisis. One is always in the irrational. We are emerging from conflict; we are not post-conflict yet. Conflict is ongoing. The day before yesterday, someone attacked, here, three of our colleagues. Throwing stones. Why? Yesterday, we held a session about it. Yet you are not the enemy. Somehow there are overflows. That is already a sickness. They kill each other, and look for—the foreigner is always the scapegoat. So, alas, it falls to us. That’s how it is. Well, we have to limit it, and we will do everything possible to threaten those who did it, and to have them arrested. And so on, and so on, which I can’t say here. Because that’s how it is.

But one has to take these risks, to trust the humanity of these people. To believe, and to respect, even if they are poor, even if they are weak, weak in terms of national solidarity, because we are not here to vanquish, to win. We are here to help, and to transform. To help through counsel, through illumination—illumination, support, guidance, but always with the nationals in the driver’s seat. Everyone knows me a little in Bujumbura. Almost no one has seen me. They accuse me of everything, but they don’t see me, because I have no need to be seen. I have no need of the TV, where people come on certain [UNCLEAR 58:19—CCME?] programs and say, “We have transformed, we have trained so many officers...” We are here to help them deliver, not to deliver in their place. Because really, in the UN, it is often like that. The balance favors oneself. Yes. Because in our respective police forces, or armies, one is judged on this. So,

there is a competition to excess. Military officers, police officers, are like that. Me, I tell you, I was in an elite school where we were trained like that. Preparatory school exams, prep school for the elite universities, Saint Cyr [58:58] exam, competitive exams for whatever, you name it; exams for exams. We have a spirit of competition. We're going to do [UNCLEAR 59:04] and then we're going to write. I've even seen one of our police officers, from ONUB or UNPOL, who wrote a pamphlet: "My contribution to maintaining the peace as an individual." What sense, what meaning? You see, it's in some way insulting. And above all, I've seen it with Burundian men, who laugh... But as a result of the competition!

When it came time to execute the mandate, it was discussed face to face, and it was I personally who prepared—some of them had said, "We don't want any more police officers. That's enough, we've humiliated these people from ONUB enough." But here, there are pamphlets ready to be distributed, but you take the pamphlet and you say, "here is a unique thought." But people reject that, they say, "Thanks, you can go stuff it, your pamphlet." [Aside:] It's not possible, ok? I'll see you afterwards. [Voice: Okay.] The law is like this. The police are like this. The army is like that. It's not true. Everything is relative. There are many options. There are armies of development, there are armies of war, there are armies of citizens, but the states comes with its format, the format it knows, for example certain Europeans who have formats. No, but it's true. Because even in Europe, when we put these cases into place, I saw frictions. Yes, because there is not the same mentality—a Dutchman is a go-getter. A Brit is dogged; he wants fundamental, durable objectives. A Frenchman—they're my cousins. I won't talk about Italians. All of this is to say that, you say you have the only truth. That's not true. Africans, too, it's so pretentious, because they went to a European university, a military school. That's how we learn to address the same things, in balance.

The Burundian Army was trained in Egypt, in Algeria, in Russia. You have to know this as background. They don't speak. That is their national quality, or defect. They always listen to you, but they do what they want. How to manage this? Well, now, on the level of lessons, I think we should talk about the police in particular, I think we learned a great deal. FDN, which is an incredibly professional army in one area, because as I said, they were the elite who were to rule the country. They were regional governors, ministers, everything. Bank directors, Air Burundi directors. So, now when they have to leave the army, these are serious frictions, because there are 750 left, and they have to leave, to make room for Hutus. But there are no jobs. And military men don't economize; they live large. It's very human, as well, and political. Commissioner, I pass the baton to you. Wait, I'll give him this. I'm going to see Colonel [UNCLEAR 62:32-38]. Isn't that right?

BOUTELLIS: Very good. Thank you very much, Colonel. Well then. There are many things which have been said, but perhaps you can give us particular points on some lessons in the area of the police, police reform, perhaps in the past, perhaps which are guiding the new efforts of the BINUB, still on the level of the advisory effort, because that is the topic we emphasize. Working in collaboration with the Burundian authorities, as well as the different international actors.

OUEDRAOGO: Thank you. In fact, the Colonel has said practically everything. What I could give is just a small appendix. So, our mandate is to work on the transformation of mentalities, to succeed in creating out of the police force a civil police, which fulfills the classic missions of the protection of people and goods, of republican institutions, of human rights—law and human rights. So, to do this, we place the

emphasis on reinforcement. The operational and technical capacities of the members of the police force, by their training, by the apportionment, an appropriate equipment for police missions, and by the assistance, advisory or directing, of the Burundian National Police. And there is another aspect, the aspect of moral training of the workforce, in which we intervened as well by helping them form a general inspection of police services. So, as the Colonel said, here everything is a priority. Within the police force, everything is a priority. Training, equipment, everything is a priority. As the Colonel said, the majority of police officers are former “guerreros,” who came down from the bush with their unique knowledge of weapons, and who, all told, only received what we called “harmonization training,” which I believe lasted less than two weeks, when we were not yet there. So, to try to—

BOUTELLIS: And which is not yet over, which continues up until today, harmonization training?

OUEDRAOGO: No, now we’ve moved on to training—that’s over.

BOUTELLIS: It’s over, okay.

OUEDRAOGO: It was over even before our—

BOUTELLIS: Before the BINUB.

OUEDRAOGO: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Okay.

OUEDRAOGO: The major difficulty, on the training level, first of all you have almost 90 percent of the current police workforce who are only literate in Kirundi, the local language.

BOUTELLIS: 90 percent!

OUEDRAOGO: Close to 90 percent. So, there is no opportunity for us to advise, to intervene directly in their training, on the level of the initial training. It’s not possible, because we don’t speak the language. So, how do we proceed? We proceed to the training of the instructors. That had already been done, mostly through Belgian cooperation, and we had supported the instructors who had been trained by the Belgians. We had, at a previous time, supported them in the classes, in the course of this training, the training of 1000 police officers, in ethics and code of conduct. The training was financed through Belgian cooperation, with instructors whom they had already trained, and whom we supported in the classes. So, the principal difficulty, that was it. It is not possible for us to do initial training. Even in all the programs that we were asked to implement for training, it is in collaboration with Burundian officers.

FAYE: That we don’t implement, but rather they implement with our help.

OUEDRAOGO: Exactly. The commissioner general of training is always a partner; we don’t do anything without—

FAYE: He is always the leader, because it is we who are partners.

OUEDRAOGO: Exactly.

FAYE: That is really it, the fact that you can make yourself accepted or not, it's a function of that. Because you have the habit of believing that you determine the truth, but that is not the case in these areas. There is not one single model of an army. The Swiss Army, the French Army, the American Army, the Belgian Army—they are not the same. And we all come with our different experiences, and we say, "There." It depends on the individual speaking. Afterwards, it's a cacophony. It must be they who decide. And there are countries who will help, like Holland. They helped to create a seminar that helped accomplish a plan—

OUEDRAOGO: Of strategic development—

FAYE: Of strategic development for the police. And that is important. And everyone rallied around this plan. You don't think of defense at the expense of the others. They thought of helping them refine the way they see things. What they see as a risk, what they see as a vulnerability—they see it better than anyone—and if it's within the general logic of a system of defense and security, we support them. If not, we advise them, to rectify the aim, so that it might be something acceptable from the international point of view. There are norms, in any case, for the army, the police. You can't have an army of 50,000 men in a small country like this.

OUEDRAOGO: So, the current manpower is, one could say, excessive. Because it is identical to what there is in the army.

FAYE: But why "excessive"?

BOUTELLIS: In the Burundian National Police. So, around 20,000 police officers.

OUEDRAOGO: 20,000 currently.

FAYE: But that is going to reduce.

OUEDRAOGO: There is a reduction predicted, to 15,000. That's what has been forecast.

FAYE: But the Burundians tells you, "You're forcing us to reduce, despite the fact that we have no mobility, nor radio, and we must be present in the maximum of possible places. How do we do it?" So, we must help them create factors that multiply efficacy, which are, [Rue-radio 72:09].

BOUTELLIS: The equipping projects you mentioned—communication—

OUEDRAOGO: Yes, exactly, the equipping projects: mobility, with vehicles—

BOUTELLIS: Vehicles—

FAYE: If that is not there, it's a bit illusory to want people to reduce manpower, and still be effective. Outside of [UNCLEAR 72:25—grab?] crime. We could share with him the trends of crime since 2006, which corresponds to the end of the crisis—there is always a criminal element developing, especially in cities. It goes up and up.

BOUTELLIS: So on what basis was the number of 15,000 put forward—why reduce 20,000 to 15,000?

FAYE: In fact, the calculations were based on the country's capacity and the current threats.

BOUTELLIS: Budgetary capacity? All right.

FAYE: If there is a turn towards militarization or policization of a country, two per thousand, one per thousand, according to the situation, and that is an average. And that was the subject of a discussion in January 2004, with the lending countries, January 14 and 15 2004, when they were helping Burundi to create its plan, helping with the demobilization and reduction of the system of force. So there are references. That is the only index of a society's turn towards militarization. There is a number of police officers per citizen, a number, like for doctors, as in all areas. That is the international rational approach—the IMF, or the World Bank, and other organizations. It's flexible. It depends on circumstances and on the environment.

BOUTELLIS: An indication of national unity.

FAYE: Yes, because here we have continuing warfare, in Kivu. There are more third parties preparing also. Even if the country is calm, there is a regional dimension to develop. And security, it's the way in which the country's citizens perceive it, it's not us saying, "No, MONUC is there, don't worry about it." You cannot delegate sovereignty in these areas. You can accept help. But if ever Mai-Mai troops were to violate Burundi's honor, what are we going to say? We're going to say, "Evacuate the UN." Oh yes, that's how it is. We can't make war on behalf of the Burundians, right? But they know this too. Because there have been previous experiences. So it is a [UNCLEAR 74:38—galon?]. They have to feel that there is security, and if they feel it, afterwards there can be transformation; we can help them transform. And our Swiss colleague—

BOUTELLIS: Did you have another point? You finished—the principal points—

OUEDRAOGO: Yes, the Colonel mentioned a crucial current problem: the denuded state in which the police services find themselves, when you go to the interior. The strict minimum is not there; so the idea is to compensate for the lack of mobility by an excess of manpower.

FAYE: I am going to tell you a story. When our colleagues were attacked—we have Burundians, police and admin, who work with me. There are around 180. These people are internal, to us. But because there were Burundian civilians in town, they could not go arresting people in the name of the UN. So we called the national police. They took an hour and a half to arrive.

OUEDRAOGO: An hour and fifty minutes.

FAYE: In the meantime, our people could have died. Our people here were scandalized. But they couldn't have come faster! First of all, the phone call to call someone, that takes 45 minutes. Yes! Even us, when we communicate outside our ratio posts. But we had difficulty, because the network doesn't function.

OUEDRAOGO: The network [UNCLEAR 76:05]

FAYE: So I told them yesterday, we have to draw a conclusion and help them implement regional operational centers which would allow them to know in real time that such and such incident resulted in so many people dead, wounded, etc., and so on, such that the minister, the National Security Advisor soon, could be aware of it. If you don't measure the risks, the vulnerabilities or the incidents, you can't help bring about solutions, remedies, in real time. It's not possible. You can't

demand the impossible of them. It was us; so, people were scandalized.
“They’re not serious people, they’re [UNCLEAR 76:47—munic?]. Poor people.”
Poor in terms of organization. But who still made them hurry up.

OUEDRAOGO: In the framework of projected DDF projects, we can in any case offer them support—

BOUTELLIS: What you were talking about, the communication networks—

OUEDRAOGO: Yes, all that is [UNCLEAR 77:08]

FAYE: But of course, for centers—

OUEDRAOGO: We have projected the establishment [UNCLEAR 77:11]

FAYE: If not, there is no [UNCLEAR 77:10]

BOUTELLIS: Mrs. [Lele – Chief Police Advisors Unit of BINUB] described the general points.

OUEDRAOGO: Five centers of operations that have already been determined, located, and the equipment ordered.

FAYE: There you have it. That’s centers of operations with equipment, reliable radios, informational elements—

OUEDRAOGO: With equipment, radios, computerization on the provincial level—

FAYE: Which allow them to measure crime and the management of criminal cases, like those of justice, they wear us out—

OUEDRAOGO: And reinforcing materially the mobile or provincial police-judicial police stations. That’s to be able to relieve the crowding in the prisons, and others.

FAYE: The system is truly implicated, in an inextricable way, and really I have to salute, it’s really the bilateral partners who are doing it. Oh yes. The Dutch, it’s they who have equipped the whole police force with vehicles, the entire police force with vehicles, including trucks, since the elections.

OUEDRAOGO: Yes, and even radio.

FAYE: And who help them function. And the Belgians, the French, etc. Because the bilateral partners, they last. We, it’s a one-year unrenovable mandate, and if perhaps before the project mandate one of the BINUB personnel is killed, they tell us, we’re going home. So we are not reliable, long-term! Therefore it’s the bilateral partners who are the most essential. We are already a bit [UNCLEAR 78:49—qui-est-tout?] to help [UNCLEAR 78:51—eguate?] the systems. Open up, signpost the future paths. But the future cannot be a conglomerate like ours. The future is cooperation among people of their own choice, with a mutual comprehension of common interests. For now, everyone’s interest is peace, consolidating the peace. Afterwards, there are home bases for different cooperations.

BOUTELLIS: Very good.

FAYE: I like to provoke my Swiss over there.

BOUTELLIS: ---commentary, uh—

HEULIN: The Swiss...

FAYE: [INDECIPHERABLE] his officer as well.

BOUTELLIS: So, we'll change the question at the same time, and it is a question of intelligence.

FAYE: [INDECIPHERABLE]—Pour le medal obliger pas admis] intelligence: information.

BOUTELLIS: Information. Well, whatever applies. Could you perhaps rapidly explain if that applies both to members of the military and to police officers, or how the unity of information functions, vis-à-vis the other—

FAYE: It's not a specific idea; it's a function, which has—

HEULIN: It's a function.

FAYE: And with someone who has a profile, who has been in the Congo, and who certainly can't do this work openly, it's the collection of cross-references, with the help of our friends, our colleagues the United Nations who are along this border, this zone of Congo, Rwanda, AO, etc. And who help, who take on tasks like the [INDECIPHERABLE] of the FNL, which we are not charged with overseeing, but we are interested in, etc.

BOUTELLIS: So, Chief of Staff ,quickly, since I'm sorry, we don't have much more time, if you could note the principal challenges and how your colleague on the level of the police, some key projects to respond to just these challenges.

HEULIN: All right. The principal challenges, if I simply look at the framework of our military-advisor unity, we are eight, coming from eight different countries. So the first challenge is to arrive at what each one takes from himself, what he gives of himself, so we can work together. Because the big danger, each one comes from his or her own country, each one has the attitude of knowing everything, so we don't realize that in fact, even if we are all military, we have different ways of doing things. So, first of all there must be that. Second is to understand the country where you're going. The danger is to come here, to Burundi, and to see Burundi with a Swiss eye. If I see Burundi with a Swiss eye, I will understand nothing. And I won't be accepted. People will accept me, they'll be polite to me, because maybe they can get one of the vehicles—I'm giving things out, equipment, but everything else, it won't even be used, it won't function. The goal of the project is to give vehicles for, for example, a more mobile police force. Yes, but my advice won't be accepted because I don't understand them; the vehicles will disappear somewhere, they'll rot; two months after I leave they won't be used at all, they will be completely rotten.

FAYE: Absolutely.

HEULIN: So, I must be able to understand, so that the Burundians may accept me. And once I am accepted, I can begin to advise. If not, I can talk, we can do projects, etc. In a year, you go back home, and they'll say, "Oh, he's far away, perfect, we can start doing our work without that interference." But it is essential that one be able to, one, come together and understand them, and then be accepted, then use the two languages. That is the biggest challenge. Once you've done that, you can get to work. If I take, for example, in the context of my work, military training, I am incapable of analyzing a situation if I can't understand the country.

Why people are doing this, etc., or this—there is a whole history behind their mentality, so you have to, once again, you have to understand them. Then, afterwards, come the projects.

Once we had, this was several months ago now, a seminar in the area of logistics, talking about the creation of a peacekeeping center, for peacekeeping training. And at first, the first day, there was a sort of—the message wasn't getting through. The person in charge, it was an advisor from an outside country, a bilateral partner. And he, frustrated, at the end of the day, "These people don't understand me!" In fact, the problem was him: he spoke, he acted, as if we were speaking to people of his own country. So the Burundians could not accept that, did not understand. Then, he understood. "Oh, wait, I am speaking with Burundians; I must adapt." And the Burundians saw his efforts; the message got through. But he had to make this—understand whom he was speaking to. Then, they accepted, and then you can talk. You can't impose something. You can give ideas, you can advise them, that's why we have the term "well-advised," you can advise them, but you can't wait for them to take everything. They are going to take what they need. And if you understand them, they will take more, but if you don't understand them, they will take nothing. That is the great difficulty.

In the military framework, we have PBF projects, barracks. The point is to withdraw the troops that are on the ground, who, for logistical reasons, are helping themselves at the neighbors'. I'm not saying they want to—you're hungry, you have to eat, we're human, that's it. So we decided to put them in barracks; once they're in the barracks, we have a moral training project, to make them understand basic discipline, "command and control," so they behave—in parentheses, we can't do any more militarily, and at the same time there is the third project to tie in, which is family. Because there are servicemen who will be sent to the provinces; they'll be moved to the provinces, so we have to make it so that the families can follow, so the servicemen will accept these measures. There is another great challenge, which is that the projects not be there for us, as foreigners, but that they be there for the Burundians, that they see the benefits of all of this. We are here, in fact, just for support, to advise them. There you have it.

FAYE: Our richness is in our diversity, in fact. Each of us has a panoply to offer. I am sure that what the Swiss Army learned at school is another model of the army. Pakistan is yet another—"the police" is not "the police". Already, we have difficulty conceiving of how Anglo-Saxons are organized in terms of police, with elected sheriffs and such things; it's difficult to conceive of in the French law system. One cannot have, then, a unique truth. Somewhere, we must find the middle ground, and see how it fits into the realities here.

The fundamental principal is that of reality. The second is really respect for those we come to help. And to do it with all the art of persuasion, and not straitjackets. For the maniacs emerging from war, you have to guide them in a unique direction. That also, if you do it, you lose your investment, because there will be no ownership. Already in taking your money—me, I have done this already, insofar as I work with countries who imposed things on us; who gave things to us. [UNCLEAR 87:05] Even the Chinese, who come to—they know we're affiliated with France, and they come and say, "We offer you this." You don't say no. But you know how to use it. One is something of a liar, in fact. It doesn't help anyone. Everyone loses.

BOUTELLIS: Very good. Well, you have all been very generous with your time. I must thank you, the whole SSR unit, and we'll end there. Thank you.