



# INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

*An initiative of  
the National Academy of Public Administration,  
and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs  
and the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice,  
Princeton University*

Oral History Program

Series: Policing  
Interview no.: L8

Interviewee: Oliver Janser  
Interviewer: Arthur Boutellis  
Date of Interview: 25 July 2008  
Location: OSCE  
Priština  
Kosovo

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**BOUTELLIS:** Today is the 25<sup>th</sup> of July 2008 and I am now sitting with Oliver Janser who is Acting Deputy Director of the Department of Public Safety with the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Kosovo. We are now in the OSCE main building in Priština, Kosovo. First thank you for your time. Before we start the interview I'd like you to please confirm that you have given your consent to the interview.

**JANSER:** *Good morning, of course I gave my consent to be part of this important field study.*

**BOUTELLIS:** Thank you very much. I'd like to start by learning a bit more about your personal background, the jobs you held before this position and how did you get involved in the policing field.

**JANSER:** *I was 17 years with the Federal Police in Germany as a normal investigator and officer on the street. I have another background, I was a peer counselor in the police there. At one point I thought it would be nice to go abroad and work internationally. This is when I came to Kosovo. I applied first as a peer counselor but then due to political reasons, again, this was a good example, I was pre-selected in Germany to be the peer counselor in Prizren because this was my background. Also at home I was part of the critical incident, stress management group in the Federal Police, I developed it there. Politically somebody thought I should go to the Border Police when I came to the mission here. That was all with the pre-selection.*

*I was one year as a civilian police officer here with UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) with my police service from home. I was at the airport for three months and then later I always say I had the most dangerous job in Kosovo, I was the Chief of the Bicycle Unit in Priština. This means I would do all the duties a police officer does on a bicycle with a team of five or six internationals and about fifteen national Kosovo Police.*

*Then later I thought it was nice to work internationally. I also met my future wife here who is American. I basically went back, quit my job at home and came to the mission with OSCE and started out as an instructor in the tactical unit. At that time it was at the Kosovo Police Service school, the Department of Police Education and Development. After a short time, one week, I was the team leader there.*

**BOUTELLIS:** That was what year? You first came to CIVPOL in 2000?

**JANSER:** *I came to Kosovo as a CIVPOL in 2001 to 2002 and then in 2002 I started basically what I always call my second career because I basically quit my safe job in Germany because I was a civil servant for life and I changed it for a six-month contract. I very quickly realized that you have to do something so I started my studies. I did a distance degree at the University in Leicester, former Scarman Center, now it is the Department of Criminology. I did a Masters' Degree in Risk Crisis and Disaster Management. The main focus was on terrorism and peacekeeping. This was my Master's thesis.*

*Again I started out being in the defensive tactics. Over time I became the chief of this section which was the second largest section in the Kosovo Police Service school. Then later under the former Director, Steve Bennett, he was quite proactive in terms that we have to look into European training and European bilateral funding. So I became the European bilateral program manager which*

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*means that I basically coordinated all bilateral funding which was from European countries and non-European countries. I also, for some time, managed the US ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) funding in the area of organized crime. This is basically the main area where funds come in for the area of combating organized crime. I would say that 80 to 90% of all bilateral funding is for this area. It doesn't matter if it is EU funding like EU projects or bilateral funding.*

*Then after this we changed Kosovo Police Service school became Public Safety Training Institutions which then became the Kosovo Center for Public Safety, Education and Development which is basically a place—this is quite unique in Europe. The system functions in the U.S. and Steve Bennett was one of the first who developed this in the US. It became best practice. We duplicated the same system. It is basically one academy or one training institution. In this training institution you have all public safety academies embedded. It means you don't have to have four different academies for police, corrections, customs or Department of Emergency Management which is the fire and rescue. You basically have one roof and one service, which caters to all. So they share basically the services. This means also that the cost/benefit is quite high.*

*So if you have one curriculum section, they develop curriculum, it caters to all public safety agencies and you basically can have a smaller team but they cater to all. Especially in Kosovo where budget is always an issue and you only have 2 million inhabitants, it wouldn't make sense if you had four different academies. I was in this position for quite a while. Then I became the division head.*

BOUTELLIS: So did the KPS school become the Public Safety, Education and Development School in 2006?

JANSER: *Yes, it was 2006. This also means that the training institution is an executive agency under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, run by civil servants but not police officers. That's very important. So whatever services you have there you have usually a curriculum development section or you have logistics, or you have print services or whatever. This is all done by civil servants. Basically it is a budget line under the Ministry of Internal Affairs but provides the service for all the public safety agencies.*

*After this assignment as senior advisor, I was basically asked to join the senior management team and I became the Acting Deputy Director which is now a more permanent base. We had a budget freeze so they couldn't announce this post. So I am in this post since January 2008 and just now the vacancy came out and I got the job offered but unfortunately, or should I say fortunately, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of September I am going to leave this mission. I already have my next assignment. I'm going to go to – I stay within the OSCE, I go to the mission in Tajikistan in Dushanbe and I will be the counterterrorism and police issues advisor. It is basically I will develop all the police-related projects there because it is now a new focus of the OSCE to concentrate on central Asia because it is quite important now. It is envisioned that the mission in Afghanistan will support activities, or I should say the OSCE envisions to have a mission there in Afghanistan and Tajikistan as neighboring country is quite important as a neighbor mission given the fact that we have a high percentage 80% of all drug-related substances coming from Afghanistan worldwide and also the impact terrorism has there to the rest of the world.*

BOUTELLIS: When you first came to Kosovo it was under a CIVPOL hat and then you came back in 2002 with OSCE. Can you describe what was the status of public order

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and crime at the time and maybe what were the major challenges in terms of policing.

**JANSER:** *It was quite a big shock when I came to Kosovo in 2001 and started working on the street compared to Germany. I would say that the biggest difference was, and I always joke about that, when I ask what do you think how many emergency calls we had in 2001, it was exactly zero. The public did not trust the police. This also included at the beginning the internationals and they were just not used to the system. So there were no emergency calls. I was quite surprised how polite the people were to the police on the street. Most of the normal people on the street if they did something wrong they admitted it immediately and there was no discussion. I think this has just something to do with the former regime because the police were quite aggressive I would say. If someone didn't comply they probably used illegal force.*

*When you had people coming in the summer, especially then from Germany this was totally different and you knew it immediately because they would really be quite aggressive and say that we don't have anything to say. Even if they would go 100 (kph) in town or whatever. In the beginning I was also surprised a lot of people were armed. This is also probably one of the biggest differences you face if you come like me. I was in Germany, I was in Augsburg in Bavaria, I was working on the street. We had youth armed but usually light weapons like batons or knives or something. But here, due to the fact that it was just after the war everybody was like they had either long rifles or normal guns. This is, I think, most probably the biggest—or even then especially in 2001 we had a lot of big demonstrations where I took part. This was quite severe sometimes because hand grenades were thrown. This is probably the biggest difference I would say.*

*Of course also if you look in to the perspective that after a war a lot of people lost their family members, they had no illusions about their life and they didn't care. So what I also experienced in Germany sometimes, that you have somebody from here who lost their family, they would not care whatever they do. They say, you can't do anything worse to me. Also what I have to say in a positive way, the negative examples, what I had from Germany because I would say a high percentage of the people we arrested were Kosovo Albanians or Kosovo Serbs especially in the rape cases or whatever. It was totally different here. So we really made the bad experience in Germany and we came here and we had really good experience.*

*Then later, within the OSCE I was not working on the street anymore, it was more in a more development phase where we would get feedback from the police officers, the Kosovo Police officers, what they faced, their problems and we would try to incorporate this in our curriculum that they get prepared on the street. So if they faced something that in a vehicle stop they had some problems, this is what we basically took on in our curriculum. So I have only active experience between 2001 and 2002 and at this time we had really big riots, also a lot of people were injured. We had colleagues in Mitrovica at the bridge which was quite severe.*

**BOUTELLIS:** UNMIK had an executive mandate and was effectively doing the policing at that time and was building what was going to become the Kosovo Police. How did the police work relate to other activities such as the justice sector at the time?

**JANSER:** *You never can divide that. I also saw this later in my assignment as European Bilateral Program Manager. No policing is good or bad without good justice because if you don't have good prosecutor and judge who basically will follow up*

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*a criminal case, then you're lost. I think this was one of the pitfalls that—the concentration was heavily on police of course which was good. But it also - it always has to go in hand with proper build up of judges and prosecutors. Due to whatever reasons we have still up to today international prosecutors who are taking on special cases like war crime cases or whatever because no local prosecutor wants to go on this road.*

*Later I worked a lot with the Organized Crime Bureau. In fact with one colleague from UNMIK later we developed the first organized crime basic training for the police here. But what we always tried to do is to include also prosecutors and judges in all the trainings. So what we would have—we would have guest lecturers. This goes vice versa now, especially in the area of financial investigation, we now have police officers, they go and train prosecutors and judges and vice versa so it is over time. But at the very, very beginning I must say it was a farce the justice system. When I worked on the street, this was just a minor offence court, but you could see that a normal person would pay the usual price when you confiscate a car, about 160 euros, but if the person was known to the court or they were war heroes or whatever, they would pay then maybe 40 euros. So there was a big corruption inside.*

BOUTELLIS: How about the prison system?

JANSER: *I can't tell you so much about the prison system because I was not really involved. Everything that I would tell you is just second hand.*

BOUTELLIS: Can you describe, as you said you're now in the management team of OSCE, so I suppose you spend less time at the training school, but when you were at the training school can you describe what a day would be like, what the daily routine was?

JANSER: *In the very beginning, when I was in the Operational Police section, this section was basically completely responsible for all tactical training, support training, first aid. This was just in every other police academy. We had our curriculum, we had our schedules, we had our trainers. We would just do the classroom work or the outside work. I must say that the standard which is applied there in terms of equipment and everything, I would say it was even better than when I went through basic training in '86. The only thing that we had to realize very quickly is that the curriculum was quite biased. At the beginning we had a lot of American influence which then later we tried to more "Europeanize" because—I'll give you a practical example. In one lecture it was called boxing and running. It was basically a lecture how two police vehicles would stop a car if the car would go very fast or whatever. But it was really ridiculous to teach something like this because at this time 50% of the police officers didn't even have a driving license. If you want to perform something like this, I would say in my police world back home, this is something which a special swat team would do and not a normal police officer if they don't have to. So there was, the dimension was totally out of order. Pretty soon we abolished this curriculum. We probably made it more to a European standard and more applicable to the current circumstances at this time.*

BOUTELLIS: I'll get back to training when we get to the technical areas, but now the first technical area I'd like to talk about is recruitment. You may not have been involved directly in recruitment but as the trainer and head of training at the academy you were getting the new recruits.

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JANSER: *Yes, that was quite a problem. Again there's no proof for this but there were rumors that of course in the recruitment that there is also corruption involved. What we could sometimes see is that people had been through a recruitment procedure, especially through the sport test or whatever. They would come to us and they would never pass the sport test say due to a woman had a baby in between and she was not fit enough, or just because the person somehow cheated or whatever. We had a lot of problems with that. I think, I was not actively involved but we had to fight with the product of not very good recruitment. We had to either build them up or we had to look somehow that they get reassigned or they basically wouldn't pass.*

*I was more involved, I chaired several promotion boards. This is something where I was involved. I must say that the dedication of Kosovo Police officers is absolutely high. I was also a lot in the region around and if I compare the dedication is very high. I live in a village here close to Vushtrri and we have several police officers there. For 200 euros they walk every day 7 km to the main road and then take a bus maybe another 45 minutes and then they have to walk to the station. They do this day and night. So the dedication is quite high. Also the willingness to learn.*

*In these promotion boards I must say most of the police officers were quite capable. It was quite a good transparent process. We had always mixed boards. Somebody from OSCE, somebody from UNMIK and then one national colleague. We would do independently our evaluation and then we compared it. Of course, sometimes you would think why a person got promoted afterwards but this is just due to a system where if you were in a group with a lot of good people, then even if you would have maybe 85% or 90% from a group of 50 people, 40 have 95%, then you might not get promoted. If you were compared with another group, maybe you would be the best. That was just the system which was applied.*

BOUTELLIS: You said the promotion boards were missed so there was coordination between UNMIK and OSCE?

JANSER: *Absolutely. We always had a mixed board just to make it more transparent. That functioned very well.*

BOUTELLIS: Whereas for recruitment UNMIK was in charge at the time?

JANSER: *Yes, just the absolutely early days, it was even before my time, the OSCE would do the background checks. That was in the early days but I was not involved in that because at this time it was already transferred to UNMIK. However, I think it is bad practice because the OSCE has the core mandate to train the police. In my opinion this is part of a training cycle in the police because recruitment is part of the selection process. You probably know the selection also was under political auspices in Kosovo because to disarm the former KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) they had to take a certain number into the police which was more or less successful I would say because I think we have quite a good police.*

BOUTELLIS: How was the coordination again, how was the articulation with UNMIK doing recruitment and OSCE training? Was there any feedback on the recruits you were getting from UNMIK? How did this work.

JANSER: *Of course we had certain meetings. We had always close cooperation with the training department in the Kosovo Police Service plus their international counterparts. I think the biggest problem and the biggest strengths from the OSCE compared to UNMIK was that we were a team of people who were long*

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*time here. I think this is the biggest asset. So there was no institutional knowledge lost. Like I am at the moment probably one of the longest serving members in the mission here but we had so many people who were long termers, five, six, seven years in the mission. This really made a difference. We also knew what was already done and didn't work. We could basically give UNMIK a lot of good advice. I think one big complement was when we had a delegation from DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) here and they specifically asked our department to assist in the handover process from UNMIK to EU because we have the largest knowledge in this area. I think was quite a compliment.*

BOUTELLIS: What was the biggest success? We talked about some of the shortcomings with recruitment, what was the biggest success of recruitment? There seems to have been a huge turnout of applicants. What was the level of education, the quality of the candidates overall and what were some of the successes maybe.

JANSER: *You have to see that also in a certain age range they didn't have the proper school here because there was the parallel system, especially Kosovo Albanians didn't have the chance to go to certain schools or universities. This is always where you had the most people failing in their tests, it was the written test. What was the biggest success, I don't know. Probably that we are higher than nearly every EU country in the turn out of gender balance and also in the promotion of women into senior posts. What was the biggest mistake? I would say it's that we appointed some of the people without going through the regular process. I wouldn't say "we," it was UNMIK basically and now we have in some positions people sitting where I think they should not sit there because they simply went through the ranks without proper promotion.*

BOUTELLIS: When you say appointed does that mean there were promotion boards for the lower ranking officers and senior officers were appointed?

JANSER: *At the very beginning there were some appointed to senior offices which they shouldn't have been. You have to see, if you create a new police, and this was our advantage but it is also a disadvantage you create basically a brand new police. You don't have managers. How do you get managers? In order to have managers they just appointed some of the candidates and who had good connections to internationals, they sometimes got a fast track.*

BOUTELLIS: So it was based on the judgment of UNMIK managers and trainers.

JANSER: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Was there any attempt to evaluate the recruitment process? Once the candidate would arrive in the academy, was there a test, a pre-test?

JANSER: *Yes, this is why—I mean politically we started out with an eight week program, or six weeks in fact just to get the numbers on the street. It was absolutely nonsense but everybody knew that and they got called back and they got additional training. Then over time the training went up more and more from eight weeks and then to a twelve-week program, and then at the end to a twenty-week program and always then attached with the field training later. This is also something, the field training that happens in UNMIK itself later and the problem was also it was not really standardized. That was a little bit of problem. It was a little bit better and this is also quite an interesting experience that the quality of trained officers, when they were trained by their own people was much higher because what they would lose through the language—. Say if you have*

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*international trainers they always have to use language assistants. Then later the basic training, when we handed it over to the KPS, we made the experience that the standard, not the standard, I should say the failure rate was much lower. People always got more information in. This was probably just due to a lack of time because if an international teaches and you have translation into two languages, Albanian and Serbian, then you lose time and you don't have so much time for going deeper.*

BOUTELLIS: When did this transition from international trainers—at least for the basic training, when did this transition take place?

JANSER: *It was about 2005 I think.*

BOUTELLIS: How many international trainers were there at the beginning and how big were the classes?

JANSER: *At the very beginning there were over 200 international staff.*

BOUTELLIS: At Vushtri KPS training?

JANSER: *Yes. And about 200 something language assistants, program assistants, whatever. Then later when we handed it over the basic training consisted of about 100 national staff. At the moment the basic training is suspended because they are looking into now changing it to a European model and they want to have at least a one-year basic training. So this means last year there was no basic training and this year also.*

BOUTELLIS: Also because they reached their target number?

JANSER: *Yes, they reached the target number and that is why just at the moment they are doing this.*

BOUTELLIS: Towards the end the basic training was six months followed by six months field training?

JANSER: *No, the last was 20 weeks and then 20 weeks field training, so it was 40 weeks basic training plus field training.*

BOUTELLIS: Is the OSCE supporting the KP in designing the training that is more on European standards now?

JANSER: *Yes, in fact, it will take really a long time to review all the necessary curriculum. At the moment we are recruiting specialists on this topic to look into all the curriculum, what is needed. Because if you go from a small program to a big program, you have to really look and evaluate what kind of curriculum you want to implement there. But it is also about the needs. Every country is different. This is also what a lot of people don't understand. This is probably why they went – why the OSCE had the mandate. In UNMIK you get very often people who have no understanding of training. If you look in the training cycle then you have to do a needs analysis and then later measure the impact in order to go back. Then you have to predesign again the training material. You need specialists for that. If you don't understand what is it about training, then how can you provide good training.*

BOUTELLIS: How did they come up with a one-year basic training?



JANSER: *This was done by a working group from where different people took part, but it was basically a research done in several EU countries and non-EU countries. They basically had to look also at what can they pay. It is also a budget factor because at the end of the day if you pay for a police officer you have to look at how much you can pay for their basic training. This is how they came up with and with our advice and we came up with this number.*

BOUTELLIS: Earlier in our conversation you mentioned the importance of bilateral funding.

JANSER: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Were there other training programs going on or was it an attempt of OSCE to just rally bilateral funding towards this basic training that was taking place?

JANSER: *The basic training was also done by us. Then we did also advanced and specialized training. But bilateral funding was concentrating on advanced and specialized training. Basically you want to build up specialists which would be quite cost and time consuming if you want to have somebody built up in financial investigation. So what we did, we did either short-term projects or longer projects with a funding agency. There were different models like the EU funded two large projects which were Cards one and Cards two. It was in the area of organized crime and human trafficking. I was involved in one specific, it was financial investigation. We wrote a handbook on financial investigation and the whole training aspect.*

*This was basically how it worked. We would get in EU funding or bilateral funding. They would come mostly to me. I would coordinate this with the training department. We would see who should be trained, how much they need, that we have a training of trainers and they can basically duplicate it later. They had to go through our curriculum section to approve the curriculum because this was one of the strengths also of what we did. We basically set the standards, not the content standards; we set the standards how a curriculum should look like, how it will be stored, how it will be archived. Then you can duplicate this at any time. This was very important.*

BOUTELLIS: When you were developing those handbooks or training curriculum KPS officers were always involved in the process?

JANSER: *Yes, I would say it was always like 80% national staff and 20% of international staff. So the ownership was there. Also at this time you build up at the same time also a trainer because if this person is involved, this person would also then work as a trainer later.*

BOUTELLIS: All the curriculum was translated in both Serbian language and Albanian?

JANSER: Correct.

BOUTELLIS: Training the trainer, is there a ratio of how many weeks of training of trainer you require to train a trainer who will be able to deliver a certain number of week's training?

JANSER: *Yes, there is a policy that everybody who trains at the academy has to go through the training development course which is six weeks which contains different modules like team building, communication, training facilitating, training skills. Only with this course people were allowed to train. So you would basically go through this course which enables you to be a trainer. Then later you would*

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*look into the content. So you would have people there go first through this course. Then if they want to train in the area of organized crime we would have another part which would enable them to train in this area.*

*Then we also have a lot of part time trainers because you can imagine that somebody who works in financial investigation for example cannot train for a full year. This person will work in the unit and when there is a need for training, like twice a year or whatever, then they get pulled out, they go and train and then they go back in their respective units.*

BOUTELLIS: So basic training in the academy was 20 weeks followed by 20 weeks field training. The field training was not done by OSCE but by UNMIK, the UNPOLs.

JANSER: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: How was the coordination at this level and was the field training complementary to what was being taught in the academy?

JANSER: *Police reality is always like this and I think every police officer in the world will go through this. You come from the academy and your old, experienced police officer will say, forget everything you learned in the academy, now you're in the real world. This was basically up on assignment. If you would go to Priština you would learn more because more happens. If you go to Dragaš you have different problems. So wherever the person got deployed, in theory they should have the same standards applied, but reality was definitely not because they would just learn whatever the person who is their field training officer. So if you have a very experienced field training officer then you were lucky. If you have somebody who maybe comes from a country which does not have the same standards or were not so experienced then you didn't learn so much.*

BOUTELLIS: Was there a curriculum for field training as well?

JANSER: *An informal. I had quite good relations with some of the field training officer and they tried to put something together, but every region was different so there was not one single standard.*

BOUTELLIS: You mentioned earlier the transition from the KPS school to the training school for public safety agencies on the whole was a good cost saving initiative. What are some of the courses that are applicable maybe to different safety entities and do we have an idea approximately of the savings?

JANSER: *I think the budget is about 2 million and they cater to all public safety agencies. Especially in the area of management, this is where people come together. People receive the management training and they get to know each others. It's generic, so it doesn't matter if you have firefighter being in a management course or police officer but a good outcome of that is they already get to know each other and they train together so that's perfect.*

BOUTELLIS: We'll interrupt it for now, thank you very much.

BOUTELLIS: Today is the 29<sup>th</sup> of July and this is a follow up interview with Oliver Janser at OSCE. So I'd like to talk about the public perceptions of the Kosovo Police and particularly the work that the OSCE has done in perception surveys and so on and how did they come about, when were they first thought of and what were some of the findings?

JANSER: *I think this answer is two-fold. It is my personal experience and then a statistical experience. My personal experience is quite good. Because I live in a small village here I got a lot of feedback that the police are now much better, they're really good. What I observed was also very positive. However, it changed a little bit due to behavior maybe where internationals pulled out and nationals are in charge now. Some people would fall in a pattern which is not very good policing like what I always call static policing where they just stand somewhere and take the cash from people. This is what a lot of people then say, well there is not real policing, they just stand there and take the cash. We also did, our department did an opinion poll and it was very clear in the statistics that a lot of people don't even know what the police is doing. They're criticizing certain aspects of the police; however, the Kosovo Police Service is, I would say, the second trusted entity in comparison also with international organizations. The first one was KFOR and number two was the Kosovo Police Service. This is quite relevant.*

*I would say in every organization you always have improvements or you can have improvements. What we also shouldn't forget is that the police is now eight years old – beginning from 1999 or nine years old. I always say the police here are still in their infant shoes and it is only two or three years old because was the time when we had the transition process starting and units, departments in KPS became more or less independent.*

*So before a lot of executive decisions were made by internationals and only since two or three years when we started handing over certain areas in the police was the police more or less independent and they made their own decisions.*

BOUTELLIS: So when was the first opinion poll conducted and how was it done? Was it done solely by OSCE?

JANSER: *No, I think UNICEF did some opinion poll and I don't know the other organization. But our opinion poll was just recently and this opinion poll was done like five months ago or something, that was the most recent opinion poll.*

BOUTELLIS: But there had been some other opinion polls done before?

JANSER: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Were there some done prior to the handover to the Kosovo Police in like approximately 2006?

JANSER: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: Were there some significant evolutions?

JANSER: *I would say at this time it was always - the Kosovo Police Service was always number one in the most trusted entity. That was really something. I always hear this argument from also international colleagues or whatever, you go on a conference and they say yes, but in Kosovo you have so much organized crime, you have corruption or whatever. I say of course we have corruption, of course we have organized crime, but in general as an overall entity, as a service, I think compared to other police services in the region Kosovo is quite advanced. But this is also normal because given the amount of money that was pumped in, given the amount of international presence here, bilateral funding, of course people are well trained, of course they have good equipment. This comes also in line with their quality. I'm also strongly believing that what we taught them, basically a corporate identity, is also one thing. I always say the police are the*

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*people and the people are the police. This is the slogan you see when you come into the training institution. There is probably the same phenomenon there was in the United States when you had difficulties between black and white people. When they became police officers they became blue. There was this corporate identity and the same happened here. They trained together in the academy, they lived together and at the end of the day what do they want to do? They want to achieve that they catch criminals and it doesn't matter if you are minority or majority. So they get this more or less corporate identity.*

*You cannot combat corruption only with money. Quality has to come through different things and I believe in some of the things this is the corporate identity, or giving them any identity.*

**BOUTELLIS:** For a long time the international community was doing most of the policing, then there would be a progressive transition with the police commissioner position remaining international and still an executive mandate. However there have been some major changes like the creation of a Ministry of Internal Affairs and now the Kosovo Police since the new law on police and Kosovo Police reporting of course to the international police commissioner but also to the minister. What are the oversight mechanisms that are in place and has there been a real transition from international oversight to the creation of a national structure for oversight?

**JANSER:** *Yes, this was quite difficult. If I look back because I worked closely with the Organized Crime Department it was a big deal when they started to take over certain things, but the success gave them rights. Of course it is also that some internationals always hold onto their seats. But our job is to work ourselves out of the post and hand over in the transition. The oversight itself, it is basically you have an internal oversight now where the Ministry of Internal Affairs has a close eye on the police and especially the current Minister of Internal Affairs has a vast interest. I learned this in many discussions with him, that he wants to have quality in the police and he is looking into also certain key positions and wants to have the best people for that.*

*We have the internal affairs of course. They look into how they perform. It is now solely run by national and what we do at the OSCE, we have what we call civilian oversight. It is the police inspectorate which basically looks into the performance but not only on specific key issues like performance itself, also how the budget is handled. They look also into the complaints from citizens. This police inspectorate is a civilian – it is an executive agency under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is totally autonomous, answers only to the Minister of Internal Affairs and has the right to go at any time to any station, to any rank and open the books and can have a look into that. They basically produce a report. This is not to slander somebody; this is basically just to give recommendations for the government that they will change something where there is maybe mismanagement.*

**BOUTELLIS:** So the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) is a new creation, it was created late 2005, early 2006.

**JANSER:** Yes.

**BOUTELLIS:** Do you recall the rationale for it? OSCE was involved in the training and building of this body.

**JANSER:** *The rationale behind this basically, the idea comes from the United Kingdom. It is a concept which is used there but not entirely. We adapted it to the specifics in*

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*Kosovo. I am not entirely a content expert on the police inspectorate; however, it was part of my responsibility to oversee the police inspectorate. It is basically, it gives the public a tool to see how their tax money is utilized in the policing. Again it is not only on disciplinary cases, it really looks overall how the service works for the public. If it's about – even civilians can put in complaints, but also if there is an internal affairs case or just a simple issue about how they use funds. If a police manager basically has a budget from 5 million and will use it only to buy fancy cars, this is something the Police Inspectorate would definitely put in a report. Because it is public, people can then form their opinion and this goes directly - has an impact probably on their future vote about the current government.*

BOUTELLIS: Has the Police Inspectorate been tested? Have there been major cases where it has been put to the test?

JANSER: *Oh yes. We had in January especially how the budget is utilized there was a big discussion, especially on the vehicles, how they spent the money on the vehicles, that there were also so many accidents, what are the police doing to avoid these accidents and the cost. After the Declaration of Independence of course there are now so many pending cases where a Serbian police does not come back to work. These are all cases, I think it is about 340 cases, somewhere in that range. So it is quite a good tool. The people are highly qualified that are working in there. They range between lawyers and former police officers. It is a good mix.*

BOUTELLIS: You mentioned the new Minister of Internal Affairs. He is looking at certain key positions. So the new minister came with the new government that was elected six months ago approximately. With the new government there haven't been any major changes if I'm not mistaken in the police. There haven't been any senior position changed or any major changes. What does this mean? Are there any risks of politicization of the police? So far there is no political appointment, right, at higher levels within the Kosovo Police. Is this something that is being considered? What is the way forward?

JANSER: *I think this is probably one of the advantages here in Kosovo because from my experience in other countries in southeastern Europe, for example in Albania when the government changed the whole police changed. It is bad practice and it is politicized. Here I think, and again it is my personal opinion, in the discussion with the minister he is really looking into not the person, he is looking into the post and the position. He wants to have the most qualified people in the position. Of course he realizes that his senior managers in the police are the key positions at the moment. There was no real change at the moment in the positions of the deputy commissioners for example, but there were discussions to have a certain reform.*

*One of the reforms is to expand the training for the police in the basic training which I think I already mentioned earlier will expand over one year and will be based on the European model. But this goes with a whole quality approach. I think what they really try now, because the emergency phase is by far over, we are going much more into the quality approach now. This means now they have the luxury not to look at numbers, they basically have the luxury to look into a more quality approach and see who is suitable for what position and then make a proper selection.*

BOUTELLIS: I'd like now to look to the transition process that is now taking place with UNMIK international police sort of phasing out, at least reducing its role and the new

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EULEX mission will take over with monitoring function. How is this taking place and what are some of the benchmarks that have triggered this? Why basically this transition now and how is it taking place?

JANSER: *I was pretty much involved from day one when the EU planning team came in and OSCE, I personally wrote quite a lot of analysis on the plans from at this time the EU planning team which was the basis to set the bounds for EULEX. Unfortunately at the moment everything is highly politicized and there is no real progress due to the fact that some countries recognize Kosovo and some countries don't recognize Kosovo, especially within the European Union. There is no consensus, which makes it very difficult because until now we still operate under 1244 with UNMIK.*

*I think that the biggest weakness is really that there is no proper institutional knowledge. People will go, a totally brand new staff will come in with EULEX. Because everything is so politicized it is very difficult obviously for them to work. EUPT (European Union Planning Team) had this plan, a basic implementation plan it was called and then we had all these sub group meetings and sub committees or whatever. I think it was very difficult because the time was—we were always under pressure. Everything should have been done before the Declaration of Independence which was obviously not done. A good example is the law on border police. I don't know, it was maybe in three months and we were drafting the whole complete law with a lot of gaps, but this was done due to the time. We said okay, we're going to revisit this.*

*I think the whole operation from my personal opinion will fail because there is no proper strategy for incoming and the exit strategy yet, plus the political impact of not having a proper mandate. This will really automatically lead to not satisfied staff. We have already now people leaving already because they're just sitting around because they have no clear mandate what they should do. This is the worst case scenario. Basically you create a vacuum if UNMIK leaves and EULEX is not fully operational. How will you deal with the task which should be fulfilled.*

*Another indication is that DPKO from New York asked our department to assist in the handover from UNMIK to EULEX. This also gives me a clear indication that there is really a problem that probably nobody anticipated to solve. But the whole set up was already difficult with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence because there was no consensus from the international community. There is basically a vacuum at the moment. Everybody also has different opinions and there is no clear guideline.*

BOUTELLIS: When did the EUPT, the planning team of the European Union first arrive in the country?

JANSER: *I think it was 2006.*

BOUTELLIS: So at the time had they foreseen a Unilateral Declaration of Independence and what was the original plan?

JANSER: *The original plan was always, according to the Ahtisaari package, that there will be a consensus that at one point Serbia and Kosovo find their common grounds and the Ahtisaari package would be implemented which would guarantee the right for safe movement of minorities. But now with the unilateral declaration Kosovo is not obliged to have the Ahtisaari package however they already declared that they want to have the implementation of the Ahtisaari package. But at this time it was a very ambiguous situation.*

*I remember that there was a daily rumor that yes, now we are going to have a declaration of independence and this will impact like this. People were totally confused. Some of the staff would already stop working in UNMIK. They said we are already on the way out. So I think this whole vacuum really impacts on the progress of the mission. Not only UNMIK and EULEX, it is also all the other international organizations like OSCE and whatever. The impact was directly on the progress made.*

*I'm certain that due to this whole political outcome, we went at least one year back in the development.*

BOUTELLIS: So originally EULEX was going to take over from UNMIK, now there is an UNMIK component that will stay and remain at least in the Mitrovica region with some executive authority there.

JANSER: Yes.

BOUTELLIS: How is the division of labor foreseen? Earlier when the Kosovo Police Service was starting to be built, we discussed that last time, the division of labor between OSCE doing the training in the academy and UNMIK doing field training and so on. How is the division of labor foreseen now for the time to come?

JANSER: *It is quite difficult in terms of talking north of the Ibar in Mitrovica it is a totally different story than the rest of Kosovo. But the division of labor for the OSCE is not such a big deal because we will do more or less the same thing because EULEX also has the agreement that they will not touch training or certain areas where we engage. So this is good; there is no duplication on that. However, for my opinion there will be a duplication in the area where UNMIK operates because there is no clear structure how it is going to be divided. There was always this 120 days foreseen but nobody knows when this date basically starts. You always have this duplication of EULEX and UNMIK. At the moment the KPS are operating in the north only because they still operate that—KPS officers in the north report not to the national structure meaning to the Kosovo Police, to their colleagues, they report to UNMIK structures meaning civilian police. This is basically how they can keep their face and say okay, we are still trying to get Kosovo back. This is just, in my opinion, political farce. At one point they have to address this issue. I don't know what is going to happen and how they are going to control the north. It will be very difficult. I think at the moment nobody knows how this is going to impact.*

BOUTELLIS: So it is difficult to speculate on UNMIK EULEX, but OSCE has a plan. What are the tasks that when it comes to the police, what are the tasks that have been identified as priorities and what will be the focus?

JANSER: *Our department is not only concentrating on police, we do the whole public safety development and a great emphasis is given to also the Fire and Rescue Service because it is really, really bad. We already addressed this issue. Also customs and corrections is in our mandate for next year. We have a strong emphasis on building further the capacities in the training center in Vushtrri plus also the strategy development and the operational development in the area of organized crime. This is one of the main responsibilities, plus as the last pillar I would say it is also the Community Safety Development Section which will further build up the municipal council teams in all the municipalities, also concentrating more on minority communities.*

BOUTELLIS: If you had to point to maybe some experiments, some innovations and particular programs, either run by OSCE or others that you know of regarding the police that were particularly interesting, what would you say?

JANSER: *I would say that one of the most advanced programs you have in Kosovo and I only say this because this was also my field of expertise at home. It was a very diverse project and it is working now and it is a full success. We had three phases where we built up the counseling and support unit for the Kosovo Police Service. If I look back, I was the first peer counselor for critical incidents in the German Federal Police and I implemented this in '97. To have a service like this in a post war country I think this is quite advanced. We started out with training them as peer counselors and then also the third phase training the peers.*

*So in every police station you have one colleague who knows about critical incidents who will report to the full time counselors in their respective areas and they can basically give the certain units support. I would say this was really a big success.*

*The other major success is really that we have a functioning training system which is really well advanced to all the other countries in southeastern Europe. If we talk about proper adult learning we at the moment are in the process of the accreditation certification according to Bologna. These are really advanced achievements I think we can be proud of.*

BOUTELLIS: Now the last section, we already started talking about the international community as far as transition, but you worked both under the UN, UNMIK first as an UNPOL officer and now you have been working for some years with the OSCE here in Kosovo as well. How different were these experiences and what are some of the comparative lessons that you've learned?

JANSER: *I think the biggest difference is really the organizational structure and therefore the quality. With the UN you have a much more diverse participation of different countries. Some countries maybe provide better quality than others. But I think one of the biggest differences is also the selection criteria for certain posts. The OSCE is issuing the vacancy notice; with the UN you get a contingent in and according to their CVs they get distributed. Maybe now it is different but in 2001 it was absolutely who would you know, what is your CV and this is how you got distributed. So you would have people in positions they probably never should have been in.*

*The OSCE I think in terms of their mandate is also totally different. It is more a political organization; with the UN it is a peer executive policing where I worked and therefore it is also totally different.*

BOUTELLIS: Are there two or three changes that you would wish for either in your previous UN experience or now in OSCE in terms of policy or management that would help you do your job more effectively?

JANSER: *With the UN I think it would be much better if there were better guidance, what is basically expected and also a better pre-training, not from your respective country, a better pre-training in the mission itself. The preparation training was not so good I think and it was not such a high quality. So there should be something which is done already internationally to bring colleagues together. I think with the OSCE I don't know. I think the mandate is quite sufficient and the preparation, for me it was not such a big problem because I had already the mission preparation with the police which was really good.*



BOUTELLIS: Are there any lessons with respect to the relationships with the host country personnel or politics versus organizations?

JANSER: *I think what people always have to understand is we are guests here. We are not coming here to change people, we are coming here to share experiences. This is also one important thing, I think I would much earlier empower the people here to go back and take responsibilities. That is probably one of the things, I think it is very important, plus it is also important having already the exit strategy when you come into a mission. The minute I set up a mission I must have already the exit strategy, otherwise I just go from year to year and I will be there forever. Then things happen, like in Kosovo where we now came to a point where I think the politics made it so difficult. We have now this Declaration of Independence and now we're really stuck for years. If there would have been a little bit better planning before, maybe we would have concentrated more on this issue.*

BOUTELLIS: One last question. UNMIK is progressively withdrawing, EULEX will have a lighter monitoring mandate and will eventually also withdraw. Right now there is no question of this for OSCE but the mandate is very different. What do you think will be the biggest challenges facing the police service when the UN particularly, but also the international community and donors progressively withdraw.

JANSER: *I think there will be a huge budget impact first of all. In general for Kosovo, given the fact that there are quite a lot of internationals here, this has a direct impact on the economy plus, at the moment if the police service needs something they will be coming through donors or through funding, training, etc. Also I think we have to be careful that we put structures in place that afterwards nobody can hijack the structure and go back to a more politicized structure and that they are working still according to EU best practices. I think this is the biggest impact, what could happen, because we experienced a little bit already when we handed over a lot of things. The power struggle began and then certain individuals tried to put their claim in their turf and certain turf wars started. So I think this is probably the biggest challenge.*

BOUTELLIS: In terms of putting the structure in place is there any particular structure that you can think of or particular risks?

JANSER: *Unfortunately we have it already. The original set up from the organized crime unit was that we wanted to have something similar to Germany where you have, or like the FBI in America—no, not the FBI, but a specific department which deals exclusively with organized crime which is directly answering to the commissioner. Now you have different layers and it is well known that some of the people in influence, certain decisions in this business and especially in the organized crime business where you have sometimes very powerful people involved either within the police or politics or whatever, it is always difficult. This is one of the structures which we had envisioned that got abolished and now we have to deal with it.*

BOUTELLIS: It got abolished in Kosovo? The organized crime unit is still completely international?

JANSER: *No, no. At the beginning we established a Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau. This is how we wanted to have it but then one international commissioner basically abolished it, put it in the main structure of the KPS. It is now under the crime pillar. Before it was more or less independent answering directly to the commissioner, now it is in the structure where many more people have influence on that.*

BOUTELLIS: Even though it is still staffed by international police officers?

JANSER: *Yes, but it is, a lot of the tasks are done by national staff.*

BOUTELLIS: Do you have any final comments? We discussed a lot.

JANSER: *I just hope that this interview will be part of lessons learned where people can really draw conclusions because if many people mention that the structure of the UN is weak, I hope somebody will take initiative and change something. It was certainly a very interesting experience.*

BOUTELLIS: Thank you very much.