



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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ANDREW SCHALKWYK: Today is the 17th of December, 2008. I'm at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. with Denyse Morin. And before we start the interview, can I ask that you've given your consent?

DENYSE MORIN: *Yes, it's fine.*

SCHALKWYK: All right. Thank you. So I'd like to begin this conversation by talking a little bit about the role that you've played in civil service reform. Could you tell me about what you do now, the jobs you've had in the past, and your current responsibilities.

MORIN: *With respect to this program, or generally?*

SCHALKWYK: Generally.

MORIN: *What I do now, I'm the task team leader for this Public Service Reform Program in Tanzania. I was doing a similar job until about two months ago for the Uganda program. I've also in the past worked more extensively on other aspects of the reform -- legal, judicial reform -- preparing a program that's called Accountability, Transparency, and Integrity, which covered the World Bank support to legal, judicial reform, public financial management, and building the demand side of accountability. I've been working for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. since 1994, generally in the same areas: public sector governance and capacity development. Before that, I was the at the World Bank office in Nairobi and worked on institutional issues related to water and sanitation. And before that I was working for the Canadian International Development Agencies. And I lived in Kinshasa for three years, Nairobi for four years, and Dar es Salaam for six years.*

SCHALKWYK: OK. Most of this interview will revolve around your work in Tanzania and Uganda -- we're interested in both countries -- but we welcome comparison to other contexts as they're relevant. And I'd like to begin with some general questions about the Civil Service Reform Programs, and then move on to some specific types of reforms. So would you talk about the issues and challenges that faced the civil service in Tanzania and then perhaps in Uganda before the reforms were started?

MORIN: *Well, I think it was like many other places on the continent and on other continents during the years of structural adjustment. Basically what you had was a civil service that was really bloated. It had taken on -- the government had basically taken on a lot of functions that could have been performed by other actors -- non-state actors. The budgets were unaffordable. And basically what led to the reform were these anomalies, if you want, in the system -- a need to rationalize and for governments to live within their means, and tackling the issues of having a more -- a leaner and more efficient public service. And this is -- it was the same in Uganda, basically.*

SCHALKWYK: And in Tanzania, could you talk about the goals of the Civil Service Reform Program? How did they identify and articulate their goals?

MORIN: I don't really -- I wasn't directly involved at the time, but my understanding was that they had -- they basically had -- I think it involved several actors within government, where they looked at the -- and they even had a national symposium, which included academia, civil society organizations, the people, common citizens, and so on, to sort of look at what were some of their issues and what they wanted to be in the future. So they had a vision: 2025, and in that context, basically looked at what should the public service be about. And that's how they came to sort of say, "We want to have basically an institution of excellence, and we want to have a civil service that will perform better and will provide quality services to the public of Tanzania, but all of that within budgetary constraints." So I think it was very much of some internal thinking, some retreats, if you want, and then culminating in these national workshops that sort of led them to the objectives that they have for the program.

SCHALKWYK: And when was this?

MORIN: Ooh. It must have been around 1997, I think. Or maybe -- between '95 and '97. It's sometime around those dates.

SCHALKWYK: So who was -- who was exactly involved in those -- in that goal-setting?

MORIN: I'm not completely sure -- definitely Permanent Secretaries. I know that the previous president, President (Benjamin) Mkapa, is the one who launched the program. So I'm not -- I don't know -- but I would think that internally, even if it was not part of the overall public debate, that there must have been some consultations at Cabinet level. And as you know, Tanzania functions in a very collegial way, so the head of the public service and Permanent Secretaries, I'm sure, were involved in discussing whether these were the right objectives, right goals, and if that's where they wanted to -- if that's where the government wanted to go. And as I said, there were other people. There were technical advisors at the time that were also involved with the Tanzanian senior management in helping them define better what they wanted to achieve.

SCHALKWYK: And were there discussions about targeting reforms, or were they committed to doing comprehensive reform?

MORIN: I believe there were -- from what you see now, they were really looking at the comprehensive, overhaul, of the state machinery, and the one thing that they did which is different than other countries, at least that I have seen, where you have one program that's embracing everything. Here, Tanzania has chosen to have some four or five core reforms, depending on how you look at it. So you have a program for public service reform, you have one for public financial management, you have one for legal/judicial reform, you have local government reforms, and you have the overall National Anti-Corruption Strategy and action plan. So there was a big exercise at some point that was conducted to develop this national good governance program, which included these core reforms.

SCHALKWYK: And could you talk about the motivation for civil service reform, and what keeps it driving? Or what keeps driving it at the moment?

MORIN: I think that the government was fortunate to have some visionary senior management, and also visionary top leadership that had basically understood the need for those reforms and that basically -- and that, you know, they capitalize on

some of these reformers that were in the system to sort of drive the reforms. And I believe that one of the important ingredients is that also, with the technical assistance they had at some point, they really built their capacity to be able to lead that reform. So it's not anymore a question of just having a couple of visionary leaders, but there is a deep understanding of what needs to be done, and people that are technically competent to do it. So since they have this deep understanding and deep belief in the reform program, they're able to continue to drive it, even as we speak.

SCHALKWYK: How did the planning effort work out? Who was involved in the planning? And was there a comprehensive plan in terms of which reforms would go when?

MORIN: *I'm not sure that it was that well-planned. I think for the public service reform program, there was definitely... It was quite amazing, actually, that when we started preparing our own program --*

SCHALKWYK: That's the World Bank?

MORIN: *The World Bank. The government was able to give us its own strategy and action plan for public service reform. So we were able to use that, adapt it to be able to write our own documentation, which is the way you would like it to be generally. In terms of how the other programs fitted in, I think it was more initially public financial management and public sector that went together. Local government was actually part of the public service reform program until they realized that it was too massive to be done under one program, and then it was set -- you know, it was organized separately.*

SCHALKWYK: When -- when did that split up?

MORIN: *Oh, I think that was also again in the early -- in the late nineties. It was under the Civil Service Reform Program -- a project. And then when that finished, basically, and they moved to the comprehensive 15-year Public Service Reform Program, they said, "That needs to be hived off; it's too much to carry at the same time, and you need to have a different management for that program." With legal sector, the discussion started around 1993, I believe, and it's only recently that it came on board. And I have to say that you can even see that in government, although some senior government people really understand why it needs to happen, it is often left aside. That, and the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan, the NACSAP, as we call it. So you often think of the three more central reform as public service, public finance, and local government. The others are sort of part of the program, but it seems to take more effort to integrate them in the thinking.*

SCHALKWYK: In terms of planning, what do you think should have been done differently, starting, say, in 1998?

MORIN: *Actually, from, you know -- I think it was pretty much optimal for the situation. I know that one of the issues was that under the Civil Service Reform Program, you had a separate Secretariat that was basically managing, if you want, the reforms, and that was in parallel to what is now -- what -- the Civil Service Department, which is now what we call POPSM -- the President's Office Public Service Management. And one of the issues was that as long as you had this parallel system, there was not much ownership, but one of the things that they*

did correct was to dismantle the Secretariat and to mainstream the reform. So I think in a way, you basically have quite a good setup. It was not perfect, but it reflected on the Civil Service Reform Program, as I said, with this overall national symposium, and internally, the -- they themselves took a lot of time to work in the workshops and retreats, to work out their own thinking of where they wanted to go. They had worked out the main policies that they wanted to be the foundation of the program. So I think it was -- for me, at least, thinking about it, it's difficult to ask for much more than that. So no, I don't think there's a need to think of them doing something differently.

SCHALKWYK: And what is your relationship to the political leadership in like -- with regards to reform. Reforms have now been going on for a long time. How has it changed, and how has that affected the reform?

MORIN: *I think one of the main differences is that the previous president had come through the ranks of the civil service, so he understood very much how the machinery of government worked himself. So I believe that for that reason, he probably had a deeper understanding. Although we have to say that the present president as -- you know, in his inaugural speech, made a strong commitment to the reform program, but has probably less direct interest in how things are going. At the same time, as I say that, you know, he was there also to launch the second phase of the reform program in January 2008, which is quite unusual in my experience, that the president will take the time to launch a Public Service Reform Program. Because usually public service reform is about rationalizing the -- you know, how government does business, which means usually some ugly choices maybe, or not necessarily bringing more resources, but less resources -- trying to be more efficient. So I think if you talk to some Tanzanians -- not all of them, but there are some that feels that maybe there is a loss of momentum in terms of how deeply the political level is interested now in the reform program. But I'm not sure I would subscribe to this, necessarily, myself.*

SCHALKWYK: So. My next questions pertain to some of the more specific types of reforms. And I was wondering if I could talk about -- ask you some questions about -- professionalization and merit-based hiring, and recruitment and promotions. So could you describe the changes in the procedures and standards used in recruitment in the civil service and how this has affected the civil service?

MORIN: *Well, I think it -- I'm not sure I can go into a lot of the details on that, but I would certainly think that one of the key features is that there has been an attempt to have less and less interference in the hiring. I think firing is still not something that's going on very often in Tanzania. But definitely setting up the Public Service Commission was an attempt to have a regulatory body that would look at how hiring was taking place. And I know that even within the President's Office Public Service Management, when they were looking for a replacement for some specific position, those were advertised widely, and yielding to some not necessarily good results initially, so which has led to re-advertising, which I thought was a very good sign. Now, how widely this is applied throughout the public service -- I would think that there is still a lot of room for improvement.*

SCHALKWYK: And what pro -- how did, then, these new processes come about? Was there resistance from people to have these new procedures or this new competitive process introduced?

MORIN: *I believe that the colleagues you interviewed in Tanzania were closer to this -- probably can tell you more than I can. Also, you have to realize that when this all started, the task team leadership was based here in Washington. So in the last six years, I was able to be closer to some of the -- closer to the action, but in the initial years of the program, I was sitting here, so a lot less close to what was happening. So I'm sure that in almost every one of those -- introduction of those changes -- there is resistance. There was resistance to the overall program, because you're trying to put in place more transparent system, and of course, have vested interest in making sure that things remain as they are. So I think it's a tribute to our colleagues to think that they were able to get some of those legislations passed and approved -- with some challenges, I believe, at some point in time.*

SCHALKWYK: Where did the resistance come from primarily?

MORIN: *Well, in this case, I would definitely think that it would come from more senior managements who have been able in the past, maybe, to decide who was going to be coming into a position without having any transparent or clear process to -- or competitive process -- to put people in place, or just instructing someone, even instructing POPSM that this person will move in -- you know, we want this person to be in this position. So the approval of some of the laws and of the policies that they had at the beginning, I think it's sort of a demonstration, that at least technically, they were willing to put in place the right framework, and that gave some -- at least some legitimacy to POPSM and the Public Service Commission to be able to operate according to the policies and the laws.*

SCHALKWYK: Do you know how POPSM sort of got around the challenges they faced in trying to implement these -- or trying to introduce these policies, and the law?

MORIN: *No, I don't know, actually.*

SCHALKWYK: So I was wondering if I could ask you some questions about performance management. And what is -- what was -- what has your experience been with the performance management system that has been introduced recently?

MORIN: *I think it's -- you know, if you look around the world, it's not like performance management has been working very well anywhere. So personally, I'm a bit skeptical. I think one should strive to put in place systems for performance management, but at the same time, I think we should not be surprised that it -- if it takes a long time for that to sort of be completely rooted into the system. If we're talking about having in place an instrument, like open performance appraisal -- I believe Tanzania is still struggling even with that part of the system, because it's only with the introduction of what they call OPRAS -- that system -- they've moved away from a confidential appraisal system of staff, which means that staff didn't even know what was being said about them. So to think that they would suddenly move to an open system and then have open discussions about someone's performance, I think that even in the best-case scenario, we -- it's probably a big change, so somewhat difficult. So I think that there is still a long way to go, and I think probably a lot of refinement of the instruments to be put in place. You know, just like in our own organizations. We've moved from very long forms to fill to maybe now one page -- at least when I look at the World Bank -- something like a one-page form that reflects your performance. So I believe that a lot needs to be done in that respect to have in place a system that is*

manageable and that will be acceptable. So I think it will take -- it will take time to change the minds to move to a system that's really working.

SCHALKWYK: Was the World Bank involved at all in the pilot schemes, implementing the OPRAS?

MORIN: *I'm not sure what is this pilot schemes.*

SCHALKWYK: Do you know when it was rolled out?

MORIN: *Yeah.*

SCHALKWYK: The open performance appraisal schemes?

MORIN: *Yeah, yeah.*

SCHALKWYK: Where -- which ministries has it been most successful in? Or --

MORIN: *That I --*

SCHALKWYK: -- you don't know.

MORIN: *No, no. That, I don't know.*

SCHALKWYK: OK. And do you know, what are the major challenges that it's faced?

MORIN: *Well, I think part of it is what I just mentioned, is having a manager that feels that he -- you know, that he has to discuss what he thinks of someone with that specific person -- has been quite a challenge. And to sort of being honest about the performance of an individual. And I think that the challenge is still that generally you will see most performance being rated as 'satisfactory,' when it's not necessarily true. So I think that there is still quite a ways to go between having -- you know, saying people are filling the forms, and then having a meaningful use of the content of these forms, and then using them. I think, for example, Tanzania has not moved from using what's in these OPRAS to sort of look at a development plan for employees, or succession planning, or disciplinary action. So I think you can say, yes, they've rolled out the system, but in terms of how it's being used, there's still quite a bit of a challenge.*

SCHALKWYK: And was the World Bank involved in designing the system, or was that -- that was left up to Tanzania?

MORIN: *That was left up to Tanzania. We made comments on -- you know, like I said before, the forms, and whether or not these were the right kind of instrument, and how well it was designed. But ultimately, it's left to government to decide what it wants to do with the -- with our inputs.*

SCHALKWYK: And what sort of input was that? What --

MORIN: *Well, technical comments on the instruments.*

SCHALKWYK: And what -- in what ways did you think the instruments were inappropriate for the Tanzanian contexts?

MORIN: Well, for one thing, it was -- at least, the initial forms were way too long. If I remember, the first version was something like 11 pages. So which manager has the time to fill 11 pages of comments on each employee? You know, I'm not certain about that, so I don't know if you want to write that, necessarily, but if I remember, that was one of the key things, was how detailed it was, and whether or not there was another way to summarize some of these 11 pages so that a manager would not be completely discouraged from having to do that with his or her employees.

SCHALKWYK: And was the -- were members of the civil service below the upper management, consulted in creating these forms -- or in creating the instrument as a whole?

MORIN: If I remember, they were. That's -- I remember that they were. But how far it went and to -- you know, how broad the consultation was, it's -- I'm not clear. If I remember, they had sessions, actually, to sort of present the forms, and to collect comments, and to give a chance to various ministries to -- yeah, to give their inputs on whether or not they thought these were -- this was the appropriate instrument.

SCHALKWYK: And do you think it has changed the environment, the atmosphere, of the civil service at all since it's been introduced?

MORIN: I will not be able to judge directly. I think the overall program -- if you want to look more broadly -- not just the OPRAS. I think the overall idea of having a better-performing public service to deliver better services, I think the program overall has changed the dynamic within the public service. I believe there are lots -- a lot less complaints, to a certain extent, and a lot more hope that some things are right. Or maybe if there are more complaints, it's because more information is available, which is also good news. So I think having in place that program has certainly made a difference. OPRAS specifically, I'm not sure.

SCHALKWYK: Another question in -- generally in civil services is that about the political and non-political appointees. And you talked earlier that there's been efforts -- a successful effort -- to reduce the influence that politicians have on appointing employees. Has there been a discussion in Tanzania about the level at which they think political appointees should happen?

MORIN: No, I think that I -- there hasn't been a discussion. If they have, the Tanzanians had it internally, but certainly not with the development partners. And there is an understanding that from the director level up, they can -- you know, those are generally political appointees. And that -- there hasn't been any discussion on that.

SCHALKWYK: So I wonder if I could talk about the Public Service Commission. You mentioned that it was implemented as an attempt to have an oversight party. When was the Public Service Commission introduced, and was the Bank involved in providing input on its composition?

MORIN: The Public Service Act 2002, I believe -- yeah, 2002. Yes, we've provided not so much on the composition of the commission, but more on the act itself initially, and also some of its roles and responsibilities and function. But not so much on the composition itself.

SCHALKWYK: And what do you think are the important roles that the Public Service Commission has, and how have those changed -- or how those affected the reforms and the working of the public service?

MORIN: *I think the Public Service Commission has a very important role, actually, because it would -- it should provide the checks and balances on how the recruitment and treatment of the civil services servants is taking place. So you -- it should give the confidence to the civil servants and non-civil servants that basically everyone has a chance to compete for positions, and that they will be treated fairly in terms of -- and assessed -- in terms of how the decisions are being made. I believe it should also have an important role in -- of inspecting, looking -- you know, doing spot checks in terms of assessing whether or not the rules of the public service are being implemented -- being applied as they should be. I think the commission has done quite a good job so far in doing that, but it also has a challenge of capacity and believe that, you know, it -- there is a lot of room for improvement in terms of how it performs its role.*

SCHALKWYK: I mean, how independent is the Public Service Commission able to be?

MORIN: *As far as I know, it seems to be able to function quite independently, at least seen from the outside. What we see from the public service commission and what we're presented in terms of reports and information, it seems to be able to function quite independently.*

SCHALKWYK: And does the commission try to communicate directly with the public?

MORIN: *I certainly have not seen much of that when I -- when -- for the six years I was in Tanzania, I haven't seen anything in the newspaper or otherwise that led me to believe that the commission has been communicating with the public as much as it should.*

SCHALKWYK: All right. I'd like to talk a bit about retrenchment in staff size in Tanzania and about Tanzania's relative success, particularly in the 1990s. When Tanzania made much of its downsizing, were there specific goals set in terms of how many people should remain in this public service, or was it done on a more ad hoc basis?

MORIN: *No, I don't -- it was not done -- I don't think it was done on an ad hoc basis, as far as I know. I was not involved during that period of the program, but I know that there has been -- there were a lot of operation and efficiency reviews that took place and that the size was also determined in terms of, you know, what are the skills that were needed, and try to link the service that they wanted to deliver to the number of people who were needed at the time. Of course the situation has changed with the MDGs and so on, and what we've seen is that it's a steady increase now in staffing. But linked at least to trying to achieve the medium -- the Millennium Development Goals.*

SCHALKWYK: And where has that increase in staffing happened?

MORIN: *Health and education, mainly.*

SCHALKWYK: Right. And has there been general success in maintaining the size of the civil service in other areas?

MORIN: *In other areas, yes, pretty much. There hasn't been large increase, and even the increase now, I think, it's not overly excessive. At the same time, I've been telling the permanent secretary that they need -- you know, that they cannot ride on the success of their first retrenchment, that they have to look at -- again -- at the -- doing a full inspection -- payroll inspection. This has not been done since 1997, I believe, where you do a head count of the public service and try to see whether there are ghosts in the systems. And we know that there are some. So there is certainly room for improvement even in the size by looking at -- doing a payroll audit and making sure that you don't have ghosts, that you don't have double -- you're not double-counting some people, and so on. So I'm sure that if the -- they're supposed to do it this year -- that when they do that, you'll find that you can reduce the size even strictly by doing that exercise.*

SCHALKWYK: And what do you think has accounted for the fact that the civil service has remained at a reasonable size?

MORIN: *Well, I think the POPSM has been quite careful at monitoring -- you know, first of all, the constraint in terms of resources is probably an incentive in itself to make sure that you don't waste resources by continuing to hire people if you cannot afford it. So there was a freeze on employment for quite a long time. So I believe that generally, the role that POPSM has played in terms of controlling the establishment has been quite good. So that has definitely helped in managing the size.*

SCHALKWYK: And when the census or head count is carried out, do you know what mechanism they're planning on doing -- on using to carry it out?

MORIN: *Right now, they're doing inspections of specific ministries. And I believe that it's already starting to yield some results, and in a way, they would like to continue that way. But when I was there in November, we indicated that we don't think that will -- that amounts to the same as carrying out -- you know, having teams of people just going all at the same times or one after the others to the various entities and checking lists of employees and so on. And so I'm not sure when they're going to do it, but I think the agreement is that this will happen in the course of this year. It's an agreement that we have.*

SCHALKWYK: OK. And so are they -- when they would do these inspections, they would compare them to the payroll lists and to who's working?

MORIN: *There are various ways of doing it. For example, in Uganda, there was an instruction that came from the president that basically instructed every accounting officer -- meaning every permanent secretary -- to sort of look at his payroll and confirm the numbers that he had. So you had people from the Ministry of Public Service that went into every ministry and discussed and, you know, checked with every unit that the people that were there were the same people that were on the list. So there are a number -- numbers of ways to do it, but you can do head counts, you can decide to pay people at the end of one month, so that they have to show up in person to collect their check or whatever, so you can actually see who's going to turn up and not going to turn up. So we'll*

see which one of those methods -- we'll let them decide which one suits them best, basically.

SCHALKWYK: And do you know who was responsible for planning the retrenchment process in the nineties?

MORIN: *I believe -- it was within POPSM -- the Civil Service Department at the time -- but I don't know if it's the establishment division... And I believe that they had established a unit that was in charge of handling that, but I wouldn't be able to give you the details.*

SCHALKWYK: So next, I'd like to talk a bit about pay policy --

MORIN: OK.

SCHALKWYK: -- which I understand is a difficult issue.

MORIN: Yes.

SCHALKWYK: So could you talk about any of the major changes that the bank has been involved in helping the Tanzanians change their pay policy to make it more efficient?

MORIN: *Well, first of all, the first -- the initial -- we had -- we made the -- quite a few -- we had quite a few technical inputs into the pay policy that was done in the late 1990s, and worked -- had a strong dialogue with government in terms of, you know, what would be appropriate. And I think it's fair to say that Tanzania's pay policy is one that's being looked at in the region as a very good one, for the reason that it moved away from being egalitarian, which is very difficult for a government to do -- to say, "We're not going to pay everybody equally -- you know, increase pay equally. We will favor some groups." That's a particularly important achievement in Tanzania, which comes from a socialist background, where there was a recognition that although ultimately you need to increase the salaries of everyone, there are groups of people that you're losing more quickly than others, which are very important to the running of the countries, and that you should seek to retain those people, and in order to do so, you need to increase their salaries faster. So there -- the studies that the Tanzanians did demonstrated that at the top level, people were generally quite well-paid, if you look at the types of perks that they were benefiting from. If you look at the bottom of the salary scales, you realize that civil servants in the lower echelons are paid about the same as the private sector, so they were not the ones that are suffering. The ones suffering the most were the middle, at the director level, so the technical, professional, and managerial staff. So the policy, although it states that generally, it wants to bring everybody up, recognizes the need to do something more for that group. And over time, they really tried to keep to that policy, meaning that on a yearly basis, that group in the middle gets a bigger increase than the ones at the bottom and the ones at the top. They also did quite a good job in rationalizing the allowances that people were getting, from 45 to 26. But that, I think, is -- as we speak now -- is less of an achievement. You know, it was good at the beginning, but a lot of these allowances crept back -- you know, having been creeping back into, you know, into the systems. And there is still a genuine effort that needs to be made to have a transparent regime of allowances.*

SCHALKWYK: So how do they -- how do they get -- how do they reduce the allowances?

MORIN: *By monetizing some of them and integrating them in the salaries. But some of them have to remain. You know, like we talk about allowances for travel, which is legitimate, I think, whether it's a university or here in the World Bank, when you travel, you have per diems and so on. So those need to remain there, but there were others that were related to -- I'm not sure -- telephone, electricity allowances and so on, and things that people benefited from that were actually integrated into the basic pay.*

SCHALKWYK: And who would be responsible for maintaining that discipline in terms of reducing allowances?

MORIN: *Well, in a way, each accounting officer is responsible for his or her staff, meaning for the entire staff of the ministry. But as long as the salaries remain too low, there will always be ways that people will find to compensate for the low salary. So despite the fact that Tanzania made good progress, they've achieved their targets in terms of pay reform, the salaries still remain too low to make sure that you can prevent this indiscipline from happening. They're in the process now of reviewing the medium-term pay target, and also to sort of put in place a model that would enable them to look at what are the revenues, what are the budgetary constraint that we will face, and how -- and to model different pay scenarios. So we'll see where that will lead us. The study is underway right now. But it's also important to mention that the president asked for a Presidential Pay Commission to make recommendations, because he was committed to increasing salaries much faster than they have been increasing. Nobody has been able to see the report from that commission. It is with the president, but we understand that the POPSM is actually implementing the recommendations, and one of them is to sort of have someone look at the medium-term pay policy, to revise it and also to provide a new set of targets.*

SCHALKWYK: OK, I'll -- so if I could talk a bit about the management of reforms and the way that the Tanzanian government has gone about managing the reforms. What has the Bank's relationship been with the reform process and with the Tanzanian government, with regards to the Public Service Reform Program?

MORIN: *What do you mean, in terms of "relationship"? How we've worked with the government?*

SCHALKWYK: Yes.

MORIN: *The (World) Bank has now -- has been, for the last four years, the chair of the Donor Group on Public Service Reform. So that has given us special access, if you want, by being the chairs. But nevertheless, we've always been one of the two key players. DFID has been the other one, and over time, others have joined in, but basically you can still see that the two key players are DFID and the World Bank, in terms of the amount of funding that they've put into reform. But I also think that by having some continuity in our dialogue with them that we developed over time is quite a constructive relationship with government, and I've been able to be quite open about the challenges as well as, you know, recognizing their efforts but still pushing quite a bit on government to make sure that they deliver*

on the reform program. It's one of the few programs that seem to be going in the right direction, although at a very slow pace, but nevertheless going -- you know, maintaining the commitment to the reforms. And we've tried to nurture that and make sure that we can help in a constructive way -- help the government advance with the program.

SCHALKWYK: So what have been the major challenges in terms of getting the reforms off the ground? Why do you think it's been so slow?

MORIN: *I think it's just the nature of this kind of program. You know, it's so much about changing mindset, so there is resistance to change in the best case, and in this case, you're trying to move from the informality, basically, in how the public service has been run, to restoring some formality in the rules of the game. So that is bound to create quite a bit of resistance, and I think, to give credit to the Tanzanians, they function a lot by -- they function a lot by consensus, and that means that at every step of the process, they've made sure that within government, they were not going to encounter major disruption and major disagreement with what they've been putting forwards. So they've really maneuvered within the politics of government quite well, but they've done that by, you know, not going just with a technical approach, but also what is sensible to do politically, which means that it has taken more time than sometimes we think it will take if we look at an activity just at the technical level. So to me, it has been worth waiting for them to move, knowing that they have not regressed.*

SCHALKWYK: Has there been any -- have there been any problems with reforms being attempted prematurely, before ministries were ready for them?

MORIN: *Do you have any specific things in mind when you say that? No?*

SCHALKWYK: No, not -- not --

MORIN: *I don't think so. I think it's a learning -- it's very much learning by doing. So if you look at the first phase of reform, the PSRP I, implemented since 2000 -- 2007. If you look at that, the bulk of the activities have been implemented by POPS. So looking back at that, you know they -- one of the main complaints by the ministries have been that, you know, this is a reform that belongs to POPS. So in the second phase, they're attempting to move into getting the ministries to take ownership for the reforms. Because actually, it needs to happen -- these reforms need to happen in the ministries themselves. So that is going to again probably slow down the process, but will give more traction to some of the reforms. So I wouldn't think anything has been attempted too quickly. Maybe it hasn't moved quickly enough into the ministries. I think when it comes to sequencing, there is no right sequence. They've seized the opportunity when there was an opportunity to do some of the activities. But quite the contrary, you could say that the reforms have not been implemented fast enough. But I think for the reasons I explained, one can understand and probably appreciate that it's much more difficult than we think.*

SCHALKWYK: I was going to ask you about the shift of the reforms into the ministries themselves. Do you know how that decision was made, and who made that decision?

MORIN: *Yeah, I -- it was two -- it was from two sides. You know, they did their own introspection and looked at what they had done, how they had done it, and whether there was any ownership, and if not, why not. And I think that has led to the conclusion that they had not been present enough in the ministries, so that ministries didn't feel that they had any stake in the reform, that it was going to happen, and POPSM was going to take care of it. At the same time, I believe, on the donor side -- not I believe, I know -- that on our side, on the donor side, we also noted that, you know, yes, POPSM is very committed to the Public Service Reform Program, but what about the rest of government? And when we talked to our respective sector colleagues, we realized that, you know, there was not much awareness of what was supposed to happen. So that also led to a bit of pressure being put from us for POPSM to think of a different approach. So I think there was a convergence of -- or reaching the same conclusion on the first phase in terms of how well it had worked and what could be done better during the second phase.*

SCHALKWYK: And how has the shift worked out so far?

MORIN: *That part has worked out not too badly. PO-PSM spent a lot of time with ministries, and when I was there in November, we were pleasantly surprised to see that the ministries were actually happy, which was quite a revelation, in a way. To go to the ministries and to be able to talk to PS and to hear them say that they like this approach. I think they also liked it because it came with resources. And the good point about phase II is that the resources allocated to public service reforms are integrated into the budget of the ministries. Under phase I, if you remember from reading the documents, there was a Performance Improvement Fund, and ministries could apply to get that funding. Well, I guess some ministries were happy because they got some funding, but other ministries never got any funding -- not because they were denied it, but probably because they never -- their request came at a point where no money was available anymore, and the project was -- the program was -- the project was winding down. So to have the funds allocated within their own MTEF -- within their own Medium-Term Expenditure Framework -- is something that they welcome. So it looks like this is going to work well. But I think the challenge will be for POPSM now to meet the expectation of all these ministries. Whether they have the resources -- physical resources -- people that can support the ministries and at the same time implement other aspects of the program, which are going across the board, will be quite a challenge, because that second part has not worked very well since the beginning. They've moved to the ministries, but they have not moved much on the activities that POPSM needs to implement itself.*

SCHALKWYK: And within the ministries, are there specific ministries that are struggling with this process more than others, or others that have been particularly successful?

MORIN: *It's not clear yet. I think it's too early. Once we do the -- when we do the next mission, we hope to see more. Now, what we saw in the ministries that we visited is that they had gone through the process of establishing their priorities and deciding for which activities they wanted to get the funding. And all the ministries did that. We picked, obviously, bigger ministries -- key ministries -- to visit, and in those ministries, it was clear that the process went well and that there was a genuine interest in moving with this process. But whether or not, now that the funding is available, whether or not they'll get the right support or*

whether suddenly everything will go -- you know, idling, waiting for POPSM, it's not clear. I think we'll see better the next time around what's happening.

SCHALKWYK: And how is POPSM shifting -- dealing with this shift to a new role?

MORIN: *I think they're dealing with it very well, but as I said -- dealing with that role very well -- but how to combine that role and the ones of being implementers of other parts of the reform is something they're struggling with. They've put all their eggs into working with the ministries, which I think if you put in the balance, is probably worth more than the -- looking at the number of activities that were left aside as a result of them moving to the ministries, which was a smart strategic move from their part. But how they will cope with implementing the other activities is not clear yet. We've talked about that during the supervision mission. We talked about them probably needing more help inside POPSM for some of their activities, but we also talk about making sure that they have quality people to implement these activities.*

SCHALKWYK: And what activities have they been -- have they retained?

MORIN: *Well, in almost every aspect, there is something. For example, the implementation of integrated personnel and payroll management system, the HCMIS -- Human Capital Management Information System -- that's not something where a ministry has a choice. At some point, you have to have a system that will be across the board. So that's one of them. When it comes to pay reform, it's not something that a ministry needs to make a choice; that needs to go across the board. So those kind -- so those are two of the major activities. But they were also struggling with other aspects, like, for example, policy management, which would be a key function of ministries. As they decentralize, one of the key functions that they retain is to make policies and to monitor implementation of policies. Well, some ministries -- most of the ministries -- didn't pick that up as a priority. So they've decided that they will need to pick it up and see what they can start doing across the board to make that a reality.*

SCHALKWYK: In terms of the reforms as a whole, how has Tanzania dealt with limited resources, and has it had to discard any plans because they proved too costly?

MORIN: *I don't think they've ran into any problems with resources, especially if you look at the Public Service Reform Program, they have \$100 million from the Development Partners, in addition to the government budget, to implement the reforms. So there is -- they had -- budget has not been an issue. And I think the same for the other reform program. If you look at them, they're well-funded, public financial management, local government, legal sector, so I don't think budget has been an issue.*

SCHALKWYK: And what do you think has been -- what have been successful aspects of the reform process?

MORIN: *I think to have maintained the commitment to the reforms that long is in itself an achievement. And you have it within POPSM, but you have it even more broadly. As I was saying, right now, you're even moving into ministries becoming even more enthusiastic about it. So having been able to penetrate the ministries, the departments and agencies, to get them to endorse the reform agenda, I think has been quite a success. Pay reform, despite all of its challenges, has been a*

success, to the extent, as I said, that they've moved away from an egalitarian position to something that's more realistic, in light of the financial constraints. And to have been able to meet that commitment every year, to increase salaries one way or the other, I think has been quite an achievement. All the fundamentals, the laws that they've put in place or policies, like the public service act, the management -- employment and management policy, records management act. If you want to go beyond that, the Public Financial Management Act, the Procurement Act -- all of these were not easy to pass. And so I think in putting the fundamentals in place, the foundations to move with the reforms, they've been quite successful.

SCHALKWYK: And what -- what has been -- what would you do -- what do you think should have been done differently? Were there any aspects that could have been altered or you think should have been altered if you were to go back?

MORIN: *I think there is still a lot of time and scope to adjust. You know, that has been the advantage of the government developing a 15-year program is that -- that was one of the main reason -- and one of the main reason for the Bank to use the adaptable program lending as an instrument, so that we could -- so that if government adjusted this program, we could also adjust our support accordingly, provided that, you know, the overall remains -- that the trajectory remains good. I think one of the places where they definitely need to improve is the coordination of those cross-cutting reforms. That has been a weakness since the beginning. They have sort of put in place the mechanism to rectify that by creating a Reform Coordination Unit in the Chief Secretary's office, but as of now, I have yet to see how these cross-cutting reforms are working together to provide the tools that the ministries need to improve their performance. And I think that has still not come about. So I would probably put more emphasis on that right from the word "go." The other one would be -- the other one where there has been quite of a struggle is that having in place a monitoring and evaluation system. It took a long time to establish it, and even now, in phase II, we're still struggling to get baselines for what -- for the indicators that will be monitored during this phase of reform. So if one needed to go back, or if one needs to put some emphasis, those are two areas that I think one would need to really sort of sit down and say, "OK, let's make sure that these mechanisms are in place from the word 'go,' and that you can start operating with this structure in place." Offhand, those are the two things that come to mind.*

SCHALKWYK: So going back to the evaluation, what sort of indicators are being used, or would you like to use?

MORIN: *Well, they're quite well defined in terms of our project appraisal document. And those were not based on us sitting behind a desk and defining them; they were worked out with government, with POPS, and based on the system that they have in place and what they were planning to achieve. So they're quite concrete, but at the same time, some of them will be hard to measure. They have to do with all the components, in terms of leaders that are capable of managing the public -- managing the public service, the reform program. They have to do with the citizens' feedback, they have to do with information that's being communicated, and performance of ministries, and so on.*

SCHALKWYK: And has the Bank had any -- has the Bank helped in any way to make changes to the structural or institutional -- institutional changes in the organization?

MORIN: Well, the first one was in pushing for the Reform Secretariat to be dismantled and integrate and mainstreaming the reform. And I think that is, in my opinion, quite an achievement. Because the Secretariat was more or less like a PIU -- what we call PIU -- Project Implementation Unit -- which means a little enclave that has a special remuneration and that implements a project, but in the end, by the time you're finished with the implementation, there is no ownership; it doesn't continue because that unit doesn't exist anymore. So in this case, our interlocutor is squarely the permanent Secretary for Public Service Management. And, as you have seen yourself during your interviews, the people that you've talked to are people holding position, you know, at directors' level in government, which are -- were in charge of implementing each component of the program. So that has been quite an achievement, and we've maintained that throughout. So that's something. When it comes to the rest, we've of course dialogued with government. There was a time when there were four entities that were responsible for agriculture, one way or the other. So we've tried to influence that process, and at times, maybe we have, maybe we haven't. It's not clear. But overall, that's -- we've had dialogue on the various aspect, in terms of the structure of government, like for example, the need to have coordination embedded into the government structure and the reforms being better coordinated.

SCHALKWYK: And on a human resource level, is there a -- do civil servants have clear career paths? Have those changed under the reform process?

MORIN: Like I mentioned before, I think the initial step to try to do that was through the OPRA, and there was a number of activities now that are to be taking place under the program to try to establish that, but that, I cannot say has been the main focus. Even the focus -- when training has taken place, there has been no tracking mechanism to see whether it has made a difference. It has been quite ad hoc. So I don't believe that civil servants have a clear career path and that there is yet a system that sort of enables management to sort of see where are the promising civil servants, how you can move someone from being junior to becoming one of the senior people. It's -- there is no clear path for the time being, but it's part of the agenda.

SCHALKWYK: And have -- has there been -- has there been any... Sorry. So what do you think the major changes have been within the civil service since you started working with Tanzania? If you could identify sort of the three or four major, major changes.

MORIN: I think -- one of them has definitely been a greater awareness of the need for reforms and a commitment to the reform program -- and not just as a response to structural adjustment or structural needs, but more recognizing that you need to have a performing public service. That has definitely been one of them. Another one has been -- I think a stronger dialogue within the government around reforms, at the senior level. Although I've mentioned before that the coordination is not -- is still not working properly among the Core Reform Program, I still think that between the head of the public service and the permanent secretaries, it's definitely an issue that's on the table and that is being discussed more openly. Thirdly, I believe the attempt to put in place some systems to manage better the public service is one of the things that I've seen happening over time. So I would say those -- there are others, but those would be the key ones.

SCHALKWYK: Has the civil service been able to attract the skills that it's needed, and has -- what did -- and has that changed over time, and why is that the case?

MORIN: *The way I see it, it has been able to attract, because we've seen people coming into the public service that you might not have thought would, eventually. And also, quite interestingly, is when the organization, such like the World Bank has advertised position, there has not been too many public servants who have applied for the jobs. At least, I can talk for -- you know, I can talk of a specific case where I was involved, and I was quite surprised that there was nobody from the public service who applied for a job within the bank. So I think that sort of gives you the signal that the situation is not so bad that the civil servants are running out -- that they were running out to us. As opposed to a similar situation in Uganda for a similar position, where there were quite a few civil servants who applied for one specific position.*

SCHALKWYK: What do you think has changed, or what do you think...?

MORIN: *Well, I believe that salaries -- although we've said that they have not reached a level -- they have not reached a very high level -- are still more attractive than they used to be. And I -- the fact that there is more transparency in some systems, I think has sort of started to give more confidence to people who are applying for jobs, that actually maybe you can have a career in the public service. I've certainly heard that the public is more positive about the public service than it used to be. I think we've -- I've seen -- I've read it in newspaper, we've come across people that you talk to, you know, in the course of working in Tanzania that have sort of indicated that there is improvement. There's still a long way to go, but nevertheless, you can see that there is an attempt to change the way business is being done.*

SCHALKWYK: And do you think there's anything -- any aspect of the design or implementation of the reform that reflects particularly Tanzanian traditions or political culture that may not be transferable to other places?

MORIN: *Can we pause for a minute?*

SCHALKWYK: Certainly.

(break in recording)

MORIN: *-- probably on that one. I think one of the key things that is fairly typical of Tanzania is this consensus-building that they go through for any changes that they want to make. I think that's fairly unique and is not necessarily transferable. They don't -- Tanzanians don't necessarily talk a lot about their issues in public, but we understand that they do behind closed doors, and that's probably how they're able to move. Once they come out in public, they've -- they have a consolidated view of how they're going to move forward, and then they move forward. So that takes quite a bit of time, and I think it's quite unique to Tanzania and has enabled them to probably move with some aspects of the reforms where others have been stumbling. So I would say that would be one of the main features. There also -- the fact that they have quite a good structure to do this consensus-building within government with this Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee, which is headed by the Chief Secretary, the head of the public*

service, which include all of the PSs. It has been in Tanzania an institutional arrangement that has worked very well and has been more than a pro forma type of committee. It has been a committee that has discussed in depth some issues and that has been able to form, if you want, consensus, to get consensus around key issues that probably is not necessarily replicable somewhere else. I think it comes from their own culture to be able to do that.

SCHALKWYK: Is there anything else you'd like to add before we finish the interview? And do you have any thoughts from your -- the trip you've just taken?

MORIN: *Yes. I -- from the trip I've just taken -- which could be my last trip, actually, because I'm changing jobs in the new year -- I have some -- more concerns than I used to have about the program. I think it will be -- as one moves into the next election, it's always more difficult to maintain the momentum of reforms in that context, so I think it will take quite a strong management in the POPS to navigate through that. It will also -- it also means that you have to keep in mind that the reforms are not just technical, but also political. And I think the management of POPS will have to sort of be quite strong to be able maybe to sell -- to continue to sell some of the reforms, and making sure that there is no reform fatigue, and be ready for the next phase of a new government. I also -- as I mentioned before -- I think one of the issues will be how POPS can manage to be supportive to the ministries, and at the same time to have the resources to implement themselves -- its own agenda -- is somewhat of a concern to me in how they will do that. And how, also, they're able to resist the temptation of being involved in all kinds of other things than focusing on the reform program, because they have other tasks to do. We see them as the main implementer of the Public Service Reform Program, but they're a part of the government and have a day-to-day task. So how they're able to juggle that and have strong, good staff in place to do it is a bit of a concern. But overall, I think they have -- in the management positions, they have people who understand the reforms well, who are technically competent, and should be able to deal with these issues.*

SCHALKWYK: If I could ask one question. Somebody I spoke to suggested that some of the ministries see the reform resources as an opportunity to sort of carry out their day-to-day tasks rather than as a chance to reform dysfunctional operations or change... How -- what are you -- what is your opinion of that?

MORIN: *Well, I think it will take, again, a strong monitoring and evaluations system in place. And that's also one of my concern, that POPS might not have kept the resources that it needs to do that, to be able to assess whether ministries are actually doing what they are supposed to do, and if not, what kind -- what do you do? What is the mechanism to either redress that situation or to say, OK, there has to be a way to reward the ones who are performing and sanction the ones who are not performing. So that, I'm not sure, has been fully appreciated yet. And as I said, it goes a little bit with the learning by doing. It seems like a good idea to move to the ministries, but then how far do you go to monitoring what they're doing? If there is to be some ownership, maybe some of the daily tasks that they have to implement are part of the reform? So it will be difficult to judge that, but they have to have some sort of mechanisms to do it.*

SCHALKWYK: OK, thank you very much.

MORIN: *(laughs) That felt like an exam.*