



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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- SCHER: My name is Daniel Scher and I'm here with Adrian Horn in Norfolk County, UK. The date is the 5th of December 2007. Adrian, before we begin I'd just like to make sure that we've spoken of the informed consent.
- HORN: Yes.
- SCHER: Do you have any questions about that?
- HORN: No.
- SCHER: We've spoken about the legal release, and you understand all that?
- HORN: Yes, *all signed up.*
- SCHER: Great. Then let's get started. Before we get into the meat of the interview, I'd just like to talk a little bit about your biography. Could you describe your position now and what exactly you do, what your responsibilities are and that sort of thing?
- HORN: *I'm a former chief police officer, I had a career in the police service in the UK. I finished up as Assistant Chief Constable. I left the police service in 1994, set up my own company which is involved in the collation, analysis, and dissemination of information on policing in the UK, and my particular input into all of that, into the business, is as a consultant in working with police forces in developing and post-conflict, conflict countries.*
- SCHER: Within police work do you have a particular specialty, or is there something that you would consider to be your main personal focus? Some area that you like to work on?
- HORN: *My career gave me experience in all aspects of policing in the UK. I was sort of selected early on for accelerated promotion; so consequently, I was exposed to all aspects of policing. But I'm very much more a practically-based individual rather than theoretical, and I do have a particular interest in the community-based type policing and what you can do with that in these sorts of countries, as I think that's a solution to many of the problems.*
- SCHER: We certainly hope to talk about that in the interview. If it's all right with you, I'd like to kind of jump into the functional areas that we're interested in. The first thing I'd like to talk about is recruitment and developing effective recruitment strategies. Is this something that you have any experience with?
- HORN: *Yes, in Sierra Leone we were faced with this problem where we had quite a large police force on paper, but in terms of the people who could actually undertake policing duties it was pretty small. And one of the problems in countries like Sierra Leone and developing countries' police forces, actually, when you see a police officer on the street, they're not necessarily policemen in the true sense of the word. For example, in Sierra Leone, all the mechanics, all the laborers, all the technical people, were police officers; where in sort of modern professional police forces they would actually be civilians. So one of the aspects you've got to consider is separating out the civilian support side of the police service from the actual people who deliver the police service themselves.*
- So we actually had to recruit a lot of people in Sierra Leone. One of the reasons was to make sure the police force was ready and trained to deal with the draw-down of the UN contingent, for example. They had about 17,000-odd UN*

personnel in Sierra Leone, and before they could withdraw, we had to make sure that we had something there to fill the vacuum when they pulled out. So we had to have a very intensive recruitment drive, to build the police force up to about 9,500 over a period of two to three years.

There are several issues you actually have to address. Let's get straight into corruption. In post-conflict countries, you find that people want to be police officers. One of the reasons is that they actually have power, so they can use corrupt ways in which to get money. So if they're not paid properly, obviously somebody in uniform, in power, whether it be on traffic duty or whether it be dealing with crime or whatever, is in a very strong position to get money. So we had to address those sorts of issues. So integrity, background checks on the individuals, were very, very important.

The sort of issue that you don't expect, but you became very quickly familiar with is, for example, if you ask for a certain standard of academic achievement, they will bring in forged documents. They will bring in forged exam results, forged attainment certificates for education, etc., which they could buy. You also found, as you dug a bit deeper that at school, corruptly, they could get better marks than perhaps what they were deserving. So, you had to introduce tests; where as they said they can read and write, you had to introduce tests to make sure that they could read and write, and they had a basic education.

So there are all sorts of practical issues you have to address to make sure, first of all, that you get people coming into the service who are literate. In the Congo, for example, where I'm working at the moment, the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), something like 50-60 percent of the police force are illiterate, so the Inspector General says. So you've got to address issues like that. You can't suddenly get rid of that number of people. First of all they've joined the police service, been accepted, and they're police officers. So you've got to care for them, and you've got to make sure there is some sort of exit strategy. But, at the same time, you've got to make sure that the job is attractive enough, that people are joining it for the right reasons and have the necessary levels of education, levels of reading and writing.

The other side of that is that, I find within most police forces, there is a critical mass of people who are extremely well educated, want the force to change, want the service to develop, because that's what they joined for, and are willing to do it. That often is a great encouragement to somebody who is working this area to know that there are people there who are willing to make things happen and want to do it for the right reasons.

So as a recruitment policy, you had to first of all select—well, before you even did that, you need to come up with job descriptions; you need to come up with the competencies that are required for the people who are joining the police. You have to make sure that the people were acceptable because, obviously, you're going to get tribal, you're going to get ethnic, you're going to get all sorts of issues like that creeping in. If you want to do some checks on whether people are acceptable, then you have to have some sort of system—particularly if they're coming from villages where perhaps the chief gives some sort of reference for the individual which can be checked—just to make sure you're getting the right quality of people applying to join the job.

The other aspect of it is having the training infrastructure to actually cope with this number of people. So, something we had to do—again back to Sierra Leone—we had to quickly put together a training school that could actually train

and accommodate 600-700 students at any one time. So there's a big investment in putting in proper classroom facilities, proper sleeping facilities, all those sorts of things.

You then have to review the courses, because you find that there is a lot of, for example, training in the use of firearms, which people will never use. In Sierra Leone, the police force is basically not armed. The armed part of the police force is a separate body all together. So the police were not armed. So because you're inheriting a legacy system that goes back to colonial days, there was a lot of drill, a lot of arms training, and all the rest of it; and you have to ask the question: Is this necessary? If we're trying to train a lot of people up quickly in how to be a police officer or the basics of how to be a police officer, do they really need to know how to drill and present arms and put on marvelous parades? So we were able to cut the size of the course down, the length of the course down, by looking through all that stuff and chucking out what isn't really relevant and concentrating on the stuff that is relevant.

And you have to introduce things like human rights. Obviously human rights is a major issue. So you have to train people in human rights, their responsibilities, all those sorts of issues. And it's pretty effective. So we got the course down from about six months, the initial course I think it was, down to about 12-14 weeks; and at the end of the time, police officers came out with the basic knowledge that they required and the basic skills that they required. Then you enter another big problem. It follows on to talk about this.

After about 18 months—well, it's all very well training somebody to do something, but then comes the question: How is that training applied when you get out on the ground, when you go to the station that you're assigned to? How do you apply the training you have been given in the training environment to how you actually do the job on the ground? After we peel back all these layers of issues and problems as we tried to develop the Sierra Leone police, something suddenly leapt out, and that was the fact that—, and the best way to describe this is to ask people, "How did you learn to do your job?" Most people will say, "Well, I worked with this person, I worked with that person, and they showed me how to fill a form in, or they came with me when I went to interview somebody, or whatever." You learn from other people, not necessarily from training. So you then ask the question, "Well, are those people there to teach you how to do the job?"

If you look at a country, and most of the post-conflict countries you're talking about are ones where they gained independence in the '60s, when you probably had a good basic policing system up until that point, so the people who used to teach the new recruits how to handle a prisoner for example, or how to fill in a prisoner form, or how to take a statement, simply are not there. So therefore, there is no organizational memory, knowledge bank, in which to train people on how to do the job on the ground; and that became a major, major problem.

We had to introduce a strategy, which we called back-to-basics, of actually teaching people on the ground how to do those basic things. They may sound very simple—like keeping a pocket book, or taking a statement, or filling a form in that registers how a prisoner is dealt with, etc.—but they're absolutely essential because these are the basic day-to-day tasks that police officers have to undertake. We introduced a very good system in liaison with the UN, who had lots of policemen out there on the ground, whereas for six weeks everybody would train everybody on the ground as much as they possibly could on a small number of basic essential tasks.

But then we struck another problem. What we found was, particularly when you're talking about United Nations and the civilian police component, they come from many different countries themselves. I think we had something like 17 different countries represented. So we had to train them up as well, in the Sierra Leone way of doing things, rather than the various countries' ways of doing things. So we had to train the UN police officers on how to do these things the Sierra Leone way, together with the necessary forms and what have you.

So they would come in, we'd have a big training session; then they would go out to various police stations and help train up policemen on how to do things, because you had to rebuild that institutional memory, the knowledge bank of just the basics—a very interesting problem we came across, and no doubt everybody else comes across. I'm currently working, as I say, in the DRC. Same problem. New police force, lots of old systems and procedures, but everybody's forgotten them, and very little access to the written word in the police stations. So, all that's got to be replaced and got to be rebuilt.

SCHER: There are a lot of things that I'd like to pick up on there. If you don't mind, I'd like to pull it back a little bit to some things that you mentioned when you were talking about your recruitment strategy. Firstly, you mentioned actually drawing job descriptions and putting the word out. How did you do that? Was that over radio and local newspapers? How did you get the word out that you were recruiting police?

HORN: *Very much it comes by word of mouth. We wanted to make sure that we recruited across the country, not just in Freetown or whatever. Radio, well, alongside this, one of the first things we did in Sierra Leone was build a media department. Now it might sound strange to some people. Why is that a priority? Well, it is a priority for several reasons, because you've got to communicate what's going on both internally and externally. So we had a consultant there, Stuart Donaldson, a retired senior policeman who had specialized in media matters, who set up a media department, did the training, gave them the basic equipment.*

And, for example, one of the things we introduced because you just could not rely on the press at that time—I mean they would put in stories which were paid for by people who wanted a particular story to go in, or they were just interested in the headlines or whatever. So it was totally unreliable. They would not give the right story. Solution? We introduced a police newspaper. So, once a month a police newspaper went out, and there were enough copies to go around the country so the people could obviously read them and share them; and through that we were able to announce that we had a particular recruitment going on, or whatever. So, the word soon got about, and the UN helped enormously in managing that. So we would ask that adverts go in the newspaper, things on the radio, saying that, "The recruiting is starting. Apply," which they did. They could get the forms from the police station, and then there was a filtering process, and we went from there. So, in support of a lot of this stuff—you can't just say, we're going to recruit—you've got to have an infrastructure in place to deal with that, and part of that infrastructure is internal and external communication.

SCHER: That makes sense. Another thing I wanted to pick up on was this idea of making sure that the recruits you were getting were acceptable from a community perspective, and you said sometimes you'd get references from the local chiefs.

HORN: Yes.

SCHER: You said you set up a system to do this and then to verify the information that you got from these chiefs. How did that work? What was the process?

HORN: *Well, because the UN officers, civilian police component, were locally based, they handled a lot of that, and they filtered a lot of that. We had another consultant in Peter Kinson (Advisor, Commonwealth Community Security and Safety Project, Sierra Leone), who sort of was overseeing the whole training thing. But basically, it's pretty simple; you couldn't have anything too complicated because of the communications problems and all the rest of it. But when anybody applied for a job, they had to fill in the application form, and they had to produce references. I don't know what happened, and I can't remember whether it was for the police or for the army, but there was a system debated about putting pictures up in villages and saying, "Anybody got any objection to this person? Give us some feedback," type of thing. I'm not sure how that went, but that was one of the ideas that was mooted. But basically, you had references and, as far as possible, those references were checked with the person who wrote them.*

As I said, going back to the corruption bit, it's very easy for somebody to get a teacher to say, "This guy is the best thing since sliced bread," but when you go and talk to them they say, "Oh no, perhaps he's not the right person." So, there was a filtering process. It's not going to be exactly like it is in the UK or somewhere like that with reference checks to the criminal records, because one of the problems we had was that all the criminal records were destroyed round about 2000 when the CID (Criminal Investigation Department) headquarters was burnt down. So there were no fingerprints, there were no, what were called CRO checks, criminal record checks. So you had to rely on people's memory and also on comments you may get from the villages wherever these people live. But generally it worked pretty well. Occasionally you found that—particularly in the early stages until people realized we are not going to accept corruption, this has got to be done properly—there were the odd occasions where halfway through the course, somebody suddenly found out that the person couldn't read or write, and there was some scam going on where somebody else was writing the exam paper, or there was collusion with one of the trainers or whatever. But that soon got eliminated because one of the things you've got to be pretty aware of is all the corrupt practices and scams that exist; and you just try and design them out.

SCHER: Did you make use of any sort of trial periods or probationary periods to make sure you were weeding those sorts of scams out?

HORN: *I think it was two years. There was certainly a probationary period built in. Because Sierra Leone, for example, was built on the old British system, that was fairly well accepted that in the first couple of years, if the officer didn't perform then you could get rid of them. The other—again, I'm not quite sure how this finished up—but within the old regulations, people had to reapply for their job after five years, or a five-year period, and that was a point where somebody could say, "Sorry, we don't want you any more, you can go." But it had to be handled very gently. You were talking about a legacy police force, you were talking about people who had been through horrendous times. I mean, you didn't just get rid of people. You had to consider things like, Well, if they can't read and write, if they're illiterate, what areas of the police force can they actually work in? We don't want to get rid of people just for the sake of getting rid of people. And, for example, if you're guarding premises or guarding Parliament or whatever, you don't necessarily have to be literate to do that; so, therefore you could make good use of the individuals and gainfully employ them. So it's several years on in*

the build up of an organization like that before you can have really strict policies like that, and you've got to think about the welfare of the individuals.

SCHER: Sure. You've mentioned corruption and the sort of scams a few times as being a major obstacle to designing this type of effective recruitment strategy. Would you mind talking about some other obstacles you encountered?

HORN: *On the recruitment side?*

SCHER: On the recruitment side, yes.

HORN: *You've got practical considerations like, you've got to win the hearts and minds of the senior officers for a start. Let's take something simple like the drill sessions. Because senior officers would have been through that system, because they had quite a lot of pride in the training school that they had just outside Freetown, and because this is how they did it, it was actually quite difficult to convince some of them that we needed a change. Why spend half of a six-month course on teaching drill and teaching how to handle a weapon when the guys and girls aren't going to have access to the weapons on the ground? So over time we managed to convince them. Because, at the end of the day, it's not what we want, it's not what the UK wants, it's not what any other country wants; it's what Sierra Leone wants. So, they've got to decide what sort of training system, what sort of police force, whatever, that they want, and then you have to train to that. Now, that's actually extremely important. Because if you're going to impose something, it's simply not going to be sustainable, it's not going to work. But, over time, talking to people, I began to realize well, yes, there is a lot of wasted time. We've got a lot of people to train up quickly, what can we eliminate which isn't 100 percent successful? What do we need to build into the training course? What are the themes, etc.?*

Alongside that, at the end of the day, we introduced a policing system with the police officers and with the people of Sierra Leone which is called local-needs policing. So you had to make sure that all the training was directed at this concept of community-based policing, which again required education of the trainers, education of the senior officers about headquarters supports the policing on the ground; not the policing on the ground supports headquarters. So we had to turn the whole thing upside down. So you can imagine a triangle where before it was sitting on the base and the base was, you know, the policeman on the ground, the traffic, etc., all supporting the pinnacle which was headquarters. Turn it upside down so the pinnacle is at the bottom and the base is at the top and that's what should happen. It's about delivering policing service on the ground.

Also, we had to retrain the trainers. So, quite a bit of effort and bit of money was spent on bringing people over to train the trainers in modern ways of delivering training, more practically-based, less of the chalk-and-talk where people would just write out the lesson notes on the blackboard, and everybody else would copy, in classes of 100-odd people. No, not good. So it was about more discussion, about more participation, about more understanding of why we are doing this, what the new style of policing is going to be, and how do you actually do that on the ground. So much more practically-based, modern methods of training, and working to a concept rather than just rote learning of the lesson notes. So it was quite a radical change. And you had to change the senior officer there, obviously, brought up on the old system. They had to understand and encapsulate why this was necessary.

SCHER: Can I ask, you mentioned that you developed themes that were perhaps more relevant than these kinds of drills and that sort of thing. What were these themes? Could you talk about the curriculum of the training?

HORN: *I didn't handle that personally, so Peter Kinson would be the guy to talk about that; but things like introducing human rights into just about everything that you dealt with. A basic human right is that you don't arrest somebody without telling them why they're being arrested in a language they understand. So, they've got to understand where this comes from. That then leads on to how you arrest somebody—practical demonstrations, understanding the law—so you can say, "I have the power of arrest under this act, I'm arresting you for this"; and then giving the caution. So just basic, proper, standard police techniques on how to deal with people properly—how to arrest people properly, how to take statements properly—and a lot of bad practices had built up. We had to take, particularly the detective branch, you have to take them back to retrain them on things like the judges' rules which were the rules which governed how you handled and how you interviewed and when you could interview prisoners, for example.*

That was an interesting exercise. We set up a major robbery squad, a major crime squad—a small number of people—but again, trained by a detective from the UK who knew the law, the judges' rules, and was a very experienced detective. He trained them up on the proper way to take a statement, the proper way to gather evidence, the fact that you can go out and interview people as witnesses, all this sort of thing. Of course, when some of the cases started coming to court which were first class cases—because this was a practice that had become abused or wasn't used for many, many years—of course, the magistrates would look back and the solicitors would look back and say, "What is this new thing?" and we had to explain to them, this isn't new; this is how it should be done. It's just that bad practices have crept in over the years, and you've got to get back to what the law supports and not what you think should be done. So, there were a number of good examples like that.

SCHER: We've touched on this a bit, but I wonder if you could talk in some more detail about modern methods of police training. You said you had demonstrations and these sorts of talks and—

HORN: *You need to practically base them, and you need to allow the people to discuss the issues, as I say, not stand at a board and write it all out. You say, "Right, well this is the law. Can anybody give me an example? How are you going to handle this? What if this happens? How are you going to deal with that?" It's a far more interactive, far more of the students being involved in discussing the issues and problems and understanding why certain things have to happen, and why we have to handle prisoners in this way, etc., etc. And all through was this concept of, this is the new style of policing; this is local-needs policing; this is what you're going to have to do in this area to make sure that you're dealing with this on the ground. So, it's things like devolved responsibility; in other words, police officers on the ground have the confidence to make decisions.*

And of course, on top of that you had management training with the middle ranks. That was an important issue as well, and that was done locally with management training people within Sierra Leone. That was very useful, to start them thinking more about management and how you manage people properly, how you get the best out of people, how an organization works, all those sorts of things. There was specialist training as well, particularly, for example, in the women and child abuse area. We had people come over who were specialists in this area to make sure there were enough police officers trained who could deal

properly and respond properly to women who had been raped for example, or complaining about domestic violence, these sort of issues.

SCHER: I'd like to get back to the management in a little while. For now, I just wanted to ask, you said you had people come over to handle the specialist training. Who primarily conducted the training?

HORN: *Experienced people. In the case of the women and children, some very experienced people. Not just police officers, but people who have been involved in dealing with these sorts of issues in the UK. We used UK people for this. It was a combination of people experienced on the social welfare side, people who had been experienced before in setting up things like sexual abuse referral centers, and a woman detective who had been working in this area for some time. We also had to address the medical issues, for example, medical examination, which was a new dimension. So you had to find counterparts on the medical side, doctors, who were willing to examine female patients, for example, and be prepared and trained to give evidence and make statements and do the necessary checks.*

SCHER: And the training was all conducted in English?

HORN: *Yes, the benefit of Sierra Leone, of course, is it is English-speaking. English is the main language, so we got to do it all in English. So language wasn't a particular problem there.*

SCHER: I understood there was some sort of local patois that's quite distinct.

HORN: *Oh yes, you've got Creole, and you've got five or six tribal languages. But generally, everybody spoke English, so it wasn't a problem. I mean all the law was in English, all the written work was in English.*

SCHER: Oh, okay. And having done the training, what sort of follow-up procedures were there to make sure that the training was having its intended effect?

HORN: *Ah, that's interesting, that's important. As I said before, there's no point training somebody if you don't monitor the application on the ground. So, what we built up was that we made sure that people came back to go and check on the ground what was happening, to work on the ground; and we worked with the people who were trained to make sure that they were applying what they'd been trained to do. And that raises a very interesting area; and it's about the longevity of projects. There's no point in going in and doing something—we talked before about vehicles—there's no point in going into a country and thinking, "Ah right, they need vehicles," which they obviously will do; then giving them 100 vehicles and thinking, "Job done," and coming away—because they'll last a few months and that will be it, a total waste of money.*

So, we were able to take a longer-term view, and also the British government took a longer-term view. Clare Short (Member of Parliament), for example, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the President, which says we'll basically support you for ten years, subject to certain conditions. So, we had a longer-term view, and individually we were there for some time; we were there for several years. So it gave a great deal of confidence to the officers who wanted to make a change, to stick with it. That was a major decision—I'm going off the track here for a bit—but that was a major decision for some of the senior officers as to whether to commit to this process of change, because historically, whenever there was a coup attempt, or whatever, the police were subject to quite

violent and horrendous abuse by the rebels or whatever, because the police were always seen as an arm of the government that was in power. So therefore, they were the natural target. So, for a senior officer, politically, socially, whatever, to say, "Right, okay, I'm going to work with these guys who have come in, and I'm going to be part of this police reform," that's a major decision on their part. One of the things, we were there long term; and we were able to tell them that there was long support. It gave them the confidence to work with us, genuinely work with us, not just say so, but actually work with us to put these changes in place and to develop the police force. Major, major issue.

But going back to the vehicles, we supplied something like 400 or 450-odd Land Rovers, a lot of motor bikes, all this sort of thing. But we didn't do it all at once. We spent a lot of time concentrating on setting up a proper garage, training the technicians and engineers up so they could work on the vehicles properly, making sure they had the proper tools to do the job, making sure they had the spares to do the job, making sure they had the facilities on which to properly maintain these vehicles. Also driving a Land Rover may seem quite simple, but if you don't drive it properly and use the right gears, you can soon destroy the thing. So therefore driver training was an important issue.

We very soon discovered that something like 15 percent of the force budget was being stolen through misuse of fuel. So we quickly implemented some simple management tools to enable us to properly monitor the use of the vehicles, things like log books, things like proper records at the fuel pumps—and checking that. So, one of my pet phrases in Sierra Leone was, management-by-walking-about. The only way you could check these things was to walk to the fuel pumps, ask to see the stuff, ask to see the records, and do some physical checks, which in itself cut out a lot of the problems and a lot of the abuse. So yes, quite interesting.

We very quickly, within about 24 hours—well, what happened there, was I was driving around where the garages are, and I saw a guy behind one of the Mercedes ambulances, the second-hand Mercedes ambulances we supplied, and he was siphoning fuel; so, he was duly dealt with. Then I went to the fuel pumps, and there was a guy with a motor bike. Not his lucky day. He had just put in 2 gallons of fuel into a Honda 125 XLS, which were the motor bikes that we supplied, and of course the attendant had written 2 gallons of fuel in the book. I said, "How come you put two gallons in?" He said, "Oh, well, that's what it takes." I said, "Yes, let's just have a look at the handbook. Right, maximum capacity of fuel, including reserve, 1.7 gallons." "Ah, yes, well, we have to round it up." "Okay, so you put in just over a gallon?" "Yes." "But you round it up to two gallons?" "Yes." "So how many motor bikes come through here a day?" "Oh, I don't know, 40-50." "So what happens at the end of the day when your tally on your log sheet doesn't tally with the pump meter?" "Ah, well, we have to use the petrol somewhere else."

So basically, there was a great big fiddle going on with this. Then of course, we introduced log books with the Land Rovers and very quickly discovered that some of the Land Rovers were doing about 4 or 5 miles to the gallon. But the log book soon solved that. Except that suddenly, we had a lot of speedometer cables that were broken so that the speedometer didn't work and therefore didn't record the mileage. So, you know, you have to be aware of all these things, and you have to deal with them. You can never totally eliminate all these problems, but you can quickly build quite a resistance to some of these problems.

But you're faced with an enormous problem. You have police officers working in these areas who get paid a pittance—I mean minimal wages, not enough to live on and certainly not enough to feed the family and all the rest of it—and they're in a position of power. So when we first went out—me and Keith went out to Sierra Leone in '98—about between 40-50 percent I think, of the police force were in traffic. They had these white sleeves, and their job, they thought, was to direct the traffic. But of course, being on the traffic point and stopping vehicles and all the rest of it was easy access to some leones—because it was a money-making job to the extent that people would buy their own white sleeves even though they weren't in traffic, or they would rent some white sleeves in order to go and do some traffic duty to bump their wages up.

So you had to do with these sorts of issues, knowing that if you really became tight on corruption and arrested everybody you saw taking money, you wouldn't have a police service. Often there wasn't much you could do about it until such time you could actually increase the wages, or at least make sure that they had some food allowance or whatever. So, it's actually morally quite difficult because in theory, these people need to be stopped, but in practice, they couldn't live without it. So you had to strike a balance between reality and theory.

SCHER: You mentioned a food allowance, what other sort of balances did you strike?

HORN: *Well, one of the of the things we did to look after the welfare of the officers was to make sure—they had a police hospital, for example, at King Tom, which is in Freetown—was to make sure they had the drugs there. Of course, buying anti-malarial drugs or vitamin supplements or something like that, for the most common majority of diseases, was actually very small money. You could buy the things in tubs of 10,000 through the World Health Organization, I think it was. You could buy boxes of drugs for that particular area of the country in which you're working. So, you could actually fill the hospital with drugs and make sure they got proper treatment. You could make sure that they had disinfectant to clean the wards. Very simple stuff that doesn't cost a lot of money but has quite a dramatic effect on the health and welfare of people.*

And it wasn't just in Freetown. In other areas we introduced some clinics and made sure that there was either a nurse or a doctor available to cope with police officers, as well as everybody else. Interesting thing we did in one of the main towns outside Freetown is, we had to build a new police station or refurbish a new police station; and one of the senior officers from the Sierra Leone police came up with the idea, well, why don't we build a community hall as well? And very quickly, the town people supplied the labor. We as a Project supplied the material; and they built a new community hall, which was used for police training or for village meetings. We put a clinic on it, we dug a well, put clean water in, and generally, it became a kind of centerpiece of the town—a meeting place that involved the police and all the rest of them—and did a great deal to build up this relationship between the police and the people. They felt very much part of the whole thing because they'd actually provided the labor and a lot of the support work to get this thing built. And all it cost us was the material, which was not expensive. So, it was an extremely good idea; it worked very well.

SCHER: Was that something that you replicated elsewhere?

HORN: *Yes, we tried to replicate that in a number of places, but rather than us do it—I mean, it was an idea that we said to the police, "Look, this works. We'll support you with material, we'll support you with tin sheets for the roof or what have you. You go away and do what you can." And in some areas, it was replicated. In*

some of the barracks—for example, in Freetown, policemen can't generally afford to live outside barracks—the toilet facilities needed building in some cases, refurbishing in others. We as a Project supplied some cesspit emptiers which were simple technology, a tractor and vacuum trailer, to suck the stuff out of the cesspits and clean them out. We also said, "We will fund the materials to build new cesspits and new toilets; but you as a barracks—because there's lots of people there, lots of quite fit young men for example—you dig the holes, you do the building." And in most places, they grasped the opportunity, and for themselves developed good toilets, good cesspits. In one or two places they said, "Oh, you need to pay us." We said, "No, we're not paying you. This is for your own benefit. We'll provide the materials, but we're not going to pay you to do the labor. You sort yourselves out." So in one or two places it was a bit more difficult, but generally, people grasped the opportunity and did it for themselves, which is the best way to make sure that the thing will continue, and there will be some sustainability with it.

SCHER: Definitely. Just talking about these different approaches or different strategies in different areas, I was wondering if I could bring it back to the training issue. Was the same training done all around the country? Or was there a central training base where officers from all over the country were kind of routed through? How did that aspect work?

HORN: *I think I'm right in saying that all the initial training was done in Freetown, but we also had training centers in Bo and in Kenema, and in other places. Again you have to address the balance. In the Congo, for example, it will be very different. The training skills and the training classrooms all have to be built and developed, and some of that has gone on because of the distance in between and the impossibility of anything other than air travel between Lubumbashi or Goma or Bukavu, and Kinshasa. So you have to decentralize. You have to look at the country you're dealing with. In Sierra Leone, it's much easier. You have a simple road network; it's not a big country. DRC is completely the opposite. I think you can fit Sierra Leone something like 22 times into the DRC. It gives you some idea of the size of the place.*

I think the point about all of that is that you have to understand the environment in which you're working, and you have to work with the local police force etc., to come up with a solution that suits their environment and what they need; and not say, "Yes, we need central training." Because in some places it works, some places it won't work. So, you have to work all that through.

The other thing we introduced in Sierra Leone, which was very effective, is what we call peripatetic trainers. In other words, we trained them as trainers and then as part of the ongoing training, they were on a motor bike; so they would go to a local police station, do some training locally and then go on to the next place and do the same training in another smaller town or what have you, which was a much more cost effective way of doing it and helped with the continuity of the whole training thing.

SCHER: Were they in specific areas of training?

HORN: *No general trainers.*

SCHER: Another thing I wanted to follow up on, you mentioned this problem of police officers who maybe had been police officers for a while, and it turned out that they were illiterate, and so you had to find specific jobs for them. Did you have any kind of basic reading and writing training to address this issue because that's

something we heard quite a few times, that just basic reading and writing is not given enough emphasis in training programs.

HORN: Yes, in Makeni for example, we used to go and visit there and the local police themselves realized, obviously, that this was a problem and had set up a little classroom and were giving some basic training in reading and writing. I mean, it's nice to think, ah, well let's train the illiterate how to read and write. We're not educationalists, and to train someone to read and write to the standard that you would need to be to read law for example or to write a statement is quite a high standard. So that's going to take a long time to achieve; and you have to balance what would be nice to train people up to read and write, against we need policemen now who can do the job. You know, is this really a job for the police?

So you need to look for partnerships with schools and stuff like that. It's a long-term commitment. You know how long it takes you to learn how to read and write properly from five years old through to 11, 12, 13 before you become quite proficient in writing at the standard that you need to do for a police officer. So you have to ask the question, is it actually something we can do? Personally, I think it's very difficult. At the same time, you can't just sack somebody; you have to find ways to deal with that issue and deal with that problem.

SCHER: There's one last thing I wanted to ask you about training and that is, you mentioned these peripatetic trainers which was quite a good cost-saving measure. Were there any other cost-saving devices that you employed to reduce the overall cost of training?

HORN: There's not a lot more you could do because training is expensive. You've got to accommodate people, you've got to give them the proper training facilities. You've got to feed people. You can imagine feeding 600 people at a time as we were doing, and the cooking is all done on log fires with great big cooking pots. I mean, it was as basic as that, but it worked. So you couldn't save any more costs on that. Simple things like, we're all used to using white boards and white board markers, well, expensive. Where do you get replacements from, when the first supply goes in six months' time? So go back to basics. Blackboard and chalk is the cheapest way in which you can have a visual display; so use it. These sorts of things you build in.

You're always thinking, what's professional and what facilities are needed. But then what is the best way to do that? Blackboard and white chalk is obviously a simple solution to that problem. And you can extend that to all sorts of things. Printing—everybody wants color printers; color printers are very expensive to run and manage. What happens when the inkjet goes? What happens when the expensive toner cartridges go? You can't replace them; they cost money. So, keep it simple, keep it basic—a good simple, black and white laser printer that you know is going to be reliable and is the cheapest thing to run, if you're going to introduce something like that.

So it's those sorts of things. Bicycles—we supplied something like 500 bicycles—cost little to maintain, can be maintained locally, but gives the police officer some mobility. But in terms of training, I'm just trying to think if there's anything else that leaps out. The peripatetic training was extremely good. Obviously, some of the UNCIVPOL (United Nations International Civilian Police) guys got involved in training. Somebody came and suggested computer-based training, which would be excellent. The trouble is, if there's no electricity, you can't do it. That was the case in a majority of cases. So, while you think about and consider these things, and perhaps in the future, they're going to be a good way of training, going into a

country which is coming out of a war, or in this case was in a war, some of the things you have to put to one side and think about the future.

SCHER: Fair enough. Well, we're at 52 minutes and I'd like to suggest we take a break.

HORN: Yes, great.

SCHER: This is part two of the interview with Adrian Horn, and we've had a lot of good stuff about recruitment and training, and now we're going to speak a bit more about management and local-needs policing. Firstly, let's talk about internal management. Have you ever assisted—I mean, in Sierra Leone—did you assist at least, with processes to strengthen international management?

HORN: *Yes, we had to do a lot of work on that. You've got to remember, the old management had obviously developed over the years, and in some cases was quite corrupt and didn't want to move forward for whatever reason; and we had to find some solutions to that. The other thing to realize is that within the organization were a fair number of people who wanted to do the right thing, who knew what to do, who were extremely well educated, in some cases educated in other countries, in some cases holding relevant police degrees but hadn't been able to get through the system; again for all sorts of reasons—politics, nepotism—all the wrong reasons as to why people who are able and capable, can't actually get in a position to make themselves effective.*

You've got a thing in Sierra Leone called the "pull-him-down" syndrome. If anybody down below showed some spark of life and started bubbling to the surface, if he wasn't doing it for the reasons that the bosses wanted they were quickly pulled down and didn't go anywhere. So you get quite a bit of frustration in some of the junior ranks.

One of the first things we did when we got there was we sent a letter from the then Inspector General, or the person standing in for the Inspector General, explaining a bit what was going on in terms of the change process and what may lay in front of them for the future, and leaving half of sheet of A4 paper clear so they could write back to us—because paper was a problem, nobody had access to paper. And we got hundreds back. Nearly all—in fact all—were from the lower ranks and the junior ranks, and some from the middle ranks. These were people who were telling us, "For goodness sake, please enable us to do the job we joined to do. We joined to be police officers; we know what we need to do. Just give us a way that enables us to live and not to have to go out and beg on the streets or get money from other sources, where our families can live, can be fed, where we get healthcare, etc., etc; and give us the tools to do the job."

That told us that there was a critical mass within the police service that was worth working with and supporting. The other thing is we had to get some fresh management in to some of the posts. There were easily identifiable individuals who, for whatever reason, had been kept down, and because we were in a position to do it—particularly with Keith Biddle as being later on the Inspector General, we had operational and administrative control of the force—we were able to quickly bring some of these people up into positions of power and therefore able to be effective and able to help the change process. And that was very effective. We had half a dozen people who we were quickly able to put into the senior officer ranks, and they worked extremely hard to bring in the changes that were required. Some of the other officers suffered; there were some corrupt, some incompetent, some had been put in for the wrong reasons. But quite quickly, looking back, they were either retired or moved on elsewhere. You had

to be careful who you put into where because you're talking about political interference at that time rather than political involvement. Some of the politicians had to be very careful about who they approved and appointed because of the need to balance and to be seen to be fair.

You had to, as well, train people, and one of the things we did—which cost a lot of money but proved to be very worthwhile—is that we brought over, over a period of two or three years, something like 30 senior officers in that region to Bramshill (Police Staff College, Bramshill House) in the UK. They went through the international commanders' course at Bramshill, and for the first time many of these people were actually working together as a team. That program was really effective. They were introduced into new ways of policing, modern ways of policing, a lot of the management techniques, management training; together, and also with people from several other countries. They learnt a tremendous amount, and when they came back, they were that much more effective and able to work together as a team. I think that's a very important point to make, as well.

So, rather than sending off one or two, and perhaps going to different countries, different courses, different places, we actually sent them all to the same course. They all had the same training, they all had the opportunity to work and develop together, and it's those officers now who are in the positions of power within the Sierra Leone police and proving to be extremely effective. So you've got to think about the succession planning. Amongst all these things you have to think about, you've got to have a succession plan in place. You know, when this IG (Inspector General) retires, who's following on behind in 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 years time? Who's had the right training in a position to step into his shoes to ensure that all the work you've done in the past is carried on and developed, and you have the sustainability?

And there were several other issues we had to address with the senior officers. The first was to put in place—which they did themselves very effectively—a strategic development plan. There's no point in doing any of this work unless you're working to some sort of strategy. So they sat down between them, they thought about what it was that needed to happen, and they had a three-to-five-year strategic development plan, which rolled on. So, certain things were achieved, and they then refreshed it every year. They worked a system, initially quite crude, but some sort of "what are we going to do this year?" type plan, with some monitoring built into it as well; and that became more and more sophisticated as time went on.

I was looking at the latest strategic development plan and the policing plan a few months back, and it's quite a sophisticated document now. It recognizes that you can't do everything in one go. You've got to make sure that what you've done in the past is successful, all those sorts of things which lead to good change management. And they had to learn a lot of this, and we did some of that. They set up what they call the Executive Management Board, and every week the senior officers, heads of department of the police would meet, and we would be part of that. So we were able to sort of impart advice and impart ideas as they ran their force and moved it forward.

As I say, over a very short period of time it became very effective and quite sophisticated, calling for reports, calling for research reports, and thinking about things in the round rather than just singly. So we go back, say, to vehicles as the example. So they're thinking about getting ten vehicles: How are you going to run them? What's the recurrent budget effect? You're going to have to have fuel for them. How are we going to get the spares? We've got to build that into the

budget, and we've got to get budget support from the Treasury and other departments within government. So it's that level of thinking that became part of the organizational thinking quite quickly, which was very encouraging.

SCHER: There are a few things I'd like to pick up on there. First, getting back to what you were saying about picking up the junior officers who had quite a lot of potential and pulling them up. Basically, did you hand select them? Or was there reforming of a promotion system that made it possible for them to rise in the ranks?

HORN: *The promotion system was totally restructured, and it became one based on merit rather than the old-fashioned way of nepotism or political interference or whatever. So there was quite a revision of the whole promotion system, and a staff appraisal system introduced; and not just introduced but checked. I think everybody who has been part of a staff appraisal system realizes the weaknesses of it. You know, somebody says, "This officer is first-class and ready for promotion." "Okay, right, we're going to promote him, but he's going to be your second-in-command." And they say, "Oh, no, no, don't want that—he's useless." So, you've got to challenge people.*

In the case of Sierra Leone, it was relatively easy to do because the size of the force and the size of the country, you quickly knew most of the people individually. Consequently, you were able to spot yourselves the people who wanted to do the right thing, who showed enthusiasm, who obviously had the ability to do it; so in Sierra Leone it was relatively simple. In the DRC it's a totally different kettle of fish, and that's a major problem that's going to have to be addressed; and there's no simple solution to that. Going back to Sierra Leone, you could quickly spot the people who had potential, and then obviously, help them.

Again, you could select people for management training, and we did send—I don't know what the exact number is—but a number of people on, for instance, achieving scholarships. So, they spent a year studying a relevant degree, either it's a first or a second degree or whatever, in another country. For instance, Leicester University; two or three people went there for master's degrees or for achieving scholarship facility, and they brought an awful lot back into the force. Again, able to study other forces, able to study how policing is developed in different countries. They came back with new ideas, and it worked extremely well; and some of those people are now in very senior positions within the force.

So it is about long-term planning. Obviously, you've got to do a number of short-term things. You've got to do some quick fixes, you've got all that sort of stuff to do, but it's got to be in the context of a long-term plan, a strategic development plan.

SCHER: There was something I wanted to pick up on, too which was this idea of bringing—I think you said thirty—people out for training here.

HORN: *Something like thirty.*

SCHER: Something we've heard is that often what's more important than the training is, as you said, working as a team, and this building up of a kind of esprit de corps, some sort of morale amongst the people who do that. Was that the case here?

HORN: *Oh, absolutely, yes. And that's got a lot to do with political interference, political pressure. Those 30 people didn't all come at one time; that was spread over three years, I think; and as a group, as a team, they suddenly realized that they*

were far more powerful than the sum of the individuals. And you would get politicians pressuring an individual to do something which wasn't correct, to lose a case, or take somebody on, or promote somebody, or whatever—and political interference is not acceptable in democratic policing. Political involvement is, but not interference. And what we tried to demonstrate, and they quickly realized is, for example, if through the Executive Management Board somebody asked for something to be done, an individual would find it very difficult to say no. But, as a team, as a policy decision, "No" could be said, because it wasn't down to an individual; it was a policy decision, a cabinet decision, whatever you want to call it, it was a decision made by the team. That helped again to build their confidence and to build, to a certain extent, courage to say no to things which they knew were wrong. As an individual they found it very difficult; as a team then, it was much easier to do. So, it's building up resistance to this pressure.

But there's a problem there, on any reform project. I equate it to, you build this pressure vessel, and it gets bigger and bigger and stronger to resist the pressure from the outside. Of course, at some stage that pressure may be too great and the whole thing blows up. So therefore, you've got to think, well, it's a two-way reaction. Yes, we build the ability to resist the pressure; but through education of politicians and the public, you've also got to do something about reducing the pressure. There's no point saying to police officers, "A politician can't tell you what to do. A minister can't tell you what to do." You've also got to educate the minister or the member of the public or whatever, saying, "Well, you can't tell the police what to do."

So, it's wider than just internally within the police. There's a whole area of education, instruction, etc., that has got to take place within the other two corners of the policing triangle, the government and the public, because they've got to work together to ensure that you have a good democratic police service in the country. It's not just the police force; it's much wider than that. That was an interesting thing that we had to address fairly early on; and we found what I think was a particularly good solution.

Everybody was talking about, "We need community policing." But then you ask everybody, "What does community policing mean to you?" We're fortunate in having all these different countries represented within the UN. You'd say to somebody, "Well, what does community policing mean to you?" "Oh, we sit in the police station and we wait for a call, and we get in our vehicles, we go and sort the problem out and we come back to the police station." Okay. "What does community policing mean to you?" "Oh, zero tolerance. We don't allow any indiscretion at all. We stamp on any crime, we stamp on any indiscretion. We stamp on anything." Okay. And you ask every single individual, "What does community policing mean to you?" and they'll come up with a slightly different answer. Their answer and the concept that the word implies, will very much be reflected by their own experiences in their own country; so they'll want to put something in. If somebody is putting in community policing, they'll probably want to put something in which is based on their own experiences in their country, which is not suitable for any other country. You've got to find a solution that fits the needs of, in this case, Sierra Leone.

We're going through the same process in Somalia, and the same process in the DRC. So we stripped it right back to basics. When we sort of just thought about it and talked to a number of people about it, we came up with this concept which we called local-needs policing; and all it simply means is, it is a system of policing that meets the needs and expectations of the local community but delivered within national standards and guidelines. Because in any country,

you're going to have, both by time and by area, the need for different types of policing; and it's got to be locally based. You can't say we're going to have this style of policing in Freetown, which is a big city; but in Kenema, which is a totally different environment, it's probably not going to work. It's got to be done within national standards and guidelines, things like compliance with human rights, national policies about prisoner handling; you've got the same laws across the whole country. But you've got to allow the devolved responsibility for people to make decisions at the local level. And that was quite a change because in the past, often, most things were referred back to headquarters, who made the decision and then sent them back. Now, this is about policing decisions being made locally—and not just involving the police. You've got to involve the community, and you've got to involve government, whether it is national or whether it is local.

So, along side this local-needs policing, you've got to have an organization which supports it, and that became known as the local command unit. Again, a simple structure, common to all police stations, whereby you had the man in charge and then you had supporting disciplines—operations, crime, information, intelligence, the logistical side. And they would meet together on a regular basis—daily, hourly, whatever it needed—and say, "Right, what are the problems, and what are we going to do about it?" It's pretty simple stuff. Also with a link in the community; and the local police there in Sierra Leone sort of came up with the phrase, "partnership boards." So, alongside this new policing structure also sat a partnership board which liaised and worked very closely with the police to solve local problems; and that was quite a dramatic change. We piloted it in a village, whilst the war was still on, called Waterloo, and the change was quite dramatic.

So, you move one day from a system where the police never talked to the council, never went out of the police station, very rarely talked to the public, to a completely different system, which everybody wanted, everybody expected, that we can actually talk to a policeman, we can work together to solve problems. When you move from war to peace, the change can be quite dramatic. For example, when does a war crime become a criminal offence? Lots of women can be raped, or there can be mutilations, and people seem to think they can get away with it by calling war. But when that stops, that then becomes a very horrific, nasty crime which has to be dealt with.

But what you find is when you move through war, and perhaps the village problem is one of rebels in their midst or whatever, suddenly that's all stopped; and then the problem becomes one of vehicle driving, or kids playing in the street, or something simple like that; and they're the main policing problems in a peaceful society. Many of these problems can only be solved by the public coming up with their own solutions. A particular one involved taxis in one area, I remember, in Freetown, and it was raised at one of these partnership board meetings with the police where they worked together. The solution to the problem actually involved the taxi drivers' union, not the police; but the police, because of the system that had been set up, were able to act as the catalyst to find a solution to a difficult local problem. And there are many different examples of that.

So, local-needs policing—we avoided the term community policing because it meant all things to all men—yes, it's community-based policing, but at the same time it's individual to Sierra Leone. It's a Sierra Leone solution to a Sierra Leone problem. You can adopt that; and it has been adopted in different places because it is so simple and so easy. You know, a system of policing that meets

the needs and expectations of the local community, but make sure it's delivered within national standards and guidelines.

SCHER: Would you mind talking a little bit more about these partnership boards? Who was on them and how its members were selected, if that's the right way of thinking about them?

HORN: *Yes, and it's interesting, because you're at a local level. If you take Freetown, for example, you had Kissy, one side of the city; and you had Congo Cross, for example, a different district, the other side of the city. Congo Cross was much more the business area so the partnership board had much more representatives of business and was a different structure; you know, people who represented the makeup of the community that existed in the area. In Kissy, it was very different. You had the market women, for example, you had a lot more youth, there was much more in the way of trade through the docks and things like this; so you had representatives of the market women, the youth, the taxi drivers association. So, it was a different structure, but most of these people were either established or elected representatives of different groups, like the market women or the taxi drivers association, who formed a small board, no more than 12-15, perhaps a maximum of 20 people, who had regular meetings with the local police organization—formal meetings and informally, mixed all the time—and it was through these that problems didn't become big problems. Attempts were made to sort problems out at the earliest opportunity, and there was a much wider effort in sorting out the policing problems of their own area. It worked extremely well.*

SCHER: Did they have any kind of monitoring role on crime? Was any information available to them to judge whether the police were doing a good job in their particular area?

HORN: *Well, they would know because they lived in the area. That was the beauty of it. So, they knew when the police were doing a good job or when they were doing a bad job; and in most cases, they soon made it known to the police that they weren't doing a good job. Also, within the new system, slowly, much more in the way of management information was introduced. But that's a difficult one. But over time, more management information was there—the number of crimes, the number of accidents, these sorts of things—so they could identify problems.*

The police just picked up far more about what the issues and problems were, and they knew who to go and see if there was a particular problem. So, they became far more knowledgeable of the people who lived in their area. They became far more knowledgeable of the general crime that was going on, for example, or whatever the problems were. And also involving the local council, because, as I said policing is a three-way thing—it's the government, it's the public, and it's the police—and by involving local councils, sometimes you could find a solution. If there's an accident place, it might be due to a pothole or something, well, get the pothole filled in and we solve the problem. The policemen liked it themselves because they actually felt far more involved in policing, rather than sort of managing some whatever it was.

SCHER: It sounds like there was a lot of support for this idea. Did you encounter any resistance from any sectors?

HORN: *Very little, very little; in fact, I can't think of any. I mean, everybody wanted it. And that's what you find in a number of countries, that once—in Waterloo, and then we trialed it in Bo and somewhere else—once people saw it and heard about it and saw what was happening, they all wanted it. So there was a demand for it*

which is good, so it wasn't imposed. People wanted it, they asked for it, and they wanted to make it work. And it was a real check on the police, as well. You talked about accountability. The people in general had the ability to walk into a police station when they wanted; they could go into a police station. And I think we tried some lay visitor schemes; in other words, individuals could go and visit the cells, for example. Now, you can't get much better accountability and check on policing than that, where somebody has the agreement with the police and the community, as their representative, to go in and check and make sure prisoners have been treated properly, and see what's going on.

SCHER: To your knowledge, has this level of enthusiasm continued? Are people still involved in the boards?

HORN: *Oh, very much so, yes. In fact, I was at a conference in South Africa a few months back—it was organized by JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), a Japanese organization—and it was about African experiences of policing. Sierra Leone was represented, and it wasn't actually a policeman who gave the presentation about policing. It was one of the local chiefs, which was quite amazing, and he was so enthusiastic about it. One of the Assistant Commissioners was there, Moire Lengor, and he just sat back and let him get on with it. And when somebody asked him a question, he said, "Well, don't ask me, ask the chief." So, it was really good to see.*

SCHER: Quite an endorsement there.

HORN: *Absolutely, and it's only now—I mean, we're now ten years on since we started to introduce a lot of this stuff—it's only now—and this gives an indication of the length of time you need to be involved in this stuff—ten years on, and it's now that the police force and the community themselves are driving this, they're making it happen.*

SCHER: Well, that would obviously seem to be a clear sign of a successful initiative and something that has really worked well. Are there any other kinds of evaluation tools or measures that you could think of or use, as you say, ten years on, to look into whether the police force is where you would want it to be?

HORN: *One of the best ways is, obviously, attitudinal surveys. We tried to start these, and that's a difficult science. It's not easy to do. But the measures over a number of years show an improvement, show people thinking better about the police, the police feeling better about themselves, that sort of thing. To use measures like crime measures in a place which is just coming out of war, is very difficult, because you've got to have proper recording systems, you've got to have proper recognition of what's a crime, you've got to have willingness of people to report the crime.*

So, if you take crime, for example, you say, "Oh, there's going to be an increase of crime, and the police are recording it." Then it will show an increase—but is it an actual increase in crime, or is it an actual increase in the willingness of people to come and report crime to the police? I firmly believe it is the latter. I mean, you're going to get an increase in reported crime and recorded crime. It doesn't necessarily mean you've actually had an increase in crime. So, using statistics like that is always very, very difficult. In many ways it's not a very scientific approach. If you don't have really good attitudinal surveys and all the rest of it, you've got to rely on, for instance, reports from NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations).

And you've got to ask the "what-didn't-happen" question. This is a question people don't ask. You say to people, "Can you remember the last two general elections in Sierra Leone?" The answer is no. Why not? Because they went well, they went smoothly, generally fair, generally extremely successful, a lot of it down to the fact that you had a police force that had been trained to manage the elections, that were in place, had the communications, transport, etc., to manage the elections. Very successful. So nothing happened. But how do you measure that?

Ask the question, "Well, the OSD (Operational Support Division), the 'paramilitary' wing or the armed wing of the police force, 2000-odd people. When was the last time they shot and killed somebody who was not a robber or there wasn't a problem?" "Can't remember."

Because it hasn't happened. Because they've been properly trained, because they've been properly equipped, because they've been properly managed, you don't get those instances of shooting, of human rights abuse, etc.; whereas previously, they wouldn't have been recorded, they would have been more a case of rumor and innuendo, and all the rest of it; but no doubt they happened. But you can't say that there were ten committed then, and one committed now. You can't say that because you haven't got the figures to do that. So I put a lot of faith in the what-didn't-happen question.

SCHER: Sort of along these lines, were you involved with any attempt to build a more formal oversight system? An investigative agency or such?

HORN: *Yes. Again, the two things we did right at the very start was put in a media department, which we talked about before, and also put in a whole new complaints department. It was called the CDIID (Complaints, Discipline, and Internal Investigation Department). And alongside that, we had to introduce a whole new set of discipline regulations, which is actually quite easy to do. We did it through the police council; they supported it. So, we had a modern day set of regulations, discipline regulations about what policemen can and cannot do and what the punishment would be if the regulations were abused. There was a whole new department set up, a whole new monitoring regime set up, all trained up, again by an experienced consultant from the UK. It was very, very effective, very, very effective. The public soon knew that they could actually complain about police officers, and something would be done about it. And because proper monitoring procedures were put in place—reports would go up to the police council, for example—there was that external oversight as well.*

SCHER: The police council, could you talk about that?

HORN: *Yes. The police council, when we first got out there, was pretty ineffective. The Vice President was chairman, you had the Minister of the Interior, and you had three lay people on it, as well, and the head of the police—a small group—and their job was to really oversee what was going on with the police, in theory; and also to support the budget-making process and make sure that they got provided with the pay and rations that were needed to run to the police force. We worked closely with them, and over time they, too, became quite effective as an oversight mechanism. The Inspector General had to report to them on contentious issues, progress reports, and what have you; and I believe it is still quite an effective oversight tool. And of course, you've got accountability through the press, which goes back to the media department—and they're not slow in coming forward, the press in Freetown. If they get a sniff of something, they're straight in. And now they can actually contact the police direct, they don't have to wait. They can*

phone up somebody in the media department, or whatever, and the freedom was given to senior officers to respond to the press, not to put it off. In other words, if there's a problem, to tackle it straight away and deal with it. And they had weekly media meetings with the press; and therefore were able to raise all these things in front of everybody, and everybody got the proper and right story. Sometimes the police were at fault; sometimes they weren't; but there was a mechanism for people to openly and transparently address these issues and to say their piece.

There was also oversight through the Parliament, for example. The Inspector General, on occasions, was called to Parliament to account for whatever it was he had to account for.

SCHER: You mentioned that the Inspector General had to report. Was that legislated?

HORN: *I think it was contained in the Police Act. A lot of the legislation was old and needed re-writing, and that was an issue. But we were able to work within the legislation that sat there, and the police council could call upon the Inspector General to report on certain things.*

Time for another quick break?

SCHER: Yes, sure. I was just about to suggest that.

SCHER: This is part three of the interview with Adrian Horn on the 5th of December 2007. We're going to pick up on a few sections that we haven't spoken about. The first is this issue of integration and amalgamation of services. Often there may be existing services that you try to incorporate within a new civilian police force. I understand that this was the case in Sierra Leone, and I'd like to know if you could share a little bit about that experience.

HORN: *Yes. In many ways there were two parts of the police in Sierra Leone when we first went there. The first part was the general policing, and I suppose all people saw of that really was the traffic police out in the streets directing traffic and trying to make a living. The other section at that time was what they called the SSD, the Special Security Division; it was also known as Siaka Stevens' Dogs. That was the paramilitary wing of the Sierra Leone police and comprised between 1,500 and 2,000 officers armed with army weapons—AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, a few gas guns, and the like—a very effective fighting force, but had a legacy of criminality and what have you because many of the people were recruited into the SSD during Stevens' time directly from the streets of Freetown. So, they hadn't had police training, and the discipline and control was very lacking.*

Obviously, the police who were not generally armed do need an armed element to operate properly, particularly in a country like Sierra Leone when at that time they were still at war and as they came out of war, and particularly where you wanted to put the military back in barracks. They were, as I say, a very effective fighting force and were responsible for protecting, on more than one occasion, insurgence into Freetown and elsewhere; but in order for them to be part of the new police, if we can call it that, there had to be some great change. They ultimately became known as the OSD, the Operational Support Division, and they had a number of elements within that.

Well, the sorts of issues we found were that, because they were police and because they were responsible for the control of order, and because you couldn't really use ordinary police officers at that time to control disorder, all they had to

use were AK-47s. So, if you were faced with the problem of disorder on the streets, you had two choices: either the policemen would go and try to contain the crowd, but as soon as the crowd became angry then the policemen would disappear; you were then left with the OSD, or the SSD as it was then, with AK-47s to face the crowd. That was the final option—which meant that in a riot situation there was great potential for a lot of death because military weapons would be turned on the crowd. So we had to do something about that.

In order to control disorder you need a series of options, particularly non-lethal options. So in a fairly short period of time we managed to bring in some equipment, we managed to do some initial training, we managed to get some good management in place within the OSD, which enabled these non-lethal options—a series of options—so you could go from simple cordons where policemen worked together by hanging on to a policeman's belt or forming a cordon or whatever, but in a disciplined way, trying to control a crowd.

If that became escalated into more violence, you then have the option of using batons, you then could fall back and use shields, you could then fall back and use plastic bullets, or baton rounds, or CS gas. And finally, if it had to come to that, then you would have to go back to your lethal option. But the point is, you're able to give a much stronger response to disorder without reverting to lethal weapons, which most of the time would control the problem. And you had to change the weapons. An AK-47 and military ammunition are designed to kill as many people as possible in the shortest period of time; whereas a police weapon and ammunition are designed to stop an individual committing an offense or whatever.

So, there was a change over weaponry, as well, as time went on. So you finished up with a disciplined body of people, well controlled, highly trained in public order management techniques and pretty disciplined in weapons control, rules of engagement, all those sorts of things; and they became an integral part of the police. And over time, they then became more part of the police in terms of general patrols and patrolling with the UN and whatever. One of the successes of controlling disorder, particularly within Freetown, was actually working together with all the various agencies from the UN through to the army, through to the OSD, through to normal police and actually having a joint command center that actually coordinated all the information and intelligence and communications of all these disparate bodies into one, so that you got a combined and coordinated response to any problems that might arise; and that proved extremely effective in stopping a lot of ad hoc violence or perceived violence from the different forces.

So it's very important to integrate—not just sections within the police, but certainly in operational problem areas—all the different bodies. In fact, we even had the civil defense force within that department, so that non-state organizations were actually part of that; so we had much better control of what was going on.

SCHER: There are a few things I'd like to pick up on there. First, did the OSD undergo a kind of separate retraining compared to the training of the new police?

HORN: Yes, in many ways. Again, another consultant, Ray England, was responsible for that. He had both a military and a police career in the past, so he was extremely able in retraining; and we brought in the Metropolitan Police to do some of the public order training, as well, on that. They also had instruction and training on things like human rights because, obviously, it's very important that they understood human rights, that sort of thing; and they had some refresher training. But they were never trained, or most of them were never trained, as police

officers, and because of the function that they performed at that stage, it wasn't necessary for them to undergo a full police training course. The priority and the urgency was to get a disciplined armed body that you could rely on and control ready to deal with disorder and the problems that obviously follow on in that sort of society.

SCHER: Were there any tensions between those units and the rest of the newly formed police?

HORN: *I don't think so, I didn't pick any up. Over time we started changing some of the commanders out, so some of the traditional, long-term, OSD commanders would go into the other side of policing and vice versa. We started the integration process. They had a very different function, and at the time, and for several years, that work was cut out in patrols; in trying to maintain order within Freetown; in responding to intelligence where rebels were; carrying out armed raids; and joint patrols with the UN and other people to deal with armed robberies, as some of those were going on at the time.*

As we worked through and did the training, then anybody who went into the OSD actually had to go through basic police training; so that was introduced at a relatively early stage—when the people went through the initial training course, then people were selected then to go into the OSD for specialist training in terms of firearms use and public order control, and then they became part of the OSD. I think at that time, I think we were talking about a two-year tenure of post policy so they'd only do a couple of years and then come back into the police. We started getting a good change-over of individuals, and people didn't get into the rut of being an armed OSD officer, rather than a policeman—or woman. There were women in either course.

SCHER: Did you have any sort of vetting program at the beginning of this process, perhaps to weed out people with particularly bad records?

HORN: *It was very difficult to do because there were no records, and you had to avoid going on the rumor and speculation because people would want people out for various reasons. You had to be quite careful. I mean, there were individuals who obviously weren't suited and had to go, but they were few and far between. As for the vetting processes that brought people into the police generally, they went through the initial training and then into OSD; you had some sort of filter at the beginning anyway on that. All the time the day-to-day monitoring of people was getting better and better, so that if anybody did fall out of line then action could be taken quickly and properly.*

SCHER: You mentioned also that you had this kind of integrated organizational support system—and the civil defense force was part of that?

HORN: *The JCC (Joint Coordination Commission), yes. It was a coordination center that we set up in headquarters, or Ray England set up in headquarters. It brought together representatives of the army, a civil defense force (Camajores), the UN, the police of course, and one or two others; and as a consequence, information was shared, intelligence was shared, communications were shared. There were instances where, for example, somebody would call in and say, "Ah, somebody is causing a problem from the civil defense force." Immediate action was taken, and it was often a case of somebody passing a message, or the message going down the line from the representative within the JCC, to say, "All right, stop it." And the problem was stamped out before it became a problem.*

SCHER: Can you talk a little bit about the relationship between the police and the civil defense force and how they regarded each other and whether there was much communication?

HORN: *Keith would probably be better to talk about that because he would have day-to-day—no, Keith would be better to talk about that one.*

SCHER: Fair enough. I'd like to, if we may, just talk a little bit about the reform process as a kind of general issue. Do you have any thoughts on the sequence of steps that reformers perhaps should follow? Like perhaps what tasks should be done before others and what things shouldn't be attempted before certain systems are in place. Would you mind just talking a bit about that?

HORN: *No, love to, because this is something quite close to my heart. Having worked in this area now since '94, I've seen lots of mistakes and lots of problems, and I now have some strong views on that. Very much depends on the context in which you're working. I'm currently doing a little bit of work in Somalia; some work in the DRC, looking at designing and putting in a big police project there; and, of course, Sierra Leone. Three totally different situations—and the first thing that must be done is to understand the context in which you're going to work. It's no good anybody from any country going into a place and saying, "Oh, we're going to put in a UK system," or "We're going to put in a French system," or whatever. You've got to understand how things work, and what makes the country tick.*

In Sierra Leone in particular, it was very much a family thing. The family influence, the family ties were very strong. Of course, you then had the tribes and then you had the ruling houses and all these things you need to understand before you started interfering with any organizational setup, structure, or individuals. You need to understand the politics; you need to understand the economy; you need to understand the geographic dimensions—everything—before you should even start to attempt to come up with some sort of plan.

Once you understand the context in which you're working, you must have some sort of strategic development plan. These days, there's absolutely no point in saying, "Oh, we'll go in and do some training." Training for what? "Oh, we'll go and give them some vehicles or some communications." No doubt vitally needed, but without them being given in the context of a long-term plan of reform, then you're not quite sure how or what they're going to be used for, or how long they're going to last, or even if the country can afford to supply fuel, for example, to run them. If you don't have the management controls, you could easily find them being used as taxis. That isn't a flippant remark. We often used to find vehicle carrying wives and children and relations all over the place for fees. So you've got to have some sort of strategic development plan.

The other thing now we feel very strongly with—and we did this in Sierra Leone, and we've also done it with the senior police officers from Somalia, and we've done it with the civil society in the DRC, and it will also be done with the police, as well—and that is, from a very early stage, to get some sort of statement about what their values, intentions, policies, what they're going to do; some sort of mission statement from the police. In the case of Sierra Leone, we got from the President himself a government charter about what the government is going to do, what the government expects from its police, and what the government expects from its people to do in relation to policing. We also ran the senior officers through a series of seminars, to finish up with a statement of aims and

values and those sorts of things from the police themselves, which they all signed up to.

Over time that proved extremely valuable because you could always refer them back to this and say, "Look, these are your standards, this is what you want, this is where you're heading towards; and everything that we do is working towards this." Alongside that, as I say, you've got to have the strategic development plan. What do we want to achieve? What is it that we're going to do over the next three to five years to achieve that? Now, none of that is to say you can't have quick fixes.

When we went into Sierra Leone, it was a very difficult time. We went in with a great deal of autonomy and some cash, and we could very quickly fix small things like, if they had a vehicle, and they had very few vehicles left at that time, but we could get them repaired pretty quickly. We could rebuild a police station or put a roof on it very quickly, these sorts of things. You've got to have quick fixes, you've got to have things that you can do to show that you're intent on helping and you're not just another bunch of consultants coming over to give wise words and then clear off. You're actually going to help them in the process of reform, practically, and in terms of helping them develop these things.

Once you've got the strategic development plan, that then should determine the way in which you're going to work in terms of a donor. In the case of DFID (Department for International Development), you have to go through a process of concept notes and project memorandum; and this is exactly what we did. We got the strategic development plan; we put together a project memorandum. We said, this is what needs doing over the next three years; and this is basically what it's going to cost. Once you get the approval, you can then action that.

The next stage is that you've got to develop some good action plans to deliver what you said in the strategy. That is a process that you must go through; otherwise you'll finish up with bits and pieces going on all over the place with no coordination, and no clear monitoring, and no clear aim of where you're going to go. So what we did in Sierra Leone—and what should be good practice in any big project—is some sort of project management methodology. And the extent to which that conforms to PRINCE2, which is the UK government's standard, you have to think about, and again, you have to work within, the context in which you're working. Clearly, you can't have a very sophisticated system of computer-linked reports, reports generated for this, that, and the other, if the infrastructure doesn't exist to help you do that. But you've got to have some sort of methodology which enables you to monitor how action plans are being implemented, what stage you've reached, the sort of problems that you come up against, and what you've done to resolve those; and all the other myriad problems that arise as you go through a particular set of actions.

So, if you get all that in place, if you build up a knowledge of the country, a good contextual analysis, and you have a good strategic view from the people themselves, the country themselves, about where they want to go from the people's point of view, from the government's point of view, and from the police point of view, and you have some sort of strategic development plan written, and you have the donor backing and, where necessary, the donor coordination to deliver that plan, and you have proper action planning—your next stage is to make sure you've got the right people to do the job. It's quite apparent that the success or otherwise of a project can very much depend on the individuals who are selected to either be consultants or to run it. So, great care has to be taken to get the right people in place to do that job.

And then you've got to have the commitment for long term. None of this stuff is going to work if you're talking about a year or two years, because people will come at you with a shopping list, and they will be very nice to you, and they'll take everything that's on offer, knowing that you're going to go away in two years time. Make sure that people understand that there is a commitment for probably ten years at least, possibly longer, because it's going to take that long before you see any real, sustainable result on your activities.

SCHER: That's very neatly outlined. Just along these lines of the reform process, you've mentioned that context is particularly important. I was wondering if you could tell us perhaps about one or two cultural differences that have required you to perhaps modify a project proposal, something that was either not acceptable in a country or needed to be changed because of a particular cultural context.

HORN: *Yes, I could talk quite a bit about witchcraft because we found that quite interesting. One or two of the stories I can't relate, but in that vein, it was interesting that we set off on a project, or part of a project, about setting up sexual abuse, violence abuse referral centers and about training the police how to deal properly with complaints from women in society and also deal with abuse of children and what have you. It was all very right, it felt very right, and we started training police officers. And I remember sitting down one day at dinner with another senior police officer, and after the first and second course I think it was, he said, "Adrian, what are you doing?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "My wife, she's getting reluctant to cook my tea and have my food on the table when I get home, and I can't admonish her." I said, "Why?" He said, "Just think about what you're doing culturally. For hundreds of years, and even within customary law, it's permitted to beat your wife; and it's expected that the wife does the cooking and has the meal on the table and so on and so forth. You know, just bear in mind when you're doing this stuff that you're interfering with culture and with tradition that goes back time immemorial."*

That made me think quite hard, and as a result, we actually hired in a social anthropologist. For a policeman to think of social anthropology as a skill to use in addressing police reform projects—, but he came back with stuff which was extremely interesting. As a result, I think the big lesson or message to come out of that was that when you actually do something which is interfering with culture and interfering with tradition, you need to really understand what the effect of that is, the long-term effect, and what the repercussions are right across the things. You've got to do a lot of thinking, a lot of planning, when you start doing some of these projects and some of these activities, because if you aren't careful, you might do more harm than good in implementing something. So, the message is, and we come back to the contextual analysis, you must understand the context in which you're working and what you're doing.

But it was also interesting from the social anthropologist, what he had to tell us when he came back from going into a few villages and researching in depth—and that was the problem with the whole justice system and the lack of access to justice by the general person in the village—and what he told us was quite worrying, actually. What happened was that when the rebels came into this particular village, several of the community actually rode on the back of the rebels to get their vengeance out on people who had offended them or wronged them over time, because otherwise they had no access to either traditional or state justice at all because they didn't have the money to pay the chief, or they didn't have the money to pay the policeman to undertake an investigation, or whatever. So, the only way they could get revenge or to seek reprisal was to

actually ride on the back of the rebel invasion and to get rid of their frustration that way. Also what he told us was that frustration is building again because whilst we were concentrating on the police at that stage, there was very little going on about the other elements of the justice system.

So the other big lesson, I think, which I've learnt over the years, is that you cannot deal with one without thinking about the other. So if you're going to improve the efficiency of the police and you're going to improve the efficiency, for example, of prisoner handling where the law says you must only detain, for example, a prisoner for 48 hours, then you've got to address the problem, well, what happens after 48 hours? That person has to go somewhere, he has to go before the court. If he's going to be remanded, he has to be remanded in prison. So you've got to address issues like availability of courts, of magistrates, of prison spaces, all the aspects that cover the wide range of justice sector reform, rather than looking specifically at police reform; and that is a very, very big issue.

It's good to see that, for example, with the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) manual of guidance on Security Sector Reform, that a lot of people have now taken that on board; and certainly my experience working in these various countries is that there's a lot more thought given now to addressing these issues as a whole, rather than specific items like police, or courts, or justice, or prisons, or whatever. And that's the way it's going to have to be done, because what you do in one area obviously has knock-on effects in the other.

And we come back to the point that you're raising the expectations that somebody is going to be dealt with properly and fairly within the police. Their expectations are that will follow through the whole criminal system; and the reality is that those expectations won't be met unless you addressed all the other issues as well, and that can be worse than doing nothing in the first place.

SCHER: Well, I'm keeping an eye on the time, and I think that's an excellent note to end on, and I'd like to thank you very much for giving us so much of your time and so much of your experience.

HORN: *My pleasure.*

SCHER: Thank you.