When SARS-CoV-2 emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, Vietnam’s scientists knew their country was in grave danger. Vietnam, a country of 97 million, shared an 870-mile land border with China, its biggest trade and tourism partner. Adding to the risk posed by the virus, Vietnam was a lower-middle-income nation with limited resources and an already overtaxed health-care system. But in the years after the 2003 outbreak of SARS, a deadly respiratory ailment that traumatized East Asia, Vietnam had built a robust pandemic-preparedness system that swiftly mobilized to confront the threat of SARS-CoV-2. After Vietnam recorded its first case on January 22, 2020, the prime minister declared all-out war on the virus no matter the cost to the economy. The government moved swiftly to implement border closures, extensive contact tracing, targeted lockdowns, and a strict quarantine protocol. Relentless and creative communications based on accuracy, transparency, and timeliness built public trust and compliance with public health measures. After more than three months with no community transmission, the country experienced an outbreak in Da Nang that spread across the nation and threatened to spiral out of control. But Vietnam’s authorities carried out a massive testing, tracing, and quarantine program that halted the contagion. As of December 31, 2020, Vietnam had recorded only 1,465 cases and 35 deaths—and it had posted the highest annual GDP growth of any economy in Asia.

Gordon LaForge drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in March and April 2021. Case published June 2021.This case study was supported by the United Nations Development Programme Crisis Bureau as part of a series on center-of-government coordination of the pandemic response.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP, or the UN Member States.

In January 2011, mass demonstrations in Tunisia ousted a regime that had tolerated little popular participation, opening the door to a new era of transparency. The protesters demanded an end to the secrecy that had protected elite privilege. Five months later, the president issued a decree that increased citizen access to government data and formed a steering committee to guide changes in information practices, building on small projects already in development. Advocates in the legislature and the public service joined with civil society leaders to support a strong access-to-information policy, to change the culture of public administration, and to secure the necessary financial and technical resources to publish large quantities of data online in user-friendly formats. Several government agencies launched their own open-data websites. External pressure, coupled with growing interest from civil society and legislators, helped keep transparency reforms on the cabinet office agenda despite frequent changes in top leadership. In 2016, Tunisia adopted one of the world’s strongest laws regarding access to information. Although members of the public did not put all of the resources to use immediately, the country moved much closer to having the data needed to improve access to services, enhance government performance, and support the evidence-based deliberation on which a healthy democracy depended.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Tunis, Tunisia, in October 2016. Case published May 2017.

When Gerson Martínez became head of El Salvador’s Ministry of Public Works in 2009, the organization was notorious for corruption that contributed to poor-quality construction, unfinished projects, and frequent lawsuits. Working with a prominent nongovernmental organization (NGO) and industry representatives, Martínez introduced integrity pacts as monitoring mechanisms intended to prevent corruption. The agreements publicly committed officials and companies to reject bribery, collusion, and other corrupt practices and enabled NGOs to monitor bidding and construction. Although limited capacity and resistance from some midlevel ministry staff hindered the monitors’ work, integrity pacts focused the attention of both the government and the public on problems in major public works projects; and participants said the pacts helped deter corruption in those they covered. In 2012, integrity pacts became part of El Salvador’s Open Government Partnership action plan, in implicit recognition of the tool’s contribution to reform. As of August 2015, the ministry had signed 31 integrity pacts involving five projects worth a combined US$62 million. Although sustaining the initiative proved a challenge, integrity pacts served as a foundation for increased collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector—and as a first step toward a new institutional culture at the Ministry of Public Works.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in San Salvador in July 2015. Case published in October, 2015. This case study was funded by the Open Government Partnership.

Citizens of the Philippines were used to receiving poor service in government offices. Activities as basic as obtaining a driver’s license were slow and complex, and the tortuous processes created opportunities for public employees to solicit bribes for faster service. In an effort to improve service delivery, Congress passed the Anti–Red Tape Act in 2007. But, getting civil servants to comply with the act from civil servants presented a big challenge. In 2010, the Civil Service Commission began to conduct annual social audits to assess both the public’s satisfaction with frontline services and the degree to which offices adhered to the Act’s provisions. For the audits to succeed, the commission had to both persuade skeptical citizens to cooperate with the survey, and find ways to motivate civil servants to improve in response to poor ratings. Because budget constraints limited the use of financial incentives, the commission linked the results to other oversight programs and used social pressure to prod civil servants to improve the quality and efficiency of their work. During the survey’s first four years, the commission oversaw improvement in citizens’ ratings of public services but still faced challenges in raising awareness of the law and using it reshape public expectations.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Manila in November 2014. Case published April 2015.

Associated Interview(s): Jesse Robredo

A once proud city, Bogotá was on the verge of ruin by the late 1980s. Its government was corrupt and dysfunctional, and the Colombian city regularly ranked among the worst places in the world in which to live. In 1986, then-president and former Bogotá Mayor Virgilio Barco lamented that “of that booming city that I governed, today all that is left is an urbanized anarchy, tremendous chaos, immense disorder, a colossal mess.” Beginning in 1992, however, Bogotá enjoyed a string of mayors who succeeded in turning the city around. The first of these mayors, Jaime Castro (1992-1994), fought to establish the financial and political framework that would empower the mayor’s office to function as a nucleus of reform. Castro’s successor, Antanas Mockus (1995-1997 and 2001-2003), built on that legacy, consolidating gains in the face of entrenched opposition on the city council and bringing tangible benefits to the population in the form of exemplary public-service delivery. By 2002, the United Nations had selected Bogotá as a “model city” to be emulated across Latin America and by early 2010, Mockus had emerged as a front-runner in Colombia’s presidential elections.

Matthew Devlin and Sebastian Chaskel drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Colombia during October and November 2009.

Associated Interview(s):  Jaime Castro Castro,  Liliana Caballero, Maria Isabel Patiño

GENERAR Y CONSOLIDAR UNA VUELTA DE PÁGINA: GOBERNABILIDAD EN BOGOTÁ, 1992-2003

SINOPSIS: La otrora ciudad imponente, hacia fines de los años '80 Bogotá se encontraba al borde de la ruina. El gobierno distrital se caracterizaba por la corrupción y el mal funcionamiento, y la capital colombiana frecuentemente se ganaba un lugar en el ranking mundial de los peores lugares para vivir. En 1986, el antiguo alcalde de la capital y por ese entonces presidente Virgilio Barco se lamentó, "De la ciudad vibrante que yo goberné, hoy sólo queda una anarquía urbana, un caos tremendo, un desorden inmenso, un desastre colosal." Sin embargo, a partir de 1992 Bogotá tuvo la suerte de tener una serie de alcaldes que consiguieron pasar la página en la historia de la ciudad. El primero de aquellos alcaldes, Jaime Castro (1992-94), luchó para establecer la infraestructura financiera y política que le otorgaría a la Alcaldía el poder para funcionar como un núcleo de reforma. El sucesor de Castro, Antanas Mockus (1995-97 y 2001-03), siguió construyendo sobre los cimientos legados por su predecesor, y así consolidó victorias a pesar de la oposición profundamente arraigada del Concejo de la Ciudad, trayendo beneficios tangibles para la población en la forma de mejoras en la prestación de servicios públicos. Al llegar el año 2002, las Naciones Unidas habían seleccionado a Bogotá como una ciudad modelo a ser emulada a través de Latinoamérica, y para comienzos del año 2010, Mockus había surgido como un candidato formidable a la presidencia colombiana. Matthew Devlin y Sebastian Chaskel redactaron este estudio practico basado en entrevistas que se llevaron a cabo en Colombia, en octubre y noviembre del 2009. El caso fue publicado en diciembre del 2010. Melina Meneguin-Layerenza tradujo este estudio en febrero de 2013.

Matthew Devlin y Sebastian Chaskel redactaron este estudio practico basado en entrevistas que se llevaron a cabo en Colombia, en octubre y noviembre del 2009. El caso fue publicado en diciembre del 2010. Melina Meneguin-Layerenza tradujo este estudio en febrero de 2013.
 

Inaugurated as mayor of Medellín at the beginning of 2004, Sergio Fajardo inherited a city roiled by decades of violence and corruption. During his four years in office, the charismatic former university professor turned Medellín around. He broke up clientelistic political networks, raised tax receipts, improved public services, introduced transparency fairs, established civic pacts, and restored citizens’ sense of hope. Fajardo left office at the end of 2007 with an unprecedented approval rating of nearly 90%. Though Medellín still faced significant challenges, the city was later identified as an exemplary case of good public administration by cities across Latin America and the Inter-American Development Bank. By 2010, Fajardo had been named the vice-presidential running mate of former Bogotá mayor Antanas Mockus in that year’s presidential elections. 

When he became head of Albania's Central Election Commission in February 2001, Ilirjan Celibashi faced a difficult task. Three years earlier a new constitution enshrined the commission as a non-political body charged with overseeing Albania's historically troubled elections. The permanent commission aimed to promote bipartisan cooperation and restore trust in the political system after violence gripped Albania's capital, Tirana, in the wake of 1996 national elections that the international community labeled as fraudulent.  During its first three years, the commission failed to achieve substantial reforms largely because of the partisan leadership of its chairman. When Celibashi, a former lawyer and judge, took over as head of the CEC, he had to overcome a highly politicized environment, and he set out to enact reforms to restore confidence in the commission and the electoral process. His reforms concentrated on four priority areas: staffing the CEC with competent people, ensuring transparency for the commission's activities, assembling voter lists and overseeing local election commissioners. In 2008, the political parties removed the commission from the constitution and reinstated it as a political body, erasing most of Celibashi's reforms. The case provides insight into how and why a window of opportunity opened for reform, explores how an individual was able to enact changes in a highly politicized environment and considers reasons why the changes were short-lived.   

Michael Scharff drafted this case study with the help of Amy Mawson on the basis of interviews conducted in Tirana, Albania, in June 2010. 

Associated Interview(s):  Petrit Gjokuta, Kathleen Imholz, Ylli Manjani