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Civilians at the Helm: Chile Transforms its Ministry of National Defense, 2010–2014

Author
Tristan Dreisbach
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract

In 2010, 20 years after the end of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, Chile transformed its defense sector by restructuring the Ministry of National Defense, stripping military leaders of responsibility for planning and strategy and placing that authority in the hands of civilians. The event marked a sea change in the relationship between the armed forces and the government. Civilians at the ministry previously had provided the military with scant guidance regarding the country’s strategic goals—in part because they lacked the training and experience required to anticipate threats to the country or to determine what capabilities the armed forces required to confront such threats. The enabling law, enacted after years of debate, also gave new powers to a chief of Joint Staff, an officer whose job was to promote cooperation among the army, navy, and air force—three military branches that jealously protected their independence and were wary of any attempt to diminish the authority of their powerful commanders in chief. Sebastián Piñera, who became president in March 2010 just as the law took effect, faced the task of implementing the massive shift in expectations, norms, culture, and the chain of command. His administration restructured the ministry and hired civilians to manage tasks long controlled by military officers, and by the end of his term in 2014, the Ministry of National Defense had taken the lead in developing Chile’s defense policies.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Santiago, Chile during July and August 2015. Case published November 2015.

Defending the Environment at the Local Level: Dom Eliseu, Brazil, 2008–2014

Author
Maya Gainer
Country of Reform
Abstract

A former center of the timber industry in the Brazilian Amazon, the municipality of Dom Eliseu had built its economy around deforestation—much of it illegal. In 2008, as part of a strategy to enforce the country’s environmental policies, the federal Ministry of the Environment included Dom Eliseu on a list of the worst violators of deforestation laws. The blacklist cut off residents’ access to markets and credit and made the municipality the target of intensive law enforcement. To get off the blacklist, the community had to overcome a collective-action problem. The local government had to persuade the owners of 80% of private land—more than 1,000 properties—to map their property boundaries, declare the extent of deforestation, enter their properties in the state environmental registration system, and adopt more-sustainable methods of production. The municipality also had to build the capacity to take on new responsibilities for environmental protection—most important, environmental licensing, which would enable the local government to regulate land use. With support from nongovernmental organizations and the state, Dom Eliseu successfully coordinated private compliance with the national policy and left the blacklist in 2012.

 

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Belém and Dom Eliseu, Brazil, in September 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published March 2015.

A Credible Commitment: Reducing Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 2003–2012

Author
Rachel Jackson
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract

In the early 2000s, deforestation increased sharply in the Brazilian Amazon, jeopardizing the tropical rain forest’s critical role in mitigating global climate change. In 2003, under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his minister of the environment, Marina Silva, the federal government decided to address the problem. More than a dozen ministries worked together to draft the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. Implementation, which began the following year under coordination by the Office of the Chief of Staff of the President, expanded Brazil’s system of protected areas, improved remote monitoring of the Amazon, and increased enforcement of existing forestry laws. By 2007, the deforestation rate was less than half of 2004 levels. In response to an uptick in deforestation in late 2007 and early 2008, however, the Ministry of the Environment shifted tactics. Silva and her team at the ministry published a list of municipalities that bore the greatest responsibility for deforestation. The blacklisted municipalities were targets of increased enforcement operations and sanctions. The federal government also restricted landholders’ access to credit by requiring environmental compliance to qualify for government-subsidized agricultural credit. Brazil’s decade-long effort reduced the deforestation rate in the Amazon region by nearly 75% from the 1996–2005 average annual rate.

 

Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brazil, in September and October 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published January 2015. To learn more about how one local municipality implemented deforestation efforts, see "Controlling Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Alta Floresta Works Towards Sustainability." 

Associated Interview(s):  Luciano Evaristo

Controlling Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Alta Floresta Works Towards Sustainability, 2008-2013

Author
Rachel Jackson
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract

In the early 2000s, the municipality of Alta Floresta was part of Brazil’s Arc of Fire, a curving frontier of communities whose residents were clearing old-growth forests in the Amazon region so they could graze livestock, harvest timber, or cultivate crops. In 2008, the federal government cracked down on deforestation and pressured local governments to implement national environmental regulations. It created a blacklist of municipalities that were the worst violators of deforestation laws. Alta Floresta, as one of the 36 municipalities on the list, was thrust into an unfavorable national spotlight, cut off from access to rural agricultural credit, and its ranchers embargoed from selling their cattle to slaughterhouses. To get off the list, the municipality had to convince the owners of 80% of privately held land—more than 2,500 owners in all—to register their property, map property boundaries, declare the extent of deforestation, and agree to restore any illegally degraded or deforested areas within 10 years. Making compliance feasible for local ranchers meant that the municipal government had to promote more efficient agricultural production and provide opportunities for alternative livelihoods. This approach protected land set aside for restoration and reduced the economic need for future deforestation. In 2012, Alta Floresta became the third municipality in Brazil to earn removal from the blacklist.
 
Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brazil, in March and April 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published July 2014. To learn more about national deforestation efforts, see "A Credible Commitment: Reducing Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 2003-2012."

Delivering on the Hope of the Rose Revolution: Public Sector Reform in Georgia, 2004-2009

Author
Richard Bennet
Country of Reform
Abstract

Following the peaceful Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili and State Minister for Reform Coordination Kakha Bendukidze sought to overhaul the country’s Soviet-style bureaucracy, which had become the target of public anger. Borrowing ideas from libertarian, free-market think tanks and the New Public Management model, Bendukidze recruited a staff, eliminated redundant functions in the executive arm of government, consolidated ministries and slashed the size of the civil service. Bendukidze’s vision of limited government complemented Saakashvili’s goal of eliminating corruption by reducing opportunities for bribe taking. Although Bendukidze was instrumental in developing many of the reform policies, his office left the implementation of reforms to individual ministries. This case chronicles the steps that the Georgian government took to reorganize and consolidate its operations, capitalizing on public support in order to make rapid and bold changes.

 
Richard Bennet drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, in June 2011, and interviews conducted and text prepared by Andrew Schalkwyk in May 2009. Case published December 2011.
 

Seizing the Reform Moment: Rebuilding Georgia's Police, 2004-2006

Author
Matthew Devlin
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Internal Notes
1.4.13 ST corrected name of Open Society Justice Initiative in text.
Abstract

In 2003, the bloodless Rose Revolution ushered in an era of unprecedented reform in the Republic of Georgia.  Widespread dissatisfaction with the undemocratic and corrupt post-Soviet regime culminated in the 2004 election of Mikheil Saakashvili as president.  Riding a wave of popular support and eager to act before the political winds shifted, Saakashvili immediately targeted the corrupt police service, seen by many Georgians as the epitome of state dysfunction.  By the end of 2006, his administration had abolished a KGB-style security ministry and its related police unit, dismissed every member of the country's uniformed police and created a new police force from scratch.  By 2009, it was clear that the reformers' strategy-capitalize on public support, think boldly, act quickly and fix mistakes as they arise had produced significant progress.

Matthew Devlin drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in the Republic of Georgia during May 2009. Case published May 2010.

Associated Interview(s):  Batu Kutelia, Ekaterine Tkeshelashvili

Building the Capacity to Regulate: Central Bank Reform in Egypt, 2003-2009

Author
Deepa Iyer
Country of Reform
Full Publication
Abstract
Before 2003, the Central Bank of Egypt, called the CBE, had exerted little control over monetary and foreign exchange conditions. High levels of bad debt in the banking sector and erratic government policies had undermined economic growth. Without a credible and independent supervisory authority, Egypt’s economic woes deepened. In the early 2000s, political will for change grew within the ruling National Democratic Party. In June 2003, the Unified Banking Law, pushed through by the party’s economic committee, paved the way for revitalizing the central bank. To implement this law’s mandate and oversee sweeping banking sector reforms, President Hosni Mubarak appointed Farouk El Okdah in late 2003 as CBE governor. El Okdah realized that the central bank had to be overhauled before it could begin the job of cleaning up the banking sector. El Okdah and his team restructured the CBE, aggressively recruiting private sector talent by amending the Unified Banking Law to permit higher salaries, instituting performance-based promotion, expanding training programs and strengthening information-technology systems. By 2009, the results of this institution building were apparent. The CBE commanded authority in the Egyptian banking sector, engaged in independent open-market operations and issued credible monetary and foreign exchange policies. The bank’s structural changes enabled the successful management of a broader banking sector reform effort that helped lift Egypt out of a three-year recession.
 
Deepa Iyer drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Cairo in September 2010.
 
Associated Interview(s):  Mahmoud Mohieldin

Professionalization, Decentralization and a One-Stop Shop: Tax-Collection Reform in Ghana, 1986-2008

Author
David Hausman
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract
Between 1986 and 2008, direct tax revenue collected by Ghana’s Internal Revenue Service nearly doubled as a proportion of the country’s gross domestic product. This case study offers an account of organizational change within the IRS during that period. When the agency became autonomous from the rest of the Ghanaian civil service in 1986, its leaders recruited a large number of accountants and lawyers, raised salaries by 50%-100% and instituted a collective bonus system tied to annual revenue targets. In order to make taxes easier to pay, they delegated functions, people and equipment to local branch offices, monitoring those offices through monthly revenue reports and regular internal audits. Finally, the agency focused attention on customer service for the largest taxpayers by founding a Large Taxpayers Office. That office formed the basis for a cross-agency one-stop shop, the Large Taxpayers Unit, which allowed the 360 firms and individuals that accounted for 50%-60% of the country’s revenue to pay customs taxes, value-added taxes and income taxes in one place.
 
David Hausman wrote this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Accra, Ghana, in January 2010.  Case published July 2011.