Although Bangalore had long been considered one of India's premier metropolitan areas, government agencies largely failed to respond to the city's rapid growth during the information technology boom of the 1990s.  During that period, essential public services such as electricity, water and garbage collection fell into disarray, while property-tax revenue stagnated.  Upset by collapsing public infrastructure, civil society groups began to demand broad reform of Bangalore's public agencies, many of which had a monopoly on the goods and services they provided.  In 1999, the new head of Karnataka state, S.M. Krishna, introduced a high-profile campaign to revamp and revitalize Bangalore's underperforming service providers.  By the end of Krishna's term in 2004, makeovers of several public agencies had produced significant improvements in the quantity and quality of services as well as in the agencies' public-approval ratings.  However, Krishna's focus on urban reform in Bangalore carried a high political price in an overwhelmingly rural state.  This case examines the operational details of Krishna's efforts to revamp service delivery in Bangalore and also highlights how political backlash can endanger reforms that are accomplished for one constituency at the perceived expense of another.

Michael Woldemariam drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Bangalore, India, in June 2010. Case published November 2010.

Associated Interview(s):  V. Ravichandar, Dr. A Ravindra

In the wake of the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front inherited the remnants of a highly centralized state administration.  For a number of years the government engaged in crisis management, attempting to meet the basic needs of a traumatized population.  In 2000, in an effort to improve local service delivery, the RPF-led government began a program of decentralization.  Under the new arrangement, mayors were responsible for implementing development programs.  A chief concern for the central government was how to make mayors accountable.  In response to this challenge, the government in 2006 launched an innovative system known as the imihigo process.  Imihigo had its roots in a pre-colonial Rwandan cultural practice whereby leaders or warriors would publicly vow to achieve certain goals and face public humiliation if they failed.  The modern imihigo process linked this traditional Rwandan practice with planning, monitoring and oversight.  By 2010, government officials believed that the imihigo process had resulted in improved service delivery in the districts.

Daniel Scher drafted this case study with Christine MacAulay on the basis of interviews conducted in Rwanda in May 2010. 

Associated Interview(s):  Fabien Majoro, Fred Mufulukye, Charles Munyaneza, Protais Musoni, Leonard Rugwabiza