Leaders of anti-corruption agencies frequently encounter opposition from powerful beneficiaries of existing corruption. Those antagonists often seek to neutralize the agencies by weakening the agencies’ credibility, legal power, or operations. Drawing from ISS interviews and case studies, this cross-cutting report explores responses to this strategic challenge by agencies in eight countries (Botswana, Croatia, Ghana, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Slovenia). The leaders and staff of those agencies worked to overcome opposition by recruiting allies, instituting internal controls to bolster transparency and accountability, pursuing low-visibility preventive efforts, and carefully assessing the pros and cons of high-level investigations. The outcomes of their efforts point to conditions that shape effectiveness and suggest possible workarounds or alternative approaches for anti-corruption agencies in adverse circumstances. 

 

 

In 2009, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began his second term. During the election campaign, he had pledged to develop the country’s infrastructure, strengthen education, and increase business investment. But delivering on his campaign promises would not be easy. Because he presided over a coalition government, he had to convince ministers from competing political parties to go along with his plans. In addition, his own policy office was understaffed. He had few advisers who could help him think strategically about policy decisions, monitor implementation, and keep projects on track. During his first term, Yudhoyono had set up a unit to help him cope with those challenges, but the legislature killed the initiative. At the beginning of his second term, Yudhoyono resurrected the idea by creating the President’s Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight, known by its Indonesian abbreviation, UKP4. To lead the unit, he chose Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, who had earned national respect and international stature for managing reconstruction work in Aceh and Nias provinces after the devastating tsunami of December 2004 and the earthquake in March 2005. The new operation helped set priorities, kept the president informed of ministry progress toward meeting those priorities, and stepped in to resolve bottlenecks. The challenges of managing a coalition government led the president to temper the unit’s scope of responsibilities, and at the end of 2012 there was insufficient evidence to judge whether the system had helped improve interministerial coordination or follow-through.