In 2003, after 14 years of civil war and as many failed treaties, representatives of Liberia’s government, rebel groups, and civil society came together in Accra, Ghana, to negotiate a peace agreement. They chose Gyude Bryant, a businessman unaffiliated with any of the factions, to head a transitional government made up of ministers from the incumbent political party, the two main rebel groups, and independents, including opposition politicians and civil society leaders. Bryant’s primary goals were to maintain peace and pave the way for elections by the end of 2005—an assignment that entailed disarming and demobilizing more than 100,000 combatants, creating the means to deal with crucial issues ranging from truth and reconciliation to governance reform, and addressing a long list of other tasks—all of it under the scrutiny of Liberia’s legislature as well as regional and international organizations. Although successful democratic elections in late 2005 marked the achievement of Bryant’s primary aims, his fractious government failed to reach many other objectives, including building capacity and ensuring that resources earmarked for development served their intended purposes. The difficulties led to a novel, temporary system of governance—shared with international partners—that targeted procurement, spending, and other aspects of financial management. This case offers insights useful for planning transitions in low-income, divided societies where prolonged conflict has gutted institutional capacity.

Tyler McBrien drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Monrovia, Liberia in November 2019. Case published in January 2020.

This series highlights the governance challenges inherent in power sharing arrangements, profiles adaptations that eased those challenges, and offers ideas about adaptations. 

The United States Institute of Peace funded the development of this case study.

In 2005, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became Liberia’s first democratically elected post-conflict president, she found her country’s government in shambles. Years of cronyism under military rule and a 14-year civil war had left behind a bloated civil service corps riddled with unqualified employees, most of whom did not have a university education and some of whom could not read or write. The president needed more-capable employees at every level of government. Externally supported capacity-building programs helped fill top and middle management roles with Liberians who had fled abroad during the war, but Sirleaf also wanted to attract the most-talented and most-ambitious young graduates from Liberian universities to work in the public service. With assistance from international donors, Saah N’Tow, a Liberian working at an international consulting firm, set up a fair and transparent recruitment process and coupled it with strong training and mentorship to create the President’s Young Professionals Program. Beginning in 2009 and annually thereafter, the program placed 10 to 20 Liberian youth into government ministries for two-year fellowships. By 2016, 72 young professionals had completed their fellowships and about 75% were still working for the government. Many stood out as some of the top performers in the civil service and several had been promoted to positions as divisional directors and assistant ministers.

Blair Cameron drafted this case study based on interviews he and Pallavi Nuka conducted in Monrovia, Liberia and Paris, France, in March and April 2016. This case study was funded by the Open Society Foundations, which in 2015 donated $250,000 to the program profiled. This case draws from a variety of sources including an independent evaluation ISS conducted in 2016. Case published July 2016.

After a protracted civil war ended in 2003, Liberia’s government began the costly and complex task of rebuilding. During the early years, philanthropies and foundations stepped forward to help but often worked on isolated projects that had little to do with Liberia’s broader needs. In addition, some donors duplicated the efforts of others or, worse, worked at cross-purposes. At the same time, government capacity was severely strained. Many experienced and skilled civil servants had died in the war or fled the country, and those who remained were swamped with work. When she took office in 2006, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf knew philanthropies and private foundations could help her achieve ambitious development goals. But although she had a strategic plan and concrete funding priorities, Sirleaf lacked the time and organizational means required to integrate private donors’ resources into the overall effort. After struggling with the problem early in her first term, Sirleaf assigned one of her most trusted advisers, Natty Davis, to work directly with private donors, enlist new contributors and channel philanthropic investments toward government priorities without burdening her office or ministers with repeated information requests and meetings. Davis created the Philanthropy Secretariat within the Office of the President to match donors with local nongovernmental organizations or government ministries on projects of mutual interest. By 2012 and despite shortcomings, the new unit had succeeded in linking more than a dozen new foundations and philanthropies with local organizations and government institutions. The funders gave more than US$16 million in grants, admittedly a small sum compared with annual contributions by multilateral and bilateral donors but still significant in helping the country move forward.