In this interview, Reverend Gift Moerane shares his experiences serving on the South African Electoral Commission’s Conflict Management Mediation Panels since 1999. He describes the conflicts that plagued the pre-election period in 1999, including the contestation of control of areas by various political parties, or “no-go” zones. He discusses the role that political party loyalties played in causing electoral disorder, and the effects of apartheid on these loyalties. Furthermore, he notes the role the police forces played in electoral mediation and talks about the relationship between mediation and policing. He explains the importance of the training and recruitment of mediators. Finally, he discusses the usage of the country’s electoral codes in deterring conflict escalation.
At the time of this interview, Reverend Gift Moerane was a member of the South African National Peace Accord, spokesperson for the South African Council of Churches. He served as a member of the Electoral Commission’s Conflict Management Mediation Panels since 1999. He was born in the Vaal Triangle in the Meyerton Township. He completed teacher training at the College of Education in Groblersdal. In 1984, after working as a clerk for the Meyerton municipality, he started working for the Council of Churches, assisting families of detainees and political prisoners.
In May 2004, Colombia’s Office of the Presidency established a national-level agency, the Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral, to manage the reintroduction of state institutions into areas that had been retaken from leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers. The agency set up a central Bogotá office from which it coordinated work in so-called consolidation zones around the country. In many of these areas, the government had either been absent for decades or never present. In the words of Andres Peñate, former vice minister of defense and an architect of the initiative, “Although we were all Colombians, it was almost like conquering a different country.” Despite setbacks, by late 2009 the agency had received broad-based domestic and international endorsement.
Matthew Devlin and Sebastian Chaskel drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Colombia during October and November 2009.
In this interview, Riza Shillova of the Kosovo Police discusses the transition of the police force in Kosovo from one governed by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to the local Kosovo Police. He first describes the recruitment process of the Kosovo police, which initially fell under the umbrella of the UNMIK police until 2003, when the Kosovo police took responsibility and changed the recruitment and selection process. Shillova details the UNMIK interview process and application procedure, including the medical check, school and field training phases and evaluations. He explains the lack of consistency in practices and policing as a result of international trainers policing in different ways; for instance, the theoretical training by European trainers differed from the field training taught by members representing other, particularly non-Western, regions. Shillova discusses steps they took to overcome some of these obstacles. He highlights the process, including: problems with background checks; the establishment of policing procedures, training, and the recruitment process; announcement of vacancies and the application process; and the establishment of local procedures and standards. He defines the role of the Professional Standards Unit (PSU), which was set up to handle impartial background investigations of candidates. He explains the collaboration with the UNMIK police until the Kosovo Police began to independently run the process in 2003, with UNMIK monitoring it. He discusses the selection of candidates and the need for a balance of representation, including efforts to bring minorities into the force. He then details the effect of the 2008 Declaration of Independence in Kosovo on the police force, highlighting the walkout of Serbs from the force and the efforts in getting them back. He outlines the three types of training of the 7000 member force they have in place since 2007 and the promotion process. Shillova concludes that trust in the Kosovo police force is mainly a result of the recruitment process, which includes representation of all minorities and genders from the communities in which they serve. He further attributes the training of police, independent of the old police organizations, to its success. He stresses the importance of locals carrying out the process, while international organizations should take on the role of monitoring and advising; otherwise, he says, locals cannot learn.
Shillova is a lawyer by training and received a Masters in Public Administration. He joined the Kosovo police in September 1999, following the war in Kosovo. He finished his field training as a patrol officer and began investigation work in community policing, in the coordination office under the authority of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In 2001, he was promoted to sergeant. In 2002, he was promoted to lieutenant and assigned to the division for the security of the government of buildings and very important persons escort. In Spring 2003, he became captain and served as a station commander until he was promoted to Deputy Head of Human Resources (HR) Directorate eight months later. During his role as Deputy Head, the Kosovo police became independent from UNMIK and the recruitment and selection process changed. In 2009, Shillova was appointed to the position of Assistant Director for Personnel and Trainings. At the time of this interview he served as the Assistant General Director for Investigation.
In this interview, Giuseppe Ferrante reflects on his time spent serving the Municipality of Palermo from 1995-2000 under Mayor Leoluca Orlando. He begins by explaining his personal background in the private sector prior to his appointment to the city government and describing the pervasive presence of the mafia in the city government and culture prior to the transformation of the 1990s. Ferrante discusses Mayor Orlando’s strategies to change Palermo. Orlando hired honest and hard-working employees, often from outside of political circles, as in the case of Ferrante, in order to eliminate the unprofessional culture that marked past administrations. Popular faith in the government and pride in the city soon returned to Palermo. Ferrante explains how his commercial, security, and traffic initiatives contributed to a turnaround in downtown Palermo, creating a safe and lively pedestrian area full of shops, markets, restaurants, bars, and cafés. His familiarity with the private sector as an entrepreneur informed his successful business-friendly policies. He also recounts his efforts to improve Palermo’s relationships with its sister cities around the world. Then he discusses the responsibilities of and working relationships among the members of the City Council before reflecting on the time of the Orlando administration. Although he says his term brought about positive change, he expresses disappointment with the governments that followed Orlando’s team.
Giuseppe Ferrante served the Municipality of Palermo under Mayor Leoluca Orlando from March 1995 until April 2000. He worked primarily as both Commissioner of Productive Activities and of Tourism; however, his responsibilities were many and varied. He was also in charge of the municipal police department and information technology for the city administration, worked with the municipal service companies, and served more briefly as Commissioner of Traffic. Prior to his appointment to the city government, Ferrante worked exclusively in the private sector. He managed a clothing company with 200 employees and headed the Sicilian and youth chapters of the Confindustria, an Italian confederation of industrialists. In 1985, Ferrante started a Sicilian business magazine.
1.4.13 ST corrected name of Open Society Justice Initiative in text.
Abstract
In 2003, the bloodless Rose Revolution ushered in an era of unprecedented reform in the Republic of Georgia. Widespread dissatisfaction with the undemocratic and corrupt post-Soviet regime culminated in the 2004 election of Mikheil Saakashvili as president. Riding a wave of popular support and eager to act before the political winds shifted, Saakashvili immediately targeted the corrupt police service, seen by many Georgians as the epitome of state dysfunction. By the end of 2006, his administration had abolished a KGB-style security ministry and its related police unit, dismissed every member of the country's uniformed police and created a new police force from scratch. By 2009, it was clear that the reformers' strategy-capitalize on public support, think boldly, act quickly and fix mistakes as they arise had produced significant progress.
Matthew Devlin drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in the Republic of Georgia during May 2009. Case published May 2010.
In the 1990s, the Lesotho Mounted Police Service was in disarray. Its members had gone on strike and had committed kidnappings and other crimes in the small African kingdom. A police mutiny in the capital in 1997 forced the government to address the issue of reforming the service. The effort included setting up three support agencies to monitor the activities of the police and ensure adherence to common standards. These agencies had some success but struggled to assert the type of monitoring that was envisaged. The government in 2005 appointed a forward-looking commissioner who forged ahead with her own reform priorities. The case offers insights into the challenges that arise when establishing external oversight agencies and also shows how savings can be made and reforms moved forward with the right leadership, even in low-resource environments.
Daniel Scher drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Maseru, Lesotho, in February 2010.
