In 2009, South Africa's health-funding system teetered on the verge of collapse. Despite the adoption of a transparent and credible budget framework in 1994, large parts of the public health system suffered from chronic overspending and poor financial control. As wage hikes and supply costs ate into the health budget and as government revenues plummeted in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the national health department had to find ways to preserve priorities, linking them more effectively to the budget. The department won agreement on a list of non-negotiable expenditure items to protect in provincial budgets, used earmarked conditional grants to channel funds to key programs, cut medicine costs by improving central procurement, rolled out a new information technology system, and improved its monitoring of provincial finances. Although the country's nine provincial health departments had important roles to play, most of them struggled. However, the Western Cape was able to set a model by controlling personnel costs, improving monitoring, and creating incentives for health facilities to collect fees. Nationally, total per-capita government revenues dropped by 5% in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis and grew only slowly thereafter, but the health sector's strategy helped ensure progress on its key priorities even as resources fluctuated.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Pretoria and Cape Town, South Africa, in August 2018. Case published October 2018.

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In 2010, 20 years after the end of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, Chile transformed its defense sector by restructuring the Ministry of National Defense, stripping military leaders of responsibility for planning and strategy and placing that authority in the hands of civilians. The event marked a sea change in the relationship between the armed forces and the government. Civilians at the ministry previously had provided the military with scant guidance regarding the country’s strategic goals—in part because they lacked the training and experience required to anticipate threats to the country or to determine what capabilities the armed forces required to confront such threats. The enabling law, enacted after years of debate, also gave new powers to a chief of Joint Staff, an officer whose job was to promote cooperation among the army, navy, and air force—three military branches that jealously protected their independence and were wary of any attempt to diminish the authority of their powerful commanders in chief. Sebastián Piñera, who became president in March 2010 just as the law took effect, faced the task of implementing the massive shift in expectations, norms, culture, and the chain of command. His administration restructured the ministry and hired civilians to manage tasks long controlled by military officers, and by the end of his term in 2014, the Ministry of National Defense had taken the lead in developing Chile’s defense policies.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Santiago, Chile during July and August 2015. Case published November 2015.