Fred Mufulukye describes the territorial administrative reforms implemented in Rwanda in 2005-06 that reduced the number of districts to 30 from 106. Local leaders are now elected. Pay for district staff was raised and recruitment became based on qualifications and merit. At the instigation of the president, the government initiated the imihigo process to inspire district performance and achievement of outcomes in governance, economic development, and social development. Based on a cultural tradition from the days of chiefdoms, the process requires that each district develop specific goals and priorities from the bottom up each year. Achievement of these goals and priorities is evaluated and scored each year by the government, motivating each district to out-compete other districts in performance. The program and results in each district are widely publicized in order to engage the citizenry in setting priorities and judging results.    

Case Study:  The Promise of Imihigo: Decentralized Service Delivery in Rwanda, 2006-2010 and Government Through Mobilization: Restoring Order After Rwanda's 1994 Genocide

Edward Larbi-Siaw describes in detail the process of tax administration reform in Ghana during the late 1980s.  First, the reform program sought to recruit highly skilled and diversified personnel that could raise to the challenges posed by the new taxation environment.  Larbi-Siaw describes alternative strategies to incentivize employment with the National Revenue Secretariat (NRS), including salaries matching those offered by the private sector and hierarchy adjustments aimed at providing in-demand scientists with ranks equal to those they would have at universities. This was possible only after the NRS was removed from the civil service to circumvent pay restrictions and rigid promotion systems.  Second, the secretariat was transformed into an agency through an institutional overhaul that involved the creation of departments specialized in research, internal operations, auditing, finance and human resources. Third, enhanced supervision and monitoring of revenue flow contributed to an increase in effectiveness and a reduction in corruption and malfeasance.  This was complemented by selective purges of corrupt or underperforming officials, with the notable exception of the operations core that remained largely untouched due to the strategic need to maintain the NRS running throughout the restructuring process and to minimize resistance.  Larbi-Siaw attributes the lack of generalized resistance to the reform to the support of the government, a consensus-building approach predicated on internal deliberation and consultation with other relevant agencies, and the successes of creative outreach efforts of the newly created NRS customer service and public relations departments. Nonetheless, there were two main sources of resistance. First, civil servants resented the retention of revenue to sustain high salaries at the NRS, which resulted in the abolition of retention and the drain of many qualified staff.  Second, public discontent over misused funds affected the NRS due to the inevitable link between revenue collection and expenditure. Information provision was key to transparency, and required extensive cooperation with the Ministry of Finance that could not always be secured due to intrinsic institutional conflict over jurisdictions.  Both factors also contributed to the considerable delay in integration of the revenue agencies—the Internal Revenue Service and the Customs, Excise and Preventive Services—despite a stated preference for a one-stop shop.  Finally, Larbi Siaw describes specific tax regulations that were introduced, highlighting the role of codification in the management of special interest groups that had previously been able to secure ad hoc exemptions.  

Case Study:  Professionalization, Decentralization, and a One-Stop Shop: Tax Collection Reform in Ghana, 1986-2008

Denyse Morin details the planning and motivation behind the civil service reform programs in Tanzania.  She talks about the changes in recruitment policy and procedure within the civil service and the difficulties of rolling out a performance-management system.  She describes the role and independence of the Public Service Commission, Tanzania's massive retrenchment program and attempts to tackle the difficult issue of pay reform and control of allowances.  She closes the interview with a reflection on the importance of strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

Case Study:  Creating an Affordable Public Service: Tanzania, 1995-1998

Rizwan Khair reviews the reasons he thinks civil service reform had not taken place in Bangladesh. He argues that the mindset of government leaders and the senior civil servants was risk averse and that Bangladesh was stuck in the mindset of the old colonial civil service, with its emphasis on seniority rather than performance. He believes that the development of Bangladesh in a globalized world economy requires that a premium be set on performance, accountability and innovation in the civil service. He suggests that international donors had not been persistent enough in pressing for civil service reform in Bangladesh. More importantly, he calls for his country to look at reforms in Malaysia and India to see why Bangladesh must follow suit in order to build its long-term future.    

Case Study:  Energizing the Civil Service: Managing at The Top 2, Bangladesh, 2006-2011

Shadi Baki describes his role in the process of guiding the Liberian Civil Service Agency (CSA) through a period of intense reform in the country’s post-war period. He explains how the CSA, with the help of fellow experts from the World Bank, completely redesigned employee records to ensure the availability of accurate information. He also explains how a vetting system, along with facial recognition and fingerprinting technologies, were used to prevent fraud. He describes the steps taken to reach civil servants in the counties outside of the capital city of Monrovia, as part of efforts to compile complete records. He discusses how this information was integrated with old records and made accessible through the use of new management information systems, and then used to issue employee ID cards. He explains how CSA efforts to create a single national data network relying on wireless technology grew into a broader movement encompassing the central bank, customs, and telecommunications corporations. Finally, he touches on the importance of political support and stability in achieving lasting reform.     

Case Studies: Cleaning the Civil Service Payroll: Post-Conflict Liberia, 2008-2011 and Building Civil Service Capacity:  Post-Conflict Liberia, 2006-2011

Clay Wescott draws on his global experience and talks about civil service reform programs in countries around the world.  He talks about his involvement in such programs in Vietnam, including aspects such as downsizing and the introduction of one-stop shops.  He also recalls the introduction of an effective but contentious computer-based budgeting system in Kenya in the 1980s.  Wescott reflects on the difficulty of reforming a civil service that had been used as a tool of a peace process, such as in Cambodia, where positions were parceled out in order to get different factions to buy into the process.  He also identifies the importance of building reforms to last beyond a current window of opportunity, and of selling a vision of reform that people want to buy into.  He also talks about civil service censuses and outsourcing in Nepal and capacity-building programs in Eritrea, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan.

Case Study:  Policy Leaps and Implementation Obstacles: Civil Service Reform in Vietnam, 1998-2009

Robertson Nil Akwei Allotey explains the history of civil service reform in Ghana and the National Institutional Renewal Program. Phase 1 of the program began in 1994 and ended in 2000. It redefined the mission of the ministries and set out methods to improve the delivery of services to the citizenry and to publicize the services offered to the public. The Civil Service Improvement Program analyzed ministries, departments and agencies to reorganize them, to decide on the optimal size, to retrain, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery with attention to work ethics and transparency. The first task was to reduce political and social influence in recruitment and promotion by open civil service examinations and performance assessments carried out by retired senior civil servants. In Phase I, a “single spine” pay policy was instituted to insure pay equity. Increases in salary were based on performance. In Phase II, emphasis was placed on private sector growth for the government’s development agenda. He says that the reform effort targeted all public agencies, not just the civil service, with decentralization and the restructuring of central management agencies with emphasis on procurement and records management and information technology as support interventions. The major reform initiatives were part of the government’s poverty reduction strategy program, which was linked to the Millennium Development goals developed by the United Nations.

George Pessima describes his central role in the efforts to reform the Sierra Leonean civil service. Pessima argues that though the Sierra Leonean service was once one of the best in Africa, it has been in rapid decline, in large part because of its unnecessarily massive size, the under-qualification of many of its employees, and the rates of pay, which he describes as being some of the lowest in Africa. Pessima emphasizes the importance of fair and open recruitment through the publication of openings which include full job descriptions. He goes on to identify the promotion system and the lack of extensive training facilities for a number of sectors as the major areas which require immediate attention and reform. 

Kithinji Kiragu talks about the challenges facing the Tanzanian civil service over the years, including inefficiency and overstaffing.  He describes the wave of change that began under President Mkapa in 1995 and the difficult decisions he made, such as pushing through unpopular but necessary downsizing processes.  Kiragu identifies the importance of high level support for reform efforts, in this case a powerful coalition consisting of the president, the head of the public service, and the secretary of the cabinet.  He recalls the focus on installing a meritocratic system within the civil service, and he highlights the concerns and considerations surrounding decentralization attempts.  He reflects on how the security of tenure allowed permanent secretaries to oversee long-term reform efforts: Some permanent secretaries remained in office for 10 years.  He concludes with some thoughts on how advisers, including local advisers, can be more successful in their interactions with partner countries.

Case Study:  Creating an Affordable Public Service: Tanzania, 1995-1998

Former South African Revenue Service Commissioner Pravin Gordhan describes the internal organizational changes that helped the service consistently meet or exceed its revenue targets during his tenure. Appointed commissioner soon after the service obtained autonomy from South Africa’s civil service regulations, Gordhan talks about how he led a campaign of organizational transformation known as siyakha (“we are building” in Zulu), which reorganized tasks, shifted people within the organization, and led to large-scale racial transformation. The policy depended on aggressive outreach efforts both within the organization and to the public at large. By taking office staff on public campaigns during tax-filing season, Gordhan built public willingness to comply while motivating his employees.

Case Study:  Reworking the Revenue Service: Tax Collection in South Africa, 1990-2009