In 2006, incoming Mexican president Felipe Calderón had to work quickly to deliver on ambitious campaign promises that included improving infrastructure and confronting organized crime. Limited by his country’s constitution to one six-year term, Calderón, a hands-on manager, sought to ensure coordination and follow-through among members of his Cabinet by creating a strong Office of the Presidency. At first, he appointed Juan Camilo Mouriño, a close aide and political adviser, to head a centralized office that combined political and policy responsibilities in his chief-of-staff role. Later, Calderón moved Mouriño to the Cabinet, shifting political responsibilities out of the office, flattening the structure, and assuming more-direct management responsibility than he had exercised as president earlier. Mouriño’s untimely death later the same year coincided with twin crises that tested the office and the presidency. Although Calderón’s tenure demonstrated successful planning and coordination, his experience also illustrated the limitations of an organizational structure that relied too heavily on the chief executive’s participation.
Robert Joyce drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Mexico City in January 2015. Case published in June, 2015.
In this interview, Ilir Gjoni describes his experience as a member of the Albanian government in the aftermath of extensive internal upheaval in the country. Describing the buildup of civic unrest and the revolts following the 1997 collapse of pyramid schemes, he elaborates on the challenges faced by a government administration seeking reform. Gjoni further outlines the steps taken by Prime Minister Meta upon his succession, praising Meta’s efforts in appointing individuals with differing political affiliations and backgrounds. Gjoni goes on to describe his own exertions as minister of defense, talking of the measures he took to counteract the rampant human, arms and drug trafficking in the country. His efforts included arms reduction initiatives. He also details the steps he took as minister of public order in reducing organized crime, improving personnel appointment and training policies and collaborating with other European nations to address trafficking problems. Recognizing the corrupting nature of power, however, Gjoni describes how power tussles and pressures from different party factions created infighting and tensions within the Meta administration. Gjoni concludes by providing advice to those seeking to institute reform in similar circumstances.
Ilir Gjoni served as chief of staff under Albanian Prime Minister Pandeli Majko, being appointed to the position in 1999. When the administration changed that same year, the new prime minister, Ilir Mehta, reconfirmed Gjoni’s appointment. Prime Minister Meta went on to appoint Gjoni as minister of defense in July 2000. Gjoni also became the minister of public order under Meta’s regime, holding the post until February 2002. A philology major in the Tirana University class of 1985, Gjoni’s involvement in the public sector began when he was recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs upon graduation. Leaving the ministry in 1994, Gjoni pursued a master' degree in diplomacy. He then opted to acquire a second degree in national security studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monteray, California. Gjoni also spent some time working as an international news editor at the only independent newspaper in Albania at the time, Koha Jone. After his venture into journalism, Gjoni went on to become a liaison officer for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees office in Tirana, assisting in the management of both the ’98 and ’99 Kosovo refugee crises until his appointment in the Majko administration.
Influence peddling, organized crime, and petty corruption marred Lithuania’s post-Soviet transition to democracy. Concerned that those problems were jeopardizing the country’s efforts to join NATO and the European Union, the government created in 1997 an elite law enforcement unit within the Ministry of the Interior to combat corruption, called the Special Investigation Service (Specialiuju tyrimu tarnyba, or STT). Director Juozas Gaudutis rapidly built the early agency’s capacity. His successor, Valentinas Junokas, helped the STT establish independence and broaden its mandate to perform corruption prevention activities and oversee education, thereby creating Europe’s first multifunctional anti-corruption agency. But Junokas resigned under political pressure after STT agents executed a controversial search of political party offices and investigated multiple legislators for graft just before the 2004 elections. The STT’s new director, Povilas Malakauskas, patched relations with parliament and recalibrated the STT’s strategy to emphasize preventive and educational measures—“changing the rules of the game” and “changing values,” he said. As the STT entered its second decade, its agents investigated hundreds of cases annually but faced difficulties in enlisting a wary public in a long-term war against corruption.
Gabriel Kuris drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Vilnius, Lithuania, in May and June 2012. Case published November 2012
