When he won Indonesia’s October 2004 presidential election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono found he had inherited a struggling land administration system that would block progress on some of his key policy initiatives. The National Land Agency (known by the abbreviation BPN, for Badan Pertanahan Nasional) managed records on landownership and transactions. But the organization was dogged by corruption, high costs, and delays. On average, it took 33 days, six visits to a local land office, and US$110 for landowners to register property transactions. In addition, the BPN held ownership records for only a third of the estimated 89 million land parcels on the thousands of islands in the sprawling archipelago. In keeping with his campaign pledge to spur rural development, Yudhoyono appointed a new leadership team to revamp the BPN and get the agency on track. The team partnered with the World Bank in a program to title unregistered land and then rolled out a new land database that digitally stored all new transactions, equipped vehicles to deliver mobile services in rural areas, and worked with other ministries to design a comprehensive OneMap for the country. Although the reforms improved efficiency and sharply increased the pace of property registration, 10 years after Yudhoyono’s election it remained clear that additional measures were still needed to reach the goal of a well-functioning, corruption-free, comprehensive, and sustainable land registry.

Leon Schreiber and Jordan Schneider drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Jakarta, Indonesia, in March and April 2015 as well as in October and November 2017. Case published December 2017. 

This cross-cutting analysis draws on a series of case studies conducted by Innovations for Successful Societies under the auspices of a grant from the Omidyar Network and the British Academy-Department for International Development Anti-Corruption Evidence Program. Published February 2018.

In June 2012, Rwanda’s national land registry completed a nearly four-year project that mapped every one of the country’s 10.4 million parcels and prepared title documents for 8 million landholders. It was an unprecedented accomplishment in a country in which lack of land titling had weighed on the economy and led to escalating conflict over access to land. The mapping program promised to reduce tensions by establishing an orderly system for registering and transferring landownership. However, the system could work only if Rwandans registered every transaction, and in 2012, a survey found that only about one of every eight landowners had even bothered to pick up their official titles. The registry urgently had to both make it easier to register transactions and build public awareness about the importance of keeping the land database up-to-date. A registry team launched a nationwide campaign to raise awareness about the importance of titling and of reporting all land transactions. Managers simplified procedures and registration forms. And to provide greater access in rural areas, where titling was nearly unknown, the registry decentralized services and introduced a new software platform to speed transactions. By mid 2017, more than 7 million people had collected their titles, and registrations of sales, purchases, and other kinds of transfers had begun to improve. Still, the number of transactions reported in 2016 fell short of the registry’s target, indicating that further work lay ahead.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kigali, Musanze, and Huye, Rwanda, in June and July 2017. Fortunee Bayisenge, Lecturer and Dean of the Faculty of Development Studies at the Protestant Institute of Arts and Social Sciences, collaborated on the research. The British Academy-Department for International Development AntiCorruption Evidence (ACE) Program funded the development of this case study. Case published September 2017.

In the early 2000s, Tanzania struggled to protect the land rights of the 75% of its citizens who lived in rural areas. Rapid population growth and rising investment in commercial agriculture had increased land scarcity and created the potential for violent conflict in parts of the country. In accordance with the provisions of a new law, the national lands ministry launched a pilot project in 2004 to title 158 villages and more than 1,000 individual parcels. Building on lessons from the project, the government passed a new land-use planning act, created a new implementation program, and drew up a strategic plan to title rural land throughout the country. Starting in 2008, the lands ministry worked with community leaders to grant villages and their residents title documents that protected them from land grabbing. Villages also decided how they would use communal land and how they would set up committees to resolve boundary disputes. Officials constructed registry buildings in villages and districts to house title documents before surveying individual land parcels and handing over titles to village residents. By 2017, more than 11,000 of Tanzania’s approximately 12,500 villages had mapped their outer limits, and about 13% of villages had also adopted land-use plans. Of the approximately 6 million households located within rural villages, about 400,000 also had obtained individual title documents.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, Tanzania, in April 2017. The British Academy-Department for International Development Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Program funded the development of this case study. Case published June 2017.

A 2017 workshop, Driving Change, Securing Tenure, profiled recent initiatives to strengthen tenure security and reform land registration systems in seven countries: South Africa, Canada, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Australia and Tanzania.

Watch the video of Seraphia Robert Mgembe - Program Coordinator, MKURABITA

In January 2007, Western Australia’s land agency began a top-to-bottom overhaul of its structure, management, and service delivery. A booming property market, fueled by the state’s extractive resources industry, had overwhelmed the public agency’s aging technology, but budget constraints hindered its ability to upgrade the systems. To provide financial flexibility, the state government created a statutory authority called Landgate—a public institution with some private characteristics. Landgate could keep the revenue it generated from regulated services such as property registration and engage in for-profit commercial activities, which provided resources for investment in better services. But making the new model work was not easy. Landgate’s management team had to win the trust of skeptical staff, reduce delay, and contend with a sharp drop in revenues only two years into its existence when the 2008 global financial crisis struck. To surmount the challenges, the agency created an innovation program, explored ways to commercialize its spatial data, restructured to speed up registration and cut costs, and after one failed attempt, developed an automated registration system. By 2017, Landgate had become financially stable, had drastically reduced processing times, and had won acclaim for its innovative products and management practices.

Lessons Learned

• Fusing public and private. The statutory authority structure exerted financial pressures for efficiency and the flexibility to invest revenues and pursue commercial opportunities while maintaining government control over key services such as registration. However, to make the hybrid model work, Landgate’s managers had to overcome certain inherent challenges—from bridging public- and private-sector cultures to running commercial activities under government human resources and finance policies.
• Getting software development right. Learning from the initial, failed attempt to develop an automated registration system, Landgate changed its approach to establish a joint venture with the IT provider, emphasize business process reviews early on, and break up the project into manageable pieces.
• Learning and adaptation. Experimentation and changing course were crucial to Landgate’s strong performance. The agency overhauled its software development process, shifted from developing its own spatial products to supporting and investing in other companies, and restructured after the 2008 financial crisis. The innovation program set the tone, but managers also encouraged people to think creatively and learn from missteps in their daily work.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Perth, Australia, in March 2017. Noel Taylor, at the time CEO of the Cadasta Foundation, assisted in interviews and drafting. The Omidyar Network funded the development of this case study. Case published May 2017.

A 2017 workshop, Driving Change, Securing Tenure, profiled recent initiatives to strengthen tenure security and reform land registration systems in seven countries: South Africa, Canada, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Australia and Tanzania.

Watch the video of Jodi Cant - CEO, Landgate (Western Australian Land Information Authority).

A former center of the timber industry in the Brazilian Amazon, the municipality of Dom Eliseu had built its economy around deforestation—much of it illegal. In 2008, as part of a strategy to enforce the country’s environmental policies, the federal Ministry of the Environment included Dom Eliseu on a list of the worst violators of deforestation laws. The blacklist cut off residents’ access to markets and credit and made the municipality the target of intensive law enforcement. To get off the blacklist, the community had to overcome a collective-action problem. The local government had to persuade the owners of 80% of private land—more than 1,000 properties—to map their property boundaries, declare the extent of deforestation, enter their properties in the state environmental registration system, and adopt more-sustainable methods of production. The municipality also had to build the capacity to take on new responsibilities for environmental protection—most important, environmental licensing, which would enable the local government to regulate land use. With support from nongovernmental organizations and the state, Dom Eliseu successfully coordinated private compliance with the national policy and left the blacklist in 2012.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Belém and Dom Eliseu, Brazil, in September 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published March 2015.

In the early 2000s, deforestation increased sharply in the Brazilian Amazon, jeopardizing the tropical rain forest’s critical role in mitigating global climate change. In 2003, under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his minister of the environment, Marina Silva, the federal government decided to address the problem. More than a dozen ministries worked together to draft the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. Implementation, which began the following year under coordination by the Office of the Chief of Staff of the President, expanded Brazil’s system of protected areas, improved remote monitoring of the Amazon, and increased enforcement of existing forestry laws. By 2007, the deforestation rate was less than half of 2004 levels. In response to an uptick in deforestation in late 2007 and early 2008, however, the Ministry of the Environment shifted tactics. Silva and her team at the ministry published a list of municipalities that bore the greatest responsibility for deforestation. The blacklisted municipalities were targets of increased enforcement operations and sanctions. The federal government also restricted landholders’ access to credit by requiring environmental compliance to qualify for government-subsidized agricultural credit. Brazil’s decade-long effort reduced the deforestation rate in the Amazon region by nearly 75% from the 1996–2005 average annual rate.

Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brazil, in September and October 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published January 2015. To learn more about how one local municipality implemented deforestation efforts, see "Controlling Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Alta Floresta Works Towards Sustainability." 

Associated Interview(s):  Luciano Evaristo

In the early 2000s, the municipality of Alta Floresta was part of Brazil’s Arc of Fire, a curving frontier of communities whose residents were clearing old-growth forests in the Amazon region so they could graze livestock, harvest timber, or cultivate crops. In 2008, the federal government cracked down on deforestation and pressured local governments to implement national environmental regulations. It created a blacklist of municipalities that were the worst violators of deforestation laws. Alta Floresta, as one of the 36 municipalities on the list, was thrust into an unfavorable national spotlight, cut off from access to rural agricultural credit, and its ranchers embargoed from selling their cattle to slaughterhouses. To get off the list, the municipality had to convince the owners of 80% of privately held land—more than 2,500 owners in all—to register their property, map property boundaries, declare the extent of deforestation, and agree to restore any illegally degraded or deforested areas within 10 years. Making compliance feasible for local ranchers meant that the municipal government had to promote more efficient agricultural production and provide opportunities for alternative livelihoods. This approach protected land set aside for restoration and reduced the economic need for future deforestation. In 2012, Alta Floresta became the third municipality in Brazil to earn removal from the blacklist.
 
Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brazil, in March and April 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published July 2014. To learn more about national deforestation efforts, see "A Credible Commitment: Reducing Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 2003-2012."