In 2007, the political moment was right for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to build Brazil’s Ministry of Defense into an institution that would give civilians a significant role in defense policy—more than two decades after the end of military rule. The ministry had existed since 1999 but had failed to provide effective civilian leadership in setting defense policy and overseeing defense institutions. The president, known to Brazilians as Lula, set the stage for the reform by way of a strategy document that called for institutional changes in both the ministry and the armed forces. Then he appointed a well-known and respected minister, Nelson Jobim, to implement the new policies. Jobim worked with a military adviser to unify control of the armed forces, promote greater cooperation and closer coordination among the three service branches, and press civilians and military officers to work together in creating defense policy. By the end of Lula’s presidency in 2011, key tasks remained, but the joint staff held key strategic planning functions, the three branches were cooperating on important matters, and military officers, civilians in government, and outside experts were collaborating in the formulation of defense policy.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro in May and June 2016. Case published August 2016.

In 2000, the election of opposition politician Chen Shui-Bian as Taiwan’s president upended five decades of rule by the Kuomintang Party, and an era of tight military control over defense decision making. Chen had long favored reforms to increase civilian participation in the areas of defense policy, strategy, and procurement. Now he faced the tough task of implementing a new law that called for restructuring the Ministry of National Defense and placing a civilian defense minister into the chain of command. The new president confronted strong opposition from officers, many of whom resisted the increased presence of civilians in the formulation of policy. During the next eight years, Chen’s efforts sharply increased the number of nonmilitary personnel at the ministry and created new opportunities for civilian influence and oversight. Chen turned the National Security Council, an organization within the presidency that previously had held little influence, into an effective advisory and policy coordination unit. His administration also introduced an annual political–military joint exercise that increased civilian officials’ defense capability and preparedness.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Taipei, Taiwan, in February and March 2016. Case published June 2016.

In 2010, 20 years after the end of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, Chile transformed its defense sector by restructuring the Ministry of National Defense, stripping military leaders of responsibility for planning and strategy and placing that authority in the hands of civilians. The event marked a sea change in the relationship between the armed forces and the government. Civilians at the ministry previously had provided the military with scant guidance regarding the country’s strategic goals—in part because they lacked the training and experience required to anticipate threats to the country or to determine what capabilities the armed forces required to confront such threats. The enabling law, enacted after years of debate, also gave new powers to a chief of Joint Staff, an officer whose job was to promote cooperation among the army, navy, and air force—three military branches that jealously protected their independence and were wary of any attempt to diminish the authority of their powerful commanders in chief. Sebastián Piñera, who became president in March 2010 just as the law took effect, faced the task of implementing the massive shift in expectations, norms, culture, and the chain of command. His administration restructured the ministry and hired civilians to manage tasks long controlled by military officers, and by the end of his term in 2014, the Ministry of National Defense had taken the lead in developing Chile’s defense policies.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Santiago, Chile during July and August 2015. Case published November 2015.