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A Blueprint for Transparency: Integrity Pacts for Public Works, El Salvador, 2009–2014

Author
Maya Gainer
Focus Area(s)
Critical Tasks
Country of Reform
Abstract

When Gerson Martínez became head of El Salvador’s Ministry of Public Works in 2009, the organization was notorious for corruption that contributed to poor-quality construction, unfinished projects, and frequent lawsuits. Working with a prominent nongovernmental organization (NGO) and industry representatives, Martínez introduced integrity pacts as monitoring mechanisms intended to prevent corruption. The agreements publicly committed officials and companies to reject bribery, collusion, and other corrupt practices and enabled NGOs to monitor bidding and construction. Although limited capacity and resistance from some midlevel ministry staff hindered the monitors’ work, integrity pacts focused the attention of both the government and the public on problems in major public works projects; and participants said the pacts helped deter corruption in those they covered. In 2012, integrity pacts became part of El Salvador’s Open Government Partnership action plan, in implicit recognition of the tool’s contribution to reform. As of August 2015, the ministry had signed 31 integrity pacts involving five projects worth a combined US$62 million. Although sustaining the initiative proved a challenge, integrity pacts served as a foundation for increased collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector—and as a first step toward a new institutional culture at the Ministry of Public Works.

 

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in San Salvador in July 2015. Case published in October, 2015. This case study was funded by the Open Government Partnership.

A Higher Standard of Service in Brazil: Bahia's One-Stop Shops, 1994-2003

Author
Michael Scharff
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract
Until 1994, the Brazilian state of Bahia delivered public services with little attention to efficiency or effectiveness. Citizens found it difficult to obtain basic documents like birth certificates, identification cards, and work permits, which were essential to earning a livelihood and participating in political life. Because issuing centers were mainly in urban areas with limited operating hours, citizens in interior areas were underserved, and applicants often had to wait in long lines and visit offices on different floors or shuttle between various buildings to fulfill all requirements. Poor management aggravated the problem. The state government usually placed its worst-performing employees in customer service positions. In 1995, Bahia’s newly elected governor, Paulo Souto, moved to improve service delivery by creating one-stop shops that would provide all kinds of documents under one roof in selected locations throughout the state. Souto’s reform team at the state Secretariat of Administration—the body responsible for public management—worked to enlist the cooperation not only of state agencies but also of national and municipal governments, all of which played roles in processing citizen documents. The state also hired new workers, streamlined procedures, expanded the number of locations, and deployed a fleet of mobile units to increase service access in remote areas. Regular customer-satisfaction surveys indicated the system was highly popular with the public. By 2003, when Souto won reelection, his reforms had not only simplified and accelerated document access but also demonstrated that government could be responsive and accountable to citizens.
 
Michael Scharff drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Salvador, Brazil, in April and May 2013. Case published August 2013.

Improving the Policy Process: Ghana Tries to Build Support for Cabinet Decision-Making, 2003-2008

Author
Jonathan Friedman
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Internal Notes
posted 10/23/2013
Abstract
From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Ghana’s Cabinet-level policy management system deteriorated as multiple coups d’état produced abrupt changes in government. Many competent civil servants either left or were pushed out. Ministries submitted policy documents to the Cabinet that lacked essential information ministers required to evaluate the wisdom and feasibility of proposals. Ministries rarely cooperated with each other. But beginning in 2003, a newly formed policy unit in the presidency partnered with the Canadian International Development Agency to strengthen Ghana’s policy management system. The unit helped coordinate policy planning between ministries and reported on implementation to the president. The Cabinet Secretariat introduced standardized formats to guide ministries in policy development and ensure that proposals contained all essential information. The Office of the Head of the Civil Service and the University of Ghana Business School worked together to train hundreds of civil servants in the practical skills of researching, writing, and communicating policies. By 2008, the new system was in place and the policy management process had improved, but sustaining the reforms through the tumultuous government transition that followed the country’s 2008 elections posed additional challenges. Looking back on the effort, Samuel Somuah, who helped lead the Ghana Central Governance Project, underscored the importance of an effective policy management system by saying, “If there’s one project every African country needs, or every developing country needs, it’s this project.”
 
Jonathan Friedman drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Accra, Ghana, during April 2013. Case published October 2013.
 
 
 

A Second Life For One-Stop Shops: Citizen Services In Minas Gerais, Brazil, 2003-2013

Author
Rushda Majeed
Country of Reform
Internal Notes
posted JRG 1/29/2014 10:30am
Abstract
In 2003, the new governor of Minas Gerais, Brazil, pledged to improve government efficiency and serve citizens better. Residents of Minas Gerais, Brazil’s fourth-largest state by area and second largest by population, had long bemoaned the difficulty of obtaining such vital documents as work permits, passports, and driver’s licenses, which are issued by a variety of federal, state, and local agencies. In 1996, the state government tried to solve the problem by experimenting with 26 one-stop shops that integrated related citizen services under a single roof, but the shops failed to reduce delay and confusion. From 2007 to 2010, the governor and his reform team restructured and expanded the one-stop shops. The reform team persuaded multiple levels of the government to cooperate more closely, revamped management practices, improved the physical appearance and organization of facilities, streamlined procedures, and installed an electronic monitoring system. Renamed integrated citizen assistance units (unidades de atendimento integrado), the new one-stop shops improved services, reduced delays, and sharply increased processing volume. In 2011, the team outsourced the management of six of the one-stop shops to a private company monitored by the state. The public-private experiment cut per-unit operating costs by 31%. By 2012, 30 one-stop shops were handling more than 6 million citizen transactions annually—more than seven times the annual volume in 2009. By bringing together diverse agencies from multiple levels of government, Minas Gerais was able to greatly improve the reach and efficiency of its citizen services.
 
Rushda Majeed drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil, in May 2013. The case was prepared by ISS in partnership with the World Bank as a part of the Bank's Science of Delivery initiative. Case published January 2014. 
 

Building the Capacity to Regulate: Central Bank Reform in Egypt, 2003-2009

Author
Deepa Iyer
Country of Reform
Full Publication
Abstract
Before 2003, the Central Bank of Egypt, called the CBE, had exerted little control over monetary and foreign exchange conditions. High levels of bad debt in the banking sector and erratic government policies had undermined economic growth. Without a credible and independent supervisory authority, Egypt’s economic woes deepened. In the early 2000s, political will for change grew within the ruling National Democratic Party. In June 2003, the Unified Banking Law, pushed through by the party’s economic committee, paved the way for revitalizing the central bank. To implement this law’s mandate and oversee sweeping banking sector reforms, President Hosni Mubarak appointed Farouk El Okdah in late 2003 as CBE governor. El Okdah realized that the central bank had to be overhauled before it could begin the job of cleaning up the banking sector. El Okdah and his team restructured the CBE, aggressively recruiting private sector talent by amending the Unified Banking Law to permit higher salaries, instituting performance-based promotion, expanding training programs and strengthening information-technology systems. By 2009, the results of this institution building were apparent. The CBE commanded authority in the Egyptian banking sector, engaged in independent open-market operations and issued credible monetary and foreign exchange policies. The bank’s structural changes enabled the successful management of a broader banking sector reform effort that helped lift Egypt out of a three-year recession.
 
Deepa Iyer drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Cairo in September 2010.
 
Associated Interview(s):  Mahmoud Mohieldin