Indonesia

Bertrand de Speville

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H
Focus Area(s)
Ref Batch Number
2
Critical Tasks
Country of Reform
Interviewers
Gabriel Kuris
Name
Bertrand de Speville
Interviewee's Position
Principal
Interviewee's Organization
de Speville and Associates
Language
English
Place (Building/Street)
Residence
Town/City
Kew
Country
Date of Interview
Reform Profile
No
Abstract

In this interview, Bertrand de Speville, as former head of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, and author of Overcoming Corruption: The Essentials, details the measures that should be taken by successful anti-corruption agencies. He explains how the three-pronged strategy of the ICAC is very effective. The three departments of the ICAC—investigation, prevention, and education--- investigate allegations of corruption, attempt to prevent corruption from occurring in private and public sectors, and try to educate the general public about how to eliminate corruption, respectively. De Speville stresses how important it is for these departments to be closely coordinated. Also, he states how he was able to deduce the common mistakes that countries make in regard to their attempt to fight corruption. One of these common pitfalls is a flawed investigating policy, where countries just go for the “big fish.” Thus, the public may believe that the anti-corruption agency is not impartial, but has a political ulterior motive. Therefore, de Speville explains how resources must be allocated in a way that mostly every allegation of corruption should be investigated. This relates to de Speville’s stressing the importance of public trust, in which he elaborates how measures such as the Citizen Oversight Committee within each department and the institution of public relations, are taken. He states that the real measure of success of an anti-corruption agency is whether it can bring about a change of heart and mind in every member of a community, and draws upon the examples of Hong Kong, Singapore, Latvia, and Lithuania to show that this success is possible. 

Case Study:  From Underdogs to Watchdogs: How Anti-Corruption Agencies Can Hold Off Potent Adversaries

Profile

Born in Southern Rhodesia and educated in England, Betrand de Speville served as Solicitor General of Hong Kong before beginning his career in anti-corruption. In 1992, upon becoming the Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, de Speville commenced his concentration in fighting corruption. Through this position, in which he served from 1992-1996, de Speville witnessed the aspects of anti-corruption agencies that were effective, along with practices that were common mistakes. While leading ICAC, he states that he has few regrets, and that in order for corruption to be fought effectively in the future, although agencies should be tailored to their surroundings, they should have a three-pronged strategy of attack, and warrant public support, while staying away from the common mistakes made while fighting corruption, such as selective investigation. Since then, he has worked with dozens of countries and international organizations on setting up specialized anti-corruption agencies and other aspects of anti-corruption policy. From 1997-2003, he was the advisor to the Council of Europe’s Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption. He detailed the necessities of a successful agency and the pitfalls faced within his book, Overcoming Corruption: The Essentials, which was published in 2010 De Speville is currently the principal of de Speville and Associates, an international anti-corruption consultancy based in England.

Full Audio File Size
106 MB
Full Audio Title
Bertrand de Speville Interview

Decentralizing Authority After Suharto: Indonesia's 'Big Bang,' 1998-2010

Author
Richard Bennet
Core Challenge
Country of Reform
Abstract

When President Suharto's regime fell in 1998, reform leaders in Indonesia responded to public calls for democracy by implementing reforms in the structure of government, decentralizing authority to the country's districts.  This transformation altered the relationship between the Indonesian people and the state, granting greater autonomy to local leaders.  In theory, decentralizing to the district level would reduce demands for separatism in the provinces while strengthening the accountability of local governments to their constituents.  However, the new structures also risked empowering local politicians who might be inexperienced, corrupt or interested in secession, triggering the very disintegration of the country that the reformers sought to prevent.  This policy note outlines the ways in which Indonesia implemented sweeping reforms-consolidating regional and central government services and empowering local governments-while avoiding this governance trap.  It also traces the process by which the government incrementally revised the initial laws and policies as it encountered challenges. 

Richard Bennet drafted this case study with the help of Itumeleng Makgetla and Rohan Mukherjee on the basis of interviews conducted in Jakarta and Surakarta, Indonesia, during April and June 2010. 

Associated Interview(s):  Siti Nurbaya, Hadi Soesastro

Against the Odds: Attempting Reform in Suharto's Indonesia, 1967-1998

Author
Matthew Devlin
Keywords
Critical Tasks
Country of Reform
Abstract

President Suharto of Indonesia (1967-1998) presided over one of the most corrupt regimes of the 20th century.  For over three decades, the political and financial interests of Suharto's family, cronies and allies in the military dictated the policies of the Indonesian state.  Nevertheless, a handful of public officials attempted to rationalize, improve and clean up the way government worked.  Emil Salim and Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, both cabinet ministers under Suharto, were two such men.  The pair struggled to manage the influence of the military, motivate a moribund bureaucracy and confront Suharto's many cronies.  Lacking formal mechanisms through which to channel their efforts, Salim and Kusumaatmadja seized on passing targets of opportunity, structuring and adapting their initiatives on an ad hoc basis and relying on unconventional tactics.  Although their successes proved unsustainable, their story offers specific lessons in the often elusive tactics of how individual public officials can achieve modest change against institutional inertia and determined opposition from vested interests.

Matthew Devlin drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted inJakarta, Indonesia, in July 2009. 

Associated Interview(s): Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, Emil Salim

Instilling Order and Accountability: Standard Operating Procedures at Indonesia's Ministry of Finance, 2006-2007 (Bahasa Translation Available)

Author
Rushda Majeed
Country of Reform
Translations
Language
Bahasa
Abstract

Studi kasus ini juga, Menerapkan Aturan Dan Akuntabilitas: Standar Operasional Prosedur Di Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia, 2006-2007, tersedia dalam Bahasa Indonesia.

In 2006, Indonesian economist Sri Mulyani Indrawati took on a huge and knotty problem: bringing order and efficiency to the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, an organization of 64,000 employees. At the time, many Indonesian citizens viewed the ministry as corrupt and unaccountable, exemplifying the failures of the entire government. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had appointed Mulyani because of her reputation as a tough-minded reformer and a savvy manager. Mulyani ascribed the ministry’s weak and inconsistent handling of taxes, customs and other services to a shortage of clear and consistent procedures for the many tasks employees handled. A key element of her strategy was to simplify and standardize ministry processes in order to improve employee performance and accountability. During the next two years, Mulyani and her team initially focused their efforts on 35 priority services that citizens used heavily, and then they expanded the reforms to include other activities. By 2007, the ministry had developed and implemented nearly 7,000 standard operating procedures. The changes significantly improved public services and earned popular acclaim for both the ministry and the Yudhoyono government. This case shows how a strong leader and her reform team introduced new ways of working to achieve significant gains in service efficiency, quality and fairness.

 

Rushda Majeed drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Jakarta, Indonesia, in November and December 2011, and on a 2009 interview of Sri Mulyani Indrawati by Matthew Devlin and Andrew Schalkwyk. Case published April 2012.

Associated Interview(s):  Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Robert Pakpahan

Defusing a Volatile City, Igniting Reforms: Joko Widodo and Surakarta, Indonesia, 2005-2011

Author
Rushda Majeed
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract
In July 2005, Joko Widodo, the first directly elected mayor of Surakarta, faced the daunting job of revitalizing an Indonesian city whose history of violence had earned it the label sumbu pendek in the official Bahasa language—city with a “short fuse.” Seven years earlier, riots had shaken Surakarta, known as Solo, as mobs razed several neighborhoods, destroying homes and businesses. In 2002, Solo made international news again when officials uncovered terror networks in the city. Poorly functioning government services, high unemployment and weak economic growth weighed on the half million residents. With the help of Vice Mayor F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, the mayor took a series of steps to turn Solo around. Known by his nickname Jokowi, he built alliances with businesses, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations representing the poor. Initially he relocated thousands of street vendors to relieve traffic congestion and created a one-stop shop for business licenses and other services. He also expanded facilities at new vendor locations, improved conditions in slums and upgraded health services. Jokowi then worked to boost tourism and strengthen the economy by reviving Solo’s image as a regional center for arts and culture, both to its own citizens and the outside world. While economic growth bolstered the city’s revenue base, Jokowi reorganized parts of the government to promote efficiency and opened the budget process to greater public scrutiny. In 2010, he and Rudyatmo were re-elected with 90.9% of the vote. This case study recounts their reform efforts between 2005 and 2011.
 

Rushda Majeed drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Surakarta and Jakarta, Indonesia, in November and December 2011. Case published July 2012.

Translating Vision into Action: Indonesia's Delivery Unit, 2009-2012

Author
Michael Scharff
Focus Area(s)
Country of Reform
Abstract
In 2009, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began his second term. During the election campaign, he had pledged to develop the country’s infrastructure, strengthen education, and increase business investment. But delivering on his campaign promises would not be easy. Because he presided over a coalition government, he had to convince ministers from competing political parties to go along with his plans. In addition, his own policy office was understaffed. He had few advisers who could help him think strategically about policy decisions, monitor implementation, and keep projects on track. During his first term, Yudhoyono had set up a unit to help him cope with those challenges, but the legislature killed the initiative. At the beginning of his second term, Yudhoyono resurrected the idea by creating the President’s Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight, known by its Indonesian abbreviation, UKP4. To lead the unit, he chose Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, who had earned national respect and international stature for managing reconstruction work in Aceh and Nias provinces after the devastating tsunami of December 2004 and the earthquake in March 2005. The new operation helped set priorities, kept the president informed of ministry progress toward meeting those priorities, and stepped in to resolve bottlenecks. The challenges of managing a coalition government led the president to temper the unit’s scope of responsibilities, and at the end of 2012 there was insufficient evidence to judge whether the system had helped improve interministerial coordination or follow-through.
 

Michael Scharff drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Jakarta, Indonesia, in December 2012. Case published April 2013.