In the wake of the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front inherited the remnants of a highly centralized state administration.  For a number of years the government engaged in crisis management, attempting to meet the basic needs of a traumatized population.  In 2000, in an effort to improve local service delivery, the RPF-led government began a program of decentralization.  Under the new arrangement, mayors were responsible for implementing development programs.  A chief concern for the central government was how to make mayors accountable.  In response to this challenge, the government in 2006 launched an innovative system known as the imihigo process.  Imihigo had its roots in a pre-colonial Rwandan cultural practice whereby leaders or warriors would publicly vow to achieve certain goals and face public humiliation if they failed.  The modern imihigo process linked this traditional Rwandan practice with planning, monitoring and oversight.  By 2010, government officials believed that the imihigo process had resulted in improved service delivery in the districts.

Daniel Scher drafted this case study with Christine MacAulay on the basis of interviews conducted in Rwanda in May 2010. 

Associated Interview(s):  Fabien Majoro, Fred Mufulukye, Charles Munyaneza, Protais Musoni, Leonard Rugwabiza

More than a decade after the 1994 genocide, Rwandan government ministries struggled to implement long-term plans or even meet mid-term targets. A skills shortage hindered projects at the district and local levels. In 2008, Charles Karake and Stella Mugabo, senior officials at the Human Resources and Institutional Development Agency, a government organization charged with improving national capacity, experimented with a management practice known as the Rapid Results Approach to enhance ministries’ ability to implement successful projects. Rapid Results encouraged officials to focus on small-scale projects that could be completed in a relatively brief time span, usually less than four months. This case shows how Rwanda’s Ministry of Local Government, under the direction of Protais Musoni, championed the technique to advance the goals of an anti-poverty program. A pilot program in Gashaki, an impoverished region in north Rwanda, improved the ability of local officials and leaders to help poor families raise their incomes. Although adoption of Rapid Results did not progress beyond the initial phase for a variety of reasons, public servants who participated in the program increased their ability to deliver services effectively and many of Gashaki’s residents improved their financial positions and quality of life within a surprisingly short period. However, critics noted the high cost of implementing Rapid Results and stressed that other factors also contributed to the positive results in Gashaki. This study considers the approach as an alternative to traditional methods of building capacity.