A former center of the timber industry in the Brazilian Amazon, the municipality of Dom Eliseu had built its economy around deforestation—much of it illegal. In 2008, as part of a strategy to enforce the country’s environmental policies, the federal Ministry of the Environment included Dom Eliseu on a list of the worst violators of deforestation laws. The blacklist cut off residents’ access to markets and credit and made the municipality the target of intensive law enforcement. To get off the blacklist, the community had to overcome a collective-action problem. The local government had to persuade the owners of 80% of private land—more than 1,000 properties—to map their property boundaries, declare the extent of deforestation, enter their properties in the state environmental registration system, and adopt more-sustainable methods of production. The municipality also had to build the capacity to take on new responsibilities for environmental protection—most important, environmental licensing, which would enable the local government to regulate land use. With support from nongovernmental organizations and the state, Dom Eliseu successfully coordinated private compliance with the national policy and left the blacklist in 2012.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Belém and Dom Eliseu, Brazil, in September 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published March 2015.

In the early 2000s, deforestation increased sharply in the Brazilian Amazon, jeopardizing the tropical rain forest’s critical role in mitigating global climate change. In 2003, under the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his minister of the environment, Marina Silva, the federal government decided to address the problem. More than a dozen ministries worked together to draft the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon. Implementation, which began the following year under coordination by the Office of the Chief of Staff of the President, expanded Brazil’s system of protected areas, improved remote monitoring of the Amazon, and increased enforcement of existing forestry laws. By 2007, the deforestation rate was less than half of 2004 levels. In response to an uptick in deforestation in late 2007 and early 2008, however, the Ministry of the Environment shifted tactics. Silva and her team at the ministry published a list of municipalities that bore the greatest responsibility for deforestation. The blacklisted municipalities were targets of increased enforcement operations and sanctions. The federal government also restricted landholders’ access to credit by requiring environmental compliance to qualify for government-subsidized agricultural credit. Brazil’s decade-long effort reduced the deforestation rate in the Amazon region by nearly 75% from the 1996–2005 average annual rate.

Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brazil, in September and October 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published January 2015. To learn more about how one local municipality implemented deforestation efforts, see "Controlling Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: Alta Floresta Works Towards Sustainability." 

Associated Interview(s):  Luciano Evaristo

In the early 2000s, the municipality of Alta Floresta was part of Brazil’s Arc of Fire, a curving frontier of communities whose residents were clearing old-growth forests in the Amazon region so they could graze livestock, harvest timber, or cultivate crops. In 2008, the federal government cracked down on deforestation and pressured local governments to implement national environmental regulations. It created a blacklist of municipalities that were the worst violators of deforestation laws. Alta Floresta, as one of the 36 municipalities on the list, was thrust into an unfavorable national spotlight, cut off from access to rural agricultural credit, and its ranchers embargoed from selling their cattle to slaughterhouses. To get off the list, the municipality had to convince the owners of 80% of privately held land—more than 2,500 owners in all—to register their property, map property boundaries, declare the extent of deforestation, and agree to restore any illegally degraded or deforested areas within 10 years. Making compliance feasible for local ranchers meant that the municipal government had to promote more efficient agricultural production and provide opportunities for alternative livelihoods. This approach protected land set aside for restoration and reduced the economic need for future deforestation. In 2012, Alta Floresta became the third municipality in Brazil to earn removal from the blacklist.
 
Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Brazil, in March and April 2014. This case was funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation in collaboration with the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy program at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Case published July 2014. To learn more about national deforestation efforts, see "A Credible Commitment: Reducing Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 2003-2012."

In May 2004, Colombia’s Office of the Presidency established a national-level agency, the Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral, to manage the reintroduction of state institutions into areas that had been retaken from leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers. The agency set up a central Bogotá office from which it coordinated work in so-called consolidation zones around the country. In many of these areas, the government had either been absent for decades or never present. In the words of Andres Peñate, former vice minister of defense and an architect of the initiative, “Although we were all Colombians, it was almost like conquering a different country.” Despite setbacks, by late 2009 the agency had received broad-based domestic and international endorsement.

Matthew Devlin and Sebastian Chaskel drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Colombia during October and November 2009. 

Associated Interview(s):  Diego Molano