Tunisia’s Independent High Authority for Elections faced a formidable task in May 2011. The newly created commission had five months to organize and implement elections for a National Constituent Assembly that would rewrite the Tunisian constitution. Commissioners moved quickly to build capacity and restore public faith in elections. The commission navigated the pressures of a compressed electoral calendar, an agitated electorate, and skepticism of the transitional government. The story of the group’s efforts to manage a successful election offers insight into how an electoral commission can take advantage of relationships with political parties, government, and the public to overcome inexperience in volatile circumstances. This case study focuses on commission staffing and recruitment, the creation of regional subsidiary bodies, and voter registration.
Emmanuel Debrah discusses the successes and challenges of the electoral process in Ghana. He focuses on the role of the electoral commission in planning, implementing and monitoring elections and details that process. Debrah explains the successes and challenges of voter registration in a country with limited records of birth or citizenship. He also discusses the role of political parties in cooperating with the electoral commission, the relationship between the electoral commission and the government, and the monitoring and observation procedures for local and international observers. Finally, Debrah touches on financial accountability structures for election officials, border demarcation issues and anti-fraud measures.
At the time of this interview, Emmanuel Debrah was a senior lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Ghana in Accra. He performed numerous studies of elections in Ghana, particularly on the role of the Electoral Commission. Debrah received his doctorate in political science from the University of Ghana.
Johnson Asiedu-Nketia discusses his role as head of the National Democratic Congress in Ghana’s Inter-Party Advisory Committee. He describes how IPAC was able to introduce sophisticated voter registration systems and set an election schedule agreed upon by all political parties. He also says that both IPAC and the Electoral Commission declined in effectiveness after 2000, which he attributes to lack of government support, reduced funding and an increasingly antagonistic relationship between IPAC and the commission. He briefly touches on the role of the party in contributing to electoral transparency.
At the time of this interview, Johnson Asiedu Nketia was general secretary of the National Democratic Congress in Ghana. Prior to becoming head of the party, he was a member of Parliament for the NDC for 12 years. He also served as deputy minister of food and agriculture. Before entering politics, he worked as a bank manager.
Paul Adu-Gyamfi discusses the role of Ghana's National Media Commission in protecting press freedoms and ensuring journalistic standards, particularly during elections. He focuses on the role of the commission in ensuring the state-owned media are not unduly influenced by the government and in working with the electoral commission to monitor elections. Adu-Gyamfi explains the constitutional basis for the commission and also discusses the challenges faced by the media in Ghana.
At the time of this interview, Paul Adu-Gyamfi was chairman of the National Media Commission in Ghana. A lawyer by trade and a senior partner at Adu-Gyamfi and Associates, he previously served as president of the Ghana Bar Association. He also was a member of the executive council of the Pan-African Lawyers Union and was vice president of the West African Bar Association.
Mauro De Lorenzo explains the refugee voting process in the first post-conflict Bosnian elections in 1996. He discusses the organizational structures involved in carrying out the mandate for refugee voting, including the steering group assigned specifically to the task. He explains that Sarajevo decision makers were concerned about the integrity and peacefulness of the vote inside Bosnia and not with refugee voters. De Lorenzo discusses the legal framework of voter registration and the technical difficulties he encountered in creating a master list of registrants per the electoral law. He further describes the efforts in reaching hundreds of thousands of people across more than 70 countries or jurisdictions, printing enough ballots for those voters, distributing them, and getting them back on time. He outlines his group’s decision-making procedures, employing DHL to help establish a mail system, and running the steering group like a small start-up company, skirting formal processes to accomplish their goals. He also differentiates between refugee and diaspora voting. Finally, De Lorenzo discusses the complexity of the ballot and its implications for other countries considering refugee voting, especially since refugee voting can change election outcomes.
At the time of this interview, De Lorenzo was a Senior Research Scholar and Deputy Director of the Urbanization Project at New York University's Stern School of Business. Before joining NYU, De Lorenzo was Vice President at the John Templeton Foundation and resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. From 2007-2010, De Lorenzo served in a pro bono capacity as the deputy to Senator Bill Frist on the board of directors of the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Previously, De Lorenzo served as Assistant to the Coordinator of the Refugee Elections Steering Group, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He was an intern at the International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) at the time, which became the Secretariat for the refugee elections component of the first Bosnian elections. As his presence around the office coincided with the impending crisis to implement the refugee-voting mandate, De Lorenzo became a member of the steering group assigned to make refugee voting happen. In 1997, he served as a refugee elections specialist with the Refugee Policy Group in Monrovia, Liberia. De Lorenzo studies private sector-based approaches to political development in post-conflict countries, focusing on reforms that have made some developing countries attractive to foreign and domestic investment. He also researches Chinese investment and political influence outside the Pacific region, particularly in Africa; the design of policies that promote democratic accountability in aid-receiving countries; and refugee and humanitarian policies.
Following a close and highly contested 2006 presidential race, Mexico faced a crisis of credibility in the management of its elections. An opposition party threatened not to recognize the government as legitimate, citing fraud and unfair treatment by broadcast media during the campaign. Legislators in Mexico’s three largest political parties parlayed the crisis into an opportunity to address long-standing problems in the country’s electoral process. They passed a reform package that prohibited the purchase of radio and television campaign advertisements and gave political parties access to free airtime, thereby cutting into the profits of Mexico’s powerful broadcast industry. In the wake of the 2006 crisis, Leonardo Valdés Zurita, president of the Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal Electoral Institute), and the institute’s General Council had to implement the legislative reforms and restore public trust in the electoral management body itself. To do so, they had to meet both the technical challenge of monitoring broadcast signals across the country and the political challenge of winning compliance from some of Mexico’s most powerful corporations.
Rachel Jackson drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Mexico City, in July 2013. This ISS case study was made possible by support and collaboration from the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education. Case published June 2014.
RESTAURACIÓN DE LA CREDIBILIDAD EN EL PROCESO ELECTORAL MEXICANO, 2006–2012
SINOPSIS: Tras la reñida y muy disputada campaña presidencial de 2006, México enfrentó una crisis de credibilidad en la administración de sus elecciones. Un partido de la oposición amenazó con no reconocer la legitimidad del gobierno, alegando fraude y un trato injusto por parte de los medios de radiodifusión durante la campaña. Los legisladores de los tres partidos políticos más importantes de México convirtieron la crisis en una oportunidad para abordar problemas de larga data en el proceso electoral del país. Aprobaron un paquete de reforma según el cual se prohibió la compra de anuncios de campaña en radio y televisión y se posibilitó que los partidos políticos accedieran a tiempo de transmisión gratuito, lo que recortó las ganancias de la poderosa industria de radiodifusión mexicana. A raíz de la crisis de 2006, el presidente del Instituto Federal Electoral, Leonardo Valdés Zurita, y el Consejo General de dicha institución se vieron obligados a implementar reformas legislativas a fin de restaurar la confianza política en el organismo de gestión electoral. Para lograr esto, debieron afrontar el reto técnico de supervisar las señales de radiodifusión en todo el país, así como el reto político de obtener la conformidad por parte de una de las corporaciones más poderosas de México.
Rachel Jackson elaboró este estudio de caso sobre la base de entrevistas realizadas en la Ciudad de México en julio de 2013. Este estudio de caso del programa Innovaciones para Sociedades Exitosas (Innovations for Successful Societies, ISS) fue posible gracias al apoyo y a la colaboración del Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. El caso se publicó en junio de 2014.
