After the 1980 US national census, 53 state and local governments sued to correct alleged errors in the count, and the US Census Bureau found itself at a crossroads. For years, the bureau had integrated information from paper-based sources to create maps for its census takers, and the procedure was slow and unreliable. An overhaul of the cumbersome system would be a complex and difficult task, and there was a deadline: the next national census would take place in 1990. Robert Marx, head of the bureau’s geography division, decided to take advantage of new advances in computing technology to improve performance. As part of that initiative—known as Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing, or TIGER—the bureau built interagency cooperation to create a master map, developed a software platform, digitized information, and automated data management. Its efforts generated a nationwide geospatial dataset that fed an emerging geographic information industry and supported the creation of online services such as MapQuest, OpenStreetMap, and Google Maps. This case provides insights on overcoming common obstacles that arise in the collection, digitization, and publication of information in accessible formats, which are challenges that affect many open-data reforms.
Pallavi Nuka drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in August, September, and October 2017. Case published February 2018.
In January 2007, Western Australia’s land agency began a top-to-bottom overhaul of its structure, management, and service delivery. A booming property market, fueled by the state’s extractive resources industry, had overwhelmed the public agency’s aging technology, but budget constraints hindered its ability to upgrade the systems. To provide financial flexibility, the state government created a statutory authority called Landgate—a public institution with some private characteristics. Landgate could keep the revenue it generated from regulated services such as property registration and engage in for-profit commercial activities, which provided resources for investment in better services. But making the new model work was not easy. Landgate’s management team had to win the trust of skeptical staff, reduce delay, and contend with a sharp drop in revenues only two years into its existence when the 2008 global financial crisis struck. To surmount the challenges, the agency created an innovation program, explored ways to commercialize its spatial data, restructured to speed up registration and cut costs, and after one failed attempt, developed an automated registration system. By 2017, Landgate had become financially stable, had drastically reduced processing times, and had won acclaim for its innovative products and management practices.
Lessons Learned
Fusing public and private. The statutory authority structure exerted financial pressures for efficiency and the flexibility to invest revenues and pursue commercial opportunities while maintaining government control over key services such as registration. However, to make the hybrid model work, Landgate’s managers had to overcome certain inherent challenges—from bridging public- and private-sector cultures to running commercial activities under government human resources and finance policies.
Getting software development right. Learning from the initial, failed attempt to develop an automated registration system, Landgate changed its approach to establish a joint venture with the IT provider, emphasize business process reviews early on, and break up the project into manageable pieces.
Learning and adaptation. Experimentation and changing course were crucial to Landgate’s strong performance. The agency overhauled its software development process, shifted from developing its own spatial products to supporting and investing in other companies, and restructured after the 2008 financial crisis. The innovation program set the tone, but managers also encouraged people to think creatively and learn from missteps in their daily work.
Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Perth, Australia, in March 2017. Noel Taylor, at the time CEO of the Cadasta Foundation, assisted in interviews and drafting. The Omidyar Network funded the development of this case study. Case published May 2017.
In 1999, eight years after emerging from decades of Soviet domination, Kyrgyzstan began an ambitious effort to officially recognize property ownership throughout the country and lay the groundwork for a vibrant real estate market. During five and a half decades of rule by the Soviet Union, citizens were not allowed to own land, and after Kyrgyzstani independence in 1991, the country began a nationwide program of privatization in a bid to stimulate economic development. The question was how to register and document property rights so that people could transact efficiently in a new land market. To meet the challenge, a new land agency, known as Gosregister, had to hire and train staff in completely new responsibilities, establish performance management and funding structures, improve efficiency by introducing new technologies, and ensure that staff did not engage in corruption. Despite political upheaval—including the overthrow of two governments in the space of five years—Gosregister steadily built its capacity and evolved into an effective land registry. By 2012, the agency had registered 92% of the country’s privately held parcels, and in 2017, the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings recognized its services as among the best in the world.
Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Bishkek and Kant, Kyrgyzstan, during November and December 2016. The British Academy-Department for International Development Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Program funded the development of this case study. Case published February 2017
In 1987, Ontario’s land registration system was overwhelmed. Budget constraints and a surge in property sales were straining the Canadian province’s paper-based operation. After struggling to computerize its land records during the previous seven years, civil servants at the provincial Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations led a groundbreaking effort to form a public–private partnership to convert millions of property records—both from paper to digital and in some cases from a deeds system to titles—and create the world’s first electronic land registration system. During the partnership’s first 12 years, beginning in 1991, the provincial government and joint venture company Teranet worked to persuade sometimes skeptical politicians and real estate professionals of the value of their model and laid the groundwork for a lasting relationship even after the government sold its ownership stake in 2003. Despite early financial challenges and a slower-than-expected conversion process, Teranet and the Ontario government pioneered technology that became a model for the world, simplified transactions for the province’s landowners, and built a relationship that continued to offer value for both partners in 2016, 25 years after the partnership began.
Lessons Learned
Designing a successful PPP. The public–private partnership between Ontario and private joint venture company Teranet facilitated greater investment in innovative technology. Close collaboration, the use of existing government capacity, and strong governance structures were crucial for maintaining an effective working relationship—even after the government sold its stake in Teranet in 2003.
Challenges of converting deeds to titles. Creating a new form of title and setting precedents for the handling of unusual properties helped speed the conversion from a deeds to a titles system. But despite efficiency gains, the process remained time- and resource intensive.
Stakeholder relations. A close relationship with entities such as the law society and a gradual rollout of new technology eased real estate professionals’ acceptance of electronic registration. Later, those relationships played a key role in measures to prevent fraudulent transactions.
Private versus nonprofit incentives. As a for-profit company, Teranet had an incentive to focus on commercial, value-added products after developing the electronic registration system. In contrast, British Columbia’s nonprofit Land Title and Survey Authority reinvested its revenues in its registration and mapping systems.
Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Toronto, Vancouver, and Victoria, Canada, in August and September 2016. The Omidyar Network funded the development of this case study. Case published January 2017.
In 2001, registering or transferring land in Jamaica was an uphill battle. Four separate departments handled different aspects of land administration, leading to weak coordination and delay. Even straightforward transactions dragged on for weeks, simply getting information was a struggle, and fraud was commonplace. In April of that year, Jamaica established the National Land Agency, charged with merging the four departments, speeding up services, and improving their quality. As the new agency’s CEO, Elizabeth Stair led a team of managers that had to oversee the consolidation, design systems to prevent fraud, improve performance, and implement new procedures and technologies to increase speed and transparency. During its first decade and a half of operation, the National Land Agency significantly reduced processing times and won acclaim for its customer service and innovative use of technology. Despite these successes, there was still room to improve land tenure security. Stiff documentation requirements, high costs, and limited awareness of the process meant that registration and related services remained out of reach for many Jamaicans.
Lessons Learned
Advantages of functional consolidation. Merging four divisions into a single semi-autonomous agency allowed the government to streamline service delivery, standardize procedures, and reduce processing times.
Overcoming resistance and curbing graft. A strong, unified management team and a consistent message helped answer internal opposition and external critics of the transition. Staff retraining, individualized targets for performance tied to financial incentives, and new procedures and technologies helped establish a new operational culture.
Additional barriers remain. Despite the agency’s successes, Jamaica’s overall experience also demonstrates the range of additional barriers to land registration, including stiff documentation requirements, high costs in the form of fees and taxes, and limited awareness of the requirements, that can prevent many property owners from formalizing their claims.
Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kingston, Jamaica, in June 2016. The Omidyar Network funded the development of this case study. Case published January 2017.
In 2007, Senegal opened a Business Creation Support Office that vastly reduced the time required to register a business from two months to 48 hours. Before the creation of the office, foreign investors as well as local entrepreneurs had to deal with six different government agencies, each of which had its own requirements and procedures. The onerous undertaking discouraged business investment, kept significant revenue sources off government tax rolls, and created fertile ground for corruption. In 2006, President Abdoulaye Wade decided to change the situation. Wade assigned the Agency for Investment Promotion and Major Works, or APIX, the task of making it possible to register a business in just two days. A small team from the agency examined the options and decided that a one-stop shop would best meet Senegal’s needs. The model required no legislative changes, and it allowed agencies to retain control over their procedures—while reducing red tape and letting APIX supervise the entire process. APIX leaders worked hard to win the cooperation of institutions and individual agents, and the Business Creation Support Office opened in downtown Dakar in November 2007. The institutions involved in registration sent representatives to work in the office, and APIX staff collected applications, supervised the office, and coordinated gradual improvements in procedures. After the office opened, entrepreneurs could complete the registration process at a single location and be done within 48 hours. By 2016, the office had further reduced the time required to a single day.
MayaGainer, ISS Research Specialist, and Stefanie Chan and Laura Skoet of Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Dakar, Senegal, and Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in January 2016. This case study was funded by the French Development Agency. Case published May 2016.
A complex paper-based city tax collection system made Rio de Janeiro a difficult environment for business and a source of lost revenue when Eduardo Paes became mayor in 2009. Elected on a promise to set the city’s fiscal house in order, Paes planned to implement an electronic invoicing system based on similar programs piloted in other Brazilian cities. A recent constitutional amendment required all levels of Brazil’s federal system of government to ease the burdens of the country’s tax system. Paes reasoned that the potential efficiency gain from a new system was among the few routes available for increasing revenue. His team had to overcome significant challenges to implement the new system and ensure participation by consumers in monitoring tax payments. Strong political and technical leadership, collaboration, and good design helped to successfully implement the new system, called Nota Carioca. This case study offers other governments at the national or subnational levels useful lessons in improving revenue administration and implementing reforms that feature information technology, stakeholder communication, and partnerships.
Neil Fowler drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in March 2014. The case was prepared by ISS in partnership with the World Bank as part of the Bank’s Science of Delivery initiative. Case published July 2014.
