Muhammad A.S. Hikam describes constitutional and governance reforms and efforts to build a civil society in Indonesia since 1998. A member of the Hanura (People’s Conscience) political party, a former member of the Indonesian Parliament, and a former state minister for research and technology, he explains that prior to Indonesia’s financial crisis in 1988 and the collapse of the Suharto government, civil society in Indonesia was “corporatist”; that is, that except for the Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars Awakening) Party, all civil society organizations and political parties were controlled by the state. In 1998, it was recognized that a strengthened civil society was the only avenue to challenge the overwhelming power of the state. The result was a flowering of as many as 100,000 civil society organizations and 38 political parties. However, nearly all came into being without the capacity or understanding to pursue their roles effectively. Many were based on ethnic or identity interests and did not know how to relate to the political life of the country. The challenge was to train civil and political society to find synergies between interests and needs. Without that, governmental reform has been, and will continue to be, a patchwork, he says. He discusses the successes and shortcomings of reforms in four principal areas: changing the constitution to reduce state domination, opening the political process to opposition parties, removing the military from politics and placing civilian control over the police and armed forces, and decentralizing government and ceding some autonomy to the regions. These efforts have proceeded without regard for capacity building, he says. As a result, poorer regions simply establish regional governments funded by the central government without developing their own capabilities. Hikam stresses that economic development is essential if regional autonomy is to work.    

Babatunde Fashola describes an overhaul of the tax collection system in Lagos that successfully increased revenue for the state and indirectly financed various other reforms.  He secured public support for the overhaul after revealing the corruption in the previous tax agency through an orchestrated, public sting operation, which revealed that corrupt officials sold fraudulent tax documents on the street. He replaced the old tax agency with a smaller internal revenue service staffed by no-contract employees governed by performance incentives rather than state civil-service workers. The new service better enforced existing tax requirements and expanded the taxpayer base by introducing a simplified, single-page tax form for informal businesses.  

Case Study:  Remaking a Neglected Megacity: A Civic Transformation in Lagos State, 1999-2012

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, describes his role as a political party leader in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. As leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in apartheid South Africa, he opposed creation of his home region as an independent “homeland.” His goal was to attempt reform from within by remaining within the Union of South Africa. He opposed the imposition of sanctions by the international community and the armed struggle espoused by the African National Congress. He and his party at first refused to take part in elections after the apartheid regime relinquished power, but then agreed to participate in the elections, in government, and in drafting the constitution. He was and remains a staunch advocate of a federal system of government with significant provincial autonomy. He describes his reasons, and provides examples of actions he took as a leader in Kwazulu-Natal.    

Case Study:  Managing Spoilers at the Bargaining Table: Inkatha and the Talks to End Apartheid, 1990-1994

Juwono Sudarsono reflects on lessons learned from nation building and governance reform in Indonesia. He states that when he was named minister of defense in 2004 by the president, his instructions were to neutralize the political role of the military and its dominance of the government, to require the military to support national democratization, and to scrutinize the defense acquisition process in order to reduce corruption. He found it was not difficult to convince the military to withdraw from the political process, because the military had come to see its political role as a liability jeopardizing its credibility with the population. The police were removed from military control and placed under separate civilian control. Military-operated businesses were either eliminated or placed under control of a new agency. He says it was more difficult to reduce the number of police-operated businesses because the salaries of members of the police were low, so they inevitably seek ways to make the additional income they needed. He says that corruption cannot be eliminated, but it can be reduced step by step. He describes initiatives to reduce bribes and kickbacks in the defense acquisition process. He points out that the government was starved for revenue because $25 billion a year was being lost to illegal smuggling and organized crime. To advance the process of democratization, the military began to provide training and technical assistance to help build the capacities for democracy and development in other sectors of society. He points out that while there were individuals capable of assuming top positions, the country was very short of capabilities at the second and third levels. The military helped to train accountants, managers, specialized lawyers and other specialists at these levels, particularly in the marginal regions. He believes that while merit systems are essential to build the competence of the civil services, affirmative action needs to be taken to help marginalized people feel that they are part of the national society. This means that merit sometimes should not be the only standard taken into account. Democratization and development depend upon building up a trained middle class, he says.