When Gerson Martínez became head of El Salvador’s Ministry of Public Works in 2009, the organization was notorious for corruption that contributed to poor-quality construction, unfinished projects, and frequent lawsuits. Working with a prominent nongovernmental organization (NGO) and industry representatives, Martínez introduced integrity pacts as monitoring mechanisms intended to prevent corruption. The agreements publicly committed officials and companies to reject bribery, collusion, and other corrupt practices and enabled NGOs to monitor bidding and construction. Although limited capacity and resistance from some midlevel ministry staff hindered the monitors’ work, integrity pacts focused the attention of both the government and the public on problems in major public works projects; and participants said the pacts helped deter corruption in those they covered. In 2012, integrity pacts became part of El Salvador’s Open Government Partnership action plan, in implicit recognition of the tool’s contribution to reform. As of August 2015, the ministry had signed 31 integrity pacts involving five projects worth a combined US$62 million. Although sustaining the initiative proved a challenge, integrity pacts served as a foundation for increased collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector—and as a first step toward a new institutional culture at the Ministry of Public Works.

Maya Gainer drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in San Salvador in July 2015. Case published in October, 2015. This case study was funded by the Open Government Partnership.

In 2003, the bloodless Rose Revolution ushered in an era of unprecedented reform in the Republic of Georgia.  Widespread dissatisfaction with the undemocratic and corrupt post-Soviet regime culminated in the 2004 election of Mikheil Saakashvili as president.  Riding a wave of popular support and eager to act before the political winds shifted, Saakashvili immediately targeted the corrupt police service, seen by many Georgians as the epitome of state dysfunction.  By the end of 2006, his administration had abolished a KGB-style security ministry and its related police unit, dismissed every member of the country's uniformed police and created a new police force from scratch.  By 2009, it was clear that the reformers' strategy-capitalize on public support, think boldly, act quickly and fix mistakes as they arise had produced significant progress.

Matthew Devlin drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in the Republic of Georgia during May 2009. Case published May 2010.

Associated Interview(s):  Batu Kutelia, Ekaterine Tkeshelashvili

In the wake of Georgia’s “Rose Revolution,” Jaba Ebanoidze took charge of the inefficient Public Registry. Housed within the Ministry of Justice, the registry held information about land, property rights and titling. Work procedures within the registry were overly bureaucratic and facilitated corruption by requiring multiple stages for application processes. The reform of the agency was part of the government’s wider economic program, which sought to open the country to private investment. A well-functioning registry was a key requirement for attracting foreign investors and allowing citizens to borrow easily against the capital in their homes. By rolling out information-technology systems and emphasizing monitoring and transparency, Ebanoidze achieved reductions in both processing times and corruption.

Andrew Schalkwyk drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia, in May 2009. 

Associated Interview(s):  Jaba Ebanoidze

Following the peaceful Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili and State Minister for Reform Coordination Kakha Bendukidze sought to overhaul the country’s Soviet-style bureaucracy, which had become the target of public anger. Borrowing ideas from libertarian, free-market think tanks and the New Public Management model, Bendukidze recruited a staff, eliminated redundant functions in the executive arm of government, consolidated ministries and slashed the size of the civil service. Bendukidze’s vision of limited government complemented Saakashvili’s goal of eliminating corruption by reducing opportunities for bribe taking. Although Bendukidze was instrumental in developing many of the reform policies, his office left the implementation of reforms to individual ministries. This case chronicles the steps that the Georgian government took to reorganize and consolidate its operations, capitalizing on public support in order to make rapid and bold changes.