In July 2005, Joko Widodo, the first directly elected mayor of Surakarta, faced the daunting job of revitalizing an Indonesian city whose history of violence had earned it the label sumbu pendek in the official Bahasa language—city with a “short fuse.” Seven years earlier, riots had shaken Surakarta, known as Solo, as mobs razed several neighborhoods, destroying homes and businesses. In 2002, Solo made international news again when officials uncovered terror networks in the city. Poorly functioning government services, high unemployment and weak economic growth weighed on the half million residents. With the help of Vice Mayor F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo, the mayor took a series of steps to turn Solo around. Known by his nickname Jokowi, he built alliances with businesses, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations representing the poor. Initially he relocated thousands of street vendors to relieve traffic congestion and created a one-stop shop for business licenses and other services. He also expanded facilities at new vendor locations, improved conditions in slums and upgraded health services. Jokowi then worked to boost tourism and strengthen the economy by reviving Solo’s image as a regional center for arts and culture, both to its own citizens and the outside world. While economic growth bolstered the city’s revenue base, Jokowi reorganized parts of the government to promote efficiency and opened the budget process to greater public scrutiny. In 2010, he and Rudyatmo were re-elected with 90.9% of the vote. This case study recounts their reform efforts between 2005 and 2011.

Leaders of anti-corruption agencies frequently encounter opposition from powerful beneficiaries of existing corruption. Those antagonists often seek to neutralize the agencies by weakening the agencies’ credibility, legal power, or operations. Drawing from ISS interviews and case studies, this cross-cutting report explores responses to this strategic challenge by agencies in eight countries (Botswana, Croatia, Ghana, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Slovenia). The leaders and staff of those agencies worked to overcome opposition by recruiting allies, instituting internal controls to bolster transparency and accountability, pursuing low-visibility preventive efforts, and carefully assessing the pros and cons of high-level investigations. The outcomes of their efforts point to conditions that shape effectiveness and suggest possible workarounds or alternative approaches for anti-corruption agencies in adverse circumstances.