Muhammad A.S. Hikam describes constitutional and governance reforms and efforts to build a civil society in Indonesia since 1998. A member of the Hanura (People’s Conscience) political party, a former member of the Indonesian Parliament, and a former state minister for research and technology, he explains that prior to Indonesia’s financial crisis in 1988 and the collapse of the Suharto government, civil society in Indonesia was “corporatist”; that is, that except for the Nahdlatul Ulama (Islamic Scholars Awakening) Party, all civil society organizations and political parties were controlled by the state. In 1998, it was recognized that a strengthened civil society was the only avenue to challenge the overwhelming power of the state. The result was a flowering of as many as 100,000 civil society organizations and 38 political parties. However, nearly all came into being without the capacity or understanding to pursue their roles effectively. Many were based on ethnic or identity interests and did not know how to relate to the political life of the country. The challenge was to train civil and political society to find synergies between interests and needs. Without that, governmental reform has been, and will continue to be, a patchwork, he says. He discusses the successes and shortcomings of reforms in four principal areas: changing the constitution to reduce state domination, opening the political process to opposition parties, removing the military from politics and placing civilian control over the police and armed forces, and decentralizing government and ceding some autonomy to the regions. These efforts have proceeded without regard for capacity building, he says. As a result, poorer regions simply establish regional governments funded by the central government without developing their own capabilities. Hikam stresses that economic development is essential if regional autonomy is to work.    

Juwono Sudarsono reflects on lessons learned from nation building and governance reform in Indonesia. He states that when he was named minister of defense in 2004 by the president, his instructions were to neutralize the political role of the military and its dominance of the government, to require the military to support national democratization, and to scrutinize the defense acquisition process in order to reduce corruption. He found it was not difficult to convince the military to withdraw from the political process, because the military had come to see its political role as a liability jeopardizing its credibility with the population. The police were removed from military control and placed under separate civilian control. Military-operated businesses were either eliminated or placed under control of a new agency. He says it was more difficult to reduce the number of police-operated businesses because the salaries of members of the police were low, so they inevitably seek ways to make the additional income they needed. He says that corruption cannot be eliminated, but it can be reduced step by step. He describes initiatives to reduce bribes and kickbacks in the defense acquisition process. He points out that the government was starved for revenue because $25 billion a year was being lost to illegal smuggling and organized crime. To advance the process of democratization, the military began to provide training and technical assistance to help build the capacities for democracy and development in other sectors of society. He points out that while there were individuals capable of assuming top positions, the country was very short of capabilities at the second and third levels. The military helped to train accountants, managers, specialized lawyers and other specialists at these levels, particularly in the marginal regions. He believes that while merit systems are essential to build the competence of the civil services, affirmative action needs to be taken to help marginalized people feel that they are part of the national society. This means that merit sometimes should not be the only standard taken into account. Democratization and development depend upon building up a trained middle class, he says.

Emil Salim describes lessons learned from his long career in Indonesia’s government. He describes his efforts to institute procedures to set priorities for budgeting and implementation, to build capacity, to educate leaders (particularly from the military) about economics, to reform civil service, and to facilitate interministerial communications. He defines major challenges he faced in creating communications and systems of local governance for a nation of over 17,000 islands. He gives his views on the transition from a centrally planned economy dominated by the military to an increasingly market-driven, more democratic country and reports on his efforts to enhance civil society. He offers suggestions about how to combat loyalty to agency rather than loyalty to government and the nation.

Case Study:  Against the Odds: Attempting Reform in Suharto's Indonesia, 1967-1998

Adan Yusuf Abokor discusses the relationship between civil society and the Somali National Movement during and directly following the Somali Civil War. He also focuses on Somaliland’s transition period from SNM government to civilian government. Finally, Abokor explains the successes and challenges of Somaliland’s elections and the formation of the multiparty system, with a focus on the role of civil society.    

Case Studies:  Navigating a Broken Transition to Civilian Rule: Somaliland, 1991-2001 and Nurturing Democracy in the Horn of Africa: Somaliland's First Elections, 2002-2005