When partisan conflict tore apart the Palestinian Authority in June 2007, economist Salam Fayyad suddenly found himself in the role of prime minister—responsible for security, for basic service delivery, and for recharting Palestine’s path to statehood. Few wanted to serve in the emergency cabinet the president had asked him to form, so great seemed the risk of failure. The cabinet faced competing claims to legitimacy from Hamas, which headed the unity government that had just collapsed. The Basic Law, the territories’ constitution, included specific provisions that both provided clear guidance on how to move forward under the unforeseen conditions and contained enough ambiguity that allowed government legitimacy to be politically contested. As the internationally recognized prime minister, Fayyad persuaded a diverse group of independents and technocrats to accept ministerial posts in the emergency government. To support decision-making and implementation at the center of government, he tasked a close adviser with setting up a prime minister’s office; strengthened the role of the cabinet secretariat; established systems for paying civil servants, including those in Gaza, where his predecessor, Ismail Haniyeh, continued to assert authority; worked with international partners to help meet basic citizen needs in the territory the government could not easily reach; and strengthened communications and transparency. Those steps enabled the cabinet to work more effectively and helped support urgent efforts to restore order, expand economic opportunities, and, ultimately, embark on a more ambitious political agenda toward independent Palestinian statehood.

Henrietta Toivanen, Jennifer Widner, and Gordon LaForge drafted this case study based on interviews conducted by Tristan Dreisbach in Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July 2019 and by Dreisbach and others in additional locations during 2019 and 2020. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published April 2024.

In April 1994, after a decades-long struggle for democracy and more than three years of arduous peace negotiations, Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress formed a power-sharing government with its rivals: the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party. It was vital to overcome lingering distrust between the three groups, which had been locked in a violent conflict. Based on the outcome of an election and in accordance with an interim constitution adopted the year before, political leaders apportioned cabinet posts and appointed ministers from all three parties to the new government. They then tried to design practices conducive to governing well, and they introduced innovations that became models for other countries. When policy disputes arose, they set up ad hoc committees to find common ground, or they sought venues outside the cabinet to adjudicate the disagreements. Despite the National Party’s withdrawal from the power-sharing cabinet in mid 1996, South Africa’s Government of National Unity oversaw the creation of a historic new constitution, restructured the country’s legal system and public service, and implemented a raft of social programs aimed at undoing the injustices of apartheid.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Cape Town and Johannesburg, South Africa, in September and October 2016. Case published December 2016. 

This series highlights the governance challenges inherent in power sharing arrangements, profiles adaptations that eased these challenges, and offers ideas about adaptations.

The United States Institute of Peace funded the development of this case study.

In August 2013, two and a half years after a citizen uprising ousted a long-ruling dictator, Tunisia was at a tipping point. Following the assassination of a secularist politician—the second such killing that year—opposition parties demanded the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly and the resignation of the interim government, a coalition led by the Islamist Ennahda party. Work on a new constitution stopped amid dueling street protests between the two blocs. In October, four civil society organizations intervened and mediated political talks between the two sides. Under the terms of the resulting deal, the assembly agreed to resume its work and to appoint a new prime minister to run the government. They chose a compromise candidate, Mehdi Jomaa, an incumbent minister of industry with proven managerial experience and no known political allegiances. Jomaa and his cabinet of businesspeople, civil servants, professors, and judges led the country to peaceful, credible elections in October 2014. His government walked a narrow line as it tried to lead government operations without an electoral mandate and to bridge the interests of the civil society mediators, Ennahda, and the secular parties. By the time he left power, Jomaa was one of the country’s most popular leaders, and in 2015 the civil society leaders who had mediated the political talks won the Nobel Peace Prize for their role in crafting Tunisia’s distinctive effort to navigate tensions and avoid political violence.

Robert Joyce drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Tunis, Tunisia, in February 2016. Case published in March 2016.

Following Kenya’s disputed 2007 presidential election, fighting broke out between supporters of incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. Triggered by the announcement that Kibaki had retained the presidency, the violence ultimately claimed more than 1,200 lives and displaced 350,000 people. A February 2008 power-sharing agreement between the two leaders helped restore order, but finding a way to govern together in a new unity cabinet posed a daunting challenge. Under the terms negotiated, the country would have both a president and a prime minister until either the dissolution of parliament, a formal withdrawal by either party from the agreement, or the passage of a referendum on a new constitution. The agreement further stipulated that each party would have half the ministerial portfolios. Leaders from the cabinet secretariat and the new prime minister’s office worked to forge policy consensus, coordinate, and encourage ministries to focus on implementation. The leaders introduced a new interagency committee system, teamed ministers of one party with deputy ministers from the other, clarified practices for preparing policy documents, and introduced performance contracts. Independent monitoring, an internationally mediated dialogue to help resolve disputes, and avenues for back- channel communication encouraged compromise between the two sides and eased tensions when discord threatened to derail the work of the executive. Despite the odds firmly stacked against it, Kenya’s Grand Coalition cabinet was largely able to govern according to a unified policy agenda. As a result, the coalition managed to implement some of the important reforms stipulated under the power-sharing deal, including the adoption of a new constitution. However, the level of political corruption remained high.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case based on interviews conducted in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2015. Case published March 2016.

This series highlights the governance challenges inherent in power sharing arrangements, profiles adaptations that eased these challenges, and offers ideas about adaptations.

In early 2013, six years after the end of a devastating civil war that claimed 17,000 lives and displaced an estimated 100,000 people, the Himalayan nation of Nepal faced the prospect of renewed violence. A 2006 peace accord between an insurgent Maoist political movement and traditional political parties called for ending Nepal’s 239-year-old monarchy and creating a new democratic system. But disputes over power sharing led to the failure of four successive coalition governments and slowed the effort to negotiate and enact a new constitution. In May 2012, the deadlock resulted in the dissolution of the elected legislature, which had also been serving as a constituent assembly. It was crucial to hold fresh elections. But when political parties were unable to agree on the formation of a coalition government for steering the country toward that goal, leaders of the four main political blocs, including the Maoists, agreed to set up a caretaker government under Khil Raj Regmi, the sitting chief justice of the Supreme Court and head of the country’s judiciary. Regmi and his team of technocratic ministers strengthened cabinet decision-making procedures, agreed on a shared governance agenda, and worked closely with both the election commission of Nepal and political parties to plan elections for a new constituent assembly. Despite concerns about having the same person in charge of both the executive and judicial branches at the same time, the caretaker cabinet succeeded in holding credible elections that put Nepal back on track toward a new constitution.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kathmandu, Nepal, in February 2016.

This series focuses on cabinet management in unity governments. It profiles challenges and offers ideas for improving effectiveness. The cases provide food for thought only. Most are mixed successes and present significant unresolved problems.