After the United Nations Convention against Corruption went into effect in 2005, pressure grew on private firms as well as governments to prevent their agents and employees—high officials as well as the rank and file—from offering or receiving money or other gifts as illicit inducements in the conduct of business. But in the years that followed, it became apparent that leaders were hard-pressed to identify and establish ways to address those problems. Drawing on his experience in the international construction sector, British lawyer Neill Stansbury recognized the need for operational standards that would enable organizations of all types to reduce or eliminate the structures and behaviors that contributed to bribery risk. In 2013, Stansbury and experts representing 37 countries and eight international organizations came together under the umbrella of the International Organization for Standardization to craft ISO 37001—the first international antibribery management system standard, which laid out specific policies and procedures firms and governments could use to identify and address vulnerabilities before problems occurred. Initially, adoption was slow for three main reasons: companies were focusing their attention on compliance with applicable national laws; introduction of the new standard would demand significant amounts of management time; and final certification would require costly review by an independent third party. A high-profile bribery scandal at one of the first certified companies also raised credibility concerns. As efforts to implement ISO 37001 continued, experience revealed both the advantages and the limitations of adhering to an international management standard to change inappropriate behaviors and create a level playing field in global commerce.

Tyler McBrien drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in April and May 2020. Case published July 2020.

This cross-cutting analysis draws on a series of case studies conducted by Innovations for Successful Societies under the auspices of a grant from the British Academy-Department for International Development Anti-Corruption Evidence Program. Published February 2018.

In 2010, Indonesia planning agency official Diani Sadiawati acquired a mandate to expand the government’s anticorruption measures. Sadiawati sought to bring the country in line with its obligations under the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The country’s powerful anticorruption agency already had a full agenda and there was plenty more to do. With support from top-level officials, especially reform-minded Vice President Boediono, Sadiawati and her colleagues focused on prevention of corruption. With help from the president’s delivery unit, they began to coordinate actions among a large number of government agencies, overcome resistance to reform, and develop a system for monitoring impact and tracking progress. By 2014, the agencies had met 88% of the targets they had committed to. Civil society observers said the program had not treated many of the root problems, however, thereby underscoring the need for further work. In 2017, new President Joko Widodo leant his support but asked for a number of changes as the program moved into its next phase.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Jakarta in May and June 2017. The British Academy-Department for International Development AntiCorruption Evidence (ACE) Program funded the development of this case study. Case published August 2017.

In 1993, Emile Short, a private practice lawyer, took on the challenging job of leading Ghana’s new Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice. Created by the 1992 constitution, the commission had a triple mandate: ombudsman, anti-corruption agency and human rights monitor. Short had to construct the organization from scratch and make it relevant in a political landscape dominated by the presidency. He had to execute a constitutionally broad mandate and develop a public reputation for independence, despite a limited resource base and no enforcement authority. The commission’s power lay in its evidence-based investigations and public hearings, which, combined with media and public support, helped to expose high-level corruption and mobilize social pressures for greater accountability. Short focused on building the commission’s credibility, developing public education programs and creating a network of anti-corruption civil society groups. Short asserted the commission’s independence early on, investigating allegations of corruption against sitting ministers in 1996. For the first time in Ghana, public investigations of incumbent politicians triggered ministerial resignations.

In the late 1990s, civil society reformer Harry Pozycki began a grassroots campaign to eliminate pay to play, a form of influence buying whereby businesses donated money to New Jersey political parties and candidates in exchange for favorable consideration in the awarding of government contracts. Pay to play had plagued state politics for decades and raised the cost of public services. Pozycki pushed for enactment of contracting regulations at the state and local levels that would bar companies making campaign contributions from being awarded New Jersey government contracts. Although civic groups did make steady progress in winning public support for reform, the state legislature failed to pass regulations because both political parties relied heavily on donations from contractors to fund their electoral campaigns. But in 2004, outgoing Governor James E. McGreevey implemented the regulations by executive order, and his successor, Richard J. Codey, carried forward that momentum, thereby enacting a state law that made the regulations permanent. The state and local pay-to-play reforms ultimately required very little administrative cost and avoided legal complications related to free speech by their regulation of state contracts rather than of campaign financing. By 2006, New Jersey had one of the strongest anti-pay-to-play laws in the United States, and several other states followed its model. Under two successive governors, New Jersey continued to consider the legislation and make changes to it through the end of 2012.