During Colombia’s 2016 peace agreement referendum and its 2018 election, misinformation and disinformation circulated widely. As the country’s 2019 elections approached, Dora Montero, president of Consejo de Redacción (Editorial Board)—an association that promoted investigative journalism and operated an online fact-checking program called ColombiaCheck—realized it was especially difficult to correct factual errors at the regional and local levels, and she was determined to do something about that problem. Montero and her group assembled a network of journalists who detected and countered false claims during the 2018 campaign. Montero’s team organized workshops on fact checking for local journalists; forged alliances with local and national radio, TV, and print media; and collaborated with universities and civic leaders to produce and distribute articles that presented the facts. During the 2019 campaign, the alliance, named RedCheq, produced 141 articles that clarified and corrected political statements, social media posts, photos, and videos. This case focuses on the challenges associated with improving the integrity of election-related information at the subnational level. This case is part of a series on combatting false information, including both misinformation (unintentional), disinformation (intentional), and fake news, one form of disinformation

Alexis Bernigaud drafted this case study based on interviews conducted with journalists and civic leaders in Colombia from January through May 2023. Case published July 2023.

When a wave of online misinformation jeopardized the integrity of primary elections in Colombia, Juan Carlos Galindo, who headed the country’s National Civil Registry, decided it was time to address this emerging threat to democracy. The registry, which worked with the National Electoral Council, would soon conduct the first local elections since the country’s 2016 peace agreements, and Galindo wanted to ensure that voters had correct information about the process, including the locations and open hours of polling stations. He asked his team to find appropriate ways to respond to misinformation, mindful of low public trust, frequent strategic use of disinformation by political parties, and limited resources to target voters at the local level. Building on the experience of the registry’s Mexican counterpart, head of international partnerships Arianna Espinosa led the design and implementation of a plan to deal with the problem. The team struck deals with social media platforms, independent fact checkers, and political parties to take part in the fight against false information and used an artificial-intelligence-powered platform to detect and respond to false news about the election process during the campaign. By election day, the team had refuted a total of 21 misleading claims and published 59 verified news items and videos on social media, but the limited reach of the publications and minimal engagement with some of the key stakeholders prevented the registry from having the impact it aimed for. After the election, the new head of the registry refocused on building more-transparent processes and providing accessible information for citizens about elections while curtailing some of the initiatives Espinosa had introduced. This case is part of a series on combatting false information, including both misinformation (unintentional), disinformation (intentional), and fake news, one form of disinformation.

Alexis Bernigaud drafted this case study based on interviews conducted with officials, journalists, and civic leaders in Colombia and Spain from January through May 2023. Case published July 2023.

After a hack-and-leak operation that targeted a candidate in its 2017 presidential election and a social media campaign against its exports in 2020, France’s government decided to take steps to protect its politics from foreign digital interference. With another national election approaching in April 2022, Lieutenant Colonel Marc-Antoine Brillant began designing a new unit that aimed to detect foreign information manipulation while preserving freedom of speech by separating responsibility for identification of attacks from responsibility for framing and executing a response. After the proposal cleared legal hurdles, Brillant’s team, under the authority of the Secretariat-General for National Defense and Security, set up an interagency governance system, initiated a dialogue with social media platforms, and monitored social media to detect hostile campaigns. During the 2022 campaign, the unit, called Viginum, identified five foreign interference attempts and referred them to other parts of government that could decide whether and how to react. The elections ran smoothly, and the Viginum team started to focus on building stronger public understanding of its mission and activities.  

Alexis Bernigaud drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in France from August through November 2022. Case published January 2023.

In 2017, Cape Town, South Africa, was on a countdown to disaster. An unprecedented and wholly unforeseen third consecutive year of drought threatened to cut off water to the city’s four million citizens. Faced with the prospect of running dangerously low on potable water, local officials raced against time to avert “Day Zero”—the date on which they would have to shut off drinking water to most businesses and homes in the city. Cape Town’s government responded effectively to the fast-worsening and potentially cataclysmic situation. Key to the effort was a broad, multipronged information campaign that overcame skepticism and enlisted the support of a socially and economically diverse citizenry as well as private companies. Combined with other measures such as improving data management and upgrading technology, the strategy averted disaster. By the time the drought eased in 2018, Capetonians had cut their water usage by nearly 60% from 2015 levels. With each resident using little more than 50 liters per day, Cape Town achieved one of the lowest per capita water consumption rates of any major city in the world. The success set a benchmark for cities around the world that confront the uncertainties of a shifting global climate.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Cape Town, South Africa, in November 2018. Case published February 2019.

In 2007, Salam Fayyad accepted the dual post of finance minister and prime minister in the Palestinian Authority (PA). The financial management practices he implemented during his first period as finance minister, from 2002 to 2004, had deteriorated. During the preceding two years, from November 2005 to March 2007, the government had resumed dealing largely in cash, had kept poor records of government financial transactions, and had added more employees to an already bloated public payroll. To reinstitute good practices and implement new reforms, Fayyad and his finance ministry colleagues also had to overcome challenges related to the division of the Palestinian territories into two separate areas governed by competing political parties. Fayyad relied heavily on a small group of trusted staff, delegated important responsibilities so he could also take on the demanding job of prime minister, and set clear guidelines to maximize the long-term benefits from any external technical assistance the ministry hired.  Under his guidance, the ministry rehabilitated financial records and quickly created a new financial information system by adapting existing, locally built software; reformed the way the PA used commercial bank accounts to conduct its financial transactions; and filled gaps in capacity.  

Tristan Dreisbach and staff drafted this case study based on multiple conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, during 2019, as well as other interviews conducted in Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, and Washington, D.C. the same year.  The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine in 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published June 2022.

When Salam Fayyad became finance minister of the Palestinian Authority in June 2002, the interim government was starved for cash and faced strong internal and external pressure for reform. To ensure the government could manage revenues and expenditures with fidelity, Fayyad had to improve the functioning and the professionalism of the ministry. He moved quickly to revise core procedures and change the organization’s culture. As he did so, he also began to transform the ministry from an organization based on personal allegiances into one based on institutional policies and standards. Success in that arena during the next three years depended on building coalitions to maintain support for reform as well as marshaling capacity within the ministry itself—by reshaping expectations, centralizing control, unifying geographically divided operations, and fostering talent.

Jennifer Widner and Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on multiple conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, during 2019, as well as other interviews conducted in the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July of the same year. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

“Could the Palestinian Authority survive?” That was the question on many Palestinians’ minds when Salam Fayyad became finance minister in June 2002 and the cash-strapped government was struggling to pay its civil servants and suppliers. To avert a collapse, Fayyad quickly took steps to increase government revenue. He developed a system that would direct into a single, centralized treasury account all taxes, fees, and other income collected by government offices. He created a fund that consolidated the Palestinian Authority’s tangled and largely opaque commercial and investment assets and contracted with an outside firm to conduct a full audit of those holdings. He also took action to reduce smuggling and assert control over the tobacco authority and petroleum commission—two autonomous PA agencies plagued with management problems. The reforms required Fayyad to navigate political resistance and an entrenched administrative culture wary of financial transparency. Fayyad’s achievements enhanced efficiency, helped restart the flow of tax revenues withheld by Israel, and enabled the PA to attract external support and investment, quashing—at least temporarily—an existential financial crisis.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on a series of interviews conducted with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, in 2019. The study also incorporates other interviews conducted in the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July 2019. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

When Salam Fayyad became finance minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in June 2002, the government was struggling to manage expenditures effectively and to deliver the budget to the legislative council on time. Success in addressing those problems required winning acceptance from President Yasser Arafat and other top officials for new work processes, securing other ministries’ compliance with changes in operations, and instituting radical new levels of transparency. Fayyad focused on fixing the system instead of investigating past malfeasance. Under his watch, the finance ministry began engaging with the council’s budget and finance committee, instituting monthly financial reporting, introducing reliable internal control and audit procedures, and adopting internationally recognized transparency measures. Those reforms enhanced the credibility of the authority’s financial management internationally, restarted the flow of external aid and PA revenues withheld by Israel, and helped temporarily end a financial crisis.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July 2019 and on a series of conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, the same year. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

The Russian state information influence attack against the 2016 US presidential election rattled authorities in Sweden. The Scandinavian country of 10 million was already a frequent target of Kremlin-sponsored disinformation. With a general election approaching in September 2018 and public apprehension about a possible influence attack high, officials at the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency began preparing measures to defend the credibility of the country’s electoral process. Rather than attempt to halt the creation and spread of disinformation, the agency aimed to build the resilience of institutions and society overall to withstand information influence activities. The agency trained thousands of civil servants, built and strengthened interagency coordination structures, coordinated with traditional and social media, raised public awareness, and monitored the digital information landscape. Despite a cyberattack on the Swedish Election Authority website that fanned claims of fraud and generated a flood of homegrown political disinformation, the election ran smoothly and the government doubled down on the resilience-building approach for protecting the 2022 election.

Gordon LaForge drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in October and November 2020. Case published December 2020. The Princeton University Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination supported the development of this case study.

After the United Nations Convention against Corruption went into effect in 2005, pressure grew on private firms as well as governments to prevent their agents and employees—high officials as well as the rank and file—from offering or receiving money or other gifts as illicit inducements in the conduct of business. But in the years that followed, it became apparent that leaders were hard-pressed to identify and establish ways to address those problems. Drawing on his experience in the international construction sector, British lawyer Neill Stansbury recognized the need for operational standards that would enable organizations of all types to reduce or eliminate the structures and behaviors that contributed to bribery risk. In 2013, Stansbury and experts representing 37 countries and eight international organizations came together under the umbrella of the International Organization for Standardization to craft ISO 37001—the first international antibribery management system standard, which laid out specific policies and procedures firms and governments could use to identify and address vulnerabilities before problems occurred. Initially, adoption was slow for three main reasons: companies were focusing their attention on compliance with applicable national laws; introduction of the new standard would demand significant amounts of management time; and final certification would require costly review by an independent third party. A high-profile bribery scandal at one of the first certified companies also raised credibility concerns. As efforts to implement ISO 37001 continued, experience revealed both the advantages and the limitations of adhering to an international management standard to change inappropriate behaviors and create a level playing field in global commerce.

Tyler McBrien drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in April and May 2020. Case published July 2020.