In 2017, Cape Town, South Africa, was on a countdown to disaster. An unprecedented and wholly unforeseen third consecutive year of drought threatened to cut off water to the city’s four million citizens. Faced with the prospect of running dangerously low on potable water, local officials raced against time to avert “Day Zero”—the date on which they would have to shut off drinking water to most businesses and homes in the city. Cape Town’s government responded effectively to the fast-worsening and potentially cataclysmic situation. Key to the effort was a broad, multipronged information campaign that overcame skepticism and enlisted the support of a socially and economically diverse citizenry as well as private companies. Combined with other measures such as improving data management and upgrading technology, the strategy averted disaster. By the time the drought eased in 2018, Capetonians had cut their water usage by nearly 60% from 2015 levels. With each resident using little more than 50 liters per day, Cape Town achieved one of the lowest per capita water consumption rates of any major city in the world. The success set a benchmark for cities around the world that confront the uncertainties of a shifting global climate.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Cape Town, South Africa, in November 2018. Case published February 2019.

In 2007, Salam Fayyad accepted the dual post of finance minister and prime minister in the Palestinian Authority (PA). The financial management practices he implemented during his first period as finance minister, from 2002 to 2004, had deteriorated. During the preceding two years, from November 2005 to March 2007, the government had resumed dealing largely in cash, had kept poor records of government financial transactions, and had added more employees to an already bloated public payroll. To reinstitute good practices and implement new reforms, Fayyad and his finance ministry colleagues also had to overcome challenges related to the division of the Palestinian territories into two separate areas governed by competing political parties. Fayyad relied heavily on a small group of trusted staff, delegated important responsibilities so he could also take on the demanding job of prime minister, and set clear guidelines to maximize the long-term benefits from any external technical assistance the ministry hired.  Under his guidance, the ministry rehabilitated financial records and quickly created a new financial information system by adapting existing, locally built software; reformed the way the PA used commercial bank accounts to conduct its financial transactions; and filled gaps in capacity.  

Tristan Dreisbach and staff drafted this case study based on multiple conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, during 2019, as well as other interviews conducted in Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, and Washington, D.C. the same year.  The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine in 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published June 2022.

When Salam Fayyad became finance minister of the Palestinian Authority in June 2002, the interim government was starved for cash and faced strong internal and external pressure for reform. To ensure the government could manage revenues and expenditures with fidelity, Fayyad had to improve the functioning and the professionalism of the ministry. He moved quickly to revise core procedures and change the organization’s culture. As he did so, he also began to transform the ministry from an organization based on personal allegiances into one based on institutional policies and standards. Success in that arena during the next three years depended on building coalitions to maintain support for reform as well as marshaling capacity within the ministry itself—by reshaping expectations, centralizing control, unifying geographically divided operations, and fostering talent.

Jennifer Widner and Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on multiple conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, during 2019, as well as other interviews conducted in the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July of the same year. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

“Could the Palestinian Authority survive?” That was the question on many Palestinians’ minds when Salam Fayyad became finance minister in June 2002 and the cash-strapped government was struggling to pay its civil servants and suppliers. To avert a collapse, Fayyad quickly took steps to increase government revenue. He developed a system that would direct into a single, centralized treasury account all taxes, fees, and other income collected by government offices. He created a fund that consolidated the Palestinian Authority’s tangled and largely opaque commercial and investment assets and contracted with an outside firm to conduct a full audit of those holdings. He also took action to reduce smuggling and assert control over the tobacco authority and petroleum commission—two autonomous PA agencies plagued with management problems. The reforms required Fayyad to navigate political resistance and an entrenched administrative culture wary of financial transparency. Fayyad’s achievements enhanced efficiency, helped restart the flow of tax revenues withheld by Israel, and enabled the PA to attract external support and investment, quashing—at least temporarily—an existential financial crisis.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on a series of interviews conducted with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, in 2019. The study also incorporates other interviews conducted in the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July 2019. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

When Salam Fayyad became finance minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in June 2002, the government was struggling to manage expenditures effectively and to deliver the budget to the legislative council on time. Success in addressing those problems required winning acceptance from President Yasser Arafat and other top officials for new work processes, securing other ministries’ compliance with changes in operations, and instituting radical new levels of transparency. Fayyad focused on fixing the system instead of investigating past malfeasance. Under his watch, the finance ministry began engaging with the council’s budget and finance committee, instituting monthly financial reporting, introducing reliable internal control and audit procedures, and adopting internationally recognized transparency measures. Those reforms enhanced the credibility of the authority’s financial management internationally, restarted the flow of external aid and PA revenues withheld by Israel, and helped temporarily end a financial crisis.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July 2019 and on a series of conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, the same year. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

When Salam Fayyad became the Palestinian Authority’s finance minister in June 2002, one of his biggest challenges was to improve financial management in the security sector. To pay police, emergency workers, and other security personnel, commanders handed out cash to subordinates—a practice that was demeaning and that created opportunities for corruption. Procurement of equipment and supplies was neither open nor competitive and took place outside scrutiny by the finance ministry, which had little or no way of knowing where the government’s money ended up. To address the problems, Fayyad, a political outsider, had to take on a deep-rooted culture of secrecy, the reluctance of a powerful president, and resistance from some of the security officials. He began to tighten controls by working with a reform-minded legislature to incorporate procedural changes into the 2003 budget law. He then identified security service chiefs who were open to payroll reform, and he helped them become early adopters. After more than a year of private persuasion, backed by growing public discontent with corruption, Fayyad was able to implement reforms that reduced opportunities to divert funds and that increased security workers’ take-home pay. He also put security forces’ procurement activities under finance ministry oversight, thereby further limiting the risk of corruption.

Tristan Dreisbach drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in the cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho in June and July 2019 and on a series of conversations with Salam Fayyad in Princeton, New Jersey, the same year. The case is part of a series on state building in Palestine, 2002–05 and 2007–11. Case published March 2022.

After the United Nations Convention against Corruption went into effect in 2005, pressure grew on private firms as well as governments to prevent their agents and employees—high officials as well as the rank and file—from offering or receiving money or other gifts as illicit inducements in the conduct of business. But in the years that followed, it became apparent that leaders were hard-pressed to identify and establish ways to address those problems. Drawing on his experience in the international construction sector, British lawyer Neill Stansbury recognized the need for operational standards that would enable organizations of all types to reduce or eliminate the structures and behaviors that contributed to bribery risk. In 2013, Stansbury and experts representing 37 countries and eight international organizations came together under the umbrella of the International Organization for Standardization to craft ISO 37001—the first international antibribery management system standard, which laid out specific policies and procedures firms and governments could use to identify and address vulnerabilities before problems occurred. Initially, adoption was slow for three main reasons: companies were focusing their attention on compliance with applicable national laws; introduction of the new standard would demand significant amounts of management time; and final certification would require costly review by an independent third party. A high-profile bribery scandal at one of the first certified companies also raised credibility concerns. As efforts to implement ISO 37001 continued, experience revealed both the advantages and the limitations of adhering to an international management standard to change inappropriate behaviors and create a level playing field in global commerce.

Tyler McBrien drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in April and May 2020. Case published July 2020.

When Troy Schulte took over as interim city manager of Kansas City, Missouri, in 2009, the local economy was struggling and the government faced hard choices about how to use scarce resources. With a slashed budget and a diminished workforce, Schulte had to figure out how to deliver city services without reducing quality. Together with a small team of employees, he began to create a culture of data-driven decision making in municipal offices, to invest selectively in technology, and to give nonprofit organizations and firms an opportunity to develop their own, innovative solutions to city problems by making more information available to them. Schulte found a kindred spirit in Mayor Sly James, who negotiated a public–private partnership with a view to developing what Kansas City’s chief innovation officer called “the smartest 54 blocks in the country” along the city’s new streetcar corridor. As initial efforts came to a close and a new mayor entered office, Schulte and other officials stepped back to assess what they had learned. The new, data-driven culture had yielded positive improvements, whereas the technology-based smart-city initiative had had a more limited impact—at least in the shorter term. The experience generated important lessons about the scale of the benefits that technology could generate in midsize cities and in what kind of time frame.

Tyler McBrien drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kansas City, Missouri, in January 2020. Case published March 2020.

After a decade of reforms to boost tax collection, in 2014 the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) faced up to one of its biggest remaining challenges. Although the agency had significantly improved its internal capacity—along with its ability to collect taxes from registered taxpayers—large numbers of Ugandans paid nothing because they were unregistered or because inadequate compliance monitoring enabled them to underpay. The holes in the system undermined public trust and bedeviled the URA’s efforts to meet the government-mandated target to raise tax revenue to 16% of gross domestic product. The URA then joined other government agencies to bring millions of unregistered citizens into the tax net, and it tightened the oversight of existing taxpayers who were paying less than their fair share. Prime targets were millions of Ugandans who worked in the informal economy, which the government said accounted for nearly half of the country’s economic activity. At the same time, the URA set up operations to go after wealthy and politically connected individuals who avoided paying their full tax load, and it created a separate unit to press government departments that failed to remit to the URA the taxes they collected, such as withholdings from employees. The URA’s program achieved strong gains on all three fronts and thereby helped increase the country’s tax-to-GDP ratio to 14.2% in the 2017–18 fiscal year from 11.3% in 2013–14. Just as important, the program made significant progress toward a fairer distribution of the tax burden for Ugandans across all economic levels.

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kampala, Uganda, in January and February 2019. Case published April 2019.

To view a short version of the case, please click here 

See related Uganda Revenue Case Study: Righting the Ship: Uganda Overhauls its Tax Agency, 2004-2014

In the early 2000s, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) faced a crisis. Even after adopting a modernized legal framework that made the agency semiautonomous—able to operate much as a business would, though still accountable to a public board—the institution remained paralyzed by corruption, outdated technologies and procedures, and a toxic organizational culture. In 2004, to begin righting the ship, the URA’s board appointed 43-year-old Allen Kagina, who had served the agency for more than a decade, as the new commissioner general. Kagina engineered a radical overhaul that required all 2,000 URA staff members to reapply for new positions under a revamped organizational structure. A new modernization office overhauled tax procedures, upgraded the URA’s technology, improved anticorruption measures, strengthened the tax investigation and prosecution function, and enhanced staff capacity. At the same time, the URA was working to smooth its customs procedures and improve cooperation with partner countries in the East African Community. 

Leon Schreiber drafted this case study based on interviews conducted in Kampala, Uganda, in January and February 2019. Case published April 2019.

To view a short version of the case, please click here

See related Uganda Revenue Authority Case Study: Bolstering Revenue, Building Fairness: Uganda Extends its Tax Reach, 2014-2018