An initiative of the National Academy of Public Administration, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University Oral History Program Series: Policing Interview no.: I-7 Interviewee: Samuel Harbor Interviewer: Arthur Boutellis Date of Interview: 9 May 2008 Location: Sierra Leone Innovations for Successful Societies, Bobst Center for Peace and Justice Princeton University, 83 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, New Jersey, 08544, USA www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties BOUTELLIS: Today is May 9, 2008 and I am now with Mr. Samuel Harbor who is Deputy Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Freetown, Sierra Leone. First thank you for your time. I'd like to start by asking you a little bit more about your personal background and the position you held before coming to UNDP in Sierra Leone. HARBOR: I have a Master's in Business Administration, trained in the United States of America. I returned back to Nigeria, worked in the banks. From the banks I worked in the stock market, the stock exchange. I left the stock exchange to join Ernst & Young consulting firm. From there I left in 1986 to join the United Nations. So I have been in the United Nations for about 22 years now. I started as a national officer in Nigeria and then went on to the international service. I've worked in Gambia, I've worked in East Timor. I've assisted countries like Ethiopia and then finally, about two years ago I came to Freetown. I'm in charge of the UNDP programs in Freetown, Sierra Leone and in that respect I'm in charge of designing the strategies, linking up with our partners and supporting most of the national development efforts. BOUTELLIS: So you're particularly interested in the police reform efforts. I was wondering if you could tell us some of the work of UNDP and the peacekeeping commission and how it relates to the work of police reform. HARBOR: As you are aware, Sierra Leone is a post-conflict country and having gone through ten years of bitter conflict the security forces were not spared from being partisan. Following the cessation of the conflict and the signing of the conflict and signing of the Lome Peace Accord in 2002, the emphasis of police reform became sine qua non for establishing an impartial, able and united police force that is able to meet the demands of the state. So from the demobilization of police people, the recruitment of new people, which was being organized by UNOMSIL (United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone) with UNPOL (United Nations Police), the UNDP has always provided support, good funding for the capacity building including the consultancies. We know that the police reform in Freetown has been led by the UK through the UK Police Advisory Team working in very close liaison with UNPOL. As you are aware, most of the UNPOL police advisers are here to provide purely advisory services, including training. Funding for most of these activities was to come from UNDP because UNOMSIL or UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) didn't have resources, or were not supposed to be operational or programmatic in nature. They were supposed to be advisory and provide technical expertise. So to be able to translate their advice to operational impact, they depended on UNDP in most instances to fund most of their programs. So it is a partnership that we have had with UNPOL to translate some of the gaps they have seen capacity-wise or reform-wise into action plans, into project activities in various areas of the Sierra Leone Police reform efforts. BOUTELLIS: Can you describe for us how the process of identifying priorities works in terms of working with the Sierra Leone Police and as you were saying with the peacekeeping machine before UNOMSIL and now the peace building machine, UNIOSIL? HARBOR: The major mandate for direct interaction with the Sierra Leone Police rests with UNPOL. UNPOL has many advisers who are working with them in various units. The women, the Family Support Unit, the traffic unit, in all the cadres- investigation, the anti-riot squad and all that. In engaging with them, they are doing capacity assessments. They are doing needs assessments. Those needs assessments include collaboration with the DFID (Department for International Development) UK advisory team too throughout various areas of need to be addressed. They would then design a program of action following the identification of such gaps with the technical support of these UNPOL advisers. Once these are designed, they would then seek funding support. The UNPOL will then come with the SLP authorities. As you know, UNDP resources are for the development of the country, they are not ours. Every program is a national program. Then they will come to interact with us with the national authority, be it the Office of the President or the Office of the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, who is really in charge of coordinating UN development activities in Sierra Leone and who will look at those priorities that have been identified and see if it is not being dealt with by any other partner and then we would design a program of action projects that would address that. Once we are agreeable to that, the UNDP will provide the funding through the UNPOL for addressing those challenges and those gaps. UNPOL will be responsible to us because they know what the technical inputs are, they ensure, they have oversight. In times of both the use of resources and accounting for the resources. They will come back to us with the SLP to report on the use of such resources. So that is our engagement. We'll sit with them when they come up with their program of action. Coming from our knowledge, general knowledge of development, we will sit with them to look at strategies, what are the best strategies, what are the best options? It is not that everything they bring in, we take because we also have a perspective as development practitioners to ask, "Will that bring the biggest impact?" We keep our focus on the outcome, the results that want to be achieved. But then there may be many strategies, many alternatives that achieve the same strategy. So we have a dialogue with them. Then once we come to a consensus on the best strategy to apply, then funding is provided. That's how we interact with them on this. BOUTELLIS: You mentioned working with UNIOSIL you identify the main gaps and challenges. Some of them are very short-term? HARBOR: Yes. BOUTELLIS: Some are longer term. HARBOR: Yes. BOUTELLIS: Can you give us some examples of these and maybe which one UNDP together with UNPOL and Sierra Leone Police decided to take on and what is the rationale? HARBOR: What happens is that once identified, these priorities are- like I said, the first filter is to look through what the UK is doing. Like I said, the UK is the lead partner here in terms of the police reform. We sit with them to ensure that there is no duplication with what the UK is doing. That's the first filter. So once they get to us with those kinds of activities, I give you two, three, or one. There is a major challenge here in terms of traffic control, monitoring compliance with traffic rules and traffic regulations including conducting traffic at very odd times. There is a police adviser on that who came in and after talking with the unit found where the gaps were, both in knowledge and in terms of equipment that they needed. So he then came with them, he had to talk with us and we agreed on a program of training and capacity building including a position of one or two traffic lights that can be used in major areas where they have found that there are bottlenecks and you needed to have more than just the manual or the manned control effort to be able to take care of traffic here. So that was delivered. We also had support for women. We were very, very interested in gender issues. So we provided two or three different supports for them to strengthen women's participation and women's rights. One of it is the procedures in terms of the rules of engagement between the male and the female officers. Some [Indecipherable] through the Assistant Inspector General in charge of training, Kadi Fakondo, the lady. They came to us and said for many years they've never revised the rule of engagement. There have been a lot of abuses of women officers, and they needed to come up with a Code of Conduct for the police officers. And so we helped them go through the process of looking through all the rules and procedures and the police that have been there, where are the gaps, drafting new ones, training people to understand what it is and then advocating it within the police force. Also, in terms of preparing them to engage in peacekeeping efforts. A lot of the women who are in the police force had no ability to drive vehicles and this is one of the requirements if you are going to go on a peacekeeping mission. As you are aware, one of the things the Sierra Leone Police says is that they do not only want to keep the peace here, they now want to engage with the international community to also provide service and they want to be involved in peacekeeping missions. But there are several requirements for selection. As you are aware there is a team, no matter where it comes from, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York headquarters to test them. One of the areas to test them on firing, another area tests their ability to drive. Most of these women were disadvantaged. So UNPOL identified that. They came to us and so we provided for them for specific training for female police officers to enable them to be able to drive, use vehicles, operational vehicles, to enable them to sharpen their skills in shooting. These are some of the things that we've also been able to do in that respect. So there are various other things we've done for them. More control, anti-riot control. We provided support for training of the local unit commanders and other people in how to handle big crowds and control them; crowd control mechanisms. We used also the funding we got from PBF (UN Peacebuilding Fund) to provide them with equipment for crowd control. While our resources were used initially to provide the training, we were able to complement that with the resources we got from the PBF to buy the equipment, anti-riot equipment. BOUTELLIS: Such as helmets and-. HARBOR: Helmets, the batons, the tear gas, the shotguns that they need, all the equipment including the dresses, the protective dresses that they need. All that, and the rubber bullets that they required through the PBF; that is one of the reasons that enabled them to be really ready, operationally ready for the elections and post elections we were able to hold forth despite the potential for crisis then. They were able to maintain themselves because they were really operationally ready and had both the logistics and the operational capacity to deal with that. So these are some of the reasons, and what we worked with them on. BOUTELLIS: You described some of the major training programs in traffic control, empowering the women and arguably the biggest was crowd control with over 2000 policemen trained. HARBOR: Yes. BOUTELLIS: Can you tell us what part of the support came from UNDP? Who were the trainers? How was the task of training divided? HARBOR: Trainers were mainly the UNPOL advisers. Fortunately the guy who was brought in as the adviser also was a Nigerian. He is no longer here. He worked with them to devise a program with the trainers group. They devised a program and we funded this program. That's the way it worked. Like I said, they came up with the strategies, we discussed that with them, we looked at ensuring that the strategies are sustainable and then they will implement them. So that's how it worked with all the programs. BOUTELLIS: The focus of UNDP is sustainability? HARBOR: Capacity building, and sustainability. BOUTELLIS: Capacity building and outcomes? HARBOR: Yes, sustainability of that. BOUTELLIS: How do you evaluate these things? HARBOR: You know if you look at impact, impacts are long-term things that you cannot measure immediately, but you can see what we call "process indicators." Part of the process indicators was how readily they reacted to situations that came during the elections, because this was training they got. We saw that they reacted. They were able to deal with situations that arose during and after the elections, so at least we can see the improvement in terms of that. Also the police officers themselves make a report at the end of the elections. I'm sure Rudy would have given you that. They did an assessment, how did the police perform. That showed what was their capacity, or what was their capability prior to that training and what is it and how did they engage. I think it showed a lot of progress. So that's how you can measure some of those things. Also, the respect that they now get because-when you talk to many people, how do they feel? Do they feel that their police are now more able to do with situations than they were before? So you can also get that from perception studies and talking with people. You should also be able to get a feeling of progress otherwise. BOUTELLIS: In terms of riot control, which seems to be one of the major achievements, do you have any specific examples where the new capability has been tested? HARBOR: Many, I think Rudy would give you a lot of them. In Kono and everywhere. You know about the mining sites and all the problems they've had in the various mining areas there. The attack on the various mining companies and how the police have reacted. There are many of them. Rudy will give you a lot of them where they've been able to really do it. During the elections when the youths scattered at various polling areas to disturb things in town, the police were able to provide support and all that. When there were clashes between the various party groups they were able to separate them in Makeni and Kono, in many places, there are a lot of them. BOUTELLIS: International-led trainings are often very expensive. Do you have one or two cost saving suggestions? HARBOR: These are not internationally led trainings because these police advisers are already here to provide advice through the UN. So what we have done is leverage their capacity. They didn't bring in people from outside, they used the police training school here and you leverage the software that was in these people's brain in areas in which they have worked in, to provide training. So that is the most cost-effective way. The donor country, they've done with already resources that were available to UNIOSIL so we didn't need to bring any additional experts from outside and that's how partnership works. You use both the UK police advisers, you use the UN police advisers and then you provide funding that is used for local capacity building here. So you tap into resources that already were made available so you don't have to repeat those resources. Otherwise, what we would have done was to look for a training institute, look for somebody to come from outside, but we didn't need that because Rudy and his people were already here for that purpose. All we did was provide funding to translate their ideas into actions. BOUTELLIS: So the trainers were already available. HARBOR: Yes. BOUTELLIS: What does the funding focus on? HARBOR: All kinds of facilities to have a training activity unit, to have space. You need to provide lodging for people coming from all the local areas to be there. You need to have materials for training. If you are doing crowd control then you need to have batons. Even if they are mock batons, you need to have a lot of things. These are practical things. So you need materials and input for those mock trainings to be really more like real to life. So those are costs that you have to provide for people. You need to make photocopies of material that they continue to read. You need to design curricula. You need many, many things. BOUTELLIS: Arguably there is still some way to go in the police reform and there are still many challenges, many gaps that are brought to your attention. How do you prioritize? Are there tasks that you think should come before others? HARBOR: Definitely. Definitely. Like any human endeavor, you must know that resources are not all there so you have to prioritize. Despite the myriad challenges you have to say what is most needed now and what can be done in the longer term. So the police have long-term capacity building strategy. So when you're looking to the long-term capacity building strategy, you say what is it that is most urgent now. If you look between last year and this year with the two elections going on, you clearly know what the priorities should be. The priorities would be making them ready to provide internal security, particularly for the elections and that's where we're concentrating. Then you can then look at what services they provide to the citizens that are most-for example, we are supposed to be dealing with small arms and light weapon control. We are working with the police to enable them to have a licensing bureau. That is one major area where we're doing work. We are the ones helping the police to establish the licensing bureau for small arms so that we can ensure that there is arms control here, that people will know that they have a database, that they have a system of licensing people and tracking people who are licensed to use guns. That is something that is not the most important in terms of what do you do, but it is something that is a capacity that they need both for now and for the future, so we are starting with that including training the field officers. We brought the equipment in for them, it has been installed. The officers are being trained on that. So that when the necessary legislation is in place they can operationalize the licensing bureau. So you prioritize, you look at the organization. I think the reform has come up with the organization has come up with the maximum number of people that the police should have. The recruitment is going on and as recruitment is going on training is required both for basic ability, for crowd control and other things. Then you're looking at immediate needs like supporting elections. One of the things that is happening is that over the years they have not had quite good logistical support; vehicles and other things. Most of their vehicles are getting old. So through our support, the support we got from the PBF and the basket, the election basket by the donors, we are helping them to refurbish their vehicles. The vehicles will be used by the National Electoral Commission to move materials and whatever, but it has a longer life than that period. So they will still have some of the vehicles on the road because the injection of assistance to repair those vehicles has provided them with longer-term logistical capacity to react to things. So the operational readiness has been assured through those injections. So we look at what is required now and what will be for the future. There are many more things that they will need. The SLP force for example, you're talking about more vehicles, a lot of motorcycles. Is that the most important need now? Can you afford that? So those are phased for the future. You continue to increase, in bits, those types of operational capacities but now is the capacity in terms of knowing how to police, engaging with their communities, being able to communicate effectively. We have also provided support for that. We are helping them with their communication strategy and engaging their various publics in [Indecipherable] communication unit. We are helping them with that. So these are some of the things. What are the immediate needs? BOUTELLIS: When you say assistance in repairing vehicles, is that both spare parts and training in maintenance? HARBOR: Yes. BOUTELLIS: Both? HARBOR: Yes, because that's also we are doing for them through the IMAT (International Military Advisory Team) here. We provide the funding to IMAT; the IMAT does all that for them. BOUTELLIS: So the British military trainers. HARBOR: Yes, they do that for them, but we provide the support, the funding through IMAT. We engage IMAT as [Indecipherable], also transparency in the use of resources to ensure that it goes really to achieve the repair of the vehicles; it's not just that we give funding and we assume the vehicles are repaired and they're not repaired. So they ensure that the vehicles are done by them, they send us an invoice, which we pay. So they provide these papers, it's not just the police. So we ensure that we get results for the resources that we put in there. BOUTELLIS: Some senior Sierra Leone Police argue that lots of training has been delivered by the UK inside and outside the country as well as UNPOL and that the really pressing needs are in terms of logistics, in barracks, vehicles and so on. Does UNDP have any restrictions in terms of the kind of equipment and vehicles and the amount that it can provide? You were mentioning for instance earlier, in terms of crowd control, that UNDP was financing things like rubber bullets and tear gas. Are these-? HARBOR: You're very right. Part of that we don't do. Any little weapon or semi-little weapon UNDP cannot procure directly. So what we did in this respect is to identify the vendors because we want to ensure that it is a competitive process, that the value for money is gotten. The government orders that directly. Since the Peacebuilding Fund had approved it, we supervised the process of getting it to ensure that there is value for money, that the right things are gotten and the specifications were done by the UK police and our UNPOL. We identified worldwide those who can provide them. They certified that these were the ones. The orders were placed by the government because we cannot place orders for those things, we are restricted from doing that. So they placed the orders. Once we knew that the materials had arrived, we gave the guarantee that if the materials arrived, we would then transfer the money that PBF has given us. So there are certain things we cannot do directly. For example, we will not get into construction because UNDP does not really get into construction of barracks and whatever else, but we can provide water. For example, we're engaging. We are trying to provide water for the three barracks in [Indecipherable] and some other places for both the barracks and the environment, to improve the welfare. But we cannot get into building barracks; that is not an area we are in, we are not engineers so we try to get away from that. So those kinds of things are not within what UNDP can do. We don't pretend that we do that and I'm sure other donors at EC (European Commission) are engaged in there, DFID (Department for International Development), African Development Bank and the World Bank. There are many other donors that are engaged in that. So while they provide the hardware, we do the software of capacity building, providing what is required for them to-. The senior police officers may be right, yes there has been a lot of training and there may be more training required. I don't think they have achieved the optimum capacities and competences that are required. Yes, they also want logistics. They have some; the question is, what is optimal. It's not just pumping them, what can they maintain, what can they sustain. The theme always is we want more, we want more. But this international assistance will stop somewhere and when it stops, are you able to maintain this life plan that you have? Are you able to buy these parts? You must look at what you are able to maintain. I think that is the argument that is going on both for logistics is the size. One place says, "We need a police force of 20,000," but are the national resources able to maintain that size of police force? I think those are the basis for determining what is needed now. Yes, they have motorcycles, they have some vehicles, but even the ones they have, it is a question of how well are they maintaining and can they sustain the maintenance outside donor resources, so those should be the questions. BOUTELLIS: What kinds of allies in the host country are essential for success? HARBOR: Partnership with all the donors working in the sector, with the national authorities because they must see that it is something that addresses their needs because otherwise, you can do all the best you can think of all the best and they can say, "Look, we don't think this addresses our needs." Then you have failed. So we must have national ownership of the process. It has to be nationally led. Then you have to have all partners working within a defined framework to say this is what we want to achieve and these are the targets. It has to be agreeable. So when you are monitoring whether you're making progress, is this what has already been agreed? So somebody says, "You are changing the goalpost, that's not what we thought was supposed to be efficiency, we thought efficiency was if I can get up in the morning and get to my office and go back." You say, "No, it is how many citizens you are able to protect and all that." So those have to be defined a priori. So partnership is very, very important both for funding, for ensuring that we don't have duplications, for ensuring that you mobilize both political-because sometimes you need to make some strong political decisions. So the partnership helps to ground it. So it is very, very key. BOUTELLIS: Are there underlying political, social or economic conditions that have made reform harder or easier in your current job? HARBOR: Yes there are things that have made it both good and bad. Good is the fact that they are coming from crisis and so the opportunity to start anew is there, that's what crisis does, everything breaks down so you can rebuild. You don't have to build on old systems and people will be less resistant to those kinds of changes. Unlike where structures are already there and everything you want to think of with one structure, someone says, "Oh no, no, no." So that is the opportunity that is there. The difficulty is that there are no resources, no national resources. So really, leadership from the nation in terms of sustaining what has been done has some question mark. The second thing is also the fact that you're having people who have come from diverse alliances or allegiances somewhere, working for RUF (Revolutionary United Front), working for whatever, whatever and they find themselves now, what you call strange bedfellows. So in that you have to rebuild confidence and trust within the police force. Thirdly, the poverty and the pay level, the endemic poverty and the pay level. One, it makes them susceptible to corruption to try to make up for their pay which is very little. Two, it also discourages them from giving their best sometimes. The incentives are not good enough. But given the context of what other people are earning it is tolerable, but also these are some of the challenges. How do you get a guy to give 100% when he knows that at the end of the day he goes to his family and is unable to put rice on the table and all that. It is difficult. So sometimes he starts cutting edges and he starts keeping work on the side, is doing things on the side or he gets corrupt because somebody tempts him with money because he doesn't get enough. So when somebody tempts him with money, which overwhelms him. Sometimes he can act contrary to the Code of Conduct you've trained him about and all the things that you've told him is the best way to go, he gives in professionally. So these are some of the challenges in here, opportunity is there. You have new people getting in, you have a new environment coming post conflict which means you can start afresh, you can build anew. It means you can introduce the most recent systems and processes without much resistance. But then the downside is funding, the fact that there is mistrust amongst them and all kinds of changes. Sometimes reform means that some people have to go. So there are some morale issues there. It is a mixed bag. BOUTELLIS: One of the drawbacks you mentioned is the lack of natural resources. As a side question, Sierra Leone actually is rich in minerals and so on. Is UNDP addressing some of the issues of management of natural resources? HARBOR: We are, like other partners. Every partner here is worried about the ability of the state to take care of its own responsibilities. As you are aware, the majority of the funds for development here come from budget support. Three or four partners are the ones providing that money. So it is not the best situation for the country. Yes we are worried, but we are also engaged with the government and other partners. For example take the-I'm not talking about the mining, mining is a major problem in terms of how that sector works, and what capacity you need to be able to monitor that sector to be able really to get your best. It has been a problem. Natural resources have been a source of a lot of the conflict everywhere. Here we're working with them. We've started a new [Indecipherable] system which is supposed to help them able to define the mine lords, maybe sell them out to prospective people, get their money ahead of the time to use for infrastructure rather than waiting because this issue of trying to get percentages, there are a lot of loopholes. You don't know what quantities persons are mining, how do you measure that. Taxes on them are 30%. It doesn't help. So it is better for you to sell off mine slots like they do with oil plots; auction them out, get large sums of money. Then let the person discover what they want, and take them for a number of years. BOUTELLIS: What they've done in Liberia. HARBOR: Yes, that's the way to go. So they're looking at it, we're helping them to come through that sort of system because that is what can give them the large sums of money they need to put into infrastructure and whatever else. The taxation concept has a lot of loopholes because the state doesn't have the capability to know what is mined, what is not mined. Some of them go through the borders. So what is declared is far from what probably is mined. Then you tax on that. You don't even have a way of valuing what is declared to know what is the value and then to put the tax on it. So there is a lot of-. We're working with them on that. We're also looking at other avenues, increasing their potential for agriculture here because this is close to Europe. There are certain things that Europe needs that if they do they have flights come in here from Brussels on BMI that can take you from here to Europe directly, and cheaply. These people are going without cargo. So we are asking them, you can explore those avenues. There are also the marine resources. A lot of people are coming to the coast and they're poaching all the good fishing there. There are a lot of marine resources but there is no control. People are just poaching the marine resources and going away. They have no capacity to monitor their coastal area. They cannot chase the superior vessels. They come in through the high seas, you see them, they're catching this and going away. This is large potential for resources. So we're helping them to develop those areas. Tourism, we're helping them to develop tourism. So we're working with them in various sectors. We're trying to create an environment for private sectors to come, for them to attract foreign direct investment too. We are working in diverse areas that can open up multiple channels of opportunity for the country to be able to improve its fiscal base and be able to deliver dividends to its people. BOUTELLIS: Coming back to police reform. Are there any innovations or experiments here in Sierra Leone that either you know about or programs that you have been directly involved with that you think merit more attention that we could learn from? HARBOR: I don't know of innovations yet because I think what we're doing now is basically trying to create the hope, the basic hope of what a police force should look like. One of it is community policing which they're trying to introduce, which is, I think that is the big thing now. Police is an affair of both the people and the police force itself. You cannot depend-there is no way you can have one policeman to one citizen. Once it is seen as a communal responsibility, then you can engage. I think they're experimenting on the community police system here, which is something that is innovative and many countries in Africa may not be practicing that. Some of them are starting it up. That is one innovative thing that is taking place; community policing concept. It is something that is really good and I believe can be shared with other countries. That is one thing. Also they are promoting some of their women into responsible positions; they're taking care of the women. That's another area that we can really talk about. BOUTELLIS: One last question if you'll allow me. Now turning to the United Nations and the donor countries and organizations. What are maybe some of the positive aspects you've noticed in terms of relationships with host country personnel and politics and also maybe some mistakes that may have happened or happen again and again. HARBOR: I'm not sure whether it is in the police reform but in the whole aspect of development and I think it is important that when development partners engage with the national body, the sovereign state or institutions that we must do that as supportive, not as leading. I think here, that in some areas when you talk to the nationals, I get the sense that sometimes they are frustrated and saying because they don't have resources and people are bringing large sums of resources, those people then tend to neglect or ignore them and do not allow them to take ownership. So we do things that are contrary to the Paris Declaration where we say it has to be nationally led development process. So that is one of the major challenges that we have. When we are engaging person-to-person, you must see yourself as advising somebody, and he is your leader. Rather than you being the leader and saying, "This is it, this is the way to go." Sometimes those errors have been made in terms of getting the buy-in, ensuring that this is something that they are committed to. Otherwise when you leave, they will just turn things around 360 degrees. They will say well, we did that because we were compelled, we had no option. So I think national ownership and national leadership sometimes have been a source of conflict. People have seen the parties who are supposed to be supporting them, not supporting them but leading both in ideas and in that and sometimes you find resentment and you find conflicts taking place. So that is a major area that we all have to deal with through police reform or military reform. Also sometimes the presence overwhelms. Look at our staff and the IMAT. Sometimes people will feel that it is an overwhelming presence. In all the higher tiers of their hierarchy, so they feel that their sovereignty is compromised. But they may not say it. You just hear those little things, they may not say it out loud. They feel they are helpless in that situation. But that's the feeling you get sometimes when you talk to them and if they open up. BOUTELLIS: Do you have any final comment? HARBOR: No, I think the police reform has goon well. This is one area cited as very good initiative of police reform. The entire security sector reform has really gone well in this place. There is more to do, like we've talked about the challenges of having them with good barracks, good pay, improving logistic support. Those are challenges that remain, that still need to be talked about. That is why there are various opinions about some people will say it has been successful and there is not much to do and other people are saying no, there are still gaps that we need to address if we're going to ensure that whatever we've done now doesn't get eroded. If we have them not staying in good barracks that they're living in where they could be influenced by their neighbors and other things, then you can compromise their efficiency, their neutrality, bipartisanship and all that. So there is still some work to be done and I think we should focus, we should not think that we are out of the woods. We should focus on that, build on what successes we have had so far to ensure that when the development partners leave that the country is able to continue on the path of the good story that they have. They have a trained police force. If they can keep the number we're talking about and don't bloat it. If they can then improve the professionalism of some of them-there are still some that need to be out of that place, and then improve the level of literacy of the kinds of people who are coming in. That then can improve the overall efficiency and operations of the police force. BOUTELLIS: Well Sam Harbor, thank you very much. HARBOR: It is my pleasure. Innovations for Successful Societies Series: Policing Oral History Program Interview number: I-7 ______________________________________________________________________ 11 Use of this transcript is governed by ISS Terms of Use, available at www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties Use of this transcript is governed by ISS Terms of Use, available at www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties