



INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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MAKGETIA: My name is Itumeleng (Tumi) Makgetla, it is August 25th, 2009. I am in Calabar, Cross River State with Donald Duke, the former governor who is known widely as a reformer for his promotion of business development and creation of the Tinapa Business Resort, and also for his electrification programs, amongst others. Thank you for meeting with us today and participating in this set of interviews on reform leaders. Can we start off by your describing how you became governor, maybe by just giving us a brief overview of your career and the events that led to your participation in the reform efforts as governor of the state?

DUKE: *Tumi, I'm basically a social critic who decided I wouldn't be a bystander any longer and get into the field and walk the talk, as it were. My first foray into politics was in school. I was Social Secretary in the university. It was quite strange. You've got to understand the background in Nigeria. We have a predominantly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south, and I came from the south but I went to the school in the north.*

In those days we jealously guarded our turf. Ahmadu Bello University, the school I attended, was the premier university of the north. I mean, for the north, this is their school. You don't have southerners trying to direct the affairs of the institution. So it was a bold thing, but I think circumstances led me into it. I didn't join the university or get admitted wanting to immediately go into the union. It just evolved and some folks thought I should give it a shot. But this was, as a result of my views they thought I was—my views were different. I wouldn't say radical, because I'm not radical. I was politically very alert.

The next foray was an appointed one. We supported a young gentleman here in Cross River to be governor—his name is Clement Ebri. We felt it was time for a new set of ideas. I don't talk of generation in terms of age; I talk of generation in terms of ideas, to take over. We're trying to get over the prevailing mood, which was still evolving from military administrations. Clement felt that I would be a good addition to his cabinet, and appointed me Commissioner of Finance. It was really my first deep appreciation of Cross River State because hitherto, I'd lived virtually all my life in Lagos. I'd been schooled in the north, and I could hardly speak the local language. I had no friends here. So, I was really an alien at home.

All those views I had which were really theoretical at the time, I was able to get into an environment and see whether they could work or not, because as this talk of "you can't do this," "it wouldn't work," "it can work elsewhere but it won't work in Nigeria,"—why wouldn't it work in Nigeria? Being commissioner afforded me to understand and one thing I got out of it was, it wouldn't work because we don't want it to work—it goes against people's interests and so, people just put obstacles along the way.

The eighteen months in which I was Commissioner for Finance, Budget and Planning, that's what I got out. Of course, we were sacked not long after by the (Sani) Abacha regime. Then I was appointed a member of the National Economic Intelligence Committee and the Federal Economic Council, and that gave me a larger purview of Nigeria. For four years, I was a member of this committee and I saw first hand why Nigeria does not work. Again, I was able to espouse new views and expand on my theories on how things should be done.

Then in 1997, some friends and I got together in Lagos and we were just bantering on why we're not getting it right. This is an incredibly resourceful

country, but our true resources are numbers. We are 150 million or more. The land size is big, but not too big. Sometimes when you have huge landmass, development becomes a problem. We have, what I would think, is an ideal-sized country—great numbers, quite resourceful, brilliant people, but clearly the problem is leadership because it is leadership that puts all these factors together to make it work. There seems to have been an absence of that.

People who have come forward to lead are always treated with suspicion. It is those who do not want to lead that we feel they are safe hands, but ambition is seen as a taboo in these parts. So, we got talking about that and we decided, "Let's go back to our states and see if we can make a difference." On our own, we were all fairly successful young businessmen. I was about 35 or 36, then. We had some money, we were well-to-do, actually. We were in the prime of our lives. We said, "Guys if we don't do it now, when will we; if not us who?" We had the right pedigree; we were fortunate. We come from the elite class and I want to talk about that, too, the responsibilities of the elite. The failure of Nigeria is the failure of the elite class.

I said to these folks, "Let's go back home"—we weren't thinking of running for office; we were thinking of ensuring that the right people get into office. So we organized virtually a youth movement here in Cross River. We were going to retire the old folks; we used to call them the crazy bald heads. Some of us now are bald, so we don't use that term any longer. But we got together, organized and we won. It went on for about two years, but I was asked to run as governor.

Now because we planned to be in office, it wasn't just we had the ambitions—not for ourselves but for our state—we were able to sit down, and decide on what Cross River should be like. We did what businesses do. They take a SWOT analysis to identify your strengths and weaknesses. We did that for the state. How do we relate within the context of Nigeria? If Cross River were a nation, and there are nations that are smaller than Cross River—Equatorial Guinea is smaller than Cross River, Sao Tome is smaller than Cross River, and even the country of Togo in population is smaller than Cross River—if we were a country of our own in the context of our population and landmass, our geographical location, what would be our strategy for development? So, we did all that. That was '97.

We decided that one, our economy is not akin to the neighborhood. We're not big oil players. Two, maybe we shouldn't even try to play that turf—that may be our saving grace, not having oil. We identified other countries and places that have had similar situations, and similar locations where they are not the prime players in a predominant industry in the locality, but they've benefited from them. Dubai was a raging example at the time. Dubai has oil but it is not a major oil-exporting nation, but it created an environment where all the others came out there for their relaxation. Industry, or industrialized places, don't allow for relaxation. The tempo is always fast and upbeat, and from time to time you want to get out.

We also took Monte Carlo, a small country in Europe—not much, but there are a lot of rich, busy, upbeat countries around, Switzerland, France and all that. They created an environment for people to come to. I think the most interesting example was Las Vegas. I don't know if you know the story of Vegas. Vegas was started by this chap, I don't remember his name now, who convinced the mafia that he could get them a good deal—this is in the 19th century, there were prohibitions and bans, everything that people liked doing was wrong. So, you couldn't drink, you couldn't gamble, and of course you couldn't fool around.

America was in a very interesting period when they were rediscovering religion. All the vices were banned here. It was a challenge to the mafia.

He said, "I could get a place where all these vices are allowed. You can drink, you can smoke—you can do everything." So, he got to the governor of Nevada and said, "I want a strip." With the appropriate legislation this strip, like a sin city, was allowed. He got the mafia, and they invested. He told them, "In three years or so, you'll make back your money." That didn't happen, it never happens, and they killed him. That's how Nevada started. He didn't live to see what he started.

So, we looked at that. If we create an environment whereby these well-to-do states, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, that have all this money—Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome, we could create an environment where everyone comes in here for their leisure, right? And that's how we thought about tourism. When you talk of Nigeria, and you mention tourism, people look at you and say, "Are you crazy?" But we want to create an oasis in this area, in the Niger Delta.

Again, you've got to look at the temperament of the people you lead. I don't think my people are skewed towards heavy industry. We're very Caribbean. I tell folks that we like the sun and we like to dance, but that's true in a way. When you go on a tour of Calabar, if you know parts of Trinidad and the Caribbean, you'll see that it's very similar. So again, you have to understand the people you're leading. I said, "Look, let's do something that goes with the nature." Don't go against the nature, flow with them—people are different. That was difficult for people to understand, but we preached it over and over again.

Well, we won the elections, we put together a strategy, and we started. We developed the Obudu Cattle Ranch. I think it is one of the most beautiful resorts on the continent today. It's absolutely beautiful. It has the longest cable car in Africa, the second one—the first one is in South Africa, the Cape—but this is spectacular. It also has a canopy walkway. We developed our forest; we have the largest remnants of virgin rainforests in Nigeria, and we developed that. We have the second longest canopy walkway in the world out there; the longest is in Malaysia.

We supported nongovernment organizations in conservation. The most successful primate rehabilitation center in the world is also out there, called Pandrillus. We built cabins in the forest so that people could stay out there, young people particularly. So, that was our thrust.

Of course in Calabar and urban areas, we greened them up—we were planting trees. We had a target to plant 10 million trees annually. We didn't achieve that, but I think we did three or four million; we didn't have the resources to plant all those trees. You know when you plant these trees you lose about 50% of them, but you have to just keep on going. We did a lot of that. If you look at Calabar, it is a bit green. They're very young trees, and things grow very fast here because it is very wet.

But there was resistance. There's always resistance when you introduce something new, so you must be ready for it. The problem is, people are not ready for it and they either get discouraged or disillusioned, or they try to conform. We were not going to conform. I have this deep and abiding sense of history. I'm going to walk this path, but I'm going to be remembered that I walked this path.

I'm not the first man to be governor of Cross River and I won't be the last, but I want to be remembered.

So, I was ready for the opposition, the cynicism, and the smears, from folks who say, "Look at him, he's talking about tourism in Nigeria, people are looking for food to eat, and you're talking about tourism." But once we could get the people to connect—and interestingly, it's people who came from outside that appreciated it, not the folks who are in here. We cleaned up the city, we greened it, we lawned it. That indeed in itself, created a lot of jobs. But the elites—I said to you I wanted to talk about the elites—the elites did not appreciate that.

For them they're selfish, it will come to that. Right? But jobs were created. Then gradually, we introduced events that would bring people. We set up a tourism bureau. We had a tourism board but we restructured it, and called it a bureau. We got our folks to Jamaica, to the tourism institute in Jamaica for training. We sent them to the George Washington University in DC (District of Columbia) for training in events management. Then we started attracting events into Calabar—corporate board meetings, bank AGMs, and all sorts of events. Sometimes we subsidized the organizers just to attract them. We said, "Okay, if you're going to come we'll take care of your hotel bills," because they're ambassadors. They're going to go back and say Calabar is beautiful, it's nice, the people are friendly, and all that. We did that a couple of times, and it worked.

After a while, we just stopped doing it and folks started coming on their own. We organized tours to Obudu. We built an airstrip. We've got one of the best airlines in Nigeria, Aero, to ferry folks to Obudu and go up the cable car. Children loved it. There's an incredible water park in the bowels of the mountain there. It is very picturesque. I'm going to get you a few photographs to see that. So, all those things were put in place.

Folks just gradually started appreciating it. People who were traveling through, maybe going to Akwa Ibom state, said, "Hey, this is different." You made a similar comment when you came in. They liked it, and that grew. Then we had this Christmas festival and for a whole month we shut down the state. There was a lot of criticism about that. Folks said, "How can you shut down a whole state and frolic for a month?" Hey, we don't do anything at Christmas; people don't go to work at Christmas. The amount of truancy in the public service is amazing. The schools are on holidays, anyway. So, why don't we do this? Let's stop deceiving ourselves; shut down the state for Christmas.

You can take your vacation. So, everybody, except if you're on essential duties—everybody is on vacation for the month of December. Usually you have six weeks in a year. So, take four weeks for the month of December and any other two weeks in the course of the year. That way we're not deceiving ourselves. But, what does it do? It brings everybody out on the streets. It is a whole festive environment. We have bands from all over the world playing here night after night. All the big bands in the world have been to Calabar at one time or the other. The only guy we didn't get here, and we're not going to get him again, is Michael Jackson.

But we did that and it was fun. It is a 24-7 environment. It is alive. Hotels sprang up. The hospitality industry boomed, and is still booming. Crime crashed. The month of December is our lowest crime month. Everyone is great. So, that put Cross River and Calabar on the map. Of course a lot of people were going to the

ranch, going to the forest. It is also during the dry season, so it doesn't rain like now. It was fun and that brought us forward.

Is it easy? No. It's determination. Leadership must be determined. The word leadership, we must understand the word leadership connotes a lot of things. Sometimes you've got to get a sound bite to know what a word means. To lead, to be in leadership connotes vision; you know where you're going. It connotes determination; you're determined to get to where you're going. It connotes compassion, because not everyone sees where you're going. You've got to have understanding for those who don't, but leave them alone.

But, it is not resources or money that develops a people, it is your will. Otherwise, nations like Israel would have fizzled out. They're determined to be where they are and conquer the environment. When I go to Dubai, what I see is a determination of a leadership. Right? Conquer the challenges of the environment, and make the best out of it. Dubai is a desert. The biggest challenge today is having greened parts of this desert, but as a result, they have more rainfall. They built roads designed for deserts and so now, they have floods because there is no runoff. Just a little sprinkle and the place is flooded. But you can see the determination of that family to overcome their circumstances.

That's what is missing in the leadership that we have on this continent. They talk the talk, but they're not willing to walk it. It is never going to be smooth. If I go back to the Bible and I say look, God had willed the children of Israel to get to the promised land and achieve this and achieve that, yes, it is God's will, but it still wasn't easy. They had challenges—all sorts of things, and they died on the way. There is this joke in Israel, "What's so special about Moses, he roamed the desert for forty years and he didn't find Kuwait. He should have found Kuwait." I use that joke which is one of the first things I did when I became governor. I had a digital map of Cross River made. I said, "I want to know my environment."

I was criticized that, "Oh, he is going to funnel money, what does he want to do with a digital map, these are all these high-falluting projects that this guy has come up with so that they can send the money abroad." If I didn't do that project, I probably wouldn't have been able to give the state the infrastructure it has today. Because with the map, we could see the network of roads, we could do the interconnections, and we could plan. We could build the cable car because we had a picture of the terrain. We could identify the location of Tinapa.

But better still, when we were doing our census we were able to locate houses and homesteads and do the counting. For our urban tax, we were able to identify houses. For planning, it is absolutely invaluable.

MAKGETIA: Can we get into that because I'd like to maybe take some of the reforms you've discussed, some of the policies that you introduced for change, and to go through them and ask you how you were able to operationally make that a reality. But just before we get into the details of how you went about implementing the strategies, you've identified a host of things that you were engaged in—the Obudu Cattle Ranch resort, the tourism bureau that was set up. Is there anything you would add to that list of reforms?

DUKE: Oh yes.

MAKGETIA: Key achievements.

DUKE: *I have talked about a larger vision, about how I want Cross River to function economically in this environment. But how do you get there? The four things you must do to develop a society—I call it the S.H.I.T.* theory, because it is Skills, Health, Infrastructure and Technology.*

In developing tourism we had to ensure that we improved the educational system. We invested a lot in education. We built new schools, and we improved the existing ones. We reviewed the entire curriculum. Of course we introduced tourism as part of the curriculum. But you can't have tourism functioning properly in a largely illiterate society. We invested in skills acquisition because there are folks who were too old to go to the regular school, but nobody is too old to acquire a skill. That's why we called it skills and not education. So, it is skills.

We improved on our Medicare. Our policy was to ensure that we had a general hospital in every local government and a primary healthcare center in every ward. That ensures that we will have about 197 primary healthcare centers in Cross River and 18 general hospitals. There are three senatorial districts. One of each general hospital will be a referral institution.

Going back to schools, our policy was to ensure that no school would have more than thirty children in a class, three arms to a class, and of course, 540 children in a school.

MAKGETIA: Were those the metrics of your success, those were what you set out as goals? How did you determine—?

DUKE: *Yes. We know we're not going to achieve that overnight. We gave ourselves ten years to get there. Fortunately, we're still working towards that. More schools are being built. The current administration is also improving on the existing schools. Teachers needed to be trained. You can't give what you don't have. The problem with education in Nigeria is that the teaching cadre, the teaching class, has lost it. So, we exempted teachers from paying tax, but on the other hand, we also subjected them to examinations to ensure that they qualified to teach. Every two years you go for a requalifying exam. Two strikes and you're out. Not paying tax virtually doubled their salaries, but it also gave us a basis to now demand that you must be qualified to be a teacher. So, that was a measure.*

I think the first year we did the GCE examinations we had a 15% improvement. The second year it went up to about 47%, and it has been going up ever since. Before then, it was woeful. Students came out and could not construct a proper sentence in English. These students are going to go on, so, what goes into the university is also poor. You must start from the primary and give them the right background. We also encourage a lot of private investment in education.

During the military years, the private schools were taken over. We thought that was wrong. Education is one sector where all hands must be on deck. These folks put their hands on deck and they were chopped off. All the missionary schools, which were the better schools, were lost. It is part of the mentality of the military to have a unitary system, to have an egalitarian system they call it, where

* No expletive reference intended. Mr. Duke commonly refers to this theory to emphasize the importance of skills, health, infrastructure and technology in the context of state reform and development.

everybody is on the same block. Life is not like that. For those who cannot make it, let's have a basic level that everyone has to obtain in society.

So, we returned the schools back to their owners, and gave them some compensation. We couldn't really compensate them for the over twenty years that they were taken over, but we gave them some compensation. Then we established a lot more schools. From our analysis, we needed to build sixty new schools. I think we were able to do about thirty. We need to do a lot more primary schools, about 120-150 new primary schools, because we want not more than 300 children in a primary school; that is not more than twenty in a class. Because there must be that interface, the student teacher ratio must be such that there is an interface where the teachers know the students intimately and of course the principal, as much as possible, knows all the students in his school.

We used to have classrooms with over a hundred children—the teacher is not in control, he is probably not well prepared to teach, and he is not dedicated to his function. The schools were totally out of control. You would come in and you'd see children at this time of the day walking all over the city. That has stopped.

MAKGETIA: How are you able to change that sort of culture?

DUKE: *You have to be firm. Leadership must be—I talk of compassion, but compassion is our weakness. Compassion is strength; we were very firm. Those who worked in the state public service knew that there was a zero tolerance level and people fall in line. You see, people are like water; they'll always find their level, and where there are cracks they'll leak. So, you've got to be firm to contain it. Now a container is not a bad thing, it just puts everyone in check. We were very firm. We would strike you when necessary. We would fire you if you don't conform.*

MAKGETIA: Did you make any key appointments to ensure that oversight in the education sector?

DUKE: *Yes, like a football team, the first thing you do, if you want to win the championships, you get the best players, right? That's why in basketball in the US (United States) they're buying players for millions of dollars. Otherwise, you can't win. You can't win a championship.*

It's the same thing in life. If you want to be number one, you headhunt the best. In sports, regardless of whether you come from the country or the locality, they go for anyone in the world. Here, for political reasons, you want to get the best in the locality. But I did more than that. I went out. I went, in some places—if I can't make you commissioner because you're not from the state, I could get a board. Like the fellow who was head of the tourism bureau, he did not come from Cross River state. We got a lady from Jamaica who was in charge of marketing the state, and later on, we got a lady from the Philippines who was in charge of the tourism bureau. It had nothing to do with where you come from.

MAKGETIA: Right. Can you just explain that? So, people who are appointed as commissioners would have to be from the state, but you could set up a board to oversee that area that could bring in the skills you needed?

DUKE: *It's again very touchy, politically. People resisted it because people want appointments. People want jobs. How can you give a foreigner this job, and all that? But this is where the strength of leadership comes in. Leadership can be*

bullied. People talk, and if you're not firm in your convictions—and that's another quality of leadership—leadership must have convictions, otherwise it will be bullied. You can't borrow the thoughts of someone else. You went for a lecture and the lecturer said, "this, that—that is the way forward and you're going to do it that way," without any convictions. The first drive of resistance is like a hot-house plant—puff, and you change directions.

MAKGETIA: Can you give me an example of how you would mediate that sort of conflict of interest, bearing in mind that people have to work together in the future?

DUKE: *First of all, let's start this way. The best politics is to do the right thing. Where there is a conflict of interest, you always look at the larger goal. There may be a conflict in the immediate, but in the larger goal—that is what should be sustained. So, you do what is right, not what is expedient. An example readily comes to mind—we had a situation where a local government chairman had employed far more than they could pay because it was politically astute for them to give as many people jobs and look good, because they were going into the elections.*

I had oversight over the local governments, and I said, "No, you have to disengage these people." Some folks in the party said, "These are politicians, hey, let's disengage them after the elections, not before." I said, "That would be deceptive because they're going to be disengaged anyway, we can't pay them. Rather, we should disengage them, give them micro-credits, or have them go do something else." The party was really worried about this, but we put our foot down. I like to use the word 'we' because it was really teamwork. We put our foot down and said this is the right thing. We'll do what is right and not what is expedient.

We won the elections, we swept the elections, but I feel good about that. Now that is a conflict between going for elections in two months and having to—I think about five, six thousand people were involved—having to disengage them. Most people would wait until after the elections and do it. But where you have a conflict, always look at the larger picture and go for that.

MAKGETIA: Before then you've been talking about a list of reforms, schools being one, health being another—

DUKE: *Yes, infrastructure is the third one. You have to develop your infrastructure. What moves an economy is motion. The infrastructure allows goods and services to move as fast as is possible. We had a state that had virtually zero infrastructure. The roads were bad, and you couldn't commute from one part of the state to the other for the shortest possible distance—it is a long state, it is a big state. It takes you five, six hours by road from here to Obudu with the best of roads. But here you are where the roads are terribly bad, and it will take about twelve hours to pass through one state.*

Most communities had no electricity, water, no schools, this or that. So, we said we have to invest in infrastructure. Capital incentive, we don't have it, but like I said it is a will, and we are determined. Today, we've left Cross River state with the widest distribution of electricity in Nigeria. Eighty percent of Cross River state is on the national grid. Whether they produce enough power is a different thing, but they are on the national grid—80% of the state. We have the best urban infrastructure outside Abuja in Calabar and in Cross River because we identified five urban areas. Urban centers are catalysts for development.

People talk about rural development—rural development is good for politics, but they don't bring development. It is urban areas that generate cash that can go back there. So, we developed the urban areas, but we ensured that virtually every rural community in Cross River has electricity because electricity is a catalyst. If you have electricity it changes your lifestyle. It increases your productivity. We even discovered that by having electricity, students did better in school because they had longer reading hours. Industry started, such as hair dressing, bars and pubs. There was motion. People were spending money and that's what an economy is all about. Food preservation improved, the birth rate dropped, and healthcare improved—all that happened. So, we were really encouraged to do that.

We got a lot of support both from the federal and from international institutions. But today, most of Cross River is on the national grid. The challenge we have in terms of infrastructure in Cross River is actually the federal roads, the major trunk roads. They have a lot of work to be done. They haven't been worked on in over twenty years, so there's a lot of work to do. But in the urban areas, as you would drive around Calabar, you'll notice that most of the roads are good. We also introduced sidewalks.

You'd be surprised, sidewalks were a thing of—I remember when we started with sidewalks and people said, "We don't even have roads, and you're talking of sidewalks." I said, "You need roads that have sidewalks and drains because it rains a lot here, so you need drains to channel the water out." You don't want people sharing the roads with cars. Again, sidewalks also curb the roads because it is hot here and it is liable for the asphalt to expand, so it keeps it in check. So the roads were built here, and have lasted because they were well built and were done without compromising standards.

But there are four things: I said skills, I said health, infrastructure—you've got to get the infrastructure right. The strength of South Africa is infrastructure. That's the real strength of South Africa. I know South Africa pretty well; I did a lot of touring there. What you can see, there is world-class infrastructure. No matter what happens, whether they have a good government or not, the private sector will thrive because infrastructure is there for them to move. They have electricity, even though they're having problems with that right now. But you know, industries can work, people are employed.

Go back to the ultimate norm. Why was man created? Why did the Almighty, if you believe, create man? The pursuit of happiness. That's the answer I get all the time. People say that in different words, "Oh, to enjoy his creation." You don't enjoy something if you're not happy about it. So if the pursuit of happiness is a grand norm, is the reason why man was created, then you must provide an environment for that. You must train the man better; he'll enjoy life better if he has skills. If he is a hunter, he should have the skill. If he is a farmer, he should have the skill. If he decides to be an astronaut and go up into space, he should have the skill for that, if he has good health, right? If he can move around as he wills and get things done within the shortest time, which is all about infrastructure and technology—which is the last bit, that's part of it.

But how can you be happy, for instance, if you have no job? The cardinal objective for me, for every government, is ensuring that every citizen is productive. Productivity comes out of having skills, out of having good health, out

of having the requisite infrastructure, and out of adapting the right technology. That's why I said I have the S.H.I.T. theory—S-H-I-T. That's the way for Nigeria to move forward. That's the way for African countries to move forward. That's the way that every country that has developed has done it.

You take the newly developed nations like China. They've invested heavily in skills. Sometimes you even get worried that they're pushing too hard, but they're doing that because they want to catch up. They're investing heavily in health. I was watching CNN the other day and people are now looking at Chinese herbs, all over the world, to see what we can learn. The Chinese themselves are developing even further than that. You would not doubt the investment they've made in infrastructure, and the way they've embraced technology. These are things—the same thing with India. That's what Dubai is all about. That's why all these countries—I mean today, Nigeria send their children to school to Dubai. So, it is not rocket science.

If you want to develop a nation you've got to invest in the skills, you've got to invest in their healthcare, you've got to invest in infrastructure, and you've got to embrace technology.

MAKGETIA: Did you do anything particular to encourage learning in the area of technology?

DUKE: *Yes, we introduced IT (Information Technology) in schools. One way you could get promoted in the public service was to be IT compliant. You have to get certified that you are IT compliant; otherwise, you would not get promoted. We trained our teachers in IT, and we introduced IT to schools. We have a Cross River University of Technology. I got all the tertiary institutions in Cross River, put them together, and called it the Cross River University of Technology. And there, that's all you're taught—the sciences and technology. We don't do law and things like that there.*

Even in the judiciary, we had courses for the judges to be technologically compliant, information technology and all that. You see, to embrace technology—you don't embrace something you're afraid of. You don't see a masquerade and embrace it, if you're afraid of masquerade. So, we got them to understand it, to see it as a game, a challenge, to have a computer and explore as much as you can, then get the software, and see, 'how far can I go with this.' That changed the thinking of how things should be done in these areas.

MAKGETIA: When you came in, these reforms seemed to span quite a number of areas.

DUKE: *Eight years.*

MAKGETIA: Exactly. When you first came in did you prioritize certain things? You described that some things are good for investment, while other things are good politically. How did you determine what you would start off with?

DUKE: *The first thing to do is to get the people to understand what you're trying to do and embrace it, otherwise you're on your own, you're totally disconnected. Even though I knew where I wanted to go, I knew it was one step at a time. I'm not going to achieve it overnight. We have not achieved it, yet. There are still skeptics out there, but the army of believers is increasing. So, it is one step at a time. I tell people, it is a sheep and shepherd theory.*

The shepherd knows where the oasis is. The sheep don't, but they trust him. So, you've got to first get your followers to believe in you. It is beyond campaign rhetoric now. They must see you and therefore you must have a connection with them. Not just being a rabble-rouser and this, and a show person, no. There must be a certain sincerity—you must earn their trust. It is not given to you; you earn it. I didn't earn it until my third year in office.

The first three years were tough. I had all sorts of opposition. As a sitting governor I was constantly being undermined, but I was resolute. It was the will. I'll give you a perfect example of that. In my sixth year in office I decided we had taken the state to a certain level and we must now control the urban motorcyclist, the taxis. Some folks said, "No, ban them outright." I said, "No, you can't because they're needed." The moment they are not needed they'll disappear, but people need them. There are still parts of this city people can't get to without them. So don't ban them, control them, or provide an alternative.

Then we introduced the metro blue, which is an urban city bus. We called the motorcycles together and said, "Hey guys, from this date we're going to regulate you. What does that mean? You can only carry one person, both of you must wear helmets, and you must be registered to do this work. You must have insurance in case there's an accident." We had a set of rules.

The folks here like me. "Yeah, yeah, don't worry, we'll do it". But as the time drew near, "Oh, we're not going to do it, it's too expensive. It's going to cost 15,000 naira, we're not going to do it." So I said, "Okay, it was meant to start September of 2005. All right, I'll move it to January 1st, 2006." They said, "Okay," but I knew they weren't going to do it because they had to spend 15,000 naira to conform. You've got to paint the fuselage of the tank of your motorcycle yellow, and certain parts of your motorcycle, so that we immediately know it is a taxi. Otherwise you could just have anybody stopping by to pick up people. You've got to wear a colored jacket that states your number and your color tells you about your registration—we had yellow, blue, green, and things like that, and your number on it. If anything goes wrong you're easily identified.

We educated the public. Before you get on a motorcycle, remember the number of the guy, that's his registration number. So, if your number is G14 and something happens, you steal my bag or whatever it is, I say G14, I know who owns it. Then, we supplied them helmets. Otherwise some of them would get pots from the kitchen and put it on their head and say that's a helmet. So, we supplied them helmets and all that. Of course insurance because the biggest—the casualty wards of the hospitals were busy. These guys were throwing people up and down.

Of course there was resistance, and I appealed to the public, "This is for our own good, but we must overcome these guys." I must say, the public was very supportive. But, you see, this was my sixth year. At this point they believed in me. If I tried that in my first year or second year, it wouldn't work. The motorcyclists would have supporters all over the town. The very people you're trying to save will be fighting you. But in the sixth year, Donald knows what he's doing. They endured the hardship. People had to walk to the offices. We provided buses, but those people who were living in nooks and all that, we persevered and gradually, we broke the ranks and they conformed. We were the first state in this country where everyone, all the motorcycles, had helmets and all that.

I don't think the control is as it was in my time. In my time, it was stringent. We had patrols making sure you conformed. But what did it do? It led to the introduction of this policy nationwide.

MAKGETIA: From Cross River State initially.

DUKE: *From Cross River State, it became a nationwide policy. Because it was—hitherto they said you can't do it. Why can't we do it? People go to the moon and come back, and here we can't get you to put on a helmet. They say, "We can't do it." Why can't we do it? We can't do it because we don't want to do it.*

MAKGETIA: When you appeal to the public, how exactly—was it a matter of press releases, speaking—

DUKE: *Broadcasts. I spoke to them. We have to do this. At that time, Calabar was the delight of the country. Everyone wanted to come here. They were proud that the city was seen in this light. Hotels were springing up, and they are still springing up. So, you've got to organize the city. They understood where we were going and they conformed.*

MAKGETIA: Did you appeal then to their sense of pride in where the city was?

DUKE: *I did.*

MAKGETIA: So, that's an example of building a popular support base for the work that you had to do. Can you describe other ways in which you reached out to people to build that popular support? What did you see as the obstacles to efforts to build a public constituency for reforms?

DUKE: *One is self-interest. Don't forget that in every situation, good or bad, people will find a niche for themselves. Once they do that, they get entrenched in that niche. A reform would reorganize society, and dislocate or disconnect certain folks and their niches. So, they're going to kick. Some folks make billions from the way society is. They're going to kick against it. Take the motorcycle thing, a small reform, but hey, they were okay, they didn't need to spend 15,000 naira. They didn't care that you'll break your limb riding the motorcycle, and they have no money. So, we ensured that the insurance and all that—you've got proper insurance.*

So, what happened? The casualty figures in the hospitals crashed from about 90 a day to about 5 or something, it was ridiculous. But ultimately, even the folks on the motorcycle saw the benefit. Their pride—they were not ashamed any longer because they're now well dressed, well kitted, and all that. There was a sense of pride. Actually, before I left office they gave me a parade. So reform, even those who are affected must see the greater good.

Sometimes, you reform to enhance security in the system and people don't like it. But hey, if we all live in fear, even your niche is threatened, and if people don't see the larger picture all the time, leadership ought to. They should show understanding and compassion even to those who don't.

Let me give you a current example. Today we have a crisis in the banking industry. What has happened? Nigeria had a major banking reform. We had over

90 banks and there was a policy that these banks, S and L's—small institutions, but they call themselves banks—they were not viable. So, the policy was to consolidate them. The minimum shared capital banks were increased to about 225 billion naira, about 200 million dollars, or something like that. This in effect, a lot of banks could not meet. So, they came together. Some fizzled out, but at the end of the day, we only had 25 banks left and they were meant to be big banks. That was good. They were able to give bigger loans, their deposit base was larger, their share capital was much larger, and they were solid banks. It was radical, very radical at the time and there was resistance. Why was there resistance? It means that I, with my small bank, will have to go or join a bigger bank. As managing director of this small bank, I will go to the bigger bank, but at best I can be a director. Otherwise, I'm just a shareholder. I'm not even on the board because I'm too small.

So of course, those that are affected that way resisted. But the leadership at the time persevered and said, "No, I'm giving you one year. We're not going to extend it. Either you shape up or ship out." That worked. The overall society. What happens in that is as an individual try and negotiate what is best for you. Then as you go on there was the stock market boom, and this and that, and a lot of banks, businesses, creating a run on capital in the banks.

We have a new governor of the central bank. He comes up with a policy and says, "Look, first of all these banks that have eroded their capital we're going to get rid of all their management—" not their management, their executive management, their directors—"then we're going to go after the lenders, the borrowers who have non-performing debts." In principle, it's good. Banks should never have their confidence eroded. Banking is a confidence business. But I wouldn't approach it that way because of two things: first of all, I'd ask the bank directors and I give them ninety days to go get back those monies, otherwise I'll come after their personal assets. I'll file them and I'll prosecute them. I also wouldn't go public with that policy because I don't want to erode the confidence. It is something that I would sit down with the banks and agree upon, but I'd be very firm.

Now what we have going on, it's a good policy but it has created a panic in the system. Banks are no longer lending because they're scared. There's a run on those banks and they were big banks. So even the deposits they have, they've lost it to other banks because they feel that their money—people feel that their money is not safe.

Then they went further and published the names of all the debtors, and all that. In other words, they criminalized banking. The bank executives are in jail, and the lenders are being published for having bad debts. Don't do that, you don't do that. Banking is one sector; your finance sector is something you don't create excitement over. And hey, in the last one-year we've had a global meltdown. We've had a crash in oil prices. We had a stock market crash. We've seen the value of the naira depreciate. You're bound to have bad loans in a situation like that. You've got to manage it because you can never, never allow a crisis of confidence in your banking industry, or your finance sector. What we've done is systemic—we've introduced a systemic panic in the banking sector. It will take another one year, or thereabouts, to recover. But the damage has been done because Nigerian banks were becoming the toast of the continent. They're always advertising on CNN and we really had a lot of money coming in. But that

has created a panic such that even our letters of credit, they're no longer confirmed.

MAKGETIA: In terms of managing that situation then, would you apply that only to the financial sector because of the role of confidence or would you say there are other areas of governance where you have to be sensitive about—?

DUKE: *You've got to be sensitive about everything around governance because lives are involved. Every statement the President makes affects one person or the other. If you accept that you don't have compassion, then you want to railroad everything. But that doesn't mean that you cannot achieve radical reform. What makes it radical is swiftness. The word radical means swift. You can have a reform that lasts fifty years, and people will gradually conform. When it is radical, you want it swift, but at the same time you've got to carry everyone along. They've got to appreciate it. You've got to reduce their sense of anxiety; otherwise, you're not going to carry them along.*

When I shifted the policy of helmets and reforming the motorcycle industry, the business here in Cross River, I gave them more time. There was a lot of education going on. Behind the scenes we were working with them, trying to get them to appreciate why we needed to institute those changes. But we also informed that if you do not comply, the penalties are stringent. If you fail to comply we would seize your motorcycle. It's not a sanction. If we caught you on the road riding a motorcycle without a helmet, you would lose that motorcycle. You'll pay about 10,000 naira, no, you pay 10,000 naira to get the motorcycle and you pay another 10,000 naira for the fine. So, it costs you more because you're going to spend 15,000 naira and conform, but you're going to pay—. No, this is what happened—It cost you 10,000 naira penalty and 15,000 naira to conform. So, you end up paying 25,000 naira. But we gave them time and we did a lot of education in the back rooms.

This is the same thing that could have happened in the banking sector. There are only 25 banks, so the governor of the central bank can call them into a room. I think monthly or weekly they have a bankers' committee meeting where the bank MD's (managing directors) sit down with the governor of the central bank to discuss monetary policy, and all that. "Guys, you guys are sick. Ten of you are going to be judged sick. The rest of you, these are your problems. I'm giving you ninety days. In ninety days if you don't, we've decided that three things could happen: one, we'll go after your personal assets; two, we'll fire you; and three, we may prosecute you." So, you have it. Believe me, if you could achieve all this there would be no panic in the system. Right now, all over the world, folks are looking at Nigerian banks with huge questions. Are you sure you want to do business with Nigeria? We're trying to do some implementation here and I said to the guys, "We're going to open a letter of credit." "Sorry, we don't take letters of credit from Nigeria." Even though the letter of credit will be confirmed by a US bank...but when I just said I'm going to open a letter of credit, "I'm sorry, we don't touch it." So I said, "It was confirmed by Citi Bank."

Citi Bank shares crashed to \$1 about a year ago but there was no panic. The government rather was trying to shore it up. So, they're ready to take a Citi Bank letter of credit.

I wanted to conduct a transaction using my credit card, which is from a Nigerian bank. "I'm sorry, we can't touch that." I said, "Don't ship the goods until the cash

is confirmed.” Really. “No, we don’t want it.” So, I have to get a friend of mine to pay for the goods of the state. It’s there. People are scared.

MAKGETIA: In your explanation of how you dealt with that in the motorcycle example, you mentioned this ability to set the parameters for people’s behavior so that they would comply with the law, hopefully. That assumes that you have, perhaps, legislative authority or policy-making authority. Did you have that kind of scope to go out and just sort of lay down the law in that matter? Did you have the support of the assembly? Was that an important factor?

DUKE: *No, you’ve got to go through the process; the Assembly must be with you. We had to pass a bill. We went to the House of Assembly and had the motorcycle commission...”blah, blah, blah.” That’s the first step, because you’re going to prosecute the offenders. If there is no law backing you, then you cannot prosecute unless it is based on law. You have to do that. In doing that you’ve got to get the support in the House of Assembly.*

MAKGETIA: How did you get their support?

DUKE: *Education and explanations, right? They’re not illiterate; they’re not daft either. They live in this society. They see the stats we made available to them—the statistics from the casualty wards, the crime that was perpetrated on the back of motorcycles. People are maimed and crippled because folks just get on a motorcycle; they are running around and carrying people, and all that. They saw the statistics. They weren’t worried about it. What worried them was our ability to implement it. So, getting the bill passed was not a problem. They agreed with it, “But can you get the folks to comply?” I think I already had a history of getting folks to comply with what I wanted done. Once I had that behind me, I was fine.*

MAKGETIA: In general did you see the National Assembly—

DUKE: *The State Assembly.*

MAKGETIA: The State Assembly, was that a group of people that you felt you had to continually work to build support or did you have their support because it was a majority of your party?

DUKE: *Even if they all belong to your party, once they get there they have their own agenda. Before the elections they are like lap dogs, like, “Governor, whatever you want.” But once they get there, they’re independent. You’ll probably find more support from those who are not in your party than from those who are in your party. No, you’ve got to reason with them, you’ve got to work with them. They form the broad cadre of what we call the leadership. I was the leader of the state; I was in the leadership of the state. The leadership is all of us—my cabinet, the judiciary, the legislative house—we form the leadership. It is a broad thing and that is why it is called a ship. But yes, I was a leader.*

So, it is for the leader to get the leadership to believe in what it is doing. What did we start from? I started from my own cabinet. I had to convince my cabinet that this is the way to go. That’s easier because I appoint them. But yes, I still had folks who didn’t really agree that this was the right thing to do. I had disagreements and all that, but we convinced them.

Nobody was in doubt that it was the right thing really, to be fair. The argument was 'can we do it,' how realistic is it. So, besides convincing my cabinet and the House Assembly, I had to convince the leaders, the community leaders. You have leaders in the local governments, chairman and their councils, the broad spectrum of who is who. We used to have town forums. I do that a lot. I have a town meeting. I had to call them to Calabar, or go to them and talk to them on why we should do this, where we're going, and to let them understand what we are trying to do.

Why are we doing tourism? I mean folks are like—people are talking about investing in cement industry, investing in this, investing—I said, folks we'll still have all that. But you know people want to invest in areas that are beautiful, areas that are peaceful, areas that are nice. Folks will tell you this is the best place to put this factory, but the environment is too rough. The best place to put a factory in Nigeria, ideally, is Lagos because the market is there. But how many really want to go to Lagos and invest there? Life is hard there, the traffic, the 'this or that.' So, you have to explain to people why we're doing tourism.

We used to move around like a moving train, educating people, and all that. That's the process of carrying folks along. I was telling you about the sheep and the shepherd. The shepherd knows where he is going, but he has to have the patience and take the sheep one step at a time.

MAKGETIA: Can you tell me more about those town hall meetings, how often you had them? Where the inspiration for that came?

DUKE: *Virtually every six weeks I'd go somewhere for a function and I'll convert that function into a venue or an avenue to express my thoughts about what is most topical at the time. I remember when I wanted to disengage staff because the local government had taken on too many and they couldn't pay. That was just—employing people is really finicky and 10,000 people or thereabout, I think, were going to be affected—not to talk about their dependents.*

So, you go to a function—say, I'm going to commission electrification. I talk about the benefits of electricity and how it will help absorb some of these people by making microcredits available, so they can start hairdressing salons. I like to address the women. I say, "Hey ladies, you're going to look beautiful, you're going to have your hair done, and all that." But, you know, jokingly you're getting your point across that we all can't work for government. It was wrong for these people to employ them, knowing that they couldn't pay them. How many of us would like to work for someone and at the end of the month he says, "I'm sorry, I can't pay you."

So, let's stop deceiving, I want to be honest with you. I'll tell them, I could wait for two months and after the elections, I'll do it. But that's deceptive. So, trust me, we'll do it. We're not going to throw you out on the streets; we're going to give you microcredits. I think we gave them 100,000 naira each, or something like that, and tried to teach them skills and this and that to get them going. It worked beautifully.

MAKGETIA: It sounds like a lot of these projects required some sort of cash injection. Where did the finances come from?

DUKE: *The banks. Again, the banks had confidence in my administration. I'll take you to Tinapa later on. It belongs to the banks. Nine out of ten, no seven out of ten of the investors in Tinapa are banks. Eighteen of the 25 banks in Nigeria have shares in Tinapa. The state government really doesn't. We only guarantee the loaner component. So, it is all coming back to confidence. They had confidence in my administration, so they support it.*

On the rural electrification program, I didn't have the bulk cash in billions to put electricity everywhere. But I said, "Hey guys, I could make available 100 million naira every month to service the debt but I require 2 billion or 5 billion. I'm going to be here for four years anyway, so I'll give you 100 million naira every month to pay." They gave me the money.

Leadership is about confidence building, but the leader must be clear in his vision, that is, very clear where he is taking the people.

MAKGETIA: You described how in the first three years you were in a much shakier position than later when you consolidated your position in the government and built people's support. I think that is very instructive to other people engaged in this kind of process, to kind of hold the course. But how were you able to foot that, to swing the balance in your favor?

DUKE: *First of all, the people know that you are resolute; they're not going to change you because they'll try and change you. But I was resolute, I knew where I was going—I was still going on, I was still talking to them, they were still attacking. But after a while you either wear them out or you win their trust, or a combination of both. So for those who are cynics, you can't change them, but I wore them out because I believed—I had the convictions. There is a difference between belief and conviction. Conviction is born out of experience; belief is born out of blind faith and trust. I had convictions that this was the way to go.*

MAKGETIA: Can you give me an example of a policy that you finally saw through that initially encountered opposition? One that you later able to push through and how you built that support.

DUKE: *I've given you one already, I talked about the motorcycle one. You may think it is light, but it's not. It is a major thing here because the primary form of commuting is on the motorcycle. But there were many others—the school system, for instance. There was a lot of resistance in handing over the schools that had been taken over by the government, back to their owners. The teachers' union resisted it, and fought hard against it. Why? A lot of them felt that their jobs would be threatened. So, I had to understand that.*

What I did was simple. We were going to hand over the schools to the missionaries, the former owners, who were not even ready to absorb the schools back. How are they going to get teachers all of a sudden? Now, you can keep the teachers that are there for the next two years, because that's enough time for you to recruit new teachers. But then, we had resistance from parents because public schools don't pay fees; private schools pay. So parents were like, "No, no, no, we don't want—"They don't want to pay fees. We said, "Look, for those students who are already there, until they graduate from the schools, there will be no fees," because that was the contract we entered. But for those coming in, they're going to pay.

That's where the compassion comes in. You can't come up and say this is where I'm going. A river flows and it is going to end up at the estuary, and going to the sea, but the course may never be straight. As my father put it, "A tree would sway and bend, but it never leaves the spot." Rigidity is wrong in leadership. So, we did that.

Now we had to take the concerns of the teachers. They didn't want to leave. They felt that if we took them out of the schools, we'd post them to other parts of the state, and it would dislocate their families. We said, "No. You stay in the schools for two years. Thereafter we'll move you to a school and the policy is that you don't have to leave the city where you work." That was fine with them, once we gave them those assurances. For the schools that we wanted to hand back, the owners we wanted to hand the schools back to—they just weren't ready. We said, "No problems. We'll give you some subsidies, we'll continue subsidizing you as if you were a state school." The only things that really changed were the principals, the leadership now changed. We'll give you subsidies as a state school, but at the same time we're going to wean you off that in a period of two years. We think that is enough time for you to get your act together.

So, we took care of the concerns of every group but the policy was firm. In three years we had achieved everything we wanted to achieve with the schools. That was one. Another one was that even with the doctors, trying to ensure that a policy of having a primary healthcare center—some of them resisted it. Now, you know it's right, but like I said, personal interest always takes the fore. You have that in the threats of downsizing tools, and all that, and you've got to persevere but you've also got to listen to them. Never talk down just because you're in charge. You have to carry them along, you don't talk down to the people you lead, you carry them along.

We also had another one, and this was interesting. For years, in fact since inception of the state, salaries were paid in cash. The only beneficiaries were the cashiers because they always say there's no change. So they approximate your salary to the nearest whole figure and take the lesser one. So if, for instance, your salary was 7,956 naira, they tell you, "Sorry, we only have 7,950 to give you." The 6 naira, they would keep on the side as theirs. I was Commissioner for Finance and I knew the state. This was ridiculous—not in this day and age.

Secondly, they created a whole list, we used to call them ghost workers, a whole list of people who did not exist but were on the payroll. So cashiers were—that's a job to get—"What did we do?" We said, "Okay, every public servant, go open an account in a bank." We tried to organize them. The second challenge was we don't have banks throughout the state, so we had to make provisions for going to the bank, to have the banking sector work with us. They're going to have cash offices and all that. So, everybody on the payroll—and that helps us first of all to eliminate ghost workers, because a ghost doesn't go into a bank and open an account. To open an account, of course, when you fill the forms and all that, your head of department, the perm sec and the commissioner will also endorse that you are staff. That way, we eliminated ghost workers.

We found out we had about 2000 plus ghost workers. We had about 20,000—before then we had about 23,000 workers, so over 10% were ghost workers. The second thing was that we ensured that at the end of the month, your account is credited automatically. What did this do? Public servants developed a credit culture; they could now borrow money because the banks could show that at the

end of the month, you know—. We introduced ATMs and all that, which is a form of lending. So, even on Sundays they can now carry out banking, or on public holidays they can carry out banking activity. But we had a lot of resistance from the very public servants we were trying to help—ignorance. They just felt no, they wanted to see their money, cash. “Leave me with this thing you say you’re putting it in my bank.” So, you’ve got to work on that.

MAKGETIA: How did you overcome that resistance, in that case?

DUKE: *Educate them, and call them—the leadership. Call the various groups, the lower ones. The lower ones are the ones who resist more and in larger numbers, and the ones that are easy to sway because they’re not as enlightened.*

MAKGETIA: Interesting. One quick question sir, you encouraged the banks to open further flung offices so that people could access their finances.

So, maybe if we could go back to the early days of your governorship and you could tell me about—you mentioned the SWOT analysis that you conducted and how that laid the basis for some of the reforms you initiated. Could you tell me a bit more about how you went about conducting that analysis?

DUKE: *Well, there are certain empirical considerations when doing a SWOT analysis. You talk to people, try to determine the strengths, or what they perceive are the strengths of the society and what they see as their weaknesses. Extensive interviews were done. We got a professional group to do this. We had our own, having known the people for a while I thought I knew what they would consider, or what we could consider strengths and weaknesses, but it is always best to hear it directly from the people. What sort of work would you like to do? If you could describe the ideal, what would you ideally think our state is suitable for? Agriculture was a recurring theme; everyone thinks that we should do agriculture here. The state is 23,000 km², roughly the size of the state of Israel with 3 million people. And Israel is mostly desert where we are flourishing grasslands. People take agriculture very seriously here. Okay, outside of that what should we do?*

Then they start to think. Industry didn’t come up high on the ranking. What came up high on the ranking was more cultural. So, that’s how we got into the tourism thing. What resources do you think we have in the state?” Oh we have a beautiful place called Obudu Cattle Ranch, we have this, we have our forests and we have that.” Gradually as you go throughout the length and breadth of the state and people are saying the same thing, you come to appreciate that this is what they think is a plus for them. I think it was a good way to go.

I also think that every state should not only be a federating unit of the entire country but it should also be an economic unit. We had identified a niche. Other states should also identify their niche and build upon it. You’d be surprised at what they consider the niche in Akwa Ibom State, which is next door and which is a state that was excised from Cross River. It is absolutely different from Cross River.

MAKGETIA: What do they regard their niche to be?

DUKE: *They’re more industrial. They’re more—they also do agriculture. Agriculture is a common theme throughout the country but they don’t have—it is a much smaller state but more heavily populated. They wouldn’t tell you that tourism is a big thing*

because they don't have the sites and neither do they have the history that we have. So, it is a bit different.

MAKGETIA: So, the analysis was based on a questionnaire? Can you explain that to me? A survey conducted by an outside group?

DUKE: *It was actually done by a professor, if I remember right, from the US. She came from North Carolina somewhere. Yes, interviews and questionnaires, random samplings of people and different strata of society, and trying to find an average of what they think—their perceptions of the state.*

MAKGETIA: You also mentioned the map that you used. Was there any other tool that you developed in the beginning to help in the planning process?

DUKE: *The photo mapping was by far the most important, because it clearly identified the area that is Cross River and enabled me to pinpoint any part of the state on the computer. At that time, we had the conflict with the Republic of Cameroon on the island of Bakassi. We had troops out there, soldiers fighting in strategic positions. We were in control of about two-thirds of the island, and Cameroon had one-third. World Court in the Hague—on this particular day the Minister of Defense was here and we went together to see the troops. I looked at the map and something told me this map was wrong. So we went back to the governor's lodge and I brought out the map from the other photo, which was a digital—precise. The map was totally out of synch with reality.*

I said to myself, these guys could have been ambushed so easily. That was one very vivid experience on the importance of this map. But even going further, it allowed us to conduct urban planning, both urban and rural planning.

I'll give you an example. The shortest distance is a straight line, right? A lot of roads that are built follow footpaths because that's the path they know. But with the map, for instance, we were able to look—this road doesn't have to go this way to get here if we build a bridge here, and the roads go this way because there is a river here, but if we build a bridge we'll cut the distance—things like that. But you'd be surprised. Unless you have a clear-cut map and you can see it, you won't get it right.

Then for planning, we wanted to introduce an urban tax because we were doing a lot of road construction—sidewalks. We had to raise as much money as we could. So, I would look at houses; tell the size of the house, and depending on the size of your house you were taxed accordingly. When we had time we had a census, and we could approximate. With this size house, this is approximately the number of people in count. It was very useful.

Later on, several other states emulated this. I wish the federal government had done the same thing because we still have issues regarding boundaries across the country, and all that. You can't run a place successfully unless you know it intimately.

Let me share a story with you. Building the cable car up the mountains in Obudu, I went to a group called Doppelmayr in Austria. I said to them, "I wanted to build this cable car." They looked at me and said, "First of all, are you sure you're the governor." I had gone through a long flight in which I had food poisoning, Lufthansa. I was very ill, tired, and I was very young, I was 38 or 39. Are you the

governor? They were hearing too many stories about Nigeria, and 419 [Nigerian money transfer scam], and fraud, and this.

Secondly, "We don't believe there are mountains in Nigeria." There I was, battling throwing up. I was very ill. So, I said to the guy, "I don't care what you think I am. This is a disk of the area and I want a cable car. You can go to the embassy and check me out. If you decide you're interested you let me know, I'm leaving right now. I walked away. I got in the car and left.

Now what happened is that they took the disk, played it and they were amazed. In their hundred-year history they never had a presentation. In building a cable car, the most difficult part is the contours and here we were, presenting them a digital contoured map already of the area. What usually takes them close to a year to do, they could do it in just minutes. So, they started fooling around with a design. The guy said, "This is interesting."

They went to the embassy, checked me out. Okay, I was real. They sent a team out to Calabar who went to the ranch. They were amazed at the place. That's how we built a cable car. Without that, I wouldn't have done that. This afternoon you were at Tinapa. I located that site on the photomap. It was—the entire place was a rubber plantation. You see all that rubber there, which was in the thick of it. Even the lake area, which is a bit depressed, it was full of rubber. So, we did a digital map of the area trying to find the location and we got there. It is an incredible tool for development.

Statistics, you also need to gather statistics for people. You can't make a haphazard a guess. You must know, for instance, the number of children you have so you can identify the number of schools that are required. You must also develop the amount of infrastructure that you require for that society. Statistics also enabled us to prioritize which community, for instance, would have electricity. You may have a politician in your government who comes from a very small place and thinks his place should get electricity first, and someone who is not in your government, but comes from another community that is much larger that requires electricity. So, we had issues like that but we always got our way because we were quite scientific in our approach. For me, that's the path to follow.

MAKGETIA: Did you then conduct surveys as you came in? Can you describe that process, the statistics gathering?

DUKE: *Well the Federal Office of Statistics has some statistics, which we took as base data. I'm always skeptical about the data. They sit in Abuja and determine what is what. But we used it as base statistics and got the university to go back and confirm. We wanted to know, for instance, the number of children in schools. So we contacted some folks in the public service, and some folks from the university. The university has a consultancy to confirm the children within school age, and that would determine the number of schools we required and their distribution. The distribution of the population of the state, that would determine the allocation of hospitals and primary out-care centers.*

With the auto photo mapping we could plan better the—it is such a large state and the population is quite sparse. In the more densely populated area, providing electricity is much easier because you don't have to run cables for miles and miles. In this state you could run high-tension lines for 40 km before you get to a

community; it's more expensive in those areas. So, you want to be as efficient as possible. You may not necessarily follow the road because the road winds, you want to cut across. But we needed to do all that, but in the process we had to determine design and ensure that we were optimal in our planning.

We're an agrarian society so we said, "Look, we can virtually grow every crop on the face of the earth but we've got to specialize." So we took the crops that the locals are very familiar with, oil palm, cocoa, and we introduced a few others, cashew for the north, but that didn't do too well, and pineapple and cassava. We really encouraged the locals in that. We had a program to clear land for them because one of the most expensive aspects of agriculture in our state is land clearing. It is a heavily forested area, so the locals grow in small plots because they don't have the resources to clear large tracts of land. So we went in and gave them support and cleared large tracts of land for them, just to increase their output. But you cannot deny statistics. Again, it is one of the banes of development in Africa; we don't have the right stats.

MAKGETIA: Before we move on to how you pulled together a team to conduct this sort of work, if you were talking to a reform leader, how long did that process take you of gathering the information that was the basis for your later action?

DUKE: *Don't forget I had been—I had an advantage. I'd been Commissioner for Finance, Budget and Planning and so I already had a lot of statistics. As commissioner, I wasn't in a position to verify the veracity of the statistics but I had the base data. In terms of timeframe, since we started from get go and we were very clear, I had already designed a blueprint for the state. So, from the beginning I knew where we were going and I think actually while we were still in transition, I set up as part of the terms of reference for the transition, a committee to verify these statistics as we got folks from the consult. By the end of the first six months, we had all that in place.*

MAKGETIA: Can you tell me more about this transition committee because I've heard, some people have said that governors, many governors come in and there is no induction and there's no transition process. How did yours work?

DUKE: *Well there is, it depends on how serious you take it. But every state has a transition point from one administration to the other. Sometimes folks pick politicians and put them—it's just a way of saying thank you for your work during the election. Mine was different; mine were mainly technocrats. We even got folks from Price Waterhouse and Coopers, consultants, to work with us. We got them to help screen the nominees for cabinet positions. It was quite technical. We didn't take it lightly at all. Others just, you know, it is like a kickback. Thereafter, you've satisfied a group of people and they're the first set of people to be recognized by the governor-elect or the President-elect. Mine was different.*

We used that opportunity actually to set the tempo and the strategy, to reconfirm the tempo and the strategy for development.

MAKGETIA: Was that difficult for you? Were there people that expected positions on that committee?

DUKE: *Oh yes, and they got very upset.*

MAKGETIA: How did you deal with that?

DUKE: *I'm sorry, but you can't please everyone; I wouldn't even try to. There's a book, I'll send it to you. It is a book about my administration, it is more like a coffee-table book, and it is titled Doing the Right Thing. You might find it interesting. It has a lot of the information you're looking for, too.*

MAKGETIA: Excellent. Before you discussed pulling together a strong team of people in terms of creating a good team and finding or headhunting for those great individuals, could you discuss a bit more about how you went about—you mentioned the screening process—but how you went about finding individuals for your cabinet and other key positions.

DUKE: *In the course of campaigning you meet a lot of people, loads of people. Some strike you—"This guy has something." As you're campaigning you're identifying them. That is the political class. Outside that, because you're local, you know folks. They're not politicians but you know that they're resourceful people and you also note them. Some come to you from recommendations, other politicians may say, "Look, this guy is worthy." And you say, "Okay, I'll talk to him." A lot of CVs also fly around. Folks are sending you their resumes. You wake up in the morning and you have loads of envelopes, they want to give you resumes, and all that. I send all that to the transition committee or the subcommittee that is responsible for screening.*

You have folks already that you know, "This guy is something." There is a guy I met—his name is Mike Aniah—who went to a local government called Obanliku. He was a chairman of the party in that local government. Now, where you have the cattle ranch is this local government, a very rural area. When he got up to speak, what I liked about him—he was very young, and then, he was probably about 32 or 33—but there was a certain passion in the way he spoke. For me, passion was a critical element I was looking for. I was not looking for technocrats or experts; those are mainly theoreticians. They know all the answers but they can't get it done; I was looking for people with passion because that's all I had myself. I felt that was the tonic that was required to move the state from point A to point B. This guy spoke with so much passion.

I didn't say a word to him but I noted him. He was screened and he became a commissioner. He was first commissioner for education, but he didn't do too well there. So, I moved him and put him in public utilities and he excelled. In public utilities, he has the record of providing the highest number of communities in all of West Africa with electricity.

MAKGETIA: That's quite an achievement.

DUKE: *That guy, as commissioner, he presided over or he supervised the largest number of electricity distribution in all of West Africa. We have the best urban water system in Calabar in the whole of West Africa and he was responsible for that.*

MAKGETIA: Was there anything that he did, is there something in his leadership style, or is there something in that department that made it—?

DUKE: *First of all, this guy was very intelligent, very witty. He had a way with his staff and we used to enjoy him in council meetings because he is extremely witty. He was able to identify a core number of people in his ministry and when I say in a*

ministry, you have 2-3,000 people. This guy was only working with about ten people, the rest was just moving, shifting papers back and forth, but this was his team.

MAKGETIA: Did you have a similar team that you worked with?

DUKE: *Yes, what happens in a cabinet as I said earlier is you have about 21, 22 people in a cabinet, but at the end of the day maybe you have four or five as the real movers in that cabinet. It is not based on having known them in the past. For me it was, you're my friend if you perform, and if you're not performing you'll just find that we drift. Because they perform, they get more of my time and just that gives them a stronger position to perform. It's a joke—they call them super-commissioners. Those ones were given instruction and everyone feels that it's what the governor wants. So, they take that seriously.*

MAKGETIA: Staying on staff issues, did you do anything to build the capacity within your staff in terms of training?

DUKE: *Oh yes. That's constant. We ensure that there were retreats and seminars, and constant training. In a year you would probably go for three trainings on the average, which is quite a lot, in various skills. Management—before you go from one level to the other, from the junior level to the managerial cadre—you must go through training for that. We invited people over to teach them one thing or the other, mainly leadership skills and getting things done.*

I, at one time, had arranged for all my permanent secretaries—and permanent secretaries are like the administrative heads of ministries—to do a program that went on for about three months, but was like a crash MBA or MPA (Master's in Public Administration) program, just to get them all that. But, you know, my regret is that this ought to be done much, much earlier in their careers. By the time they get to their level, they're fixed in their ways. They listen, but it is difficult for them to implement it. So you have to—it all depends on driving force, getting them to do what is right, and all that.

MAKGETIA: One more question on training. Did you have a difficult time retaining people that you had trained?

DUKE: *Yes and no. Yes, some of them with their new skills became very attractive to other private sector organizations that were prepared to pay top dollar, which the public service wouldn't pay. For instance, the guys who trained in tourism and went to Jamaica, when they got back here folks were snapping them up—working in airlines and virtually the entire hospitality industry. If you go through the Cross River Tourism Bureau, you're a hotcake. So, at the end, we had to bundle—you can't go; you must put in at least two years, or something like that.*

In the public service some just wouldn't apply what they were trained for, so you've got to show those individuals an early exit. Again, I felt the public service was too heavy. I wanted to downsize, but that is politically very treacherous. We worked along side of the World Bank and provided a fund. The World Bank provided us 13 million dollars for those who wanted to leave early—you get your gratuity so you can leave. We were trying to reduce. Most folks don't want to leave because they're not sure they'll get their gratuity anyway—states never paid on time. So we said, "We have all this money in the bank. If you want it, you

just sign up and you go and you get your gratuity.” That helped and some people went on early retirement.

Some felt that even if they go early, what were they going to do. Now we had to also train people post retirement because we know there were a lot of people upon retirement, a few years later and they’re dead, from idleness. So, we taught them skills. Usually because they retired, they wanted to go back to their villages and all that. So we teach them skills, like basic farming, and all that. That’s actually how we got into the snail farming business, rabbitry, poultry and fish farming. Others, we taught fish preservation. Some we taught—the ladies for instance, some wanted to do interior décor, event management, and stuff like that.

So, before you leave the service you’re going with some other skill that could be useful to you in private life.

MAKGETIA: How did that program come about? Was that tied to the World Bank funding?

DUKE: *A lot of these things evolved and we tried to study what happens. How come when they leave office within five years they’re dead or they’ve aged, or why don’t they even want to live. So we had a human resource consultant go talk to them. The results were quite startling. You learn that these folks are afraid of the unknown. When they leave the service, they say, “What do we do?” So, they start to falsify their age; they get younger as the years go by.*

Now, what are the things we did? We were getting them to open an account, I told you earlier on. The age, as in your employment, and all that, it is fixed. Every month as you collect your salary, you get a pay slip. The only thing that comes to you in the mail is a pay slip, but your salary is in the bank. On that pay slip it reminds you constantly that your “Date of disengagement is June 23, 2009.” So, it is there. It goes over; every month you see it. It also helped prime them for it, and it stopped this thing about trying to change the age. They go into the records and before you know it files are missing. By the time it gets back into the system, pages are lost and dates are changed. We made everything electronic and you couldn’t change it, except from the governor’s office and the office of the head of service. That’s the only place you can make changes. So, that was fixed. They didn’t have access to it and their codes to get into it, and you’re constantly reminded that this is when you’re going to leave. You have to program it. Two years, three years, two years before they disengage we start teaching them post-retirement skills.

Also, besides post-retirement skills, you do counseling. These guys have been there for thirty-something years; that’s all they know. Some of them are still very energetic—“What do we do after?” Some of them are in their 50’s. They got into the service in their early 20’s, so they’re getting worried. If they had the opportunity, they would alter their ages. I used to see folks—I knew this guy was about 60-something or 70, and he’d tell me he was 40. [laughing] Because the retirement age was set as either the point when you’ve spent 35 years in the service, or you’re 60 years old.

MAKGETIA: People have commented on the difficulty they face in getting rid of civil servants who don’t go along with their reforms. This seems like one strategy, to push people out, and also to just achieve downsizing.

DUKE: *We did a lot of that.*

MAKGETIA: Was there anything else you were able to do to reduce the size or to get rid of people who were not—?

DUKE: *Well, discipline if you don't fall in. The governor has the authority to retire you for the public good. That was one, but how many can you retire that way? Again, part of the problem in the civil service was not just the numbers; it was the distribution. We didn't have enough teachers. We had 20,000 people, and we needed 8,000 new teachers, but nobody wanted to teach. They all wanted to stay in the mainstream service. Teaching—you have to go to rural areas, and all that. So, one of the amendments we made to the law was that you couldn't question where you're posted. As long as you're a graduate, you are eligible to be a teacher. You go through a crash program to do a reorientation for teaching, and then we can send you to schools.*

We didn't have the resources to employ these numbers of teachers and we had people who were not really productive where they were. Say, for instance, you studied geography in university and you worked in the Ministry of Finance. We might just post you to the Ministry of Education to go teach geography in a school somewhere. We did a lot of that. That's trying to make the labor pool more efficient. Really, how many people can you get rid of? So, you also have a responsibility—otherwise, you have no compassion.

I talked a lot about compassion earlier on. The guy may be in the service, this is not his flare, but he is there. He really may not be that good as a public servant, but there may be nothing else for him to do. So you try and find out, "Okay, he did history in school," maybe we can use him. Or he did sociology. But of course you ask the graduate, "What other subsidiary did you do?" You find that he did English, for instance. Okay. So, there was a program organized by the University of Calabar where they'll do a conversion program in three months or so, and they teach you teaching skills. They train you. Surely if you're a graduate you can teach in a secondary school.

MAKGETIA: Did you encounter opposition to this strategy?

DUKE: Yes.

MAKGETIA: How did you deal with that?

DUKE: *I had the law on my side. First, you get the law on your side before you start. Once I had it, I spoke to the labor union and the unions liked me because we had good communication. We would disagree, but we were friends. We would have meetings, which were turbulent. The labor folks always feel that they power the government. They come and say whatever they want to say and I'll say whatever I want to say, but at the end of the day, I never antagonize them. They'll come to the residence; we'd have dinner or something, and argue it all out. I'd try to get them to reason along with me, to understand why we're doing this.*

I remember saying to the folks, "This is how much I earn. You guys owe me 20,000 workers. This state population is 3 million, right? I said to the labor union, "You should not only be concerned about your members within, but also ensuring that more people have jobs. That's what it is all about, not just about yourselves. Now you guys have formed a cult. It's no longer a union, it is a cult to protect

your blood brothers. But you should be concerned about labor for the entire state, ensuring that people who are working age and able-bodied have jobs.”

“Now this is my revenue and you can verify it. I want to put electricity in every community, including your communities. I want to make sure that your children go to school. I want to make sure that there are roads leading to your communities. I want to ensure that you have Medicare. But right now, I am using most of the funds I would use for this to pay salaries for people who are not productive.”

“I don’t want to throw you out because that would also contribute to social dislocation, crime and all that. So, the best thing to do is to make sure that you earn your keep. That way, you are a productive entity and not a drain on the state’s resources while I seek other ways of employing people and creating opportunities for them.”

You take them along that path. They’re not unreasonable people. They’re difficult people, but they’re not unreasonable because they also have to play up to their constituency. They’re politicians.

So, we worked on that back and forth, and we argued, and they said, “Well, you’ve got to give this concession,” and all that. But I never lost sight of where I was going and when I wanted to get there. That’s what we had going for us. Sometimes the meetings were really tough. For instance, when salaries were increased and the minimum wage went up twice in three years. I said, “I can’t cope, I’m not going to do this.” Since it was the law, I was going to pay the minimum of the minimum wage, and not a penny more. They threatened to go on strike. I tried to break the ranks. At the end of the day, we had a deal: I wouldn’t downsize, but there would be voluntary retirement—I wouldn’t downsize. But if you ask me for a penny more than the minimum wage, then I would slash the workforce by 25%. Throughout my eight years in office, that was the deal. I hear as soon as I left they hiked it and now they have a problem.

When I left, oil prices went up to \$150, so states got a lot more money. Now that it is crashed they cannot keep it, so they are having a big problem meeting their responsibilities now.

MAKGETIA: Were there other bargains that you struck like that with other constituencies to get them onto your side?

DUKE: Oh yes.

MAKGETIA: Can you give me an example of that?

DUKE: *The teachers. I told you earlier, teachers didn’t pay tax. Okay? I couldn’t increase their salaries without dislocating the pay structure in the state, or without dislocating the wage bill structure in the state. But, I also needed public servants to leave—to be willing enough to leave and become teachers and that was the sweetener. So, what we did was we exempted public service teachers from paying tax. That cost us about 47 million a month in revenues. Then we introduced allowances for teachers, what we called the ‘teaching allowance.’ Teachers were getting about 5000 naira beyond their salary, and principals about 10. If you served in a rural area, you got 10 and the principal 15. In some cases that virtually doubled your salary because if you were earning 10,000 naira a*

month, you'd pay about 2,500 as tax. Now you retain the entire 10,000 and get an additional 5000. So, what would have been 7.5 after tax was now 15.

My concern was that the doctors or the folks in the Ministry of Health, the Medicare staff, would kick because they also considered their service as essential. I remember having a meeting with the NMA, the Nigeria Medical Association—the Calabar chapter, or the Cross River chapter—and this came up. I said, "Hey, I know you folks are important. I know doctors are very, very important to the system, but doctors were taught by teachers. So, in my reckoning teachers are number one."

But we had to consider a few things here and there. We had to increase over-time allowances for doctors and things like that, just some slight shifts here and there to enable them to go back to their members and say, "We got something out of it." But they were able to appreciate that look, teachers teach your children too, right? So this, education, is just a no-go area. All council meetings I held—the last item we had what we called AOB, any other business—it was always on education. We'd call the Commissioner of Education to brief us regarding where were we on issues at the time. Education was critical.

One of the things we noticed in education was that children didn't have textbooks. Now, you have overcrowding in schools and classrooms, you have teachers who are not up to it, but then you don't even have books for the children. We said, "Look, the minimum we can do is ensure that children have books." Those are the series—regardless of teachers and classrooms and this, a child can go back home and read. I was such a student—I hardly paid attention to what was going on in class but I always had my textbook. So, at night I'd go back home and in the evenings I'd read, and I'd pass my exams. I felt that this was the minimum we could afford our children, but the books were expensive to buy.

So, we sat down and set up a book-writing committee, and we wrote 79 titles in various courses. For instance, biology—you would have books for biology from Junior Secondary School 1 to Senior Secondary 3, for six years. We did that for the primary and secondary schools. We distributed them. I refused to give books out for free because when you give it out free people don't value it. But for 600 naira, or about three or four dollars, you could get all your textbooks for a given year. I think that was really radical in our circumstances.

Today, those books are being purchased by other states across the country and they have to pay rights to Cross River State, the copyright to Cross River state to use the books. But up to today, they are still being used. I think more than anything else I did, alongside with rural electrification, that is where I really think we made our mark. We're celebrated for tourism and infrastructure and beauty, the cleanliness of Calabar, whatever. But if you ask me what would I say I truly achieved, it was ensuring the books program. Every child had a book. Our slogan was 'every brain must be trained.' Every child had a book. The book reading culture was just going. You hardly had libraries, and all that. We tried to develop libraries, but the culture of going to the library to read was being erased and not just in Nigeria, globally. So, what we did was ensure that you had your textbooks and so, just read.

Of course the next thing I think we did pretty well, was provision of electricity to the various communities across the state.

MAKGETIA: On the textbook policy, how did you measure the success of that program and were there any unforeseen obstacles?

DUKE: *You could see that the quality, the number of those who passed exams, had shot up. It was part of an entire program but like I told you earlier, it went from 15 to 47. I don't know where it is now, but it had a remarkable improvement. There was a year, I think it was my first or second year in office, where less than 10% of those who took the GCSE examination had credit in mathematics and English, and that was deplorable.*

One of the things we introduced was before you do your GCSE exam, you have a mock exam and if you don't get a minimum of five or six credits, you are not entitled to take the GCSE. So you repeat. Now, we also subsidized the exams; the state government paid for those exams. And because we paid for the exams, we can refuse to pay for—we only paid for those who qualified, for those who had a minimum of six credits. Folks said that was too hard, that just because you fail and you don't do that well in your mock, doesn't mean you won't do well in the final exam. "Well," I said, "better take your mock seriously because if you don't pass your mock exams, or qualify for the mock, you will not be allowed to do the final." We just had to get them serious.

But if you have your own money and you want to pay privately, that's your problem, we won't stop you and you can take the exam. But to qualify for what the state was willing to pay, you've got to pass your mock.

MAKGETIA: I'd like to turn to a different set of concerns now. When you pull together a group of people or you try to bring people on board to support a particular—or perhaps because it was within their area of interest or their occupation—did you face a tradeoff between trying to include many different groups and sort of ensure that representation was the principle? On the one hand, there might be a tradeoff between that and the danger that you had too many narrow interests given a voice and that it causes people to sort of mobilize narrowly, which may ultimately undermine the spirit of cooperation that you're trying to foster.

DUKE: *I didn't allow that. I made it very clear what I wanted to achieve. So you never lost sight of my goal. How you fit into the goal and how I can adjust my position without losing sight of my goal was critical. For instance, I wanted to relocate public servants into the teaching career. That was my goal; how we'd go about it, I was flexible but that's where I was going. Or, if I wanted to hand over the schools back to the original owners, which there was tremendous resistance from the Nigerian Union of teachers. And on both sides, the former owners weren't ready for the schools, the teachers weren't ready to release the schools, and the ministry of education was foot-dragging. So, you could compromise here and there.*

For instance, I said the teachers could stay on for two years in the school and when they leave they're not going to be posted outside the city in which they worked because they have their families. You can do all that, but I'm going to do that, this is where I'm going.

MAKGETIA: Another question which I have—maybe we can move in another direction. If you look at efforts of individuals who were say, politically connected, to put people they wanted into certain positions within the government, was that either an issue

for you or for officials under you? You discussed in the context of—there was a person, I think it was in local government, who attempted to hire people because they felt it was politically expedient although unaffordable. How else did you deal with situations like that as they arose, if they arose?

DUKE: *The local government law allowed for certain disciplinary measures, but we tried not to use that because it undermined democracy. But you could, with the support or ratification of the House of Assembly, remove a chairman. So I could, for instance, write the House of Assembly and say, "This guy—" and he could be removed. We did that once or twice. But to even preempt it, after the first experience, we—there is a Ministry of Local Government, which is responsible for local government affairs and interfaces between the local government and the state government.*

What we did—salaries of all local government employees were handled by this ministry—was we centralized it. So, you can employ but you're not going to be able to pay them because they're paid elsewhere—so that was a way of taking that off them, because we saw that there was a penchant for doing this. They always wanted to employ more people because at that level, they're under tremendous pressure to employ people. They see it as a good political tradeoff. So, they couldn't resist the temptation. I took it off them completely and put it under the Ministry of Local Government. That's just one way of ensuring that that doesn't happen.

But after the experience in which we got rid of folks who had been taken, even folks who were seeking jobs became wary. You don't want to go and think you have a job, and a few months later, you don't know anymore. But local governments—the moment you allow them to handle the payroll, it gets bloated.

MAKGETIA: Was that an issue in other parts of the state government?

DUKE: *Other states?*

MAKGETIA: No, other parts of your state government, not just at the local level but say within some of the departments or ministries.

DUKE: *No, you can't employ without governor's approval. You must explain. For instance, if a commissioner wanted to employ you, you must first prove that skill is unavailable in the service. Of course there are annual recruitments, but it is to the barest minimum because we already had a bloated service.*

MAKGETIA: Another question of ours concerns how the governor relates to the federal government. How did you balance that relationship and also your relationship with your constituency?

DUKE: *I had a pretty good relationship with the President. I needed that relationship. I always said to folks that it is my duty to forge that relationship and ensure it is as healthy as possible. Why? Because I needed the President. I needed him, for instance, in building Tinapa and determining it as a free zone. Only the President can give you that authority, so I needed the President to be on my side.*

We also had challenges. When we lost Bakassi to Cameroon—and Bakassi is an entire local government—it had to leave, and the local folks were very upset. I had to manage that because the President was determined to uphold the

judgment of the court, which was the court of The Hague. I had to manage the anger of the local folks who said the President had sold them out to appease western powers. That was dicey. They were really angry. All of a sudden you're a Cameroonian. So, they had decided that they would not subject themselves to the authority of Cameroon.

We had to excise land from another local government and create another Bakassi local government for these folks. In doing that, folks who belonged to this local government found their land moving to another local government. That was an inconvenience for them. Then people emigrated onto their land. It was total upheaval. How are they going to share the land with these visitors? Now these visitors, or these new folks who had control of their local government, wanted to come here and they wanted to have control of this area. But there were people there before you!

It reminds me of the story of the aborigines and the new settlers. That's exactly what it was. How are you going to do it? Usually there are more aborigines, in this case but the new settlers wanted political control because they were in charge of their own land. They said, "This is a new local government." So, we had to deal with all those issues and—.

MAKGETIA: How did you?

DUKE: It was tough. My ears were full. Every day you heard a story and you told them don't worry, we'll have elections, whoever wins—. The settlers were worried, the new settlers. They would come in and say, "Hey, how can we win? These guys are more in number. The aborigines or the indigenous group, I won't call them the aborigines, I'm sorry, the indigenous group felt that these guys were going to come in their numbers and the day of election they're going to recruit a lot of people. "We don't know who is who, and they'll all come in and vote." There was a lot of distrust.

What we did, it would take about four or five years to get these guys to settle down. We said, "All right, we will allocate officers." The new settlers agreed on a formula, I think it was 60/40. The settlers would vie for these positions and the indigenous would vie for these. We said, "Okay, this is transitional. After four, five years we believe you guys will sort yourselves out." We speak the same language and all that, some of them are cousins. It was the nearest local government to the one that we lost to Cameroon. There were a lot of relationships there. But they're settled in now; they're fine.

MAKGETIA: So was there anything you did to prevent them seeing in the long term as though, this office will always be for my group; that group can never contest this office.

DUKE: No, we made it very clear, it was all transitional. You can't hold this in perpetuity. At the end of the day, it is democratic. But for the transition, we would allow this so that there was a feeling of belonging to both sides—this side doesn't feel they have been totally disenfranchised, and this side doesn't feel that they have been shortchanged. So, they shared it.

MAKGETIA: Are there any suggestions you might have for governors to manage that relationship with the central state, so that you have autonomy to develop your own reform area?

DUKE: *I think it is very clear, for governors to be clear. It is important that governors should be clear in their mind where they're going and what they can get from the central government, the federal government in this regard. And make it very clear to the federal government. The federal government is really a policy organ. It doesn't have any land to develop—all lands are held in trust by governors. But it is murky when governors are not themselves clear about what they want to do. I think you get a lot more from the federal government when you're very clear.*

For instance, because I identified tourism and agriculture as where I was going, anything that had to do with tourism, I'd get a call immediately. This is how we got training in Jamaica, for instance. The President went to Jamaica, he met with P. J. Patterson who was Prime Minister and in the course of the discussion, he talked about their tourism institute and it was world-renowned. Our President said, "Oh really, okay," call Donald Duke—"Do you know about this," blah, blah, blah. But if I had been vague, such that I was developing the states but no one really knew what I was doing, opportunities pass you by.

The WTO, the World Tourism Organization, paid a courtesy call on the President. He said, "You must work with Cross River State." So they came here and held seminars—training. We also sent people to Switzerland for training, and in Spain or somewhere. We had that going because we were very clear about our direction.

Palm oil was one of our principle crops and I mentioned that to then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir (bin) Mohamad. He got PORIM, the Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia, to come here and do an extensive survey. They were able to map out lands within the state that were ideally suited for oil palm plantation and we got a group, Sime Darby, to come here and work with us. Sime Darby is one of the biggest oil palm plantation companies in the world. But we're clear. So, when it came to oil palm or cocoa or our principal crops, we had support. You've got to be very clear where you're going. Everybody knows that this is where you're going and when opportunities arise in those sectors, you're the first to be considered.

MAKGETIA: Another question we have concerns a situation where a political leader has to accommodate personnel from factions that could potentially destruct their work if not enlisted as partners. Giving potential spoilers' control of key services or government functions can make it difficult to move forward later. Do you have any particular advice on what sort of tradeoffs might be appropriate in this context?

DUKE: *Can you explain that again?*

MAKGETIA: Under certain circumstances a political leader might feel it necessary to bring in someone or accommodate someone who is otherwise political opposition. In that context, how can someone balance involving someone but not allowing them to derail the reform?

DUKE: *Oh, we did a lot of that. As we got into—after the elections, when you get into government, of course the party is usually factionalized. You have this guy who contested against this guy in the primaries, the line was drawn, and all that. The party needs to bring them together to win the general elections. So, there is a need to reach out to the other group. What you do, what I did in my case was yes, we would consider appointments, but we would not allow you to impose*

people on us. At the same time, we were able to identify key people in the group that we would bring in. Usually when they come in and work for you, or work with you in the government, they fall in line with the government policy.

It is only in the beginning, before they come into government. But once they come into government, they become friends with you, and they work with you. The past is consigned to where it belongs and they fall in line. But yes, you've got to do it. You can't successfully run a winner-takes-all—you've got to reach out. Now you may always want to bring some of them into your cabinet. But as governor or President, there are hundreds of appointments to be made. Some, you may nominate them as ambassadors. That's the one I like because when they go in as ambassador, they leave the state completely and they leave their followers without a shepherd and you can now bring them in. Some, you give them a federal appointment because the President may ask you to do so. This is again a reason why you should have a good relationship, why it is important to cultivate a good relationship with the central [government].

The federal government has a lot more appointments to make and they're going to come from states. If I had ten people, for instance, whom I needed to placate because they came from the other side—or they may come from my faction of the party, or they may be people who worked with me, but they're not really appointable into government although they want to be. So, you find a way of sending them out. You've got to do that, you've got to give and take.

MAKGETIA: You mentioned the winner-take-all system and competition. That may crop up in a number of different circumstances, elections or procurement processes or competitive processes, where people see that the person who won seems to accrue all the benefits, and they get shut out. Do you have any suggestions for how to manage that kind of competitive process to prevent people from feeling isolated?

DUKE: *You frankly cannot please everybody, and don't even try it. But don't make it seem as if it is only your cronies who are recognized. Now, it is all about recognition. Folks just want to hear their name on the radio, that they have been appointed into this office. It is a feel-good factor. "Oh, so the governor recognizes the work you did for him." Okay? Some of the appointments, as far as I'm concerned are absolutely meaningless. I can set up a task force to look at the sanitation of a particular community. All right, but you're shown recognition. Politicians like recognition. I think it is critical you do that. Have I answered your question?*

MAKGETIA: Yes.

DUKE: *You know, you'll never have—you can't appoint all of them, but identify folks who are within, preferably they're leaders, but even folks within who have something to give and show them recognition. By doing that again, you can anger your own core supporters who expect that they would—and they get very upset and they sulk, and all that. Along the line you could, if you find opportunities—. But one thing I did, for those I couldn't appoint, I had an office, a special assistant. I said, "Look, these are people, we have loads of these people, they're not happy with us. Find birth dates, the children's birthdays. And on this particular day, it could be your birthday, I just saunter into your house with a gift and sometimes a television crew and a cake and sing happy birthday with you, and in the evening it's on television, you feel good, you've been recognized. He hasn't forgotten you.*

He didn't appoint you to something but he remembered you. Or you're having a birthday party for your kid and the governor shows up and clowns around with the kids and fools around and dances and all that with a gift. So, people just want recognition.

MAKGETIA: Another set of questions concerns cases where civil servants have to pay a commission for their position. Is that something that happens in the civil service here at all?

DUKE: *A commission for the position? Not in this state. I have heard of it happening in the federal where, for instance, you are in the customs [department] and you want to be posted to a particular posting so that you can make returns to your position. That happens more in the federal. In the states, hardly. But for employment no, we don't do that. Maybe for postings, but not in the states because you don't have such opportunities, such lucrative postings.*

MAKGETIA: Another question that we've discussed previously is about succession. Were you able to take any steps to ensure that your successor would sustain the reforms you introduced and how can one address these challenges?

DUKE: *Well, we had sufficiently educated and primed the state that this is where we're going. But I couldn't say, for instance, if he would approach it with the same passion. There is no way you would go out today and say Cross River is not going to follow the path of tourism, would you follow it with the same passion as Donald Duke? Hardly. You either do more or less. So, we had firmly established that, tourism was a way to go. If you go to any kid on the street today and say what is Cross River up to, they'll tell you tourism. You need to experience the Christmas carnival here to appreciate that. But it is all relative to how much passion they put to it.*

MAKGETIA: Were there any strategies that you adopted to either give them documentation, to help them set their priorities in a way that would follow what you did?

DUKE: *Yes. During the transition, the incumbent and the successive government appoint folks and they interface. In that interface we give them a program of where we are, what we want to do, and what we hope to achieve so that they can take it from there. But everything comes down to the temperament of the leadership. It takes someone to fine tune it.*

For instance, for me I declared a whole month holiday. My successor came up and said no, that was wasteful. I disagree, of course. I had a reason for doing it. I knew that the whole month of December people hardly went to work so I said you stay at home and all that. Some folks thought it was—how can you stop me from a whole month of going to work? You have what I consider the reality of the fact, and how it sounds to people. So, he got them to go back and changed the policy. But they don't realize most of the people don't work in December. How he is going to backtrack—and he said to me, "How I'm going to backtrack, I don't know." I said, "That's your problem."

MAKGETIA: As we begin to wrap up, I'd like to ask you to reflect on aspects of your own personal background or management style that helped you achieve the reforms that you did as governor.

DUKE: *Well background, my father was in the public service. My father was head of the customs for about nine years. So, I had a privileged, public service background. I think I went to the most elite of schools in Nigeria. I went to Corona, which is a British private school and St. Mary's, which was a Catholic private school. I went to Federal Government College, which is in Sokoto, the northern part of the country. It was an elite public school, but very elite, the cream of the Nigerian society was there. Then I also went to the premier university in the north and was called to the Bar. I also went to an elite university in the United States, the University of Pennsylvania. So, I think I had good training. In the course of it you mingle, and you interface with people of leadership in the country. You draw a lot from that.*

I think my personal quality was striving for ideals, never wanting to compromise. For me, there is no dream too large that cannot be achieved—just start. I think the difference between success and failure is your inability to take the first step. When we conceived Tinapa, for instance, which was the biggest project outside the oil industry in all of Africa for the time it was under construction costing half a billion dollars, folks thought, "He has finally gone mad, how is he going to afford it?" But I was so confident that all I needed to do was start it. If I start I'll see it through, and I did. But this is me; this is my personality. You can see it in Tinapa. I decided, "Look, if I don't do this, the space is going to waste. It will cost me about 20, 30 million dollars to get this going. I don't have 20, 30 million dollars, but I'm going to do it, and I think I'm almost through."

I've always had this—some think it is brashness, some people think it is gutsy, some say that I'm bold. Well a madman is also a very bold person. Boldness and madness is just a thin line. But you must be a self-assured person to lead a group. We all can't be leaders; that's a mistake. Some folks support leadership and they're as important as the leader. I respect—for me, those folks are the critical element. While you are the arrowhead, they are the flanks. If you have no followers then you're not leading anybody.

That's why I keep on saying then, leadership must be very plain in explaining where it's going. In 2007, I contested the presidency of this country at the primary level but I had to step aside when the party zoned it to the north, a policy I vehemently disagree with. But I was very clear what I thought Nigeria should do, I'm still very clear about the path we should pursue. Nigeria is a fifth of the African population and perhaps one of the most resourceful countries on the continent, but Nigeria is very far from achieving its potential. I was clear as to what we had to do.

For that to succeed the people you are leading have to understand what you want to do. You must sell the policy. Today we have a situation in this country, which is quite interesting. There are folks who do not even know the sound of the voice of the President, and that's sad. You go out, and constantly you talk to people and carry them along.

MAKGETIA: Some leaders have expressed a sort of frustration at the difficulty they face in getting information about different options available to them. Where would you say that you turn to get information on different paths to follow? Or would you say that you relied on your own instincts?

DUKE: *That is part of it, but not all of it. You must also be approachable. I told you earlier on that my phones were never off when I was in government house. I leave my*

phone on the charger, it is on. If it rings, I'll answer. If the calls are coming at 2, 3 a.m., texts will come in. Once folks know that they can reach out to their leader they'll send you information, some anonymously, but you'll get the information. You must be an ordinary fellow.

If I walk down the streets of Calabar today, people say look at Donald there. They don't say look at the governor, they say look at Donald. "Hey Donald...hi." Because they saw me as one of their own. You can't be naïve not to have security but let it be as—sometimes security is offensive, so occasionally I'll ask the policeman just go in plain clothes so you look as if you're walking with your friends. They have guns with them and all that, but they're all in plain clothes, some of them are wearing jeans and we walk around.

But again you've got to distinguish that from trying to be populist and walking the streets. No you don't do that, or jogging on the streets, no. Because you also must appreciate you don't put yourself in harms way. There are folks who don't like your guts, so you've got to manage that carefully. But once you open up and you're approachable and people know that they can reach you without having to go through the layers of the bureaucracy and all that, you'd be amazed at how much you know about the state.

I hear everything going on but I wasn't there. A text would come in, someone would tell me. Sometimes they'll tell you very rudely, because they're upset. But you've got the information and when you act on it, they're encouraged. There was a time I went to a public hall meeting and I was talking to folks and reaching out. There you hear a lot of things. People expressing—some talk utter nonsense and you parry that aside. One guy got up and said he'd been trying to come to my office to give me this information, but they won't let him through the gate and he couldn't get an appointment. I said, "Well you could have sent me a text." Why bother coming to my office except if you want to see my face.

Everybody said, "We all know we can reach you by text so they told him to sit down." Next time they said, "Send the governor a text," because they knew they could reach me. You'd be amazed at what you can do. If, for instance, the President of this country, you could reach him. Right? There are many things he would hear about the Niger delta to help him solve that problem, you understand? But you can't reach him.

So, leaders do a lot of disservice. You allow your subordinates to create this aura that you are unapproachable, you are the leader, and you are rarified. No, you'll fail from the get-go. That's why I keep on talking about compassion and compassion. You can't be a leader if you don't have compassion. You can't be a leader if you are totally unapproachable. Even God is approachable. If I get on my knees, even without going on my knees, sitting down here and send my thoughts, it will go. How can we as leaders—how can't we be approached. These are some of the challenges we go through.

But I found it so easy—. I told a friend, one of the reasons Charles Taylor is kept here was that Obasanjo could reach him at any point in time, and I also could reach him. Because I could reach him, when he calls me at 2 a.m. to ask me to do this or find out what I'm doing, I can say, "You know, I have a challenge." I'll tell you a story about the movie studio we saw this afternoon.

I was watching CNN in the morning around 6, 7 in the morning, and South Africa and your country had announced that they were going to build a movie studio. I thought that was interesting. So I called my friend, Dominic Hoole who works for KPMG South Africa and said, "Dominic, you guys are about to build—," called him in Joburg (Johannesburg). "You guys are about to build a movie studio, do you make films there?" I was teasing him and he said,—actually it is his brief because he was working on entertainment department of KPMG— "You won't believe it Donald, 40% of the market is expected from Nigeria." I said, "What?" He said, "Yes, that's what the study says. We already have a lot of Nigerians coming here to finish post-production." I said, "Okay."

Then later on that evening the President called me. I said, "Are you aware of this? You can't allow that to happen, we must have a movie studio here." He said, "How do we do that?" I said, "I don't know. If I have your support I'll build it." He said, "Okay, tell me what you want to do about it." So, I got a friend who was a partner in Dream Entertainment in the US, Moshe Peterburg, his son is actually getting married on Saturday and I'm supposed to be in Israel, but I can't make it. I said, "Look Moshe, this is a challenge and I want to do this. Can you come up with a proposal?" He came up with one. We looked at it, agreed on it and I went to the President. It will cost us 30 million dollars. The South Africans are spending 80 million dollars, but we can do it for 30 million dollars. And in fact, it may be better because all the infrastructure that is required is already in Tinapa. That's why it's cheaper. Everything was already in Tinapa, it was just to fit it in there. But I don't have 30 million dollars. I'm already overstretched in Tinapa, I need guarantees from the federal government. He said, "Okay, apply." So, I applied for a guarantee and I got it. So, that helps, the rapport and all that.

Sometimes when talking of being able to reach on high affects, your governance, you get a lot of anonymous tips. Like, this community is having a problem with this other community and you have communal clashes, particularly during the farming season. They feel that this community is encroaching on their land for farming and they take to arms. Don't forget, there are 25 ethnic groups in this state, and they speak different languages. So, they don't agree and they're suspicious of each other. Sometimes you get an anonymous tip—these people are arming themselves to go fight this other community. I get in touch with the police and say, "Let's move troops and create a buffer between—," but [this happens] because I can be reached, it is critically important.

MAKGETIA: Is there anything else? This program is designed to help you share your thoughts and your experiences as a governor with other reform leaders around the world. Is there anything you think we've missed or that you would like to add?

DUKE: *Apart from being clear, focused, and firm, let me tell you a story. The Speaker of the State House of Assembly is a great friend of mine, he is still a good friend of mine, but being the Speaker of the State House of Assembly he was painfully aware that in the next set of elections, he could never be Speaker again. The position would be altered. So, he wanted to go to the Federal House.*

The incumbent at the Federal House was determined to keep his own position. So, they mobilized their local forces and it became very murky—very, very murky. I called them severally and warned them, and each denied being part of the turf war that was going on. I said, "Even if you're not part of it, it is for your benefit." They wouldn't stop. So one day, it was a Thursday I think, I informed the police commissioner to get warrants for arrests. He did. I invited both of them to

my office because there had been another clash, albeit to warn them. I warned them and I sent them packing. As soon as they got out of the office they were arrested.

Now in terms of political hierarchy, the Speaker is number three. After the Governor are the Deputy Governor, and then the Speaker. To lock up the Speaker, that was quite something. The House of Assembly, of course, was very upset. They felt that I had insulted the House. So, they came to see me. The first thing I reminded them was that none of them could profess enjoying a closer personal relationship with the Speaker than myself. After all, in the party caucus I nominated him as Speaker, that's one. Two, those who were in the party caucus, the leaders of the House, were aware that they've had this issue going on between the Speaker and the member from the Federal House, and efforts I had taken to resolve the problems. They couldn't deny that.

I said, "As representatives of the state you also had responsibilities to ensure law and order, it is not just the governor's purview, we all have that responsibility." At no time did the House bring up this issue to discuss it. The Speaker's immunity ends in the House, not outside the House. Outside of the House, he can be arrested. On the contrary, the governor has immunity throughout his term until—I had the moral right and I had the responsibility to deal with this issue. Now after that, the House decided they were going to change the Speaker—again use the party instrument to say, "No, the Speaker has not failed as Speaker," which was wrong actually. He had failed because he was involved in this, but I didn't want to change the leadership of the House because they were already posturing for that.

The Speaker and this other guy were very upset that I had arrested them and it embarrassed them. I had tremendous pressure from the Inspector-General of Police, from everybody. But I called (Olusegun) Obasanjo and explained to him that if I am not firm on this, as we go into a general election I will lose control and that I needed his support on this to ensure that. Of course if the governor can lock up a Speaker, every other person is a small—is a joke around him. This will put everybody on their toes. He was very supportive.

It temporarily hurt my relationship with both parties, but I mended that immediately and the Speaker, actually, a week after he was released he came to me. He was locked up for about four days because if you want to deal with someone you lock them up over the weekend, and they can't get bail on the weekend. But he came to me when he realized that I had actually stopped his impeachment also, and he apologized. He is currently now a member of the Federal House. The other guy was just too devastated to contest and felt I would never support him anyway. The Speaker eventually won. Some folks would say that is high-handed.

You heard the story of me detaining the guy who was commissioner of Calabar. I don't think it was high-handed, it was just a case of everybody must conform to lawful authority. The word here is lawful. I did not—just because you're Speaker doesn't make you above the law. If any ordinary folk had done what he had done, he'd be locked up. He should be. You'd be dealt with. So, for the Speaker to be dealt with showed that there was nobody above the law. That is important. That helps you establish your authority as a leader and earns you the respect of the followers. The fellow today has tremendous respect for me and he is not deceptive about it. He tells everyone.

Even though he was hurt—his family was embarrassed and his wife was pregnant at the time—he knows he was wrong. Even if he was not involved—he still says he was not involved with it—he had a responsibility to stop it because his supporters were doing it in his name. They were so bad. They burned houses, and a few people died. I said, all this for your political ambition? So, I was firm. We had perhaps the most peaceful elections in Cross River. Everybody knew then the line had been drawn. This guy will come down heavily. There were no sacred cows.

If you look out there there's a car, a BMW, the SUV. It belongs to a friend of mine. He was the Managing Director of the Tourism Bureau, but he never settled to do the work, so I fired him. We're great friends. He is my only neighbor. There are only two of us in these mini-estates. I had warned him several times, "Larry, you're not doing the work. You have the skills, you have everything, but you're not settled into it and if you don't, I will fire you." I did. Now, if I could fire Larry everybody was fair game.

You must—leaders also must identify themselves. In other words, people mustn't be vague. You mustn't present yourself as vague. There are some people that the leadership—being a good leader you should be unpredictable. No. A leader should be predictable. You should do this or this guy will hit you—so everybody knows where he stands with you.

So, I could come to your house. I remember the day I fired Larry, I'm using it as an example. In the evening I was in his house. He heard he was fired on the radio. I told him two days before, "Larry, I'm going to fire you. You're not doing this right. You're traveling, you're leaving your post without—I'm going to fire you." I fired him. In the evening my wife went to his house to see his wife. They were sulking. I drove there. I said, "Larry, but I told you I'll fire you. Now I'm hungry, I want to have my dinner." Well, he gave me food but he was very upset.

Larry and I are great friends. We're still friends. He keeps his car here. He was here two days ago. He lives in Abuja, now. Later on he said to me, he calls me Brown, that's my nickname. He said, "Brown, you were right." If I didn't lock the gates this place would be full. A lot of them are folks I had fired one time or the other.

The current state chairman of the party was my commissioner. He was commissioner for works and he was a member of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). I thought having those two portfolios that have to do with work would enable and coordinate. But I noticed he was spending more time as a member of the NDDC, maybe it was more lucrative, I don't know. One day I called him and said, "You've got to go, take one." He went back and said he would take the NDDC.

You met Patrick Ogar, you met Patrick this evening. Patrick was my Commissioner for Information. One time I thought he was slacking his responsibilities, so I disengaged him. I fired him, but we're still friends. He comes here every day. You've got to appreciate it's not personal. This guy, what did I do? I'm still your friend and I'll make it clear, we're still friends but we can't do this work; you can't compromise on the work. For me it is a calling. It's not a posting; it's a calling. Some are going to compromise for friendship.

A friend of mine who is one of the wealthiest Nigerians, if not the wealthiest, came up to me once. He wanted me to stop another company from developing a cement factory in Cross River. I said to him, "Sorry, I can't do that." He was very upset, like I had betrayed the friendship. I said, "No, you are the one who wants to betray our friendship because about 15,000 people would be employed directly and indirectly, and you want me to forfeit this opportunity for 15,000 people, just because of a friendship. I won't do it."

You are right, whatever you're doing that's your legitimate private sector interest. What I'm doing is my legitimate public sector interest. Now if our interests converge, all well and good. If they don't we should respect each other. So, he went to court to get an injunction. How he got that injunction I don't know, but he got it. This company couldn't continue with the development of the cement factory.

So, I went to see the former President who was very friendly with this other guy, too, and I asked him two questions. I said, "Your first term you spent a quarter of your first term abroad seeking foreign investors. Now Orascom, an Egyptian company with Citi Bank wants to invest in a cement factory. You told them Nigeria was the most suitable place to invest. Investors have come and they are now being frustrated by your friend. Two, do you really want one individual to have a monopoly on cement in Nigeria?" He didn't say a word but later on he asked the guy, "I give you two weeks to resolve this issue." That's what happened.

Did it affect my relationship with my friend? Yes, temporarily. But later on he came to respect what I did. When the factory was commissioned—he is now a shareholder, and they offered him shares in the factory. He spent the night here. There are some that never reconcile with you, but it doesn't matter. The moment you get into the arena of public service, it is a calling. You don't look at faces, you don't look at friendship, and you don't look at family.

My Chief of Staff was my first cousin but he knew I would fire him if he crossed the line. In fact, he was the preferred person to fire because if you can fire a cousin then everybody is fair game. Nobody accused me of nepotism because he was my first cousin. They respected him, he did his work and he was the first to tell you that you know this madman would fire me.

MAKGETIA: Were you ever concerned that you might create a sense of insecurity if it was all dependent on your decision?

DUKE: *That happens a lot. It happens a lot in most states. You've got to be careful. So, you must have your cabinet meetings all-inclusive and allow folks to express and bring up issues so that you can arrive, or appear to arrive collectively. When I wanted to build the cable car, and I took the memo to council that I want to build a cable car, I think only about one or two people knew what a cable car was on that council. When I tried to describe it as this cable and the cars will go up the mountain— "This guy has gone mad now." People fall off driving down the mountains, they have accidents, and several people have died.*

The former President crashed down that mountain. He didn't die. But he didn't die because another car stopped his car from getting to the bottom of the mountain, and the folks in that other car had died. There was blood all over the car. "Now he wants us to go up a rope and all that? This guy has finally gone

mad." When I knew that this memo wasn't going to work, I withdrew it. I bowed to it. But I was determined to do it. I withdrew it and arranged—I told Doppelmayer, the company, to arrange for four or five—I identified, five key opponents to this program. A week later, I called them. I said, "You know Doppelmayer is inviting you to the Madeira on a holiday." He looked at me, "What's the catch? Where is the Madeira to start with?" "Oh it is a Spanish island somewhere in the Atlantic, you want to go?" It was very innocent. "Sure, sure." "Have you taken your leave?" "No." "Okay, you can go on leave. They said I should pick five people, I thought you guys should go." Okay.

But no one knew Doppelmayer was the construction company because I'd withdrawn the memo and the memo didn't state any one company. It just said the principle because you've got to go through the due process of bidding and all that. But Doppelmayer was an ideal company to build it because they really have a monopoly on cable car construction around the world. There are only two or three companies that make cable cars in the world.

So, they went to the Madeira and they went on the cable car. Every day they went on cable car from one part of the island. By the time they came back they came back to me and said, "You know, this cable car thing is—what do you think? Don't you think we should have it? It's brilliant, blah, blah, blah." So they took the memo back and they were the ones championing the memo. It passed, but you must carry them along. Otherwise the same members will go back and tell the public that it was your decision, it's a deal between the governor and this company, we don't know anything about this cable car. Privately they say all sorts of things and word will go around that the operation of this deal was—.

That I learned from the auto photomap. I singularly did that. I didn't take it to council and the backlash was horrible—the newspaper articles, and all that. But, even though I did it in the end, it eroded a lot of my political capital. Subsequently, I didn't—there were very controversial things. I took my cabinet along because when it goes out—. People are going to ask, how do you guys do this, why are you doing this and you say these are the reasons. Not many folks come to me and ask me the reasons. They can send me hate mail, and all that. Occasionally I reply, but how many can you reply?

MAKGETIA: And your cabinet was about 20 people, you said?

DUKE: It was 23 or 24, I can't remember.

MAKGETIA: Well thank you very much for your time and your thoughts. I think this will be incredibly useful to many people thinking about governance.