



# INNOVATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES

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**BOUTELLIS:** Good afternoon, today is the fifth of May, 2008 and I am now with Mr. Francis Alieu Munu who is Assistant Inspector-General (AIG) for Crime Services at Sierra Leone Police headquarters in Freetown, Sierra Leone. First thank you for your time and before we start I'd like you to please confirm that you've given your consent to the interview.

**MUNU:** Yes I have.

**BOUTELLIS:** I'd like to start by asking you to give us a brief history of your personal career within the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the positions you held before becoming the AIG.

**MUNU:** *Okay, thank you very much. I enlisted into the Sierra Leone Police on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November 1984 as a cadet assistant superintendent of police after I graduated from Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone in 1982. I did three months of induction training at the police training school in Hastings and I was sent on to on-the-job training. For three years I was posted to all the major departments of the Sierra Leone Police so as to get myself properly oriented to police work. After three years I was confirmed as Assistant Superintendent of Police and posted to Shangaima police station as Officer Commanding. Shangaima is in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. I had seven chiefdoms under my command and my immediate supervisor was Kailahun, the chief police officer in Kailahun.*

*After three years, in 1987, I was advanced in rank to Deputy Superintendent of Police. I continued working in Shangaima until the outbreak of the rebel war in 1991. So effectively I worked in Shangaima for five years, from 1988 to 1992 when I was posted to Kabala as second in command. There again I worked for two years. It was during the war. We worked with the military to execute the war. We provided intelligence. We provided moral support, sometimes logistical support. Sometimes advice, because we made sure that we shared our war-related intelligence with the military commanders. We helped raise the local militia in Genadogu. That's what I called it, [Indecipherable]. They were used to repel the attack on Kono initially and that was very successful.*

*In 2004 I was posted to Kono as the officer in charge of Tankoro police station which is at the heart of Koidu City, the diamond-rich area of Kono. I was there for six months and there was a change of command at police headquarters and I was supposed to be in charge of CID (Criminal Investigation Department) prosecutions. I was going to court, prosecuting criminal cases. Later that year I was promoted to Superintendent and later sent to prosecution headquarters where I served as second in command looking at the administration of the division to ensure that adequate personnel are posted to the courts, maintaining law and order in the courts, ensuring that we serve court processes to witnesses and other litigants. Shortly afterwards I was posted to Bo, also as second in command because the people who were at that time had some problems for which administrative action was taken and I was identified to replace the then officer who was second in command.*

*I was there, after one month the then chief police officer requested to be transferred to Freetown for health reasons. By then Bo could not be accessed by road. We used helicopters and small aircrafts, West Coast Airlines which used to fly passengers to and from Bo because there were rebels on the highway. This was a time when ambushes were very frequent on the Bo [Indecipherable] highway.*

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*Like I said, after one month when the chief police officer who was my immediate boss then requested for transfer to Freetown, his opinion was sought as to who could best replace him and he recommended me. He thought I would be capable of handling the division. So I was made chief police officer of the then I division, that is the entire Bo district. Bo is the regional headquarters for the Southern Province.*

**BOUTELLIS:** The second biggest city.

**MUNU:** *The second biggest city. I was there from 1995 to about the end of 1996. We had a lot of difficulties because there are ambushes all along the route. Food supplies could not come freely. Sometimes the military had to organize food convoys to provide security from the rebels to bring food. Bo was well populated because all the other towns and villages had been evacuated because of the fear of rebels and rebel attacks. So they all came to reside in Bo. All of Pujehun, Moyamba, Bunde, Matru, and other towns and villages in the Bo district and the southern province. By then Bo had a population of over 3/4 of a million. I was there when we had the first democratic elections after the war. It was those elections that ushered in President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah the former President. It was contested by about 14 political parties based on the proportional representation. We had some difficulties because even on the eve of the elections there were regular attacks on the townships. After the elections there was the suspicion that military people, by then they were in governance the NPRC (National Provisional Ruling Council). There was a suspicion because the military did not want to hand over power to an elected civilian government, therefore they were posing as rebels. They were then called sobels, soldier rebels.*

*There was an old style confrontation between the local militias, civil militias and the military and it was only the police that could stand as a neutral arbiter to restore calm and separate the parties. However, we managed to hold the elections. Bo, which was the stronghold of the SLPP (Sierra Leone People's Party) was the center in that election. The SLPP won after runoff elections. The handover was effected when the military finally handed over to the SLPP under the leadership of Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.*

*But I remember when Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, during his campaign tour met me to pay me a courtesy call because it was the practice that when political contestants visit an area, they visit the police to let them know that they are there and to keep them alert in case of any problems or difficulties they might wish to call in the police for assistance. He did tell us, the police, during that visit that he was aware of the problems within the police and while he was a member of the National Advisory Council they carried out a study, I think it was the Banya Commission of Inquiry on the service, the performance and conditions of service for the police. Then he was acting in the capacity of Chairman, National Advisory Council. So he was quite aware of the problems. If elected to office he would spearhead a restructuring process for the police.*

*So fortunately he was elected and became President. At the end of the year, 1996, I was transferred briefly to head the Research and Planning Division at police headquarters, a position I occupied for one month. I was later posted to Port Loko, Kambia where I was in charge of two districts, Port Loko district and Kambia district as chief police officer. I was there from the 2<sup>nd</sup> of January 1997. I only left there in 2001. So for another five years I was in Port Loko effectively as chief police officer. It was during this time we had the infamous May 25 coup which brought in the AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) military junta. Immediately the military junta came to power. They invited the RUF*

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*(Revolutionary United Front) to join them and establish the AFRC government. We had to police the populace under very difficult circumstances because the rebels had come from the bush without any reconstruction program, without any reinstatement program, they just came. We had to contend with their unruly behavior. Sometimes they would seize things from civilians like they were used to doing in the bush. They hardly recognized the change between living in the bush and living in town. In town you have to observe civility, respect for people's rights, people's rights to their property. So we had a very difficult time policing the area. However with our experience we managed to survive it all.*

*In February 1998 there was this intervention force from Nigeria, ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group). When they came they worked with us, the ECOMOG soldiers worked with us but because of the friendly relationship we had built with the military, most of the military people in my area, I spoke with them not to put up any resistance because we didn't want to see bloodshed in our area and they agreed, we disarmed them, kept their weapons and when ECOMOG came they handed over their weapons. So there was no fighting in Port Loko for regaining the township. So it was the transition from AFRC back to civilian rule was not very violent because there was no resistance. The few that did not heed to our advice, they went to the bush and joined the RUF faction, and they continued fighting. ECOMOG pushed them to the borders but after some time the tide turned.*

*Now instead of ECOMOG continuing to completely annihilate the rebels, the rebels had the upper hand and they started pushing the ECOMOG forces. They started from [Indecipherable], came to Kono, then Makeni and eventually they attacked us in Port Loko however they were unable to subdue the township since we had elements of Guinean soldiers under ECOMOG and they had superior artillery power. They didn't have the ground troops, the large weapons like the AKs but their superior artillery did not allow the rebels to enter and occupy Port Loko township. So they had to divert and come to Freetown. But at this time we were sending intelligence reports to Freetown. People who were captured by the rebels and who escaped later they came to the police to tell us that the rebels are determined to come to Freetown so Freetown better brace up and provide the required security. But Freetown was always assuring us that everything was in place and that the rebels would not dare come to Freetown. That did not deter the rebel advance.*

*On the 6<sup>th</sup> of January, 1999, I normally listened to BBC network Africa, early in the morning there was news that the rebels had entered Freetown. There was big pandemonium because most people have their loved ones in the capital and a lot of mayhem was reported. At this time we, when I say we, my personnel and myself, went to see refuge in Kambia because when we saw the wounded ECOMOG soldiers from Kono walking over 200-300 km some of them totally disoriented, we felt that perhaps we needed to find a safe haven at least temporarily until something was done. So I took my personnel to Kambia where we stayed for three weeks until the situation was brought under control in Port Loko. We came back to resume police operations.*

*So we had new ECOMOG forces, new Nigerian battalion who came to work alongside with the Guineans until the Lome Peace Accords were signed. There was the ceasefire. I was on the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. We used to meet on a weekly basis with the MilObs, that is the military observers, working with the military observers to monitor ceasefire violations and send in our reports to UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) in Freetown until the disarmament started. By then we were receiving peace delegations from the UN,*

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*from the Commonwealth and other international bodies coming to do assessment studies which led to the establishment of UNAMSIL force and the peace mission.*

*We started the disarmament, we had the responsibility of policing the disarmament camps. We also took part in the pre-discharge orientation where we made presentations and lectures to the rebels, telling them about differences between living in the bush and living in town, how they need to live peaceably with their fellow citizens in town before they could be discharged from the disarmament camps. When they were disarmed, demobilized, they were integrated. So they were sent to camps where they would spend two or three weeks before they were discharged.*

*Thereafter it was during the disarmament that I was promoted to Assistant Commissioner when we had the Commonwealth intervention in the Sierra Leone police which was expatriate which was retired Assistant Chief Constable was appointed to spearhead the police service in Sierra Leone because they thought at the time they needed strong leadership.*

BOUTELLIS: So Keith Biddle came in 1999.

MUNU: *Yes, who had retired from Kent Constabulary. So he was identifying good people and by some luck I was identified for promotion. I was promoted to Assistant Commissioner and put in charge of the northern province because the man who was in charge of the northern province feared coming to the region. He was outside the region manning the area and Keith Biddle thought it was unacceptable. Since I was brave enough to have survived 16 attacks on the township there with my men working with ECOMOG, he thought perhaps I was the right person so that was why I was promoted and posted as Regional Commissioner for the North.*

*I was there for a few months and I was selected to take part in a training program at Bramshill in the United Kingdom, a ten-week training program alongside 13 of my colleagues in the SLP. While I was there I was promoted to be in charge of operations in the police headquarters. So when I returned from the UK in April 2001, I was put in charge of national police operations. So I had the responsibility of returning the police after the disarmament to previously rebel-held areas. That also was a difficult task to achieve because all the infrastructure, most of the infrastructure was damaged and the rebels who had occupied those areas were very stubborn or recalcitrant to receive police personnel. They knew that was the return of civil authority, the return of law and order. So they were very hostile. We had difficulty cajoling them, talking to them, assuring them that we were there to work in the common interests of everybody and we were not there as agents of the government, to suppress them or investigate what they were doing but rather to provide reassurance to the returning communities and provide a framework for return of civil authority and recommencement of economic and social life in the area.*

*With support from UNAMSIL who was giving us logistical support, sometimes they could assist us with aircraft to lift our personnel because during this time even the roads were not very safe. I had a bitter experience at one time when I was captured by the West Side Boys at the [Indecipherable] Hills but fortunately I made good my escape before they could identify me. Two of my bodyguards were arrested, they were disarmed, but also returned unhurt. They only took away their uniforms, their weapons, their arms and ammunition. So it was also very interesting experience. But thank God we survived it all. So I was in charge of operations for another five years.*

*We continued the redeployment of police personnel and working with the local government, ministry, to return the Paramount Chiefs, restore civil authority. I also led an initiative, the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program. The DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) had some incentives attached to it but since the DDR had, the commission had limited resources, they could not go on and on and on to collect arms. When you look at the fact that there is a proliferation of small arms and light weapons within the southwest African sub-region it was very, very difficult for the DDR Commission to be able to continue to get people under the disarmament program. So there was a cutoff point after which the rest was to be collected by the police under the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program an initiative I led. We were able to collect 10,000 shotguns, so many rounds of ammunition, some other explosives.*

**BOUTELLIS:** Second part of the interview with Mr. Francis Alieu Munu. So we were just talking about when you were heading the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Program.

**MUNU:** *Yes, we collected a little over 10,000 weapons, a number of live rounds, explosives and munitions. It was acclaimed as a success. Then after that we had the problem of policing the refugee camps because when the Liberian war escalated, there was a large influx of refugees coming from Liberia to Sierra Leone. So we signed a Memorandum of Understanding. I signed on behalf of the Sierra Leone Police to police the refugee camps. But we had a difficult situation when military personnel came alongside civilians. It was the policy of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) that separation takes place cause they don't want to keep soldiers and civilians in the same refugee camps for very obvious reasons. Some of the soldiers were the very cause for the civilians running away and some of them had meted out atrocities. So the UNHCR could not cater for the former combatants from Liberia. So we had to lead another initiative to separate the combatants so as to maintain the civilian character of the refugee camps.*

*So I again led a taskforce that was called the Internment taskforce that was charged with the responsibility of identifying separating and transporting to an internment these former fighters. We had fighters from the AFL, the Armed Forces of Liberia, we had combatants from the Lord forces and we had combatants from civil militias. We set up two camps for them, one at Mape, a place outside Lungi which was originally a camp for the military reintegration program. At the end of the war some members of the CDF (Civil Defense Force) and the RUF were recruited into the military under the military reintegration program. So they had built a camp outside Lungi at a place called Mape. So when we had this problem it was identified as a possible location for interning them.*

*The internment itself had its legal backing from the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention around the same year, I can't quite remember, which talked of combatants entering neutral territory, the Convention imposed a responsibility on the neutral territory to intern them and provide them with clothing, housing, food, shelter. That is required by humanity. So that was the legal framework we used. But we had a motive as well because if well-trained people could come to your country and do not have any visible means of livelihood that could be a recipe for criminal activities or that could provide a reservoir of mercenaries. So that was our consideration as well. It was the government that funded that initiative. I led it.*

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*Later we were able to get a 2 million Euro grant from the EU to provide skills training for them so that when they could go back to Liberia they could become useful citizens. We carried out skills training. Upon completion, when peace returned to Liberia, we worked with the Liberian DDDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation) to affect a repatriation program for them. Accordingly we repatriated and sent them back to their communities.*

*As Senior Assistant Commissioner that was responsible for Operations, I was also responsible for the conduct of the 2002 general and presidential elections, which were also very peaceful and the police were also acclaimed. I provided the goal command that is in charge of policy, providing support to the regional police commissioners to ensure smooth polling and to police the period before, during and after the elections. I was also in charge of the 2004 local council elections because I was still Senior Assistant Commissioner that was responsible for operations.*

*During this time I attended several conferences at home and abroad. By the end of 2004 we had the rank restructuring so the post of Assistant Inspector-General was created and it was staffed by people who were then Assistant Commissioners or Senior Assistant Commissioners so that was how I became Assistant Inspector-General. In 2006 I was transferred from Operations to the Personnel and Welfare Department. I was in charge of personnel until 2007 when we had another general and presidential elections and in October 2007 I was transferred to Crime Services where I now work as AIG, Assistant Inspector-General responsible for Crime Services. I have the CID (Criminal Investigation Department), the Special Branch, the Criminal Intelligence Service, the Family Support Unit, Interpol and the precious minerals, intelligence and investigations unit under my command.*

*I am presently spearheading a review process to make those departments more responsive to the current needs and future needs, to carry out a retraining program to ensure that we have proper logistics and to make sure that we have sufficient personnel to be able to function as a modern crime investigation unit and also modern intelligence unit and to open us also to Interpol so that we can have international linkages so we will be able to deal with international crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, movement of criminals across borders, arms trafficking and the like. So that's a brief background of my work in the police. [break]*

**BOUTELLIS:** Third part of the interview with Mr. Francis Alieu Munu. I'd like to ask you now, you talked about the review process, heading the review process and looking at what crimes, the evolution of the crimes that you're facing, what are the major types of crimes and challenges to public order you're facing today, the SLP is facing today.

**MUNU:** *Generally if you come to Freetown you will hear people talking about lawlessness and lack of discipline. We have a large number of school drop outs during the war. We have a high rate of unemployment. People complete schooling every year without jobs and we have an expanding population so we have a lot of idle minds. The reintegration programs were not very comprehensive so we have a large number of unemployed youths. This is a problem for public order as well as for crime and criminality. We have increases of burglary, robbery with aggravation or what we normally called armed robberies. That is a problem now. We still have arms proliferation. We have drug trafficking. Recently we waged*

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*war on people who grow cannabis. Also West Africa is becoming an important transit point for drugs to Western Europe.*

BOUTELLIS: Coming from where?

*MUNU: Coming from South America, Colombia, Peru and other countries and others coming from Southeast Asia like Afghanistan. Flights from those areas to Western Europe are suspected, but because they are producing areas. But flights from West Africa are not suspected because West Africa is not a drug producing area, cocaine, heroin. Because of strong enforcement mechanisms on the Atlantic routes, they decided to come to areas where the enforcement is very weak so West Africa is becoming very important as a transit point. So we have that problem. We have the problem of human trafficking, money laundering. We also have problems of minor crimes like wounding, assaults. But the major ones are armed robberies, drug trafficking and money laundering. Human trafficking is not very prevalent but is becoming important. But we have a problem with the proliferation of arms, not on a large scale in Sierra Leone because of the successes we achieved in the previous DDR and Community Arms Collection exercise. Yet it is a problem when we hear about armed robberies taking place, then we know that we still have illicit arms among the population.*

*Our investigative machinery like the CID is not very much equipped to be able to combat these problems. That is why when I came over in October I started work with JSDP, Justice Sector Development Project, to carry out a review to look at what we want to achieve, whether we have the human resources, whether we have the required training, whether we have the logistics that are required. Already you see the new building on Pademba Road, that's the new CID building. So it is my view that if we go to that building we should go with a modern capability that can enable us to work and function as a modern CID.*

BOUTELLIS: Meaning with forensics?

*MUNU: Yes, it is my hope to establish forensic capability. I am in touch with some organizations that specialize in that. I made my request. I sent off some correspondence to answer certain key questions that they would require answers to move the process forward. So that is about the review process.*

BOUTELLIS: You headed the personnel section in 2006 for the Sierra Leone Police.

*MUNU: Yes.*

BOUTELLIS: You mentioned now part of the review process is also looking at personnel issues and recruitment. What are your—

*MUNU: Recruitment into the CID. So what I did was to carry out a selection process wherein we set out conditions for eligibility, the eligibility criteria. We advertised into the force as to who wants to come to the CID and who wants to come to the intelligence branches. So recently we concluded training of 125 personnel, new personnel for the CID and 125 new personnel for the CS (Crime Services), Special Branch and the Criminal Intelligence Service. So we concluded our induction training. Now we are looking at in-service training for personnel who have been there already in the CID and in the intelligence service department so that we conduct refresher training for them.*

BOUTELLIS: What are the main needs?

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**MUNU:** *We tried to establish an electronic database for crime services department for criminal profiling and record of fingerprints for our criminal records office so that in the future there is the need to respect human rights during our investigations. It is my view that if we have an electronic fingerprint database, then when we are able to lift fingerprints from the scene of the crime we can compare them to those in the database and possibly by a stroke of luck we can identify the perpetrators. The criminal intelligence service can also carry out criminal profiling so that we keep records of all hard-core criminals so that we do not abuse human rights unnecessarily when we have to arrest so many people when maybe a single person or maybe two people would have been the perpetrators.*

**BOUTELLIS:** Could you describe more in detail the initial training and maybe also the retraining programs you're considering in terms of which topics you focus on primarily and how long do they last?

**MUNU:** *The major topics in the current police practice, like the offences I have identified as the major offenses. Some of them require skillful—they require expertise to investigate them. Handling gender-based violence cases. We just recently enacted three gender bills, gender acts, that make provision for the registration of customary marriages, the devolution of estates and child rights acts. So we require training for them, that is for in-service training. Then of course human rights is one of the softer policing skills. Armed robberies, money laundering, human trafficking, drug trafficking.*

**BOUTELLIS:** How do you evaluate the success of the training? Do you see impacts?

**MUNU:** *It's too early to say because the induction training has just ended. By all indications they did very well academically but when it comes to the field it could be another kettle of fish. So we have yet to see their performance. But in the refresher training we also want to set standards wherein we carry out a performance monitoring program for line managers to be monitoring the performance of their personnel. We have monitoring and evaluation unit which we will bring to bear to the CID to ensure that what is new in the training program is actually reflected in the performance of the personnel. So all of that will be embedded in the refresher training.*

**BOUTELLIS:** You said you trained 100 new CID. How large is the CID unit overall?

**MUNU:** *Overall it is about 400 and that is very small. It is very small because we need to be accessible everywhere in the country if we are to provide services to all. We need to spread the workload so that we do not over burden our CID officers, to reduce the volume of work for one individual CID officer and thereby enhance their effectiveness.*

**BOUTELLIS:** Now looking at the broader challenges. You already mentioned some of the need for retraining personnel, logistic support. What would be your top priorities in terms of the tasks in your specific area or specific examples maybe of the kind of program you wish to see.

**MUNU:** *Like I said, the review process is broad based but there are four main things. One is the personnel. Two is we equip them with skills. Three we provide the logistics and when we talk about logistics here I want to set up a forensic laboratory because sometimes we depend on a hospital where we have only one forensic analyst. We do not have facilities like DNA, blood sampling, and we have a lot of rape cases, which require a lot of forensic analysis to be able to investigate them satisfactorily. When we look at Iraq on contemporary policing*

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*programs they are more towards the scientific method of investigation rather than relying on the traditional method of taking statements and waiting to see inconsistencies in the statements to determine someone's complicity. If we had a scientific method of investigation then it will go a long way to enhance our competence and our credibility.*

*Then the fourth one is to improve the overall framework, the working environment. For that we have the new CID building which we hope to partition into the various departments within the Crime Services Department. We make sure we will provide the necessary IT stuff to help us to make use of the wide opportunities provided by the development in information technology. Then the personnel with the right skills with the right motivation so we will be able to function like any modern CID.*

*Of course we have a few members of the FBI, National Academy. I was fortunate to have attended CS Conference in Jordan, Amman. We spoke of regional collaboration, sharing of capabilities and working together to fight international crime.*

BOUTELLIS: Is this materializing in the program? You said the FBI Academy members.

MUNU: *I said I attended DCS Retraining Program for the FBI National Academy Associates. Graduates of the FBI have regional associations. We belong to the African-Middle East chapter. Every year they hold a retraining conference. This year knowledge on the current issues in policing. We look at how you can collaboratively work together to strengthen regional and inter-regional collaboration and cooperation with a view to sharing capabilities, sharing information as to international crime. So that with combined efforts the world can be a safer place for everybody.*

BOUTELLIS: One last question. What are some of the major successes, maybe some innovations in your line of work with the SLP that you think merit more attention, that we could possibly learn from? Are there specific programs?

MUNU: *Initially when you asked me about my policing profile I gave a number of initiatives that I launched. The first one is like in Port Loko, we had 15 attacks. Ordinarily policemen will say as long as there is a military attack, a 10-12 hour attack, then it is no longer safe for police, we'd better withdraw. But we still are there to give confidence to the civil population. They always look at the police for confidence and reassurance. So that was one which was acclaimed and which was responsible largely for my promotion from superintendent to assistant commissioner.*

*Then also working with the military observers to monitor the ceasefire was another initiative. I was the only officer who survived, who was not displaced by the war in the sense that my headquarters was never occupied by rebels and there was continuous police service except for one month when we thought it was totally unsafe because we had artillery bombardments from the Guinean forces. They did not understand, they speak French, so there was a communication gap, so we thought it was better, we withdrew a little and we came back when it was much safer.*

*Then of course the Community Arms Collection which was an initiative to make our community safer, to collect arms. During the war arms extended beyond the combatant communities. Even civilians had arms, some of them for their personal protection, some of them were brought by combatants or relatives of*

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*combatants. So that was also a good initiative that we launched. And the separation of course of the refugees from the armed elements from the civilian population was also an initiative that was lauded. The return of civil authority.*

BOUTELLIS: From the recent restructuring of the SLP?

*MUNU: The recent restructuring of the SLP, that also I took an active part. We got the government to formulate a policing charter, that is to tell us how they want the police to function and how they wish to resource the police and how they want the police to look like and what would be their own commitment toward governance, the management and the funding of the police. Then the police—we took part in formulating a policing charter, that is a mission statement, that is what we think our roles, our responsibilities and our priorities are. What we say we will do, what we set out ourselves to do.*

*Then we also took part in the formulation of concept of operations, coming out with objectives and developing a strategic development plan. This was broken down into annual policing plans so that every year we review the annual policing plan depending on imagined priorities. We review the rank structure to reflect job performance. We also try to empower those at the service delivery level, the constables the sergeants. We tried to carry out role differential, the rank structure was linked to roles. We tried to create new departments like the CDIID (Complaints, Discipline, Internal Investigation Department) to look at internal matters, police excesses. Sometimes they talk about police brutality or police misconduct, or police unprofessional behavior. We set up the media to carry us in a positive light in the media.*

BOUTELLIS: The media unit?

*MUNU: Media and Public Relations Unit. No matter what we do it is how the public perceives us that is really the question. It is the media that presents us, that helps to formulate the public view of the police. So we took on the sense of that.*

*We set up a Corporate Services Department so as to look at corporate issues within the SLP. We set up the Community Relations Department so as to enhance our collaboration with members of the public. We practice community policing and we established local Policing Partnership Boards. In fact, on Friday I will be leaving for Matru to take part in the launching of the last local policing partnership board. We have local police partnership boards in all divisions. So the division in Matru, they will be launching theirs on Friday or Saturday.*

BOUTELLIS: They meet with community leaders?

*MUNU: Yes, they meet periodically to define their policing priorities for their own areas. So that the police can pay attention to that. We practice local needs policing, that is policing that meets the needs and expectations of local communities. So in order to realize that they have TCGs, Tasking and Coordinating Groups. You have LUC working with the Crime Officer and Information Officer, a Support Officer and an Operations Officer, then periodically meeting with the local partnership boards to identify their policing priorities within the areas. Of course you know policing priorities vary from locality to locality. The problems we have here might be different from problems others may have in their own areas. So it is for them to identify their priorities so the police can allocate their resources appropriately to meet the needs and challenges of those specific areas.*

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*So the restructuring has been a long and elaborate process but with the conception and framework we are able to carry it out with commitment. We have some small resistance but in time the resistance was cleared. Now everybody is toeing the line and we are moving forward.*

BOUTELLIS: Any final comments?

*MUNU: The final comment is that the Sierra Leone Police has come a long way though we still have a long way to go. We know that with commitment and continued support from the international community we will get to where we want to. We also took part in a Security Sector reform program wherein we identified present and future threats to our security, our national security, looking at the borders, looking at internal security. We looked at unemployment, we looked at terrorism and espionage and we identified future and immediate threats. We realize that it is ourselves, that is the Sierra Leone Police and the Republic of Sierra Leone armed forces that will have to provide the future security needs. The people helping us cannot be here forever. They also have resource concerns. But we are still embarking on capacity building to enhance the capacity of the Sierra Leone Police and the Republic of Sierra Leone military forces to be able to implement the security sector reform program that we have carried out since 2003.*

*So the future is bright. We do not envisage any lapse of the security situation though we have a lot of economic challenges due to global trends like the recent food crises, the escalation in oil prices. Oil prices continue to be a major determinant of our economic stability. For us, we have a fragile economy. Our state is very fragile, our peace is very fragile. Our democracies are young, we need to build them on firm foundations. It is only when we have improvements on the economic and social fronts that we can have improvement in the security and development fronts. So in conclusion, we have come a long way, we still have a long way to go, but with the good will of the international community we continue to build our capacity so that sooner rather than later we can stand for ourselves and be counted as one of the progressive nations of the world.*

BOUTELLIS: Mr. Francis Munu, thank you very much.

*MUNU: Thank you.*